12 17<\/strong>. Paul is accused before Gallio, who declines to consider the charge against him. In consequence the populace fall at once on Sosthenes, a chief man among the Jews, but Gallio lets their assault pass unnoticed<\/p>\n 12<\/strong>. And when Gallio was the deputy of Achaia<\/em> ] Better, But<\/strong> when Gallio was<\/em> proconsul<\/strong> of Achaia<\/em> (so R. V.<\/em>). The narrative is about to enter on something which was adverse to the spirit of quiet rest mentioned in the previous verse, therefore “but” is the fitting conjunction. To give the governor of the province his proper title is of much importance, and here forms a mark of the fidelity of the narrative. Achaia was a Roman province. Such provinces belonged either to the Senate or to the Emperor. When they were senatorial the governor was styled Proconsul. Now Achaia had been a senatorial province under Augustus, but under Tiberius was an imperial province for a time, but after a.d. 44 under Claudius (Suet. Claud<\/em>. xxv.), which is the reign in which these events in St Paul’s life occurred, it was once more made senatorial and so had a Proconsul at this period for its governor. This Gallio was the brother of the famous philosopher Seneca, who was tutor and for a time minister of the Emperor Nero. Originally Gallio was called Marcus Annus Novatus, and took the name of Gallio from the orator Lucius Junius Gallio, by whom he was adopted. The character of Gallio as described by his Roman contemporaries is that of a most bright, popular, and affectionate man. He is spoken of as “Sweet Gallio,” and Seneca declares that “those who love him to the utmost, don’t love him enough.”<\/p>\n the Jews made insurrection<\/em> [Better (with R. V.<\/em>), rose up<\/strong> ] with one accord against Paul<\/em> ] They probably thought to avail themselves of the inexperience of a newly arrived proconsul, and by appearing in a body to obtain the expulsion of the Apostle from their city.<\/p>\n and brought him to the judgment seat<\/em> ] To Gallio they would seem a company of Jews accusing one of their own race of some erroneous teaching. If he had only lately come from Rome, he would be likely to have heard there of the troubles about “Christus” (see above on Act 18:2<\/span>), and he would consider that he had come into the midst of a quarrel about the same matter.<\/p>\n And Gallio – <\/B>After the Romans had conquered Greece they reduced it to two provinces, Macedonia and Achaia, which were each governed by a proconsul. Gallio was the brother of the celebrated philosopher Seneca, and was made proconsul of Achaia in 53 a.d. His proper name was Marcus Annaeus Novatus, but, having been adopted into the family of Gallio, a rhetorician, he took his name. He is mentioned by ancient writers as having been of a remarkably mild and amiable disposition. His brother Seneca (Praef. Quest. Nat. 4) describes him as being of the most lovely temper: No mortal, says he, was ever so mild to anyone as he was to all: and in him there was such a natural power of goodness, that there was no semblance of art or dissimulation.<\/P> Was the deputy – <\/B>See this word explained in the notes on Act 13:7<\/span>. It means here proconsul.<\/P> Of Achaia – <\/B>This word, in its largest sense, comprehended the whole of Greece. Achaia proper, however, was a province of which Corinth was the capital. It embraced that part of Greece lying between Thessaly and the southern part of the Peloponnesus.<\/P> The Jews made insurrection – <\/B>Excited a tumult, as they had in Philippi, Antioch, etc.<\/P> And brought him to the judgment seat – <\/B>The tribunal of Gallio; probably intending to arraign him as a disturber of the peace.<\/P><\/p>\n Act 18:12<\/span>; Act 18:17<\/span><\/p>\n And when Gallio was the deputy of Achaia, the Jews made insurrection.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n Gallio and Paul<\/strong><\/p>\n The proconsul of Achaia had ended his term of office, and the proconsul appointed by the emperor was Marcus Annaeus Novatus, who, having been adopted by the friendly rhetorician Lucius Junius Gallio, had taken the name of Lucius Junius Antaeus Gallio. Very different was the estimate of his contemporaries from that which has made his name since proverbial for indifferentism. The brother of Seneca and the uncle of Luean, he was the most; universally popular member of that distinguished family. No mortal man is so sweet to any single person as he is to all mankind; Even those who love my brother Gallio to the utmost yet do not love him enough, wrote Seneca of him. He was the very flower of pagan courtesy and culture. A Roman with all a Romans dignity and seriousness, and yet with all the grace and versatility of a polished Greek. Whatever the former proconsul had been, he had not been one with whom the Jews could venture to trifle, nor had they ventured to hand Paul over to the secular arm. But now that a new proconsul, well known for his mildness, had arrived, who was perhaps unfamiliar with the duties of his office, and whose desire for popularity might have made him complaisant to prosperous Jews, they thought they could with impunity excite a tumult. Though Claudius had expelled the Jews from Rome, their religion was a religio licita<\/em>; <\/em>but the religion of this fellow, they urged, was a spurious counterfeit of Judaism which had become a religio illicita <\/em>by running counter to its Mosaic Law. Such was the charge urged by a hubbub of voices, and as soon as it had become intelligible, Paul was on the point of making his defence. But Gallio was not going to trouble himself by listening to any defence. He took no notice whatever of Paul. With a thorough knowledge of, and respect for, the established laws, but with a genuinely Roman indifference for conciliatory language, he quashed the indictment and ordered his lictors to clear the court. But while we regret this unphilosophic disregard, let us at least do justice to Roman impartiality. In Gallio, in Lycrias, in Felix, in Festus, in the centurion Julius, and even in Pilate, different as were their degrees of rectitude, we cannot but admire the trained judicial insight with which they saw through the subterranean injustice and virulent animosity of the Jews in bringing false charges against innocent men. But the superficiality which judges only by externals always brings its own retribution. The haughty, distinguished and cultivated proconsul would have been to the last degree amazed had anyone told him that so paltry an occurrence would be for ever recorded in history; that it would be the only scene in his life in which posterity would feel a moments interest; that he would owe to it any immortality he possesses; that he had flung away the greatest opportunity of his life when he closed the lips of the Jewish prisoner; that it would be believed for centuries that that prisoner had converted his great brother Seneca to his own execrable superstition; that the parcel of questions about a mere opinion, and names, and a matter of the Jewish law, which he had so disdainfully refused to hear, should hereafter become the most prominent of all questions to the whole civilised world. And Paul may have suspected many of these facts as little as the sweet Gallio did. (Archdeacon Farrar.<\/em>)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Gallio<\/strong><\/p>\n In <\/em>this fragment of apostolic history, notice–<\/p>\n 1. <\/strong>In the reason of their opposition to Paul. Was it because he had violated any law, invaded any human rights, broken the public peace, or insulted the public morals? No, but simply because he had persuaded men to worship God in a way not exactly agreeable to their own views.<\/p>\n 2. <\/strong>In the spirit of their opposition. They made insurrection with one accord.<\/p>\n 3. <\/strong>In the means of their opposition. Bigotry substitutes abuse for argument and in this case bigots sought to crush by invoking the arm of civil authority.<\/p>\n 1. <\/strong>Towards himself. The magistrate who interferes with the religious opinions of the people incurs a responsibility too great for any man to bear.<\/p>\n 2. <\/strong>To his fellow subjects. Look ye to it. Religion is not to be settled in courts of law, but in courts of conscience.<\/p>\n 1. <\/strong>The natural sense of justice in humanity. These Greeks had witnessed Sosthenes wicked endeavours to crush a righteous man, and their sense of justice was outraged; and now their opportunity occurred for vengeance. This sense of justice is a spark from Divinity, and a pledge that one day justice will be done to all.<\/p>\n 2. <\/strong>The reproductiveness of evil in man. Sosthenes had dealt out vengeance to Paul, and now it came back to him in a rich harvest. Violence begets violence, etc. The propagating power of evil is immense. Satan cannot cast out Satan. Christ has taught the true theory of this moral expulsion.<\/p>\n 3. <\/strong>The power of the gospel. It is more than probable that this is the Sosthenes referred to in 1Co 1:2<\/span>. So that over this fierce persecutor Pauls gospel so triumphed, that he became a brother in the holy cause.<\/p>\n 1. <\/strong>Unreasonable. No question is of such transcendent moment to man as religion, and therefore it is madness on his part to neglect it.<\/p>\n 2. <\/strong>Criminal. It is contrary to the wishes and the labours of the holiest men; it involves the abuse of all the means of spiritual improvement; and it is a practical disregard to all the commands of God.<\/p>\n 3. <\/strong>Perilous. The danger is great, increasing, but still, thank God, at present avoidable. (D. Thomas, D. D.<\/em>)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The nature and extent of the office of the civil magistrate<\/strong><\/p>\n If it were a matter of wrong or wicked lewdness, O ye Jews–if you would accuse this man of any injustice whereby he had invaded anyones right and property, or could lay to his charge any other villainous action done with a mischievous design, and whereby he had disturbed the public peace–reason would that I should bear with you. I should then be obliged by the duty of my place to take cognisance of your matter. But if it be a question of words, and names, and of your law; if the controversy, as it seems to me, be not about civil but religious matters, as about the Word which Paul preached, and the truth of that Word, and whether it be agreeable to your law–it is none of my business to determine such disputes. And this was a wise answer, and showed that he was well acquainted with the nature and extent of his office; and he was too good a man to lift himself in any party, and to abuse the power which was lodged in his hands by applying it to purposes foreign to the original design of it. The words thus opened, naturally lead me to treat of the nature and extent of the office of the civil magistrate.<\/p>\n Gallio <\/strong><\/p>\n illustrates–<\/p>\n Reports of Christian service<\/strong><\/p>\n 1<\/strong>. <\/em><\/strong>The report which is given of Pauls work in verse 13 is exactly the report which is being given today by hostile journalists and critics. Do not take any bad or worldly mans report of any Christian service he may have attended. They lack the one thing needful–sympathy. No man is qualified to report a religious meeting who is not himself religious. He can tell who spoke and give an abstract of what was said; but there will be wanting from it the aroma, the heavenliness, which gave it all its gracious power. This has a wide bearing upon all matters religious and theological. The Jews heard Paul speak and they said, This fellow persuadeth men to worship God contrary to the law–that is, contrary to their reading of the law. The law is one thing, and my reading of it another. So with the Bible: the Bible is one thing, and the preachers reading of it is another. Have no fear of perverting Jews misrepresenting inspired apostles and bringing Gods doctrine to ruin. The form will change; and yet when all the words have been rearranged we shall find the inner, holy doctrine untouched.<\/p>\n 2. <\/strong>The Jews were unanimous in their insurrection. Unanimity is nothing; sincerity is nothing. Sincerity is only good when rightly directed, and unanimity is worthless if moving not in the direction of truth. Paul stood alone, so far as men were concerned, on more occasions than one. Said he, in one instance, No man stood with me notwithstanding the Lord stood with me. Let us take care, then, lest we mistake human unanimity for Divine counsel.<\/p>\n 3. <\/strong>And now Gallio, much maligned by those who do not know him, comes into the story. He has been set up as a type of the careless man. And base creatures have been told that they were Gallios! They never were so honoured in their lives! Gallio would not touch them with the tip of his fingers! Gallio simply knew his business and attended to it, and limited himself by it; and his carelessness was a distinct evidence of his high qualification for his office. Yet I would chide even Gallio for the unintentional injury he has done (verse 14) in depriving the Church of another speech by the greatest speaker that ever served the cause of Christ. What he would have said to that sweet Gallio who can tell? The substance of his speech we have in all the other speeches; but we do wonder with what accidental beauty and subtlety of allusion he would have addressed the sweetest heart that ever listened to him.<\/p>\n 4. <\/strong>Gallio used a phrase which brought him within lines which we wish could have enclosed him forever. Speaking from his point of view, he said, But if it be a question of words and names. Could Gallio have heard Paul upon the Word, who can tell what would have occurred? But are we not always putting away from ourselves great opportunities? Do we not feel weary just when the discourse is sharpening itself into the eloquence that would touch our mind like light, and our heart like a wand of love? The next sentence might have saved you, but just then your ears waxed heavy and you did not hear! There may be careless people notwithstanding the misapplication of the name of Gallio. Is it true that you care for none of those things? Then for what do you care? <\/em>(J. Parker, D. D.<\/em>)<\/p>\n Verse 12<\/span>. When Gallio was the deputy of Achaia<\/B><\/I>] The Romans comprehended, under the name of Achaia, all that part of Greece which lay between Thessaly and the southernmost coasts of Peloponnesus. Pausanias<\/I>, in Attic<\/I>. vii. 16, says that the Romans were accustomed to send a governor into that country, and that they called him the governor of Achaia<\/I>, not of Greece<\/I>; because the Achaeans<\/I>, when they subdued Greece, were the leaders<\/I> in all the Grecian affairs see also Suetonius<\/I>, in his life of Claudius, cap. xxv., and Dio Cassius<\/I>, lx. 24. Edit. Reimari.<\/P> <\/P> Deputy<\/B><\/I>] , serving the office of , or deputy: see Clark’s note on “<\/I>Ac 13:7<\/I><\/span>“<\/I>.<\/P> <\/P> Gallio<\/B><\/I>] This deputy, or proconsul, was eldest brother to the celebrated Lucius Annaeus Seneca<\/I>, the stoic philosopher, preceptor of Nero, and who is so well known among the learned by his works. The name of Gallio, was at first Marcus<\/I> Annaeus Novatus; but, having been adopted in the family of Gallio<\/I>, he took the name of Lucius Junius Gallio<\/I>. He, and Annaeus Mela his brother, father of the poet Lucan, shared in the disgrace of their brother Seneca<\/I>; and by this tyrant, Nero, whose early years were so promising, the three brothers were put to death; see Tacitus<\/I>, Annal. lib. xv. 70, and xvi. 17. It was to this Gallio<\/I> that Seneca dedicates his book De Ira<\/I>. Seneca describes him as a man of the most amiable mind and manners: “Quem nemo non parum amat, etiam qui amare plus non potent; nemo mortalium uni tam dulcis est, quam hic omnibus: cum interim tanta naturalis boni vis est, uti artem simulationemque non redoleat:” vide Senec. Praefat. ad Natural. Quaest. 4. He was of the sweetest disposition, affable to all, and beloved by every man.<\/P> <\/P> Statius<\/I>, Sylvar. lib. ii. 7. ver. 30, Ode on the Birthday of<\/I> Lucan<\/I>, says not a little in his favour, in a very few words:- <\/P> Lucanum potes imputare terris;<\/I><\/P> Hoc plus quam Senecam dedisse mundo,<\/I><\/P> Aut dulcem generasse Gallionem.<\/I><\/P> You may consider nature as having made greater efforts in producing Lucan<\/I>, than it has done in producing Seneca<\/I>, or even the amiable<\/I> GALLIO.<\/P> <\/P> And brought him to the judgment seat<\/B><\/I>] They had no power to punish any person in the Roman provinces, and therefore were obliged to bring their complaint before the Roman governor. The<\/I> powers that be are ordained of God<\/I>. Had the Jews<\/I> possessed the power<\/I> here, Paul had been put to death!<\/P><\/p>\n This Gallio<\/B> was brother to that deservedly famous Seneca, (who was tutor to Nero), and hath great commendations given him, as being a man of excellent disposition, beloved by all men, an enemy to all vice, and especially a hater of flattery. <\/P> Deputy of Achaia; <\/B>this man was proconsul, governing Achaia and all Greece absolutely, or with the power of a consul. <\/P> With one accord; <\/B>wicked men in their evil deeds are unanimous, for Satan knows that his kingdom would not stand if it were once divided. <\/P> <\/p>\n 12-17. when Gallio was thedeputy<\/B>“the proconsul.” See on Ac13:7<\/span>. He was brother to the celebrated philosopher SENECA,the tutor of Nero, who passed sentence of death on both.<\/P><\/p>\n And when Gallio was the deputy of Achaia<\/strong>,…. This province, which was now become a Roman one, Pliny the younger q calls true and mere Greece; it went by the name of Aegialus r, and now it is called Livadia: it has on the north the country of Thessaly, and on the west the river Acheloo, or Aracheo, on the east the Aegean sea, and on the south Peloponnesus, or the Morea. Gallio, who was now deputy of it, was brother to L. Annaeus Seneca, the famous philosopher, who was preceptor to Nero; his name at first was M. Annaeus Novatus, but being adopted by L. Junius Gallio, he took the name of the family. According to his brother’s account of him s, he was a very modest man, of a sweet disposition, and greatly beloved; and Statius t calls him Dulcem Gallionem, “the sweet Gallio”, mild and gentle in his speech, as Quintilian says. Seneca u makes mention of him as being in Achaia; and whilst he was deputy there he had a fever, when as soon as it took him he went aboard a ship, crying, that it was not the disease of the body, but of the place.<\/p>\n The Jews made insurrection with one accord against Paul<\/strong>; being provoked that so many of their people, as well as of the Gentiles, were converted by him to the Christian religion, and were baptized:<\/p>\n and brought him to the judgment seat<\/strong>; of Gallio, the deputy, to be tried and judged by him.<\/p>\n q L. 8. Ep. 24. r Plin. Nat. Hist. l. 4. c. 5. Pausanias, l. 7. p. 396. s Praefat. ad. l. 4. Nat. Quaest. t Sylvarum, l. 2. Sylv. 7. u Ep. 104.<\/p>\n Paul Visits Corinth.<\/SPAN><\/SPAN><\/I><\/span><\/P> <\/TD> <\/TR> 12 And when Gallio was the deputy of Achaia, the Jews made insurrection with one accord against Paul, and brought him to the judgment seat, 13 Saying, This fellow<\/I> persuadeth men to worship God contrary to the law. 14 And when Paul was now about to open his<\/I> mouth, Gallio said unto the Jews, If it were a matter of wrong or wicked lewdness, O ye<\/I> Jews, reason would that I should bear with you: 15 But if it be a question of words and names, and of<\/I> your law, look ye to it;<\/I> for I will be no judge of such matters.<\/I> 16 And he drave them from the judgment seat. 17 Then all the Greeks took Sosthenes, the chief ruler of the synagogue, and beat him<\/I> before the judgment seat. And Gallio cared for none of those things.<\/P> We have here an account of some disturbance given to Paul and his friends at Corinth, but no great harm done, nor much hindrance given to the work of Christ there.<\/P> I. Paul is accused by the Jews before the Roman governor, Act 18:12<\/span>; Act 18:13<\/span>. The governor was Gallio, deputy of Achaia,<\/I> that is, proconsul; for Achaia was a consular province of the empire. This Gallio was elder brother to the famous Seneca; in his youth he was called Novatus, but took the name of Gallio upon his being adopted into the family of Julius Gallio; he is described by Seneca, his brother, to be a man of great ingenuous and great probity, and a man of wonderful good temper; he was called Dulcis Gallio–Sweet Gallio,<\/I> for his sweet disposition; and is said to have been universally beloved. Now observe, 1. How rudely Paul is apprehended, and brought before Gallio; The Jews made insurrection with one accord against Paul.<\/I> They were the ringleaders of all the mischief against Paul, and they entered into a confederacy to do him a mischief. They were unanimous in it: they came upon him with one accord;<\/I> hand joined in hand to do this wickedness. They did it with violence and fury: They made an insurrection<\/I> to the disturbance of the public peace, and hurried Paul away to the judgment-seat,<\/I> and, for aught that appears, allowed him no time to prepare for his trial. 2. How falsely Paul is accused before Gallio (v.<\/I><\/span> 13<\/span>): This fellow persuades men to worship God contrary to the law.<\/I> They could not charge him with persuading men not to worship God at all, or to worship other gods (Deut. xiii. 2<\/span>): but only to worship God in a way contrary to the law. The Romans allowed the Jews in their provinces the observance of their own law; and what then? Must those therefore be prosecuted as criminals who worship God in any other way? Does their toleration include a power of imposition? But the charge was unjust; for their own law had in it a promise of a prophet whom God would raise up to them, and him they should hear. Now Paul persuaded them to believe in this prophet, who was come, and to hear him, which was according to the law; for he came not to destroy the law, but to fulfil it.<\/I> The law relating to the temple-service those Jews at Corinth could not observe, because of their distance from Jerusalem, and there was no part of their synagogue-worship which Paul contradicted. Thus when people are taught to worship God in Christ, and to worship him in the Spirit, they are ready to quarrel, as if they were taught to worship him contrary to the law; whereas this is indeed perfective of the law.<\/P> II. Gallio, upon the first hearing, or rather without any hearing at all, dismisses the cause, and will not take any cognizance of it, Act 18:14<\/span>; Act 18:15<\/span>. Paul was going about to make his defence, and to show that he did not teach men to worship God contrary to the law; but the judge, being resolved not to pass any sentence upon this cause, would not give himself the trouble of examining it. Observe,<\/P> 1. He shows himself very ready to do the part of a judge in any matter that it was proper for him to take cognizance of. He said to the Jews,<\/I> that were the prosecutors, “If it were a matter of wrong, or wicked lewdness,<\/I>–if you could charge the prisoner with theft or fraud, with murder or rapine, or any act of immorality,–I should think myself bound to bear with you<\/I> in your complaints, though they were clamorous and noisy;” for the rudeness of the petitioners was no good reason, if their cause was just, why they should not have justice done them. It is the duty of magistrates to right the injured, and to animadvert upon the injurious; and, if the complaint be not made with all the decorum that might be, yet they should hear it out. But,<\/P> 2. He will by no means allow them to make a complaint to him of a thing that was not within his jurisdiction (v.<\/I><\/span> 15<\/span>): “If it be a question of words and names, and of your law, look you to it:<\/I> end it among yourselves as you can, but I will be no judge of such matters;<\/I> you shall neither burden my patience with the hearing of it, nor burden my conscience with giving judgment upon it;” and therefore, when they were urgent and pressing to be heard, he drove them from the judgment-seat<\/I> (v.<\/I><\/span> 16<\/span>), and ordered another cause to be called. Now, (1.) Here was something right in Gallio’s conduct, and praise-worthy–that he would not pretend to judge of things he did not understand; that he left the Jews to themselves in matters relating to their own religion, but yet would not let them, under pretence of that, run down Paul, and abuse him; or, at least, would not himself be the tool of their malice, to give judgment against him. He looked upon the matter to be not within his jurisdiction, and therefore would not meddle in it. But, (2.) It was certainly wrong to speak so slightly of a law and religion which he might have known to be of God, and with which he ought to have acquainted himself. In what way God is to be worshipped, whether Jesus be the Messiah, whether the gospel be a divine revelation, were not questions of words and names,<\/I> as he scornfully and profanely called them. They are questions of vast importance, and in which, if he had understood them himself aright, he would have seen himself nearly concerned. He speaks as if he boasted of his ignorance of the scriptures, and took a pride in it; as if it were below him to take notice of the law of God, or make any enquiries concerning it.<\/P> III. The abuse done to Sosthenes, and Gallio’s unconcernedness in it, v.<\/I><\/span> 17<\/span>. 1. The parties put a great contempt upon the court, when they took Sosthenes and beat him before the judgment-seat.<\/I> Many conjectures there are concerning this matter, because it is uncertain who this Sosthenes was, and who the Greeks were that abused him. It seems most probable that Sosthenes was a Christian, and Paul’s particular friend, that appeared for him on this occasion, and probably had taken care of his safety, and conveyed him away, when Gallio dismissed the cause; so that, when they could not light on Paul, they fell foul on him who protected him. It is certain that there was one Sosthenes that was a friend of Paul, and well known at Corinth; it is likely he was a minister, for Paul calls him his brother, and joins him with himself in his first epistle to the church at Corinth (1 Cor. i. 1<\/span>), as he does Timothy in his second, and it is probable that this was he; he is said to be a ruler of the synagogue,<\/I> either joint-ruler with Crispus (v.<\/I><\/span> 8<\/span>), or a ruler of one synagogue, as Crispus was of another. As for the Greeks that abused him, it is very probable that they were either Hellenist Jews, or Jewish Greeks, those that joined with the Jews in opposing the gospel (Act 18:4<\/span>; Act 18:6<\/span>), and that the native Jews put them on to do it, thinking it would in them be less offensive. They were so enraged against Paul that they beat Sosthenes; and so enraged against Gallio, because he would not countenance the prosecution, that they beat him before the judgment-seat, whereby they did, in effect, tell him that they cared not for him; if he would not be their executioner, they would be their own judges. 2. The court put no less a contempt upon the cause, and the persons too. But Gallio cared for none of these things.<\/I> If by this be meant that he cared not for the affronts of bad men, it was commendable. While he steadily adhered to the laws and rules of equity, he might despise their contempts; but, if it be meant (as I think it is) that he concerned not himself for the abuses done to good men, it carries his indifference too far, and gives us but an ill character of him. Here is wickedness<\/I> done in the place of judgment<\/I> (which Solomon complains of, Eccl. iii. 16<\/span>), and nothing done to discountenance and suppress it. Gallio, as a judge, ought to have protected Sosthenes, and restrained and punished the Greeks that assaulted him. For a man to be mobbed in the street or in the market, perhaps, may not be easily helped; but to be so in his court, the judgment-seat, the court sitting and not concerned at it, is an evidence that truth is fallen in the street, and equity cannot enter;<\/I> for he that departeth from evil maketh himself a prey,<\/I>Isa 59:14<\/span>; Isa 59:15<\/span>. Those that see and hear of the sufferings of God’s people, and have no sympathy with them, nor concern for them, do not pity and pray for the, it being all one to them whether the interests of religion sink or swim, are of the spirit of Gallio here, who, when a good man was abused before his face, cared for none of these things;<\/I> like those that were at ease in Zion,<\/I> and were not grieved for the affliction of Joseph<\/I> (Amos vi. 6<\/span>), like the king and Haman, that sat down to drink when the city Shushan was perplexed,<\/I> Esth. iii. 15<\/I><\/span>.<\/P> <\/p>\n When Gallio was proconsul of Achaia <\/B> ( <\/SPAN><\/span>). Genitive absolute of present participle <\/SPAN><\/span>. Brother of Seneca the Stoic (Nero’s tutor) and uncle of Lucan the author of the <\/SPAN><\/span>. His original name was M. Annaeus Novatus till he was adopted by Gallio the rhetorician. The family was Spanish. Gallio was a man of culture and refinement and may have been chosen proconsul of Achaia for this reason. Statius calls him “dulcis Gallio<\/I>.” Seneca says of him: Nemo enim mortalium uni tam dulcis quam hic omnibus<\/I> (No one of mortals is so pleasant to one person as he is to all). Luke alone among writers says that he was proconsul, but Seneca speaks of his being in Achaia where he caught fever, a corroboration of Luke. But now a whitish grey limestone inscription from the Hagios Elias quarries near Delphi (a letter of Claudius to Delphi) has been found which definitely names Gallio as proconsul of Achaia ( <\/SPAN><\/span>). The province of Achaia after various shifts (first senatorial, then imperial) back and forth with Macedonia, in A.D. 44 Claudius gave back to the Senate with proconsul as the title of the governor. It is amazing how Luke is confirmed whenever a new discovery is made. The discovery of this inscription has thrown light also on the date of Paul’s work in Corinth as it says that Gallio came in the 26th acclamation of Claudius as Emperor in A.D. 51, that would definitely fix the time of Paul in Corinth as A.D. 50 and 51 (or 51 and 52). Deissmann has a full and able discussion of the whole matter in Appendix I to his St. Paul<\/I>.<\/P> Rose up <\/B> (<\/SPAN><\/span>). Second aorist active of —<\/SPAN><\/span>, intransitive, to take a stand against, a double compound verb found nowhere else. They took a stand (<\/SPAN><\/span>) against (<\/SPAN><\/span>, down on, <\/SPAN><\/span>, upon), they made a dash or rush at Paul as if they would stand it no longer.<\/P> Before the judgment seat <\/B> ( <\/SPAN><\/span>). See on 12:21<\/span>. The proconsul was sitting in the basilica in the forum or agora. The Jews had probably heard of his reputation for moderation and sought to make an impression as they had on the praetors of Philippi by their rush (<\/SPAN><\/span>, 16:22<\/span>). The new proconsul was a good chance also (25:2<\/span>). So for the second time Paul faces a Roman proconsul (Sergius Paulus, 13:7<\/span>) though under very different circumstances. <\/P> <\/p>\n Gallio. Brother of the philosopher Seneca (Nero’s tutor), and uncle of the poet Lucan, the author of the “Pharsalia.” Seneca speaks of him as amiable and greatly beloved. <\/P> Deputy. See on ch. Act 13:7<\/span>. The verb, to be deputy, occurs only here. <\/P> Judgment – seat. See on ch. Act 7:5<\/span>.<\/P> <\/p>\n <\/strong><\/p>\n 1) “And when Gallio, was the deputy of Achaia,”<\/strong> (Gallionos de anthypatou ontors tes Achaias) “Then when Gallio was deputy (proconsul) of Achaia (Greece),” brother of Seneca, the moralist. His contemporaries called him the “agreeable Gallio.” Both he and Seneca were put to death by Nero. The province of Achaia included both Hellas and Peloponnesus.<\/p>\n 2) “The Jews made insurrection with one accord against Paul,”<\/strong> (katepestestesan homothumadon hoi loudaioi to Paulo) “The Jews with one mind-theme (intent) set on (pounced upon) Paul,” in consort or collusion, for a “pound of flesh,” as they had done in Thessalonica and Berea, Act 17:5<\/span>; Act 17:13<\/span>.<\/p>\n 3) “And brought him to the judgement seat,”<\/strong> (kai<\/p>\n egagon auton epi to Bema) “And led him up to the tribunal,” the Bema, a platform where he was to offer a public defense against charges they were to hurl against him, much as they had against the Lord, Mat 26:59-65<\/span>; Mar 14:55-65<\/span>. The (bema) judgement seat was usually a movable one, to be moved about to be used in prearranged public places, for public judgement. It is a term Paul used to signify the place of judgement of believers, after they are resurrected or caught up in the rapture, to meet the Lord in the air, 2Co 5:10<\/span>; 1Th 4:16-18<\/span>.<\/p>\n − <\/p>\n 12. When Gallio. Either the change of the deputy did encourage the Jews to wax more proud and insolent, as froward men use to abuse new things that they may procure some tumult, or else hoping that the judge would favor them, they brake the peace and silence at a sudden, which had continued one whole year. And the sum of the accusation is, that Paul went about to bring in a false kind of worship contrary to the law. Now, the question is, whether they spake of the law of Moses or of the rites used in the empire of Rome. Because this latter thing seemeth to me to be cold, − (325) I do rather receive that, that they burdened Paul with this crime that he brake and altered the worship prescribed in the law of God, and that to the end they might hit him in the teeth with novelty or innovation. And surely Paul had been worthy to have been condemned if he had gone about any such thing; but forasmuch as it is most certain that they did treacherously and wickedly slander the holy man, they endeavored to cover an evil cause with an honest excuse. We know how straitly the Lord commandeth in the law, how he will have his servants to worship him. Therefore, to depart from that rule is sacrilege. But forasmuch as Paul never meant to add to or take away anything from the law, he is unjustly accused of this fault. Whence we gather, that though the faithful themselves never so uprightly and blamelessly, yet can they not escape false and slanderous reports until they be admitted to purge themselves. But Paul was not only unworthily and falsely slandered by the adversaries, but when he would have refuted their impudency and false reports, his mouth was stopped by the deputy. Therefore he was enforced to depart from the judgment-seat without defending himself. And Gallio refuseth to hear the cause, not for any evil will he bare to Paul, but because it was not agreeable to the office of the deputy to give judgment concerning the religion of every province. For though the Romans could not enforce the nations which were subject to them to observe their rites, yet lest they should seem to allow that which they did tolerate, they forbade their magistrates to meddle with this part of jurisdiction. − <\/p>\n Here we see what the ignorance of true godliness doth in setting in order the state of every commonwealth and dominion. All men confess that this is the principal thing that true religion be in force and flourish. Now, when the true God is known, and the certain and sure rule of worshipping him is understood, there is nothing more equal − (326) than that which God commandeth in his law, to wit, that those who bear rule with power (having abolished contrary superstitions) defend the pure worship of the true God. But seeing that the Romans did observe their rites only through pride and stubbornness, and seeing they had no certainty where there was no truth, they thought that this was the best way − (327) they could take if they should grant liberty to those who dwelt in the provinces to live as they listed. But nothing is more absurd than to leave the worship of God to men’s choice. Wherefore, it was not without cause that God commanded by Moses that the king should cause a book of the law to be written out for himself, ( Deu 17:18<\/span>\ud83d\ude09 to wit, that being well instructed, and certain of his faith, he might with more courage take in hand to maintain that which he knew certainly was right. − <\/p>\n (325) − <\/p>\n “<\/p>\n Et coactum,” and forced. <\/p>\n (326) − <\/p>\n “<\/p>\n Aequum,” equitable or just. <\/p>\n (327) − <\/p>\n “<\/p>\n Optimum compendium,” the best and shortest way. <\/p>\n CRITICAL REMARKS<\/em><\/p>\n Act. 18:12<\/span>. Gallio<\/strong>.Gallio became proconsul towards the end of Claudiuss reign, about A.D. 53. His character, as depicted by ancient writers, corresponded with that revealed in Lukes narrative. He was the very flower of pagan courtesy and pagan culturea Roman with all a Romans dignity and seriousness, and yet with all the grace and versatility of a polished Greek (Farrar). Eusebius asserts that he committed suicide towards the end of Neros reign, before the death of his brother Seneca; but as Tacitus (Annals<\/em>, xv. 73) reports him alive after that event, Dion Cassius is more likely to be correct in saying that he was put to death by order of Nero. Deputy<\/strong>, or proconsul<\/em> of Achaia<\/strong>.See on Act. 13:7<\/span>. Achaia, which included all Greece south of Macedonia, was a proconsular province under Augustus; under Tiberius an imperial province with a procurator (Tacitus, Annals<\/em>, i. 76); under Claudius after A.D. 44 a senatorial province with a proconsul as governor. Another instance of Lukes accuracy. Made insurrection<\/strong>.Rather, rose up<\/em>.<\/p>\n Act. 18:13<\/span>. This fellow<\/strong>.The expression correctly enough states the feelings of disdain entertained by Pauls prosecutors, though the word fellow has no place in the original.<\/p>\n Act. 18:17<\/span>. All the Greeks<\/strong>.The best texts have simply Fuente: The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges<\/b><\/i><\/h4>\n
Fuente: Albert Barnes’ Notes on the Bible<\/b><\/i><\/h4>\n
I. <\/strong>Religious intolerance (Act 18:12<\/span>) is seen in three things–<\/p>\n
II. <\/strong>Magisterial propriety. Did Gallio, like Pilate, bow to public wish? No, he would not even entertain the case (Act 18:14-15<\/span>). He meant that the question of religious differences came not within the authority of a civil magistrate. On this principle the Roman government generally acted. Gallio, as a magistrate, acted justly–<\/p>\n
III. <\/strong>Social retribution. Then all the Greeks took Sosthenes, and beat him before the judgment seat. With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again. This case develops–<\/p>\n
IV. <\/strong>Lamentable indifference. He cared for none of these things. This can scarcely be nothing more than mere magisterial unconcernedness about religious disputes. As an educated Roman, he regarded the religion of Paul as beneath his notice. Religious indifferentism is one of the greatest and most prevalent evils of this age too, and it is infidelity in its worst form. Mere theoretical infidelity you can put down by argument. But this is beyond the reach of all logic. Religious indifference is–<\/p>\n
I. <\/strong>Then let us consider the end and design of civil government. It is plain that civil government was instituted for the preservation and advancement of mens civil interests, for the better security of their lives and liberties and external possessions. Men soon became sensible of the necessity of civil government for these ends, from the inconveniences they suffered by a private life independent on each other. The proper business of the magistrate is to preserve the external peace and the temporal good of the community; to protect every man in his just right and property (1Th 4:6<\/span>). But then it is to be considered that these transgressions are subject to be punished by the civil magistrate in a civil capacity only, and not in a religious one. They fall under his cognisance, as they are injurious to mens civil interests, and not as they have an inherent turpitude in them, and are transgressions of the Divine law; for in that capacity, I conceive, they are out of the magistrates power, and not cognisable before any courts of human judicature. The not observing this distinction has introduced no small confusion in this subject. But because those vices which are so many transgressions of Gods laws have also a natural tendency to injure our neighbour in his civil interests, and to disturb the good order and government of the world, therefore it unavoidably happens that the magistrate, in the due execution of his office, does indirectly intermeddle with religion. But though we cannot actually separate the ill influence any vice has upon the society we live in, from its being a transgression of some Divine law, yet in our minds we may make this separation, and consider every vice as a mixed action, as a transgression of the laws of man, and of the laws of God, In the first capacity only it is subject to human judicatures; in the second, it is cognisable only before the tribunal of heaven. For this reason, because vice and wickedness are punishable by the civil magistrate only upon a civil account, sins are differently estimated and differently punished by human and by Divine laws. Human laws make an estimate of sins from the damage they do to private persons, or to the public good, and inflict the greatest punishment upon those sins which are most injurious in this respect. And, therefore, if there be any sins wherein society is no way concerned, which it neither feels nor is affected with, the magistrate has nothing to do with punishing them. Consequently, secret intentions and designs of wickedness, treasonable thoughts, rebellious wishes, and seditious purposes, if they never break out into acts, can never be liable to civil punishments. But with regard to the laws of God the case is far otherwise. He takes an estimate of our sins by other measures, from those degrees of light and knowledge against which the offence was committed, and often punishes those sins most which are least, or not at all, censured by the civil power. Thus anger and revenge with Him is murder, and lustful thoughts and desires, adultery. And other actions there are which, though justly punishable by the civil power, are in their own nature guiltless, and do not displease God, but by being trangressions of that general law, of paying all due obedience to those whom He has set over us.<\/p>\n
II. <\/strong>The end and design of religion. Though religion is a great friend to civil government, and the practice of the duties which that enjoins tends very much to our present happiness, and makes this world a much more easy place than it would be without it, yet all this is but remotely the effect of religion, and makes no part of its main and principal design. Religion, in a true sense, and as the word itself imports, is an obligation upon us to God. And, therefore, though men formed themselves into societies for civil reasons, they did not do it upon any religious account; because religion as it relates to God is transacted between a mans self and God, and is what nobody else is concerned in. So that it is neither necessary in itself nor essential to true religion that great numbers of men should meet together and be incorporated in societies for the better discovery, or the more due exercise of it. Hence it is that they who lived before the institution of civil governments, or the foundation of commonwealths, were as famous for their piety and religion as any who have been since. In this state of nature, I mean before the institution of civil government, religion, as it related to God alone, had no other hold upon men but from the fear and reverence of God, and was a perfect stranger to all human power and outward force. In this state no man whatever could require me to conform to his judgment on religious matters, nor could I require him to conform to mine. This was the case of religion in a state of nature. Let us next see whether any alteration was made in this case by the institution of civil government. Now since those wrongs which men daily received from one another, and which first moved them to eater into societies, did not affect their religion, but their lives, and liberty, and goods, it follows that when they waived their natural freedom, and combined together, they did not at all submit themselves in religious matters to the will of the civil magistrate, as they submitted their persons and properties to be disposed of by him for the obtaining the end of society, the mutual defence and preservation of one another. Men cannot abandon the care of their souls as they may that of their bodies and estates, and blindly leave it to the magistrate to prescribe what faith or worship they shall embrace. And therefore the magistrate ought not to insist upon terms of purely a religious nature with those who are under his government, or exercise his power and authority over them in this respect. This will quickly appear by taking a view of the chief and principal parts of religion. To begin, then, with morality and virtue, which, though unhappily distinguished from religion, are the chief and main things wherein it consists. These are founded in the eternal nature of things, whereby some things are evidently fit, and others as evidently unfit to be done whatever the consequence of them be here. This being plainly the nature of things, we justly conclude it to be the will of God who made us what we are, and put this difference between some things and others, that we should observe this difference in oar actions. And herein we are to be directed by our own reason or conscience: we are accountable to God alone. But what if anyone upon pretence of conscience, and to show his liberty, should commit any matter of wrong or wicked lewdness, invade anyones property, or disturb the public peace? Why, then, I say, no pretence of religion or conscience can screen him from the civil power. He ought to be restrained and punished. But then he does not suffer upon a religious, but upon a civil account. If we place religion in the belief of any set of doctrines, here, too, every man must judge for himself. The magistrate has nothing to do to interpose in this case, to apply force of any kind to bring men over to any particular persuasion. The peace and good order of society are the only points which he is to take care of, and since these are as consistent with mens holding different opinions in religion, as they are with their being of different sentiments in other matters, the magistrate is no more concerned to intermeddle in religious disputes than he is in those of philosophy, law, or physic. Indeed, if men hold any opinions in religion which are destructive of the peace and quiet of the world, and act in persuance of these opinions, their actions then are of a civil and not of a religious nature, and they render themselves obnoxious to the civil power. For the magistrate to interpose and make himself a judge and an avenger in affairs which are purely of a religious nature is to trangress the bounds of his duty and to invade the prerogative of God; it is to judge and misuse the servants of another master who are not at all- accountable to him. For nothing can be more clear and certain than that as religion has God only for its Author, so it is properly His care and concern only. But such attempts as these are not only wicked and unjust, but very foolish and fruitless, as will appear if we consider that the nature and the virtue too of all religion consists in a free choice, in the consent of our minds, in the sincerity of our hearts, in our being fully persuaded of the truth of what we believe, and of the goodness of what we practise. But of what use can human laws, enforced by civil penalties, be in all this? They may make me do things which are in my power, and depend upon my will; but to believe this or that to be true is not in my power, nor depends upon my will, but upon the light and evidence and information which I have. And will civil discouragements, fines, stripes and imprisonment enlighten the understanding, convince mens minds of error, and inform them of the truth? Can they have any such efficacy as to make men change the inward judgment they have framed of things? Nothing can do this but reason and argument. And therefore if the magistrate interposes here, and either chooses a religion for me, or forces me to practise that which I have chosen with temporal rewards and punishments, he destroys my religion and spoils the virtue of whatever I do under that name. But, further, as religion consists in such a belief and practice, as we in our consciences are persuaded to be best and most acceptable to God, as it lies in the integrity of the heart, so it can be subject only to the judgment of the great God whose prerogative it is to be a searcher of the heart and a fryer of the reins; who sees the secret springs of our actions and knows our thoughts and intentions afar off. Upon which account no man upon earth can be a judge in religious matters, nor take upon him the cognisance of this cause. By this time I hope it appears that Gallio acted wise and conscientious part in this affair. For most certain it is, that the duty of the magistrate is confined to the care of the civil and temporal good of his people, and does not extend to their spiritual and eternal affairs. It is nothing to him what false and erroneous opinions men hold, what ridiculous and absurd doctrines they profess, or, in a word, what they believe or disbelieve in religion, so long as hereby they do no prejudice to their neighbour, nor make any alteration in mens civil rights, nor disturb the public peace and quiet. But here it may be objected, Is the magistrate to show no zeal for the honour of God and the authority of His laws? To this I answer, that since God, who is most certainly the properest Judge in this case, and best knows what are the fittest means to be made use of for these ends, has not thought fit to enforce His laws with any other sanctions but the rewards and punishments of a future and invisible state, nor to promote His honour and true religion by any other motives but these, what authority has any man to make any alteration in what God has established, and to enforce His laws with any other sanctions than what He Himself has appointed? And as to true religion and a right belief, every man is orthodox to himself, and thinks his own religion to be true; and, therefore, if this be any argument why the magistrate should use force in promoting his own religion, it will plead as strongly for false religions as for the true one. As for Gods honour, He Himself is the best guardian of it, and will most certainly take care of it in His own time and way, for He is a jealous God. But then I add, that for men to be restrained from these vices by the power and authority of the civil magistrate, and out of fear of his sword, is no honour to God whatever it may be to Caesar. To conclude: Since religion and civil government are, in their original, and business, and in everything else belonging to them, thus perfectly distinct and entirely different from each other, it would put an end to many controversies, and make very much for the peace and quiet both of Church and State, if men would observe this distinction, and each party would keep within their respective bounds. This would hinder them from clashing and interfering with one another, and would prevent those heats and animosities, those acts of violence and rapine, cruelty and oppression that have abounded in the Christian world upon account of religion. And let the magistrate, too, confine himself to his own proper business and attend to the worldly welfare of the commonwealth, and instead of exercising his power in binding other mens consciences by human laws, let him take care to conform his own conscience to the laws of God, and direct all his counsels and endeavours to promote universally the civil welfare of all his subjects. And let him not think that he bears the sword in vain unless he employs it in the cause of God and religion. It was not put into his hands for this use, nor can it be applied to this purpose with any good effect. (B. Ibbot, D. D.<\/em>)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
I. <\/strong>The laudable administration of justice in his treatment of the point of complaint (verse 12-15). He rejects it because it referred to a purely religious matter.<\/p>\n
II. <\/strong>The censurable administration of justice in his conduct at the violence of the Greeks (verse 16, 17). Here he shows himself indifferent and unfair. Magistrates have in ecclesiastical controversies to distinguish between what is above law and what is against the law, and have to resent what is unlawful on whatever side it happens. (Lisco.<\/em>)<\/p>\n<\/p>\nFuente: Biblical Illustrator Edited by Joseph S. Exell<\/b><\/i><\/h4>\n
<\/P> Fuente: Adam Clarke’s Commentary and Critical Notes on the Bible<\/b><\/i><\/h4>\n
Fuente: English Annotations on the Holy Bible by Matthew Poole<\/b><\/i><\/h4>\n
Fuente: Jamieson, Fausset and Brown’s Commentary Critical and Explanatory on the Whole Bible <\/b><\/i><\/h4>\n
Fuente: John Gill’s Exposition of the Entire Bible<\/b><\/i><\/h4>\n
<\/P>
<\/P> <\/TD> <\/TR> <\/TABLE> Fuente: Matthew Henry’s Whole Bible Commentary<\/b><\/i><\/h4>\n
Fuente: Robertson’s Word Pictures in the New Testament<\/b><\/i><\/h4>\n
Fuente: Vincent’s Word Studies in the New Testament<\/b><\/i><\/h4>\n
Fuente: Garner-Howes Baptist Commentary<\/b><\/i><\/h4>\n
Fuente: Calvin’s Complete Commentary<\/b><\/i><\/h4>\n