Good
Good
The adj. good (, ) may be used of any quality, physical as well as moral, thing, or person that may be approved as useful, fit, admirable, right. In the moral sense it connotes in the NT not only righteousness but kindness, helpfulness, love. For Jesus, God alone was nod without limitation or qualification (Mar 10:18, Luk 18:19); and while His own moral discipline on earth was going on, He disclaimed that epithet for Himself (cf. Mat 19:17, with its attempt to escape the apparent difficulty of the disclaimer). This Divine perfection is shown in an impartial, universal beneficence (Mat 5:45), which men are to imitate (Mat 5:48). The same conviction of what God is, and what man, therefore, should be, is found in St. Pauls counsels (Eph 4:31-32; Eph 5:1-2). Jesus Himself is the expression and activity of this Divine perfection, and so it is characteristic of Him to go about doing good (Act 10:38), as He Himself indicates in His reply to the Baptist (Mat 11:4-5); and this, too, He enjoin as the practice of His disciples (Luk 6:27; cf. Mat 25:31 ff., Mar 14:7, Luk 19:8-9). St. Paul echoes the teaching of Jesus when he bids the Romans overcome evil with good (Rom 12:21), and assures them that such conduct will have its reward (Rom 2:10). The distinction St. Paul makes between a righteous man and the good man (Rom 5:7) deserves special attention. Just as God because He is righteous reckons righteous (Rom 3:26), so it is because God is good in Himself that He is ever showing His goodness to all men, especially in Christ and His Cross (Rom 5:8, Eph 4:32) and calling all men to be the imitators of His goodness (1 Corinthians 13).
Although the following article is dealing with the Christian moral ideal as goodness, this brief statement in introducing the subject of the good as mans chief end has been made for two reasons. (a) In the Christian view, God Himself is mans chief good, for in His fellowship alone is mans perfection, glory, and blessedness, and it is Gods goodness that man enjoys for ever; and (b) it is because of this goodness-this self-giving of Gods perfection as love-that the chief good is given to man. It is in Christ that man so possesses God, and it is through Christ that God so communicates Himself to man. The total impression of the apostolic writings is that Christ Himself is the Good, for in Him and through Him alone man has God as Love.
We must note, however, that the chief good is presented to us in three distinctive phrases in the different types of teaching in the NT. In the Synoptics, on the lips of Jesus Himself, it is the kingdom of God (Mat 6:33); in the Fourth Gospel it is eternal life (Joh 20:30-31), although we also find the second representation in Mat 19:16, Mar 10:17, Luk 18:18, and the first in Joh 3:5; in the Pauline Epistles it is the righteousness of God or of faith (Php 3:9), or, more generally, salvation (Rom 1:18; Rom 1:17).
The idea of the good combines character and condition; it includes Tightness and happiness, holiness and blessedness, or, as the Shorter Catechism puts it: mans chief end is to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever. Man, by claiming Gods goodness, enjoying and praising it, and by showing a like goodness, glorifies God: that is, sets forth the honour, worth, beauty, and majesty of Gods moral perfection (Rom 15:6; Rom 15:9, 1Co 6:20, 2Co 9:13; cf. Col 3:17, 1Pe 4:10-11). As God is grace, Gods claim on man is for faith: and this is his supreme duty (Heb 11:8). Thus the two aspects of the good pass into one another: man fulfils his obligation to God by making fully his own the salvation God offers in Christ. We need not then further pursue the idea of the good as duty, but may confine ourselves to it as boon.
(1) For Plato and Aristotle the good necessarily included both well-being () and also well-doing; a man must have health, wealth, beauty, and intellect as well as the virtues to attain fully the good. Here the first great distinction of the Christian view emerges. A mans good is independent of his outward circumstances. As Jesus taught His disciples not to be anxious about food or raiment, but to leave all to the care and bounty of the Heavenly Father, who would add all these things to those who first sought His Kingdom and righteousness (Mat 6:19-34), so St. Paul assures Christian believers that even the very worst circumstances imaginable cannot really injure them, for all things work together for good to them that love God (Rom 8:28). The declaration has some affinity with Stoic thought; but the difference lies in this, that for Stoic self-sufficiency there is substituted the possession of the love of God in Christ as the satisfying portion of the soul (Rom 8:39). While there is this independence of outward circumstances, there is no cynic-like contempt for bodily needs, and the labour that meets these (1Th 4:11, 2Th 3:10, Rom 12:11; Rom 12:17). Private property even may become part of the Christians good, as affording the opportunity for the generosity which is so highly recommended as a Christian grace (Rom 12:8; Rom 12:13; 2Co 8:1-15).
(2) A second feature of the Christian view that distinguishes it from the Greek is that the good is not the result of fortune or the reward of merit, but the gift of Gods grace (Rom 5:21; Rom 6:23). It does include a duty to be done, but it is primarily a boon to be claimed. Hence the pre-eminence of faith as the primary, if not the supreme, grace of the Christian life. For human self-sufficiency there is substituted dependence upon God (2Co 2:16; 2Co 3:5-6; 2Co 12:9).
(3) A third characteristic is the emphasis on sin in the Christian view as the evil from which there must be escape. The good includes deliverance from sin in the two-fold sense, corresponding to the two-fold reference of sin in relation to God, and in relation to a mans own nature. There is forgiveness of sin, reconciliation with God, the peace of God (Rom 3:22-26; Rom 5:10; Rom 1:7; Rom 2:10, etc.); a man is set in right relation with God, so that Gods approval and not His displeasure rests upon him, and he does not distrust, or feel estranged from, God, but is at borne with God as a child with a father. There is also the breaking of the power of sin, and the banishment of the love of sin, by a new motive and a new strength (Rom 6:1-11; Rom 7:25, 2Co 5:14, Php 4:13). There is a present conquest of evil, and victory over the world. This is a present good claimed more or less, according to the measure of faith; but as Christians are not merely owners of the present but also heirs of the future good (Rom 8:17; Tit 3:7, 1Pe 1:4; cf. Heb 11:9), hope as well as faith is necessary to claim the full salvation (Rom 8:24, 1Th 5:8, 1Pe 1:3).
(4) Into the contents of the Christian hope, the details of the apostolic Eschatology (q.v. [Note: quod vide, which see.] ), it is beyond the scope of this article to enter; but one feature, because of its distinction from, or even opposition to, the Greek view, may here he mentioned. The Greek thinker, if he did hope for a future life, looked for the release of the soul from its imprisonment in the body-for a disembodied immortality; but the Christian good includes not merely the survival of the soul in death, but resurrection-the restoration of the entire personality (Rom 8:23, 2Co 5:1-4, Php 3:21). This does not involve the absurdity of a material identity of the body buried and the body raised, for St. Paul expressly distinguishes the one from the other as the natural and the spiritual (1Co 15:42-44), but only the conviction that the future life will be a completely human one.
(5) As we may surely reckon as an dement in the Christian good the fellowship of believers, the membership of the body of Christ (1Co 12:12-31, Eph 1:23), the of the Spirit (2Co 13:14 : the common life of the Church in the Spirit), so the Christian life is not individual but universal; it is the subjection of all things to Christ, the destruction of all evil, the cessation of all pain and grief, the victory of the saints, and God all and in all. No such wider hope inspired the Greek thinkers. It is true that the expectation of an immediate return of Christ in power and glory precludes our interpreting this universal good as a historical evolution of mankind in manners, morals, laws, institutions, and pieties to so glorious and blessed a consummation, and we are left uncertain as to the mode in which the process is to be conceived. But the hope is a fact of apostolic life.
(6) There is one feature in the Christian good peculiar to St. Paul. As a Pharisee he had felt the burden and the bondage of the Law, and groaned under its judgment, but he had discovered its impotence, and so for him the Christian good included the end of the Law (Gal 4:21-31; Gal 5:1), for Christian morality is not legal-the observance of the letter-but spiritual-the expression of the new life found in Christ (2Co 3:1-11). It may be doubted, however, whether even all believers in the Apostolic Age were morally mature enough to be released from all outward restraints, and to be left only to inward constraint; and St. Pauls counsels and commands even in his letters show that this end of the Law was ideal rather than actual. It is certain that the Christian Church in the course of its history generally has been legal rather than spiritual in its morality, and so this part of the Christian good has been unrealized.
(7) In the apostolic view of the Christian good there are two features which may he regarded as of temporary and local rather than of permanent and universal significance for Christian faith: (a) the expectation of the speedy Second Advent of Christ in power and glory to usher in the Last Things, which faded out of the Christian consciousness, with from time to time futile attempts to revive it, as the course of human history contradicted it; and (b) the belief which became more prominent in subsequent centuries than it was in the Apostolic Age, that the evil to be overcome and destroyed was embodied in personal evil principles and powers, over whom Christ gained the victory, and from whom He effected deliverance for the believer (Rom 8:38-39, 1Co 15:24, Eph 1:21, Col 2:15). For the details on both these subjects the relevant articles must be consulted, as all that is here necessary is merely the mention of them for the completeness of the treatment of the present topic.
Such is the Christian good; is it regarded as destined to be universal? Does the NT otter us a theodicy? It has been already indicated that the Christian hope does include the victory of Christ over all His foes, and the subjection of all things to Him, and at last of Himself to God (1Co 15:24-28); but these confident predictions do not clearly or fully answer the question whether all men will at last be saved-that is, become sharers of the good. While there are a few passages pointing towards universal restoration, there are others indicating eternal punishment, and some even on which has been based a theory of conditional immortality. This problem seems insoluble even with the data not only of the Scriptures, but also of human experience; and accordingly, whatever Christian wishes and hopes may be, we cannot affirm that the Christian good presents the final destiny of the race in cloudless sunshine without any shadow; and thus the believer must walk not by sight, but by faith, in the belief that whatever the Heavenly Father does is wisest, kindest, best. As has been shown in the article Evil, the Christian attitude is neither optimism nor pessimism, but meliorism-the belief that the world not only needs redemption, but is being redeemed in Christ.
Literature.-W. Beyschlag, NT Theology, Eng. translation , 1895. bk. i. ch. viii., bk. ii. ch. v., bk. iv. chs. vi. ix., bk. v. ch. v.; G. B. Stevens, The Theology of the NT, 1899, pt. i. chs. iii. xii., pt. ii. chs. vi. vii., pt. iv. chs. v. viii. xii., pt. vi. ch. v., pt. vii. ch. iv.; T. von Haering, The Christian Faith, Eng. translation , 1913, ii. 800-926; A. M. Fairbairn, The Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 1902, pp. 94-168; O. Pfleiderer, The Philosophy of Religion2, Eng. translation , 1886-88, vol. iv. ch. iv.
Alfred E. Garvie.
Fuente: Dictionary of the Apostolic Church
GOOD
In general, is whatever increases pleasure, or diminishes pain in us; or, which amounts to the same, whatever is able to procure or preserve to us the possession of agreeable sensations, and remove those of an opposite nature. Moral good denotes the right conduct of the several senses and passions, or their just proportion and accommodation to their respective objects and relations. Physical good is that which has either generally, or for any particular end, such qualities as are expected or desired.
Fuente: Theological Dictionary
good
Being when considered as having all that belongs to it, its perfection and therefore desirable; being, with its existence, its powers or activities, its acquired qualities. God, as possessing His existence, and powers in perfection, is therefore the greatest, highest, or supreme Good.
Fuente: New Catholic Dictionary
Good
“Good” is one of those primary ideas which cannot be strictly defined. In order to fix its philosophical significance we may begin by observing that the word is employed firstly as an adjective and secondly as a substantive. This distinction which is clearly marked in French by the two different terms, bon and le bien, may be preserved in English by prefixing an article to the term when it is employed substantively. We call a tool or instrument good, if it serves the purpose for which it is intended. That is to say, it is good because it is an efficient means to obtain a desired result. The result, in turn, may be desired for itself, or it may be sought as a means to some ulterior end. If it is sought for itself, it is or it is estimated by us to be a good, and therefore desirable on its own account. When we take some step to obtain it, it is the end of our action. The series of means and ends either stretches out indefinitely, or it must terminate in some desired object or objects which are ends in themselves. Again we sometimes call a thing good because it possesses completely, or in a high degree, the perfections proper to its nature, as a good painting, good respiration. Sometimes, too, things are termed good because they are of a nature to produce something desirable; that is, they are good casually. Finally, we speak of good conduct, a good man, a good intention, and here the adjective has for us a sense different from any of the foregoing, unless indeed, we are utilitarian philosophers, to whom morally good is but another term for useful.
Now in all these locutions the word conveys directly or indirectly the idea of desirability. The merely useful is desired for the end towards which it is employed; the end is desired on its own account. The latter is conceived as possessing some character, quality, power, which renders it an object of desire. Two questions now arise: What is it which, in the nature or being of any object, constitutes it desirable? Or, in more technical phrase, what, metaphsically speaking, constitutes the good or goodness in a thing, absolutely considered? What is the relationship existing between the good thus absolutely constituted and the subject to which it is desirable? Or what is implied by good, relatively considered? These two questions may be combined in one: “What is the good in the ontological order?” In exposing the reply to this question we shall come across the moral good, and the ethical aspect of the problem, which shall be treated in the second place.
I. ONTOLOGICAL
In Greek philosophy no topic receives more attention than the nature of the good. The speculations of Plato and Aristotle, especially have had a notable influence on Christian thought; they were adopted, in eclectic fashion, by the early Fathers, who combined many of the ancient philosophic ideas with revealed truth, by correcting some and amplifying others. The synthesis was carried on by the earlier Scholastics, and took definitive form from the hand of St. Thomas. Some of his predecessors, as well as some of his followers, disagree with him on a few minor points, most of which, however, are of a character too subtle to call for attention in this article. We shall, therefore, present the doctrine of St. Thomas in outline as the approved teaching of our schools.
Plato
According to Plato, in the objective order corresponding to our thought, there are two different worlds: the world of things, and the incomparably higher, nobler world of ideas, which transcends the world of things. The objects corresponding directly to our universal concepts are not things, but ideas. The objective idea is not indwelling in the essences of those things which fall within the scope of our corresponding universal concept, but the thing borrows or derives something from the idea. While the being or existence proper to the world of things is imperfect, unstable, essentially transitory, and therefore not truly deserving of the name of being, whcih implies permanence, ideas on the contrary are incorruptible, unchangeable, and truly existence. Now, among ideas the noblest and highest is the idea good: it is the supreme and sovereign idea. Whatever things possess goodness have it only because they participate in or draw from, the Sovereign Good. Their goodness then, is something distinct from, and added to, their proper essences or being. What, in Plato s mind, is the nature of this participation we need not explain further than that he makes it consist in this, that the thing is a copy or imitation of the idea. This sovereign idea, the Good, is identical with God. It is not a synthesis of all other ideas but is unique, transcendent, and individual. Whether Plato held that other ideas exist in God as in their proper dwelling-place is not quite clear. Aristotle so interpreted Plato; and it is very likely that Aristotle was better qualified to understand Plato s meaning than were subsequent philosophers who have disputed his interpretation. The Supreme Good imparts to the intellect the power to perceive, and gives intelligibility to the intelligible. It is, therefore, the source of truth. God, the essential and supreme Good, can impart nothing that is not good. This view leads to the inference that the origin of evil lies beyond the control of God. The theory leans, therefore, to dualism, and its influence may be traced through the early Gnostic and Manichaean heresies, and, in a minor degree, in the doctrines of the Priscillanists and Albigenses.
Aristotle
Starting from the Platonic definition, good is that which all desire, Aristotle, rejecting the Platonic doctrine of a transcendent world of ideas, holds that the good and being are identical; good is not something added to being, it is being. Everything that is, is good because it is; the quantity, if one may use the word loosely, of being or existence which a thing possesses, is at the same time the stock of goodness. A diminution or an increase of its being is a diminution or increase of its goodness. Being and the good are, then, objectively the same, every being is good, every good is being. Our concepts, being and good differ formally: the first simply denotes existence; the second, existence as a perfection, or the power of contributing to the perfection of a being. It follows from this that evil is not being at all; it is, on the contrary, the privation of being. Again, while being, viewed as the object of tendency, appetite, or will, gives rise to the concept good, so, when considered as the proper object of the intellect, it is represented under the concept true or truth, and it is the beautiful, inasmuch as the knowledge of it is attended by that particular pleasurable emotion which we call asthetic.As god is the fullness of being, so, therefore, the supreme, infinite Being is also the Supreme Good from which all creatures derive their being and goodness.
Neo-Platonism
The neo-Platonists perpetuated the Platonic theory, mixed with Aristotelean, Judaic, and other oriental ideas. Plotinus introduced the doctrine of a triple hypostasis, i.e. the one, the intelligence, and the universal soul, above the world of changing being, which is multiple. The intelligence is ordained to good; but, incapable of grasping it in its entirety, it breaks it up into parts, which constitute the essences. These essences by becoming united with a material principle constitute things. The Pseudo-Dionysius propagated the Platonic influence in his work “De Nominibus Divinis”, the doctrine of which is based on the scriptures. God is supereminently being — “I am who am” — but in Him the good is anterior to being, and the ineffable name of God is above all His other names. The good is more universal than being, for it embraces the material principle which does not possess any being of its own. The bond which unites beings among themselves and to the Supreme Being is love, which has for its object the good. The trend of the Pseudo-Dionysius is away from the dualisim which admits a principle of evil, but on the other hand,it inclines towards pantheism.
The Fathers
The Fathers, in general, treated the question of good from the standpoint of hermeneneutics rather than from the philosophic. Their chief concern is to affirm that God is the Supreme Good, that He is the creator of all that exists, that creatures derive their goodness from Him, while they are distinct from Him; and that there is no supreme independent, principle of evil. St. Augustine, however (De Natura boni, P.L., XLIII), examines the topic fully and in great detail. Some of his expressions seem tinged with the Platonic notion that good is antecedent to being; but elsewhere he makes the good, and being in God fundamentally identical. Boethius distinguishes a double goodness in things created; first, that which in them is one with their being; second, an accidental goodness added to their nature by God. In God these two elements of good, the essential and the accidental, are but one, since there are no accidents in God.
Scholastic Doctrine
St. Thomas starts from the Aristotelean principle that being and the good are objectively one. Being conceived as desirable is the good. The good differs from the true in this, that, while both are objectively nothing else than being, the good is being considered as the object of appetitie, desire, and will, the true is being a the object of the intellect. God, the Supreme Being and the source of all other being is consequently the Supreme Good, and the goodness of creatures results from the diffusion of His goodness. In a creature, considered as a subject having existence, we distinguish several elements of the goodness which it possesses: Its existence or being, which is the ground of all the other elements. Its powers, activities, and capacities. These are the complement of the first, and they serve it to pursue and appropriate whatever is requisite for and contributory to sustaining its existence, and developing that existence into the fullness of perfection proper to it. Each perfection that is acquired is a further measure of existence for it, hence a good. The totality of these various elements, forming its total good subjectively, that is, its entire being in a state of normal perfection according to its mind, is its good complete. This is the sense of the axiom: omne ens est bonum sibi (every being is a good unto itself). The privation of any of its powers or due perfections is an evil for it, as, for instance, blindness, the loss of the power of sight, is an evil for an animal. Hence evil is not something positive and does not exist in itself; as the axiom expresses it, malum in bono fundatur (evil has its base in good).
Let us pass now to good in the relative sense. Every being has a natural tendency to continue and to develop itself. This tendency brings its activities into play; each power has its proper object, and a conatus pushing it to action. The end to which action is directed is something that is of a nature to contribute, when obtained, to the well-being or perfection of the subject. For this reason it is needed, pursued, desired, and, because of its desirability, is designated good. For example, the plant for its existence and development requires light, air, heat, moisture, nurtriment. It has various organs adapted to appropriate these things, which are good for it, and, when by the exercise of these functions it acquires and appropriates them, it reaches its perfection and runs its course in nature. Now if we look into the cosmos, we perceive that the innumerable varieties of being in it are bound together in an indescribably complex system of mutual action and ineraction, as they obey the laws of their nature. One class contributes to the other in that orderly relationship which constitutes the harmony of the universe. True — to change the metaphor — with our limited powers of observation we are unable to follow the innumerable threads of this large and varied sweeps to warrant the induction that everything is good for some other thing, that everything has its proper end in the great whole. Omne ens est bonum alteri. Since this orderly correlation of things is necessary to them in order that they may obtain from one another the help which they need, it too is good for them. This order is also a good in itself, because it is a created reflection of the unity and harmony of the Divine being and goodness. When we consider the Supreme Being as the efficient cause, conserver, and director of this majestic order, we reach the conception of Divine providence. And then arises the question, what is the end towards which this Providence directs the universe? The end again is the good, i.e. God Himself. Not indeed that, as in the case of creatures He may derive any advantage or perfection from the world, but that it, by participating in His goodness, may manifest it. This manifestation is what we understand by the expression, giving glory to God. God is the Alpha and the Omega of the good; the source from which it flows, the end to which it returns. I am the Beginning and I am the End. It must be remembered that, throughout the treatment of this subject, the term good, like all other terms which we predicate of God and of creatures is used not univocally but analogically when referred to God. (See ANALOGY.)
The defined doctrine on the good, ontologically considered, is formulated by the Vatican Council (Session III, Const. de Fide Catholica, cap.i):
This one, only, true God, of His own goodness and almighty power, not for the increase of His own happiness, not to acquire but to manifest His perfection by the blessings which He bestows on creatures, with absolute freedom of counsel created from the beginning of time both the spiritual and the corporeal creature, to wit, the angelic and the mundane; and afterwards the human creature.
In Canon 4 we read:
If anyone shall say that finite things, both corporeal and spiritual, or at least spiritual, have emanated from the Divine substance; or that the Divine essence, by the manifestation and evolution of itself, becomes all things; or lastly, that God is universal or indefinite being, which by determining itself constitutes the universality of things distinct according to genera species, and individuals, let him be anathema.
II. ETHICAL
The moral good is not a kind, distinct from the good viewed ontologically; it is one form of perfection proper to human life, but, because of its excellence and supreme practical importance, it demands special treatment with reference to its own distinctive character which differentiates it from all other goods and perfections of man. It is again, in Greek philosophy, that we find the principles which have supplied the school with a basis for rational speculations, controlled and supplemented by revelation.
Plato
The supreme good of man is, as we have seen, the idea good, identical with God. By union with God man attains his highest subjective good, which is happiness. This assimilation is effected by knowledge and love; the means to achieve it is to preserve in the soul a due harmony throughout its various parts in subordination to the intellect which is the highest faculty. The establishment of this harmony brings man to a participation in the Divine unity; and through this union man attains to happiness, which remains even though he suffers pain and the privation of perishable goods. To regulate our actions harmoniously we stand in need of true knowledge, i.e. wisdom. The highest duty of man, therefore, is to obtain wisdom, which leads to God.
Aristotle
The end of man, his highest subjective good, is happiness or well-being. Happiness is not pleasure; for pleasure is a feeling consequent upon action, while happiness is a state of activity. Happiness consists in perfect action, i.e. the actual exercise by man of his faculties — especially of his highest faculty, the speculative intellect — in perfect correspondence, with the norm which his nature itself prescribes. Action may deviate from this norm either by excess or defect. The golden mean is to be preserved, and in this consists virtue. The various faculties, higher and lower, are regulated by their respective virtures to carry on their activites in due order. Pleasure follows action duly performed, even the highest form of activity, i.e. speculative contemplation of truth; but, as has been noted, happiness consists in the very operation itself. A life of contemplation, however, cannot be enjoyed unless a man posssesses enough goods of the lower orders to relieve him from the toils and the cares of life. hence happiness is beyond the reach of many. It is to be observed therefore that, while both Plato and Aristotle, as well as the Scholatics, hold that happiness is the end of man, their conception of happiness is quite different from the hedonistic idea of happiness as presented in English utiltarianism. For the utilitarian happiness is the sum total of pleasurable feelings, from whatever source they may be derived. On the other hand, in our sense, happiness — eudaimonia, beatitudo — is a distinct state or condition of consciousness accompanying and dependent on the realizaion in conduct of one definite good or perfection, the nature of which is objectively fixed and not dependent on our individual preferences. (See UTILITARIANISM).
Hedonists
The supreme good of man according to Aristippus is pleasure or the enjoyment of the moment, and pleasure is essentially gentle motion. Pleasure can never be bad, and the primary form of it is bodily pleasure. But, in order to secure the maximum of pleasure, prudent self-control is necessary; and this is virtue. Epicurus held that pleasure is the chief good; but pleasure is rest, not motion; and the highest form of pleasure is freedom from pain and the absence of all desires or needs that we cannot satisfy. Hence an important means towards happiness is the control of our desires, and the extinction of those that we cannot gratify, which is brought about by virtue. (See CYRENAIC SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY; HEDONISM, HAPPINESS.)
The Stoics
Everything in the universe is regulated by law. Man s highest good, or happiness, is to conform his conduct to universal law, which is Divine in its origin. To pursue this end is virtue. Virtue is to be cultivated in scorn of consequences, whether pleasurable or painful. The Stoic principle, “duty for duty’s sake alone”, reappears in Kant, with the modification that the norm of right action is not to be regarded as imposed by a Divine will; its original source is the human mind, or the free spirit itself.
St. Thomas
The radical difference which distinguishes the nobler forms of ancient ethics from Christian ethics is that, whereas the former identifies virtuous life with happiness, that is, with the possession and enjoyment of the highest good, the Christian conception is that a virtuous life, while it is, indeed, the proximate end and good of man, is not, in itself, his ultimate end and supreme good. A life of virtue, the moral good, leads him to the acquisition of an ulterior and ultimate end. Furthermore the happiness, which in an imperfect measure attends the virtuous life, may be accompanied with pain, sorrow, and the privation of terrestrial goods; complete happiness (beatitudo) is not to be found in earthly existence, but in the life to come, and will consist in union with God, the Supreme Good.
(A) The Proximate End and Good (Bonum Morale)
Like all creatures involved in the cosmic system, man requires and seeks for the conservation and perfection of his being a variety of things and conditions, all of which are, therefore, good for him. A composite being, partly corporeal and partly spiritual, he possesses two sets of tendencies and appetites. Rational, he employs contrivance in order to obtain goods not immediately within his reach. That he may attain the perfection of this highly complex nature, he must observe an order in the pursuit of different kinds of goods, lest the enjoyment of a good of lower value may cause him to lose or forfeit a higher one, in which case the former would be no true benefit to him at all. Besides, with a hierarchy of activities, capacities, and needs, he is a unity, an individual, a person; hence there exists for him a good in which all is other goods focus in harmonious correlation; and they are to be viewed and valued through the medium of this paramount good, not merely in isolated relation to their respective corresponding appetites.
There are, then, several divisions of good; corporeal good is whatever contributes to the perfection of the purely animal nature; spiritual good is that which perfects the spiritual faculty-knowledge, truth; useful good is that which is desired merely as a means to something else; the delectable or pleasurable good is any good regarded merely in the light of the pleasure it produces. The moral good (bonum honestum) consists in the due ordering of free action or conduct according to the norm of reason, the highest faculty, to which it is to conform. This is the good which determines the true valuation of all other goods sought by the activities which make up conduct. Any lower good acquired to the detriment of this one is really but a loss (bonum apparens). While all other kinds of good may, in turn, be viewed as means, the moral good is good as an end and is not a mere means to other goods. The pleasurable, though not in the order of things an independent end in itself, may be deliberately chosen as an end of action, or object of pursuit. Now let us apply these distinctions. Good being the object of any tendency, man has as many kinds of goods as he has appetites, needs, and faculties. The normal exercise of his powers and the acquisition thereby of any good is followed by satisfaction, which, when it reaches a certain degree of intensity, is the feeling of pleasure. He may and sometimes does pursue things not on account of their intrinsic worth, but simply that he may obtain pleasure from them. On the other hand, he may seek a good on account of its intrinsic power to satisfy a need or to contribute to the perfection of his nature in some respect. This may be illustrated in the case of food; for as the old adage has it, “the wise man eats to live, the epicure lives to eat.”
The faculty which is distinctively human is reason; man lives as a man properly speaking, when all his activites are directed by reason according to the law which reason reads in his very nature. This conformity of conduct to reason s dictates is the highest natural perfection that his activities can possess; it is what is meant by rectitude of conduct, righteousness, or the moral good. “Those actions”, says St. Thomas, “are good which are conformable to reason. Those are bad which are contrary to reason” (I-II:18:5). “The proximate rule of free action is reason, the remote is the eternal law, that is, the Divine Nature” (I-II:21:1, I-II:19:4). The motive impelling us to seek the moral good is not self-interest, but the intrinsic worth of righteousness. Why does a just man pay is debts? Ask him and he will reply, perhaps, n the first instance, “Because it is my duty”. But ask him further: “Why do you fulfill this duty?” He will answer: “Because it is right to do so”. When other goods are pursued in violation of the rational order, action is deprived of its due moral perfection and, therefore, becomes wrong or bad, though it may retain all its other ontological goodness. The good which is the object of such an action, although it retains its particular relative goodness with regard to the want which it serves, is not a good for the whole personality. For example, if, on a day when flesh meat is forbidden, a man dines on roast-beef, the food is just as good physically as it would be on any other day, but this goodness is outweighed, because his action is a violation of reason which dictates that he ought to obey the command of lawful authority.
While the moral good is fixed by the Author of nature, yet, because man is endowed with free will or the power of electing which good he shall make the goal of action, he can, if he pleases, ignore the dictates of right reason and seek his other goods in a disorderly manner. He may pursue pleasure, riches, fame, or any other desirable end, though his conscience — that is, his reason — tells him that the means which he takes to satisfy his desire is wrong. He thereby frustrates his rational nature and deprives himself of his highest perfection. He cannot change the law of things, and this privation of his highest good is the immediate essential punishment incurred by his violation of the moral law. Another punishment is that the loss is attended, generally speaking, by that peculiar painful feeling called remorse; but this effect may cease to be perceived when the moral impulses of reason have been habitually disregarded.
In order that an action mayy posses in an essential degree — no action is absolutely perfect — its moral perfection, it must be in conformity with the law in three respects: The action, considered under the character by which it ranks as an element of conduct, must be good. The physical act of giving another person money may be either an act of justice, when one pays a debt, or it may be an act of mercy or benevolence, as it is if one give the money to relieve distress. Both, of these actions possess the fundamental element of goodness (bonum ex objecto). The motive, if there is a motive beyond the immediate object of the act, must also be good. If one pays a man some money that one owes him with the purpose, indeed, of paying one s debts, but also with the ulterior purpose of enabling him to carry out a plot to murder one s enemy, the end is bad, and the action is thereby vitiated. The end which is the motive must also be good (bonum ex fine). Thus, an action, otherwise good, is spoiled if directed to an immoral end; conversely, however, an action which in its fundamental character is bad is not rendered good by directing it to a good end. The end does not justify the means. The circumstances under which the action is performed should be in entire conformity with reason, otherwise it lacks something of moral completeness, though it may not be thereby rendered totally immoral. We frequently say that something which a person has done was right enough in itself, but he did not do it in the proper place or season. This triple goodness is expressd in the axiom: bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu (“An action is good when good in every respect; it is wrong when wrong is any respect”).
(B) The Ultimate Good — God — Beatitude
The perfection of life, then, is to realize the moral good. But now arises the question: “Is life its own end?” Or, in other words: “What is the ultimate end appointed for man?” To answer this question we must consider the good first under the aspect of end. We consider the good first under the aspect of end. “We not alone act”, says St. Thomas, “for an immediate end, but all our actions converge towards an ultimate end or good, otherwise the entire series would be aimless.” The test by which we may determine whether any object of pursuit is the ultimate end is: “Does it satisfy all desire?” If it does not, it is not adequate to complete man’s perfection and establish him in the possession of his highest good and consequent happiness. Here St. Thomas, following St. Augustine, examines the various objects of human desire — pleasure, riches, power, fame, etc. — and rejects them all as inadequate. What then is the highest good, the ultimate end? St. Thomas appeals to Revelation which teaches that in life to come the righteous shall possess and enjoy God himself in endless fruition. The argument is summed up in the well-known words of St. Augustine: “Thou has made us, O Lord, for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they rest in Thee”. The moral condition necessary to this future consummation is that our wills be here conformed to the Divine will as expressed in the moral law and in His revealed positive law. Thus the attainment of the proximate good in this life leads to the possession of the Supreme Good in the next. Another condition indispensable is that our actions be vivified by Divine grace. What precisely will be the act by which the soul will apprehend the Sovereign Good is a disputed question among theologians. The Thomist theory is that it will be an act of the intellect, while the Scotist opinion is that it will be an act of the will. However this may be, one thing is dogmatically certain: the soul in this assimilation shall not lose its selfhood, nor be absorbed according to the pantheistic sense in the Divine Substance.
A word or two may be added upon a point which owing to the prevalence of kantian ideas is of actual importance. As we have seen, the moral good and the supreme good are ends in themselves; they are not means, nor are they to be pursued merely as means to pleasure or agreeable feeling. But may we make the agreeable any part of our motive? Kant answers in the negative; for to allow this to enter into our motive is to vitiate the only moral motive, “right for right’s sake,” by self interest. This theory does not pay due regard to the order of things. The pleasurable feeling attendant upon action, in the order of nature, established by God, served as a motive to action, and its function is to guarantee that actions necessary welfare shall not be neglected. Why, then, should it be unlawful to aim at an end which God has attached to the good? Similarly as the attainment of our supreme good will be the cause of everlasting happiness, we may resonably make this accompanying end the motive of our action, provided that we do not make it the sole or predominant motive.
In conclusion, we may now state in a word the central idea of our doctrine. God as Infinite Being is Infinite Good; creatures are good because they derive their measure of being from Him. This participation manifests His goodness, or glorifies God, which is the end for which he created man. The rational creature is destined to be united to God as the Supreme End and Good in a special manner. In order that he may attain to this consummation, it is necessary that in this life, by conforming his conduct to conscience, the interpreter of the moral law, he realizes in himself the righteousness which is the true perfection of his nature. Thus God is the Supreme Good, as principle and as end. “I am the beginning and I am the end.”
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St. Thomas, S. Theol., I, QQ. v, vi, xliv, xlvii, lxv; I-II, v, xvii-xx, xciv; IDEM, Summa Contra Gentiles, tr. RICKABY, God and His Creatures (London, 1905). II, xxiii; III, i-xi lxxxi,cxvi; ST. AUGUSTINE, De Natura Boni; IDEM, De Doctrina Christiana; IDEM, De Civitate Dei: PLATO, Republic, IV-X; IDEM, Phaero, 64 sqq,; IDEM, Theatetus; ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, I, II, IV, VI; IDEM, Nicomach. Ethics, I, i-iv; IX; X; BOUQUILLON, Theologia Fundamentalis, lib. I; lib, III, tract. i; lib. IV; all textbooks of Scholastic philosophy-goo is treated in ontology and in ethics; RICKABY, Moral Philosophy (London, 1901); MIVART, On Truth, sect. iii, iv (London, 1889); TURNER, History of Philosophy (Boston and London, 1903), passim; JANET AND SEAILLES, History of the Problems of Philosophy, ed. JONES (London and new york, 1902), II, i, ii; FARGES, La liberte et le Devoir, pt. II, iii; MCDONALD, The principles of Moral Science, bk. I, chs i-vi, xl; HARPER, The Metaphysic of the School (London, 1884), vol. I, bk. II, ch.iv.
JAMES J FOX Transcribed by Beth Ste-Marie
The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume VICopyright © 1909 by Robert Appleton CompanyOnline Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. KnightNihil Obstat, September 1, 1909. Remy Lafort, CensorImprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York
Fuente: Catholic Encyclopedia
Good
(Lat. bonum) is variously defined by moralists, according to the nature of their ethical theories. The Stoic would define it to be that which is according to nature; the Epicurean, that which increases pleasure or diminishes pain; the Idealist, that which accords with the fitness of things; the Christian theologian, that which accords with the revealed will of God. So the philosophical schools give various and even contradictory definitions of the highest good (summumsbonum). Thus Aristippus placed it in pleasure in activity; Epicurus, in pleasure in repose; Zeno, in tranquillity of mind; Kant, in well being conditioned on morality; the Materialists, in self-love.
Schleiermacher states his views of. the subject as follows: In ethics there are three fundamental conceptions duty, virtue, good. Duty is the obligation of morals action; virtue is the moral power of the agent; the highest good is the objectives aim of both. In the Systems of Kant and Fichte, ethics is the doctrine of duty, and its development becomes simply a treatment of individual virtues. In opposing this view, Schleiermacher maintains that a system of moral precepts, or formulas of duty, even though it might embrace the whole life of man, could only be applied in isolated cases and single acts, leaving the moral life as a whole. still unexplained. It is only in a very limited sphere that a moral agent acts alone, and without reference to other agents; and his virtue has relation to a general state of things, to produce which other agents cooperate. Schleiermacher charges the existing ethical systems with making an unnatural schism between the law of action (duty) and the active power (virtue) on the one hand, and the resulting actions on the other hand; and also with leaving entire spheres of human action, of unquestionably moral character, in the domain of adiaphora (things indifferent), instead of brinmging them under the authority of moral law. To remedy these alleged confusions, Schleiermacher seeks for an organic principle of ethics, which shall be at once objective, systematic, and comprehensive. He finds it in the highest good, which can be completely apprehended, not in its relations to the individual merely, but with reference to the human race as a whole. From this principle the whole sphere of ethics may be mapped, placing universal nature on the one hand, and the organizing reason (the universal reason of humanity) on the other. In this theory Schleiermacher expressly recognizes the authority of Plato, who, in his Philebus investigated the “highest good.” Aristotle, in whom the idea of virtue was the highest, places the highest good in , individual happiness not, however, in the Epicurean sense, but in the sense of , the working out or realization of a perfect life through perfect virtue.
In the further development of the history of ethics, so far as relates to the definition of the “highest good,” we must particularly notice the distinction (1) between the individual and the general, indicated in Plato and Aristotle, and carried to the greatest extent by Epicurus and the Stoics; (2) the resulting distinction between the objective and subjective, according to which the “highest good” is, on the one hand, a condition of man (e.g. Epicurean enjoyment, Stoical endurance); or, on the other hand, a product of human activity, the end of humanity as a whole;. (3) the consequent moral theories of pleasure or of activity, according to the farmer of which the “highest good” lies in enjoyment, while according to the latter it lies in moral activity. In the language of Christian theology “the highest good” is the kingdom of God, which includes within itself all ethical elements, the individual and the general, activity and happiness, theory and practice, means and end. The means of securing the “highest good” is to promote the advancement of that kingdom; the end, the “highest good” itself, is the coming. of that kingdom, to the individual. in his personal salvation to the universal race, in the realization of the promise “God shall be all in all!” See Schleiermacher, Ethische Abhandlungen, in his Phil. Nachlassen, 2:12, 13; Herzog, Real-Encyklop. s.v. Ethik, Tugend.
Fuente: Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature
Good
GOOD (, ).It is not easy to define Christs idea of what is good. His expressions vary from a conception of the Good as one with the infinitely and inimitably Perfect to the most commonplace uses of the word. He speaks of old wine as good (Luk 5:39), of the wedding-guests as both bad and good (Mat 22:10), of salt as good (Mar 9:50 || Luk 14:34), of certain ground as being good (Mar 4:8 || Luk 8:8), of God making his sun to rise on the evil and on the good (Mat 5:45), and He says of Judas, Good () were it for that man if he had not been born (Mat 26:24 || Mar 14:21). Yet when the young ruler comes to Him with the same conventional usage of the word, Good Master ( ), what good thing shall I do to inherit eternal life? (Mar 10:17 || Luk 18:18; cf. Mat 19:16 f. and WH [Note: H Westcott and Horts text.] s Notes on Select Readings ad loc.), Jesus rejects the title as applied to Himself, and asserts that none is good save one, even God. Whether this be read as not denying that He is good, but insisting that none should call Him so who did not believe Him to be God (Liddon, Bampt. Lect. i. 23), or as the self-judgment which felt hurt by the epithet good (Martineau, Seat of Authority, 651), there can be little doubt that Jesus purposely made use of the young mans phrase to point him to the ideal Good. Behind the things to be done, which were in the questioners mind,greater than matters of law or ritual, or even charity,was the necessity that he should recognize the Supreme Good, the Eternal Spirit of all goodness. This did not imply that man should be hopeless of attaining a certain measure of the good, that it was something beyond the reach of the race, but that the fundamental idea of the good is God, and that to define or limit it is as impossible as to define or limit the Eternal Himself. Only on this occasion does Jesus so suddenly soar beyond the intention of any questioner who approaches Him. Elsewhere He tells a parable, and puts into the mouth of the master of the vineyard (a most human representative of the Heavenly Master) the question, Is thine eye evil because I am good? (Mat 20:15); and He speaks of the good man who out of his good treasure bringeth forth good things (Mat 12:35 || Luk 6:45). So we may look upon the story of the Rich Young Man as a unique expression of Christs highest thought of the Good, but not as thereby ruling out all lesser conceptions. A man may begin to do good or to live a good life before he learns that the foundation of all the good he accomplishes or attains to is God Himself; that no ethical aims are good which lack a Divine sanction. It is better for a man when this inward recognition of the Eternal Goodness precedes the active goodness of his life, for then he finds the peculiar secret of St. Pauls dogma (Rom 8:28), All things work together for good to them that love God. But the doing of good for its own sake may be a mans first step towards the Kingdom of God, and later he will be prepared for any self-denial or self-sacrifice that may bring him nearer the heavenly perfection (Mat 18:8 || Mar 9:43; Mar 9:45; Mar 9:47), when he has learned that it is Gods Kingdom he approaches and not the invention of his own sympathetic impulses alone.
In line with this thought of Christs is the liberty in the modes of doing good which He frequently asserted. With Him the present was always the fitting opportunity of the good, though He might occasionally ask the opinion of the Pharisees and scribes as to whether it was lawful to do good on the Sabbath (Mat 12:12 | Mar 3:4, Luk 6:9).
Some element of altruism enters into all His conceptions of good. The Greek masters (especially Plato and Aristotle) assert the good of a man to lie in his well-being (Sidgwicks constant rendering of ), a condition which depends on certain visible goods that are his own personal possession, and in no way bring him into contact with less fortunate men, such good things as wealth, health, beauty, and intellect. But Christ regards that alone as good which lessens the distance between man and man, and man and God. The good a man should seek is that of each and all men, even them that hate you (Luk 6:27), for the doing of good to others is the final test of the practical value of religion, and became the distinctive note of the character of Christ in the Apostolic days when He was described as one who went about doing good and healing (Act 10:38). This is indicative of all the visible elements of the good in His teachings. Love, His supreme dogma, finds its essence in self-surrender. The parables of conduct, such as the Good Samaritan, are insistent upon the actual doing of some good. When Jesus sends the Baptist His own record, the good things that will bear witness to Him, it is a tale of deeds of brotherly kindness, of help for the blind, lame, lepers, deaf, the poor, and even the dead (Mat 11:5). Zacchaeus is assured of his salvation when he has learned to share with his poorer brethren (Luk 19:8-9). The fact of giving is accepted by Christ as the evidence of a desire to do good (Mar 14:7). The good man is not only devout; his personal piety may be the surest basis for the true spirit of goodness in him; but the good must take form in some actual warring with the worlds evils, some earnest attempt to remedy the miseries, sufferings, diseases, afflictions, sorrows, or poverty of men. This is the vital test applied in the great parable of the Judgment (Mat 25:31 ff.). The Son of Man there asks no question as to spiritual apprehension, or intellectual convictions, or ecclesiastical obedience. The kingdom prepared from the foundation of the worldfrom the moment of the birth of mankindis for those who saw and served the King in brethren who were hungry, thirsty, outcasts, naked, sick, or in prison. Christ sanctions the popular judgment of what constitutes a good man,that effectiveness in well-doing which moves steadily and lovingly towards the ultimate conquest of the world, that social message of the gospel which is the enthusiasm of true goodness, and is able to overcome evil with good (Rom 12:21). But all such doing rests on being. It is intimately connected with each mans own spiritual vision and condition, for it is the rudimentary realization of the Kingdom of heaven; it issues from that Kingdom which is within (Luk 17:21), where glory, honour, and peace are the blessings which come to every one that worketh good (Rom 2:10)a Kingdom which a man may never have explored, but which is the ground from which grows all the practical good he does (Mat 12:35). If the tree is good, the fruit is good (Mat 12:33), and when the whole being of a man is awake to the inflowing of the Divine Goodness, he becomes the more keenly sensitive to Righteousness, Truth, Love, and the Brotherhood, and finds increasingly St. Peters utterance at the Transfiguration to be his own: Lord, it is good for us to be here (Mat 17:4, Mar 9:5, Luk 9:33). The Good enters imperceptibly; it is not born of the law, nor of any ethical analysis; and in the unexpectedness of its joy the disciple is conscious of having reached the highest heaven, of having found that delight in whatever is good which helps him to understand the true end of life, to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever.
Edgar Daplyn.
Fuente: A Dictionary Of Christ And The Gospels
Good
good (, tobh, , tubh, , yatabh; , agathos, , agathon, , kalos, , kalon): In English good is used in various senses, most of which are represented in the Bible.
(1) In the Old Testament the commonest word is tobh, occurring very frequently and translated in a great variety of ways. Of the different shades of meaning, which frequently run into each other, the following may be distinguished: (a) Possessing desirable qualities, beneficial, agreeable, e.g. good for food (Gen 2:9); We will do thee good (Num 10:29); Who will show us any good? (Psa 4:6); good tidings of good (Isa 52:7). (b) Moral excellence, piety: to know good and evil (Gen 3:22); that which is right and good (Deu 6:18; 1Sa 12:23); good and bad (1Ki 3:9, the Revised Version (British and American) evil); Depart from evil and do good (Psa 37:27); a good man (Pro 12:2); compare Isa 5:20; Mic 6:8, etc. (c) Kind, benevolent: The men were very good unto us (1Sa 25:15); Give thanks unto Yahweh; for he is good (1Ch 16:34); the good Yahweh (2Ch 30:18); God is good to Israel (Psa 73:1); Yahweh is good to all (Psa 145:9), etc. (d) Serviceable, adequate, sufficient: saw the light that it was good (Gen 1:4; so Gen 1:10, Gen 1:12 etc.); not good that the man should be alone (Gen 2:18); in the frequent phrase, if it seem good (1Ch 13:2; Est 5:4, etc.), sometimes rendered, if it please (Neh 2:5, Neh 2:7; Est 1:19, etc.). (e) Not small or deficient (full, complete): a good old age (Gen 15, 15; Gen 25:8); a good dowry (Gen 30:20); good ears, years, kine (Gen 41:24, Gen 41:26, Gen 41:35); good understanding (1Sa 25:3); good trees – land (2Ki 3:19, 2Ki 3:25), etc. (f) Not blemished, fair, honorable: tender and good (Gen 18:7); good kids (Gen 27:9); good report (1Sa 2:24; compare 2Ki 20:3; Jer 24:2); and the renderings fair (Gen 26:7, etc.), beautiful (2Sa 11:2), pleasant (2Ki 2:19), etc. (g) Pleasure-giving, happy: glad of heart (1Ki 8:66; Est 5:9); sometimes in the King James Version and the Revised Version (British and American) translated merry (Jdg 16:25; 1Sa 25:36; 2Sa 13:28; Pro 15:15, the Revised Version (British and American) cheerful), etc.
Changes that may be noted in the Revised Version (British and American) are such as, good for ready (Isa 41:7); I have no good beyond thee for My goodness extendeth not to thee (Psa 16:2); goodly for good (Psa 45:1); good for goodness (Psa 107:9); good for well (Zec 8:15).
Tubh means something good, e.g. the good of the land (Gen 45:18, Gen 45:20; Deu 6:11; Job 21:16, the Revised Version (British and American) prosperity).
Yatabh, to do good, occurs several times, as, I will surely do thee good (Gen 32:12); to do good (Lev 5:4); Make your ways and your doings good, the Revised Version (British and American) amend (Jer 18:11; Zep 1:12, etc.).
Numerous other Hebrew words are rendered good in various verbal connections and otherwise, as to bring good tidings (2Sa 4:10; Isa 40:9, etc.); take good heed (Deu 2:4; Deu 4:15; Jos 23:11); make good (Exo 21:34), etc.; good will (racon, Deu 33:16; Mal 2:13); what good? the Revised Version (British and American) what advantages? (kishron, Ecc 5:11); good for nothing, the Revised Version (British and American) profitable (caleah, Jer 13:10), etc. In Jer 18:4, as seemed good to the potter, the word is yahsar, which means literally, right.
(2) In the New Testament the words most frequently translated good are agathos and kalos. The former, agathos, denotes good as a quality, physical or moral. Thus, He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good (Mat 5:45); good gifts (Mat 7:11); Good Master (the Revised Version (British and American) Teacher) … Why callest thou me good? none is good save one (Mar 10:17 f; Luk 18:18 f; compare Mat 19:16); they that have done good (Joh 5:29). Sometimes it is equivalent to kind (thus Tit 2:5 the Revised Version (British and American)); to agathon is that which is good (Luk 6:45; Rom 7:13; 1Th 5:15; 1Pe 3:13), etc.; that which is honest, the Revised Version (British and American) honorable (2Co 13:7); meet (Mat 15:26; Mar 7:27); worthy, the Revised Version (British and American) honorable (Jam 2:7); agathon is a good thing, as good things to them that ask him (Mat 7:11); Can any good thing come out of Nazareth? (Joh 1:46), etc.; agathoergeo (1Ti 6:18), and agathopoieo (Mar 3:4; Act 14:17), etc., to do good.
Kalos is properly, beautiful, pleasing, useful, noble, worthy in a moral sense, e.g. that they may see your good works (Mat 5:16); She hath wrought a good work on me (Mat 26:10; Mk 14, 6); the good shepherd (Joh 10:11, Joh 10:14); Many good works have I showed you (Joh 10:32); good and acceptable before God (1Ti 5:4; the Revised Version (British and American) omits good); the good fight (2Ti 4:7); good works (Tit 2:7); the good word of God (Heb 6:5). But it is often practically equivalent to agathos, e.g. good fruit (Mat 3:10); good ground (Mat 13:23); good seed (Mat 13:24); but the idea of useful may underlie such expressions; to kalon is properly that which is beautiful. It occurs in Rom 7:18, Rom 7:21; 1Th 5:21, Hold fast that which is good. In Rom 7 it seems to be used interchangeably with to agathon. In Rom 5:7, the good man (ho agathos) is distinguished from a righteous man (dkaios): For the good man some one would even dare to die (compare Rom 7:16; Heb 5:14; Jam 4:17); kalos, well, pleasantly, is translated good (Luk 6:27; Jam 2:3); kalodidaskalos (Tit 2:3), teachers of good things, the Revised Version (British and American) of that which is good.
Good occurs in the rendering of many other Greek words and phrases, as eudoka, good pleasure (Eph 1:9); good will (Luk 2:14; Phi 1:15); sumphero, to bear together, not good to marry (Mat 19:10), the Revised Version (British and American) expedient; philagathos, a lover of good (Tit 1:8); chrestologa, good words (Rom 16:18, the Revised Version (British and American) smooth speech, etc.).
The following changes in the Revised Version (British and American) may be noted. In Luk 2:14 for men of good will (eudokia) the Revised Version (British and American) reads in whom he is well pleased, margin good pleasure among men, Greek men of good pleasure. The meaning is men to whom God is drawing nigh in goodwill or acceptance; compare Luk 4:19, the acceptable year of the Lord; Luk 4:43, Preach the good tidings of the kingdom of God. In Mat 11:5; Luk 4:43; Luk 7:22; 1Pe 1:25 and (American Standard Revised Version) Rev 14:6 the gospel is changed into good tidings. In Mat 18:8 f; Mar 9:43, Mar 9:15, Mar 9:47; Luk 5:39, good is substituted for better; on the last passage in notes Many authorities read ‘better’; in 1Co 9:15 good … rather for better; good is substituted in Luk 1:19; Luk 8:1 and Act 13:32 for glad; in Act 6:3 for honest; in Heb 13:9 for a good thing. In 2Th 1:11, all the good pleasure of his goodness becomes every desire of goodness (m Gr good pleasure of goodness); in 1Ti 3:2, good (kosmios) becomes orderly. There are many other instances of like changes. See GOODNESS; GOOD, CHIEF.
Fuente: International Standard Bible Encyclopedia
Good
(AS god)
(a) In ethics, morally praise-worthy character, action, or motive.
(b) In axiology, two types of good, goodness, or valueintrinsic and extrinsic or instrumental.
Extrinsic or instrumental goodness depends for its existence upon some object, end or purpose which it serves. It derives its being from its service as an instrument in promoting or sustaining some more ultimate good and finally some ultimate or intrinsic good. It is good which is good for something.
Intrinsic goodness, or that which is good in itself without depending upon anything else for its goodness (though it may for its existence), is conceived in many waysRealists, who agree that goodness is not dependent upon persons for its existence, say good is
anything desirable or capable of arousing desire or interest,
a quality of any desirable thing which can cause interest to be aroused or a capacity for being an end of action,
that which ought to be desired,
that which ought to be.
Subjectivists, who agree that goodness is dependent upon persons for existence, hold views of two sorts
good is partially dependent upon persons as
anything desired or “any object of any interest” (R. B. Perry),
“a quality of any object of any interest” causing it to be desired (A. K. Rogers);
good is completely dependent upon persons as
sittsfaction of any desire or any interest in any object (DeW. H. Parker),
pleasant feeling (Hedonism).
See Value. Opposed to bad, evil, disvalue. — A.J.B.