Necessary
Necessary
According to distinctions of modality (q. v.), a proposition is necessary if its truth is certifiable on a priori grounds, or on purely logical grounds. Necessity is thus, as it were a stronger kind of truth, to be distinguished from the contingent truth of a proposition which might have been otherwise. (As thus described, the notion is of course vague, but it may in various ways be given an exact counterpart in one logistic system or another.)
A proposition may also be said to be necessary if it is a consequence of some accepted set of propositions (indicated by the context), even if this accepted set of propositions is not held to be a priori. See Necessity.
That a propositional function F is necessary may mean simply (x)F(x), or it may mean that (x)F(x) is necessary in one of the preceding senses. — A.C.
Fuente: The Dictionary of Philosophy
Necessary
“necessary” (from ananke, “necessity;” see below), is so rendered in Act 13:46; 1Co 12:22; 2Co 9:5; Phi 2:25; Tit 3:14; Heb 8:3, RV (AV, “of necessity”); for Act 10:24, “near friends,” see NEAR, B.
“a necessity” (see No. 1), is rendered “(it was) necessary” in Heb 9:23, lit., “it was a necessity.” See DISTRESS, A, No. 1.
an adjective akin to the preceding, with epi, used intensively, found only in the neuter form, is used as an adverb signifying “of necessity” and translated as an adjective in Act 15:28, “necessary,” lit., “(things) of necessity.”
Note: For the AV of Act 28:10 see NEED, A, No. 1.