Passion
PASSION
Mal 1:3, suffering; the last sufferings and death of Christ. In Mal 14:15 Jam 5:17, “like passions” is nearly equivalent to “the same human nature.”
Fuente: American Tract Society Bible Dictionary
PASSION
In its general import, signifies every feeling of the mind occasioned by an extrinsic cause. It is used to describe a violent commotion or agitation of the mind; emotion, zeal, ardour, or of ease wherein a man can conquer his desires, or hold them in subjection.
1. As to the number of the passions, Le Brun makes them about twenty,
1. Attention;
2. admiration;
3. astonishment;
4. veneration;
5. rapture;
6. Joy, with tranquillity;
7. desire;
8. laughter;
9. acute pain;
10. pains, simply bodily;
11. sadness;
12. weeping;
13. compassion;
14. scorn;
15. horror;
16. terror or fright;
17. anger;
18. hatred;
19. jealousy;
20. despair.
All these may be represented on canvass by the pencil. Some make their number greater, adding aversion, love, emulation, &c. &c. these, however, may be considered as included in the above list. They are divided by some into public and private; proper and improper; social and selfish passions.
2. The original of the passions are from impressions on the senses; from the operations of reason, by which good or evil are foreseen; and form the recollections of memory.
3. The objects of the passions are mostly things sensible, on account of their near alliance to the body: but objects of a spiritual nature also, though invisible, have a tendency to excite the passions; such as the love of God, heaven, hell, eternity, &c.
4. As to the innocency of the passions; in themselves they are neither good nor evil, but according to the good or ill use that is made of them, and the degrees to which they rise.
5. The usefulness of the passions is considerable, and were given us for a kind of spring or elasticity to correct the natural sluggishness of the corporeal part. They gave birth to poetry, science, painting, music, and all the polite arts, which minister to pleasure; nor are they less serviceable in the cause of religion and truth.
“They, ” says Dr. Watts, “when sanctified, set the powers of the understanding at work in the search of divine truth and religious duty; they keep the soul fixed to divine things; render the duties of holiness much easier, and temptations to sin much weaker; and render us more like Christ, and fitter for his presence and enjoyment in heaven.”
6. As to the regulation of the passions: to know whether they are under due restraints, and directed to proper objects, we must inquire whether they influence our opinions; run before the understanding; engaged in trifling, and neglectful of important objects; express themselves in an indecent manner; and whether they disorder our conduct. If this be the case, they are out of their due bounds, and will become sources of trial rather than instruments of good. To have them properly regulated we should possess knowledge of our duty, take God’s word for our rule, be much in prayer and dependence on the Divine Being.
7. Lastly, we should study the passions. To examine them accurately, indeed, requires much skill, patience, observation, and judgment; but to form any proper idea of the human mind, and its various operations; to detect the errors that arise from heated temperament and intellectual excess; to know how to touch their various strings, and to direct and employ them in the best of all services; I say, to accomplish these ends, the study of the passions is of the greatest consequence. “Amidst the numerous branches of knowledge, ” says Mr. Cogan, “which claim the attention of the human mind, no one can be more important than this. Whatever most intimately concerns ourselves must be of the first moment. An attention, therefore, to the workings of our own minds; tracing the power which external objects have over us; discovering the nature of our emotions and affections; and comprehending the reason of our being affected in a particular manner, must have a direct influence upon our pursuits, our characters, and our happiness.
It may with justice be advanced, that the happiness of ourselves in this department is of much greater utility than abstuser speculations concerning the nature of the human soul, or even the most accurate knowledge of its intellectual powers; for it is according as the passions and affections are excited and directed towards the objects investigated by our intellectual natures that we become useful to ourselves or others: that we rise into respectability, or sink into contempt; that we diffuse or enjoy happiness, diffuse or suffer misery. An accurate analysis of these passions and affections, therefore, is to the moralist what the science of anatomy is to the surgeon. It constitutes the first principles of rational practice; it is, in a moral view, the anatomy of the heart; it discovers why it beats, and how it beats; indicates appearances in a sound and healthy state; detects diseases with their causes, and it is infinitely more fortunate in the power it communicates of applying suitable remedies.”
See Hutcheson, Watts, Le Brun, Cogan, and Davan on the Passions; Grove’s Moral Philosophy, vol. 1: ch. 7; Reid’s Active Powers of Man; Fordyce’s Elements of Mor. Phil. Burke on the Sublime and Beautiful, p. 50.
Fuente: Theological Dictionary
passion
(Latin: passio, a suffering, an affection)
A desire or emotion in which excitement reaches an intense degree. The passions are movements or tendencies of the sensitive appetite toward a sense good or away from a sense evil. The sensitive appetite tends toward the good of the individual animal life or the life of the species. The passions therefore are of the sensitive or animal order and are found in the animal as well as in man. Emotions in man, such as surprise or laughter, that are not concerned with good or evil, are not passions. Again such tendencies in man as are not concerned with the good or evil of sense, but with intellectual or spiritual good or evil, e.g., desire of learning, love, of virtue, are not in the strict sense of the word passions. The good and evil that are the objects of passion are the good and evil of sense, and commonly as presented by the imagination. This fact shows that the passions are fed by the imagination, and that the control of the passions must begin with its control. The passions in themselves are non-moral. Only in so far as they are subject to the will do they come under the moral law. When regulated by reason and subjected to right control of the will, the passions can be considered good and used in the practise and acquisition of virtue. Love and hatred as general tendencies toward good and evil are the generic passions. Under them come desire and aversion, joy and sadness, hope and despair, courage and fear, and anger.
Fuente: New Catholic Dictionary
Passion
(Gr. , to suffer) expresses really the contrary of action. But first in the plural form, and now even in the singular, the word is used to describe a violent commotioi or agitation of the mind emotion, zeal, ardor. In its widest sense it denotes all the states or manifestations of the sensibility every form and degree of feeling. In a more restricted psychological sense it is confined to those states of the sensibility which are turbulent, and weaken our power of self-command. This is also the popular use of the phrase, in which passion is opposed to reason.
(a.) Plato arranged the passions in two classes, the concupiscible and irascible and ; the former springing from the body and perishing with it, the latter connected with the rational and immortal part of our nature, and stimulating to the pursuit of good aid the avoiding of excess and evil. Aristotle included all man’s active principles under one general designation of oretic, and distinguished them into the appetite irascible, the appetite concupiscible, which had their origin in the body, and the body rational (), which is in the will, under the guidance of reason. Descartes and Malebranche have each given a theory and classification of the passions, also Dr. Isaac Watts, Dr. Cogan, and Dr. Hutcheson and Le Brun. The last named makes the number of passions about twenty:
1. attention;
2. admiration;
3. astonishment;
4. veneration;
5. rapture;
6. joy, with tranquillity;
7. desire;
8. laughter;
9. acute pain;
10. pains, simply bodily;
11. sadness;
12. weeping;
13. compassion;
14. scorn;
15. horror;
16. terror or fright;
17. anger;
18. hatred;
19. jealousy;
20. despair.
All these may be represented on canvas by the pencil. Some make their number greater, adding aversion, love, emulation, etc.; these, however, may be considered as included in the above list. They are divided by some into public and private, proper and improper, social and selfish passions.
(b.) The origin of the passions is from impressions on the senses; from the operations of reason, by which good or evil is foreseen; and from the recollections of memory.
(c.) The objects of the passions are mostly things sensible, on account of their near alliance to the body; but objects of a spiritual nature also, though invisible, have a tendency to excite the passions: such as the love of God, heaven, hell, eternity, etc.
(d.) As to the innocency of the passions; in themselves they are neither good nor evil, but according to the good or ill use that is made of them, and the degrees to which they rise.
(e.) The usefulness of the passions is considerable; they were given us for a kind of spring or elasticity to correct the natural sluggishness, of the corporeal part. They give birth to poetry, science, painting, music, and all the polite arts, which minister to pleasure; nor are they less serviceable in the cause of religion and truth. When sanctified, says Dr. Watts, they set the powers of the understanding at work in the search of divine truth and religious duty; they keep the soul fixed to divine things; render the duties of holiness much easier, and temptations to sin much weaker; and render us more like Christ, and fitter for his presence and enjoyment in heaven.
(f.) As to the regulation of the passions: to know whether they are under due restraints and directed to proper objects, we must inquire whether they influence our opinions; run before the understanding; are engaged in trifling, and neglectful of important objects; express themselves in an indecent manner; and whether, they disorder our conduct. If this be the case, they are out of their due bounds, and will become sources of trial rather than instruments of good. To have them properly regulated, we should possess knowledge of our duty, take God’s Word for our rule, be much in prayer and dependence on the Divine Being.
(g.) Lastly, we should study the passions. To examine them accurately, indeed, requires much skill, patience, observation, and judgment; but to form any proper idea of the human mind, and its various operations; to detect the errors that arise from heated temperament and intellectual excess; to know how to touch their various strings, and to direct and employ them in the best of all services to accomplish these ends, the study of the passions is of the greatest consequence. Amid the numerous branches of knowledge, says Mr. Cogan, which claim the attention of the human mind, no one can be more important than this. Whatever most intimately concerns ourselves must be of the first moment. An attention, therefore, to the workings of our own minds; tracing the power which external objects have over us; discovering the nature of our emotions and affections; and comprehending the reason of our being affected in a particular manner, must have a direct influence upon our pursuits, our characters, and our happiness. It may with justice be advanced that the happiness of ourselves in this department is of much greater utility than abtruser speculations concerning the nature of the human soul, or even the most accurate knowledge of its intellectual powers; for it-is according as the passions and affections are excited and directed towards the objects investigated by our intellectual natures that we become useful to ourselves and others; that we rise into respectability or sink into contempt; that we diffuse or enjoy happiness, diffuse or suffer misery. An accurate analysis of these passions and affection, therefore, is to the moralist what the science of anatomy is to the surgeon. It constitutes the first principles of rational practice; it is, in a moral view, the anatomy of the heart; it discovers why it beats, and how it beats; indicates appearances in a sound and healthy state; detects diseases with their causes, and it is infinitely more fortunate in the power it communicates of applying suitable remedies.
See Hutcheson, Watts, Le Brun, Cogan, and Davan On the Passions; Grove, Moral Philos. vol. 1, chap. 7; Reid, Active Powers of Man; Fordyce, Elements of Moral Philos.; Burke, On the Sublime and Beautiful, p. 50; M’Cosh, Hist. of Scottish Philos.; Ueberweg, Hist. of Philos. (see Index in vol. 2); Southern Rev. Oct. 1874, art. 3; New- Englander, Oct. 1872, p. 289.
Fuente: Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature
Passion (2)
is a term ecclesiastically applied to our Lord’s crucifixion (as in Act 1:3, , suffering, as elsewhere rendered). For the detailed circumstances connected with this event, SEE AGONY; SEE CRUCIFIXION; SEE FLAGELLATION, etc. Monographs on the various points may be seen cited in Volbeding, Index Programmatum, p. 50, 52, 60, 62; Hase, Leben Jesu, p. 158, 174. See also Blunt, Hist. Dict. s.v.; Lond. Qu. Rev. January, 1875, p. 106 sq.; Liddon, Div. of Christ; Bunsen, Die heilige Leidensgeschichte (Leips. 1861); Farrar, Life of Christ. For the history, SEE JESUS CHRIST.
Fuente: Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature
Passion
Only once found, in Acts 1:3, meaning suffering, referring to the sufferings of our Lord.
Fuente: Easton’s Bible Dictionary
Passion
PASSION.In Act 14:15 We also are men of like passions with you, passion means feeling or emotion. But in Act 1:3 He showed himself alive after his passion, the word means suffering, as in Wyclifs translation of Heb 2:9 Ihesus for the passioun of deeth, crowned with glorie and honour.
Fuente: Hastings’ Dictionary of the Bible
Passion
We find mention made of our Lord’s passion in the Acts of the Apostles: (Act 1:3) and indeed the whole tendency of the Scriptures is to bring the church acquainted with this one great event, in the sufferings and death of Jesus. The reader will do well to have this always in remembrance in all his researches and enquiries concerning Christ.
Fuente: The Poor Mans Concordance and Dictionary to the Sacred Scriptures
Passion
‘Suffering:’ Christ showed Himself alive after His suffering. Act 1:3.
Fuente: Concise Bible Dictionary
Passion
General references
Act 1:3 Jesus, The Christ, Sufferings of
Fuente: Nave’s Topical Bible
Passion
pathos (G3806) Passion
epithymia (G1939) Lust, Desire, Concupiscence
horme (G3730) Impulse
orexis (G3715) Desire
Pathos is used three times in the New Testament, once in coordination with epithymia and once in subordination to it. In Rom 1:26, the pathe-atimias (G819, vile passions) are lusts that dishonor those who indulge in them. Pathos belongs to the terminology of the Greek schools. Thus Cicero wrote: “What the Greeks call pathe we prefer to term passionsmore than maladies” After Cicero adopted Zeno’s definition of pathos as “an emotion of the mind, turned from correct reason contrary to nature,” he called it “a disturbed impulse of the mind.” According to Diogenes Lartius, Zeno said: “Pathos itself is the irrational movement of the soul contrary to nature or an excessive impulse [horme].” Clement of Alexandria had this definition in mind when he distinguished horme from pathos:
Horme is a thrust of the intellect toward something or from something; pathos is an excessive impulse [horme] which goes beyond the limits of reason, or an impulse [horme] carried beyond bounds and unpersuaded by reason.
In the New Testament, pathos does not have as broad a sense as it did in the Greek schools. In the Greek schools, pathos’s meaning was so much broader than epithymia’s that the latter was only regarded as one of the several pathe of our nature and was used with orge (G3709), phobos (G5401), and the rest. In Scripture, however, epithymia is the more inclusive term and refers to the whole world of active lusts and desiresto all that the sarx (G4561) as the seat of desire and the natural appetites impels. Pathos is the morosa delectatio (capricious delight). It is not so much a disease of the soul in its more active operations as the diseased condition from which these operations arise. Bengel correctly called pathos the morbus libidinis (the disease of passion), rather than the libido (lustfulness, as distinguished from lust). According to Theophylact, “pathos is the frenzy of the body, like a fever or a wound or some disease.” Godet wrote: “The term pathe (passions) has something more ignoble than the word epithymiai (lusts) in Rom 1:24, for it includes a concept more marked by rebuke and shameful bondage.”
Aristotle defined epithymia as “a longing [orexis] for pleasure,” and the Stoics explained it as “an irrational longing [orexis].” Cicero called it “an immoderate desire for the greatest good without being tempered by reason.”The Authorized Version usually translates epithymia as “lust” (Mar 4:19; and often), though sometimes as “concupiscence” (Rom 7:8; Col 3:5) or “desire” (Luk 22:15; Php 1:23). Occasionally, epithymia has a good sense in the New Testament, though usually it means “depraved concupiscence,” not merely “concupiscence.” According to Origen, this was its only sense in the Greek schools. Thus we have epithymia kake (G2556), “evil desires” (Col 3:5); epithymiai sarkikai (G4559), “fleshly lusts” (1Pe 2:11); neoterikai (G3512), “youthful lusts” (2Ti 2:22); anoetoi (G453) kai blaberai (G983), “foolish and harmful lusts” (1Ti 6:9); kosmikai (G2886),”worldly lusts” (Tit 2:12); phthoras (G5356),”corruption… through lust” (2Pe 1:4); miasmou (G3394), “in the lust of uncleanness” (2Pe 2:10); anthropon (G444), “the lusts of men” (1Pe 4:2); tou somatos (G4983),”the lusts of the body” (Rom 6:12); tou diabolou (G1228),”the desires of the devil” (Joh 8:44); tes apates (G539), “the deceitful lusts” (Eph 4:22); tes sarkos (G4561), “the lust of the flesh” (1Jn 2:16); and ton ophthalmon (G3788),”the lust of the eyes” (1Jn 2:16). Epithymia also is used without a qualifying term. Vitringa’s definition of epithymia is correct: “That corrupt disposition of the will which leads to striving after what is acquired illegally or which strives in an irregular manner after what it acquires illegally.” This evil sense of epithymia also appears in other definitions, such as that of Clement of Alexandria: “An irrational pretext and longing [orexis] for what is gratifying.” Clement also noted: “Those who are skillful at these matters distinguish between orexin and epithymias; the latter they assign to areas of pleasure and wantonness as not directed by reason, and the former as an emotion guided by reason in areas which by nature are necessary.” Primarily, Clement pointed to Aristotle as one who is skillful. Formerly, the English word lust, whose history is similar to that of epithymia, was harmless enough. We have already traced the relation of epithymia to pathos.
Horme occurs twice in the New Testament (Act 14:5; Jam 3:4), and orexis occurs once (Rom 1:27). Elsewhere, these words often are found together, as in Plutarch and Eusebius. On one occasion, Cicero translated horme as appetitio (desire) and as appetitus animi (desire of the soul) on another. The Stoics said: “He horme is a person’s reason compelling him to act” and further explained it as an “impulse of the mind” or “impulse of the soul toward something.” Horme is orexis if it is toward a thing and ekklisis if it is from a thing. When the Authorized translators translated horme as “assault” (Act 14:5), they ascribed more to it than it implies. Certainly there was no actual “assault” on the house where Paul and Barnabas stayed, for in this case it would have been unnecessary for Luke to tell us that they “became aware” (Act 14:6) of it. Rather there was only a purpose and intention of assault.In Jam 3:4, the horme of the pilot is not the “assault of the arms” but the “eager attempt of the will.”
Although horme frequently refers to a hostile motion toward an object for the purpose of propelling and repelling it further from itself, orexis always refers to reaching toward an object for the purpose of drawing the object to itself and making it its own. Orexis is commonly used to refer to the appetite for food, as is the Latin orexis (appetite), which was used during Latin’s “silver age.” In the Platonic Definitions (414b), philosophy is described as a “desire for the knowledge of the eternal entities.” The context of the one passage in the New Testament where orexis occurs (Rom 1:27) reveals Paul’s view of the nature of the vile pleasures that the heathens reach out for and seek.
Fuente: Synonyms of the New Testament
Passion
“a suffering” or “a passive emotion,” is translated “passions” in Rom 7:5, RV, “(sinful) passions,” AV, “motions,” and Gal 5:24, RV; see AFFECTION, A, No. 3, AFFLICT, B, No. 3.
see AFFECTION, A, No. 1.
“to suffer,” is used as a noun, in the aorist infinitive with the article, and translated “passion” in Act 1:3, of the suffering of Christ at Calvary. See SUFFER.
“of like feelings or affections” (homoios, “like,” and A, No. 2; Eng., “homeopathy”), is rendered “of like passions” in Act 14:15 (RV marg., “nature”); in Jam 5:17, RV, ditto (AV, “subject to like passions”).