Person
PERSON
An individual substance of a rational intelligent nature. Some have been offended at the term persons as applied to the Trinity, as unwarrantable. The term person, when applied to Deity, is certainly used in a sense somewhat different from that in which we apply to one another; but when it is considered that the Greek words to which it answers, are, in the New Testament, applied to the Father and Son, Heb 1:3. 2Co 4:6. and that no single term, at least, can be found more suitable, it can hardly be condemned as unscriptural and improper. There have been warm debates between the Greek and Latin churches about the words hypostasis and persona; the Latin concluding that the word hypostasis signified substance or essence, thought that to assert that there were three divine hypostases was to say that there were three gods. On the other hand, the Greek church thought that the word person did not sufficiently guard against the Sabellian notion of the same individual Being sustaining three relations; whereupon each part of the church was ready to brand the other with heresy, till by a free and mutual conference in a synod at Alexandria, A. D. 362, they made it appear that it was but a mere contention about the grammatical sense of a word; and then it was allowed by men of temper on both sides, that either of the two words might be indifferently used.
See Marci Medulla, 50: 5.& 3; Ridgley’s Divinity, qu. 11; Hurrion on the Spirit, p. 140; Doddridge’s Lectures, lec. 159; Gill on the Trinity, p. 93; Watts’ works, vol. 5: p. 48, 208; Gill’s body of Divinity, vol. 1: p. 205, 8 vo. Edwards’ History of Redemption, p. 51, note; Horae sol. vol. 2: p. 20.
Fuente: Theological Dictionary
person
(Latin: persona, mask)
A complete individual rational or intelligent nature, distinct from, and incommunicable to, every other being, so that it exists and acts “of its own right” (sui juris), autonomously, independently of every other being except the Creator. Briefly it is a rational or intelligent individual. The attributes and actions of an intellective nature are always referred to the person present. This person is not communicable ”as an accident” since it is a substance – not ”as a universal” to individuals since it is itself an individual – not ”as an integral part” to a whole, as a foot or hand to the whole body, nor ”as an essential part” to the whole as the body or the soul to the composite, since it is itself “complete” – nor can it be communicated to, or assumed by, a higher person by which it would be controlled and to which its actions would be referred, since it has a perfection giving it its “own proper independent existence” called subsistence.
The latter perfection by which a complete individual rational nature is rendered incommunicable to another being and hence a person according to the common opinion of Scholastics is some positive perfection, really distinct from the complete individual nature. By many it is considered to be a “substantial mode” perfecting the nature in the line of substance and rendering it independent and incapable of being communicated to or assumed by another.
Since the human nature of Christ was communicated to or assumed by the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, there was no human person in Christ, only the one Divine Person. To this Person were referred all the acts of Christ’s human nature. There are three persons in God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, really distinct as persons although possessing the same nature. Personality in the Trinity is based on the “opposition” of the relative perfections, which are founded on the Son’s having been “generated” and on the Holy Ghost’s having “proceeded” from the Father and the Son. The Divine Substance or Essence as such is not a person, since it is communicated to the three Divine Persons.
PERSONALITY
That substantial permanent being which is the subject of, and to which are referred, all the states and acts of an intellective being. It is that which is understood by the “I,” the “self.” It remains numerically and essentially the same throughout life, differing at various times only in accidents, in super-added states or acts. Since the sensations of “seeing,” “hearing,” etc.” modify the “self,” personality consists of body as well as soul; Personality in this sense is a particular view of the Scholastic “person.” Personality (as a perfection) differs from individuality. Individuality is that perfection by which a being is rendered unique, distinctive, and separate from others, incapable of being duplicated into another of that same being. It is possessed by inanimate objects, by plants, and by animals, as well as by men. Personality, however, is that perfection by which a being has control, control of self and of others through self, is free and independent, and superior to material forces, dominates instead of being dominated. Hence it is possessed only by beings with a spiritual principle. One could possess great individuality through remarkable “uniqueness” and distinctiveness and yet have little personality, due to his dependence and inability to control himself and others. Most moderns place personality in self-consciousness or in freedom or in some act. Self-consciousness “manifests” the personality but does not constitute it. Consciousness is the modification of some thing, which thing is the self, the person or the personality. Likewise there must be some being which is free and which acts, and that being is the person.
Fuente: New Catholic Dictionary
Person
The Latin word persona was originally used to denote the mask worn by an actor. From this it was applied to the role he assumed, and, finally, to any character on the stage of life, to any individual. This article discusses (1) the definition of “person”, especially with reference to the doctrine of the Incarnation; and (2) the use of the word persona its Greek equivalents in connection with the Trinitarian disputes. For the psychological treatment see PERSONALITY.
(1) Definition
The classic definition is that given by Boethius in “De persona et duabus naturis”, c. ii: Naturæ rationalis individua substantia (an individual substance of a rational nature).
Substantia — “Substance” is used to exclude accidents: “We see that accidents cannot constitute person” (Boethius, op. cit.). Substantia is used in two senses: of the concrete substance as existing in the individual, called substantia prima, corresponding to Aristotle’s ousia prote; and of abstractions, substance as existing in genus and species, called substantia secunda, Aristotle’s ousia deutera. It is disputed which of the two the word taken by itself here signifies. It seems probable that of itself it prescinds from substantia prima and substantia secunda, and is restricted to the former signification only by the word individua.
Individua — Individua, i.e., indivisum in se, is that which, unlike the higher branches in the tree of Porphyry, genus and species, cannot be further subdivided. Boethius in giving his definition does not seem to attach any further signification to the word. It is merely synonymous with singularis.
Rationalis naturae — Person is predicated only of intellectual beings. The generic word which includes all individual existing substances is suppositum. Thus person is a subdivision of suppositum which is applied equally to rational and irrational, living and non-living individuals. A person is therefore sometimes defined as suppositum naturae rationalis.
The definition of Boethius as it stands can hardly be considered a satisfactory one. The words taken literally can be applied to the rational soul of man, and also the human nature of Christ. That St. Thomas accepts it is presumably due to the fact that he found it in possession, and recognized as the traditional definition. He explains it in terms that practically constitute a new definition. Individua substantia signifies, he says, substantia, completa, per se subsistens, separata ab aliia, i.e., a substance, complete, subsisting per se, existing apart from others (III, Q. xvi, a. 12, ad 2um).
If to this be added rationalis naturae, we have a definition comprising the five notes that go to make up a person: (a) substantia– this excludes accident; (b) completa– it must form a complete nature; that which is a part, either actually or “aptitudinally” does not satisfy the definition; (c) per se subsistens–the person exists in himself and for himself; he is sui juris, the ultimate possessor of his nature and all its acts, the ultimate subject of predication of all his attributes; that which exists in another is not a person; (d) separata ab aliis–this excludes the universal, substantia secunda, which has no existence apart from the individual; (e) rationalis naturae–excludes all non-intellectual supposita.
To a person therefore belongs a threefold incommunicability, expressed in notes (b), (c), and (d). The human soul belongs to the nature as a part of it, and is therefore not a person, even when existing separately. The human nature of Christ does not exist per se seorsum, but in alio, in the Divine Personality of the Word. It is therefore communicated by assumption and so is not a person. Lastly the Divine Essence, though subsisting per se, is so communicated to the Three Persons that it does not exist apart from them; it is therefore not a person.
Theologians agree that in the Hypostatic Union the immediate reason why the Sacred Humanity, though complete and individual, is not a person is that it is not a subsistence, not per se seorsum subsistens. They have, however, disputed for centuries as to what may be the ultimate determination of the nature which if present would make it a subsistence and so a person, what in other words is the ultimate foundation of personality. According to Scotus, as he is usually understood, the ultimate foundation is a mere negation. That individual intellectual nature is a person which is neither of its nature destined to be communicated–as is the human soul–nor is actually communicated–as is the Sacred Humanity. If the Hypostatic Union ceased, the latter would ipso facto, without any further determination, become a person. To this it is objected that the person possesses the nature and all its attributes. It is difficult to believe that this possessor, as distinct from the objects possessed, is constituted only by a negative. Consequently, the traditional Thomists, following Cajetan, hold that there is a positive determination which they call the “mode” of subsistence. It is the function of this mode to make the nature incommunicable, terminated in itself, and capable of receiving its own esse, or existence. Without this mode the human nature of Christ exists only by the uncreated esse of the Word.
Suarez also makes the ultimate foundation of personality a mode. In his view, however, as he holds no real distinction between nature and esse, it does not prepare the nature to receive its own existence, but is something added to a nature conceived as already existing. Many theologians hold that the very concept of a mode, viz., a determination of a substance really distinct from it but adding no reality, involves a contradiction. Of more recent theories that of Tiphanus (“De hypostasi et persona”, 1634) has found many adherents. He holds that a substance is a suppositum, an intelligent substance a person, from the mere fact of its being a whole, totum in se. This totality, it is contended, is a positive note, but adds no reality, as the whole adds nothing to the parts that compose it. In the Hypostatic Union the human nature is perfected by being assumed, and so ceases to be a whole, being merged in a greater totality. The Word, on the other hand, is not perfected, and so remains a person. Opposing theologians, however, hold that this notion of totality reduces on analysis to the Scotistic negative. Lastly the neo-Thomists, Terrien, Billot, etc., consider personality to be ultimately constituted by the esse, the actual existence, of an intelligent substance. That which subsists with its own esse is by that very fact incommunicable. The human nature of Christ is possessed by the Word and exists by His infinite esse. It has no separate esse of its own and for this reason is not a person. The suppositum is a suppositum as being ens in the strictest sense of the term. Of all Latin theories this appears to approach most nearly to that of the Greek fathers. Thus in the “Dialogues of the Trinity” given by Migne among the works of St. Athanasius, the author, speaking of person and nature in God, says: He gar hypostasis to einai semainei he de theotes to ti einai (Person denotes esse, the Divine nature denotes the quiddity; M. 28, 1114). An elaborate treatment is given by St. John Damascene, Dial. xlii.
(2) The use of the word persona and its Greek equivalents in connection with the Trinitarian disputes
For the constitution of a person it is required that a reality be subsistent and absolutely distinct, i.e. incommunicable. The three Divine realities are relations, each identified with the Divine Essence. A finite relation has reality only in so far as it is an accident; it has the reality of inherence. The Divine relations, however, are in the nature not by inherence but by identity. The reality they have, therefore, is not that of an accident, but that of a subsistence. They are one with ipsum esse subsistens. Again every relation, by its very nature, implies opposition and so distinction. In the finite relation this distinction is between subject and term. In the infinite relations there is no subject as distinct from the relation itself; the Paternity is the Father–and no term as distinct from the opposing relation; the Filiation is the Son. The Divine realities are therefore distinct and mutually incommunicable through this relative opposition; they are subsistent as being identified with the subsistence of the Godhead, i.e. they are persons. The use of the word persona to denote them, however, led to controversy between East and West. The precise Greek equivalent was prosopon, likewise used originally of the actor’s mask and then of the character he represented, but the meaning of the word had not passed on, as had that of persona, to the general signification of individual. Consequently tres personae, tria prosopa, savoured of Sabellianism to the Greeks. On the other hand their word hypostasis, from hypo-histemi, was taken to correspond to the Latin substantia, from sub-stare. Tres hypostases therefore appeared to conflict with the Nicaean doctrine of unity of substance in the Trinity. This difference was a main cause of the Antiochene schism of the fourth century (see MELETIUS OF ANTIOCH). Eventually in the West, it was recognized that the true equivalent of hypostasis was not substantia but subsistentia, and in the East that to understand prosopon in the sense of the Latin persona precluded the possibility of a Sabellian interpretation. By the First Council of Constantinople, therefore, it was recognized that the words hypostasis, prosopon, and persona were equally applicable to the three Divine realities. (See INCARNATION; NATURE; SUBSTANCE; TRINITY.)
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BOETHIUS, De Persona et Duabus Naturis, ii, iii, in P.L., LXIV, 1342 sqq.; RICKABY, General Metaphysics, 92-102, 279-97 (London, 1890); DE REGNON, Etudes sur la Triniti, I. studies i, iv; ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, III, Q. xvi, a. 12; De Potentia, ix, 1-4; TERRIEN, S. Thomae Doctrina de Unione Hypostatica, bk. I, c. vii; bk. III, cc. vi-vii (Paris, 1894); FRANZELIN, De Verbo Incarnato, sect. III, cc. iii-iv (Rome, 1874); HARPER, Metaphysics of the School, vol. I, bk. III, c. ii, art. 2 (London, 1879).
L.W. GEDDES Transcribed by Rosalie Nesbit
The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XICopyright © 1911 by Robert Appleton CompanyOnline Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. KnightNihil Obstat, February 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., CensorImprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York
Fuente: Catholic Encyclopedia
Person
SEE PERSONALITY.
Fuente: Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature
Person
(in Max Scheler) The concrete unity of acts. Individual person, and total person, with the former not occupying a preferential position. — P.A.S.
In scholasticismThe classic definition is given by Boethiusperson is an individual substance of rational nature. As individual it is material, since matter supplies the principle of individuation. The soul is not person, only the composite is. Man alone is among the material beings person, he alone having a rational nature. He is the highest of the material beings, endowed with particular dignity and rights. — R.A.
Fuente: The Dictionary of Philosophy
Person
for the meaning of which see APPEARANCE, No. 2, is translated “person” or “persons” in Mat 22:16; Mar 12:14; Luk 20:21; 2Co 1:11; 2Co 2:10; Gal 2:6; Jud 1:16, lit., “(admiring, or showing respect of, RV) persons.”
a generic name for man, is translated “persons” in Rev 11:13, RV (AV, “men”).
Notes: (1) In Heb 1:3, AV, hupostasis, “subtance,” is translated “person;” see SUBSTANCE. (2) In Mat 27:24, RV, toutou, “of this … (man),” is translated “of this … person” (AV). (3) In Phm 1:12, the pronoun autos, “he,” placed in a position of strong emphasis, is translated “in his own person,” RV, stressing the fact that in spite of the Apostle’s inclination to retain Onesimus, he has sent him, as being, so to speak, “his very heart,” instead of adopting some other method. (4) In 1Co 5:13, AV, the adjective poneros, “wicked,” used as a noun, is translated “wicked person” (RV, “… man”). (5) In 2Pe 2:5, AV, ogdoos, “eighth,” is translated “the (lit., ‘an’) eighth person” (RV, “with seven others”). (b) Various adjectives are used with the word “persons,” e.g., “devout, perjured, profane.”