Pragmatic Sanction
pragmatic sanction
(Latin: sanctio pragmatica, decree on public affairs)
An edict formally issued by the emperor, in the later period of the Roman Empire. The name is also given to some famous edicts of the kings of France and Spain. The following are the best known among these decrees:
The Sanctio Pragmatica, said to have been issued by Saint Louis IX of France in 1269, dealing adversely with the papal fiscal and appointative powers in France.
The Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges, 1438, issued by Charles VII of France, accepting much of the reforming decrees of the pseudo-council of Basel. It was a law of the secular legislative power in a purely ecclesiastical affair. Only in 1516 was it withdrawn.
The German Pragmatic Sanction of 1439 issued by the diet of Frankfort, without, however, the ratification of the emperor. It was somewhat similar to the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges.
The Pragmatic Sanction of the Emperor Charles VI, 1719, reserving the Austrian hereditary lands to the female descendants, in case of the failure of male heirs.
The Pragmatic Sanction of Charles III of Spain, 1759, which also dealt wIth the question of succession.
New Catholic Dictionary
Fuente: New Catholic Dictionary
Pragmatic Sanction
(pragmatica sanctio, lex, jussio, also pragmatica or pragmaticum)
Pragmatic sanction meant in the latter period of the Roman Empire an edict formally issued by the emperor. They were called pragmatic, from pragma, the affair or matter of sanction. In later times the best known are:
I. The Sanctio Pragmatica said to have been issued by St. Louis IX of France in 1269
Its purpose was to oppose the extension of papal power, the demands of tribute made by Rome, and the increase of papal reservations in regard to the filling of offices. The rights of prelates, patrons, and the regular collators of benefices were protected against papal collation of benefices. Free elections, promotions, and collations were guaranteed to the cathedrals and other churches. This was directed against the papal right of reservation and presentation, not against the filling of offices by the king. It was further laid down that all promotions, collations, and bestowals of Church offices must be in accordance with the common law, the early councils and the ancient regulations of the Fathers. Simony was forbidden. Papal taxes and imposts were permitted only in case of necessity, and with the permission of the king and the French Church. The liberties and privileges granted to churches, monasteries, and priests by the kings were guaranteed. The investigations of Thomassy (1844), Gérin (1869), Viollet (1870), and Scheffer-Boichorst (1887), have proved that it is a forgery which appeared between 1438 and 1452.
II. The Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges
The Council of Basle (1431-7) had issued many useful decrees concerning reform, but finally came into conflict with Eugenius IV and was suspended by him. Both parties, pope and council, now sought the support of the secular powers. It was to the interest of these to prevent a new schism and not to permit the complete failure of the reforms of Basle. The position of France in regard to these questions was to be discussed at a national council that King Charles VII commanded to meet at Bourges in May, 1438. This council declared itself neutral in the dispute between the pope and the synod, but accepted the greater part of the Basle decrees on reform, modifying some on account of the special conditions in France; these changes were made with the expectation that the council would ratify the modifications. On 7 July, 1438, the king issued a decree, the Pragmatic Sanction, in which he accepted the decisions and ordered the observance of them. Essentially it contains the tenets of the supremacy of an ecumenical council over the pope, of the regular holding of general councils, and of the limitation of papal reservations and demands of tribute. The suppression of annates by the Council of Basle was added, but with the modification that a fifth of the former tax was conceded to the papal see.
By this edict the French king issued a law of the secular legislative authority in purely ecclesiastical affairs. The recognition of the authority of the Council of Basle was only formal, for the validity of its decisions in France rested solely upon the edict of the king. As the law was recorded in the Parliaments these, especially the Parliament of Paris, received the right of interfering in the internal affairs of the Church. In addition, no attention had been paid to the pope, consequently every effort was made at Rome to have the law set aside. Pius II (1458-64) declared it an infringement of the rights of the papal see, and called upon the French bishops to aid in its suppression. Charles VII appealed against this to a general council. His successor Louis XI promised the pope to repeal the sanction, but the Parliament of Paris and the university resisted, and the king let the matter drop. In 1499 Louis XII by explicit declaration renewed the enforcement of the sanction. Leo X effected its annulment by means of a Concordat made with Francis I in 1516.
III. The German Pragmatic Sanction of 1439
At the Diet of Frankfort held in March, 1438, the German ruling princes also declared their neutrality in the struggle between Eugenius IV and the Council of Basle. A new diet was held for further discussion of the matter in March, 1439, at Mainz, and this diet also accepted a series of the Basle decrees of reform with modifications in individual cases. The diet reserved to itself the right to make other changes, and at a convenient time the council was to pass decisions on such points. This is the substance of the “Instrumentum acceptationis” of 26 March, 1439. The designation pragmatic sanction is, however, misleading, for it was not confirmed by the emperor.
IV. The Pragmatic Sanction of the Emperor Charles VI
This edict, issued by the last German male member of the House of Hapsburg regulating the succession to his hereditary lands, was read 19 April, 1713, before the ministers and councillors, but was temporarily kept secret. The law ordained that all the Austrian hereditary lands should always remain united, and that on the failure of male descendants they should pass to the daughters that might be born to the emperor; and not until their descendants died out should the right of succession revert to the daughters of his brother, the Emperor Joseph I (1705-11), and to their male and female descendants. This pragmatic sanction was accepted by the estates of the Austrian lands in 1720-4; then in the course of time it was also recognized and guaranteed by the Powers of Europe, so that after the death of Charles VI his daughter Maria Theresa could succeed.
V. The Pragmatic Sanction of Charles III of Spain
Charles III was King of Naples and Sicily until he succeeded his brother Ferdinand upon the throne of Spain in 1759. The pragmatic sanction that he issued 6 Oct., 1759, before he left Naples, is also an edict of succession. As earlier treaties forbade the union of Spain and Naples, he transferred Naples and Sicily to his third son Ferdinand. Up to Ferdinand’s sixteenth year Naples was to be administered by a regency. The eldest son, Philip, was weak-minded; the second son Charles was to receive Spain. Charles III also provided that in case Ferdinand’s line should become extinct his brothers Philip and Louis were to have the succession. The union of Naples and the Two Sicilies was expressly forbidden in the edict.
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HERGENRÖTHER, Handbuch der allgemeinen Kirchengesch., ed. KIRSCH, II (4th ed., Freiburg, 1904), 600-01, 931; HEFELE, Konziliengeschichte, VII (Freiburg, 1869), 762-70; KOCH, Sanctio pragmatica Germanorum illustrata (Strasburg, 1789); St. Louis and the Pragmatic Sanction in The Month (London, Oct., 1869), 366.
KLEMENS LÖFFLER. Transcribed by Douglas J. Potter Dedicated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ
The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XIICopyright © 1911 by Robert Appleton CompanyOnline Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. KnightNihil Obstat, June 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., CensorImprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York
Fuente: Catholic Encyclopedia
Pragmatic Sanction
was a general term (from , business) for all important ordinances of Church or State-those perhaps more properly which were enacted in public assemblies with the counsel of eminent jurisconsults or pragmatici. The term originated in the Byzantine Empire, and signified there a public and solemn decree by a prince, as distinguished from the simple rescript which was a declaration of law in answer to a question propounded by an individual. But the most familiar application of the term is to the important articles decided on by the great assembly held at Bourges (q.v.) in 1438, convoked and presided over by Charles VII. These articles have been regarded as the great bulwark of the French Church against the usurpation of Rome. King Louis IX had drawn up a pragmatic sanction in 1268 against the encroachments of the Church and court of Rome. It related chiefly to the right of the Gallican Church with reference to the selections of bishops and clergy.
But the great articles of 1438 entirely superseded those of Louis IX; for though they reasserted the rights and privileges claimed by the Gallican Church under that monarch, the articles were chiefly founded on the decrees of the Council of Basle. Some of them relate to the periodical assembling and superior authority of general councils; some to the celebration of divine offices and other matters not connected with papal prerogation; but of the rest it has been truly said that the abuses of the papal prerogation against which they were directed were chiefly connected with its avarice. This was the most unpopular of the vices of the Holy See, and was at the bottom of more than half the grievances which alienated its children from it. Pope Pius II succeeded in obtaining the abrogation of this sanction for a time; but the Parliament of Paris refused to sanction the ignominious conduct of Louis XI in setting it aside, and he was compelled to restore it to its original influential position. Accordingly the pragmatic sanction continued in force till Francis I’s concordat in 1516 supplanted it. Although by the concordat privileges were given and received on both sides, yet the real advantages were on the side of Rome, which advantages it has ever since been her constant aim to improve. See Jervis, Hist. Ch. of France, 1, 23 sq.; Hist. of Popery, p. 202; Gieseler, Eccles. Hist. (see Index to vol. 3); Fisher, Hist. of the Ref. p. 48, 49; Mosheim, Eccles. Hist. vol. 3; Milman, Hist. Latin Christianity (see Index to vol. 8); Hardwick, Hist. of the Church in the Middle Ages, p. 272, 358, 362; id. Ref. p. 7, 353; Waddington, Eccles. Hist. p. 576; Ranke, Hist. of the Papacy, 1, 28 sq.; Aizog, Kirchengesch. 2, 48, 180, 189, 191; Ebrard, Dogmengesch. 4, 206; Brit. Quar. Rev. April, 1873, p. 273.