Property
Property
See Wealth and Community of Goods.
Fuente: Dictionary of the Apostolic Church
property
(Latin: proprius, one’s own)
That which is or may be owned. In its most general sense, it includes life, health, knowledge, and reputation, which belong to individuals. More strictly, it refers to the external material world as it is or may be subjected to ownership. The origin of property rights has occasioned much dispute among philosophers. Among the false theories are those which trace this origin to ordinances of the state (Hobbes, Kant), to an original agreement or contract (Grotius, Pufendorf), to labor expended (Locke, Henry George), to injustice, fraud, and force exerted by the strong upon the weak. The proper view, supported by all available history, is that ownership of property is natural to man, a requirement for individual and social life, obvious in itself, and approved by reasoned consideration. Revelation assures us that God made the earth and all that it contains for the use of man, and that, in addition God explicitly made man the lord and owner of the earth. Property may be owned by man as an individual, or owned in common by social groups. The assignment of property to one or other form of ownership has varied widely in different countries, times, and civilizations. Primitive hunters and nomads have a very restricted private ownership, while our civilization gives private ownership a wide extent and restricts common ownership. Our system is under attack by socialists, who, in general, seek to restore all property to public ownership. Socialists find their strongest argument in the abuses and injustices which are easily discovered in the present distribution of material goods. While facts are indisputable, the socialistic remedy is utopian and illusory, involving more and greater evils than it seeks to cure. The philosophical bases of socialism are likewise condemned: economic determinism, materialism, rejection of religion and ethics. The Christian doctrine of private property teaches that man has a right to own, derived from his nature and God’s institution; that the exercise of this right is limited by the requirements of justice, charity, and religion; that the institution of private property must not be overturned, but that, as far as may be, any abuses involved be corrected.
Fuente: New Catholic Dictionary
Property
I. NOTION OF PROPERTY
The proprietor or owner of a thing, in the current acceptation of the word, is the person who enjoys the full right to dispose of it in so far as is not forbidden by law. The thing or object of this right of disposal is called property, and the right of disposal itself, ownership. Taken in its strict sense, this definition applies to absolute ownership only. As long as the absolute owner does not exceed the limits set by law, he may dispose of his property in any manner whatsoever; he may use it, alienate it, lease it etc. But there is also a qualified ownership. It may happen that several persons have different rights to the same thing, one subordinate to the other: one has the right to the substance, another to its use, a third to its usufruct, etc. Of all these persons he alone is called the proprietor who has the highest right, viz., the right to the substance; the others, whose rights are subordinate, are not called proprietors. The tenant, for example, is not said to be the proprietor of the land he tills, nor the lessee proprietor of the house in which he dwells; for though both have the right of use or usufruct, they have not the highest right, namely the right to the substance. There are two reasons why he to whom the substance of a thing belongs is called its proprietor: first, because the right to the substance is the highest right; secondly, because this right naturally tends to grow into absolute ownership. The tenant, for instance, enjoys the usufruct of a thing only through a cause which lies outside the thing itself, i. e. through a contract. If this cause is removed then he loses his right, and the thing reverts to him to whom the substance belongs. The right to the substance necessarily implies the absolute right of disposal as soon as any accidental, external limitations are removed. This is probably the reason why lawmakers, when establishing the definition of property, take into consideration only absolute ownership. Thus the French civil code (544) defines ownership as “the right to make use and dispose of a corporeal thing absolutely provided it be not forbidden by law or statute”; the code of the German Empire (903) says: “The proprietor of a thing may use it as he likes and exclude from it all outside interference, as long as the law or the rights of others are not violated” and in Blackstone (Comm. I, 138) we read that the right of property “consists in the free use, enjoyment and disposal of all acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land”.
The statement has been made that the Roman law set up a definition of property which is absolute and excludes all legal restrictions. This is not correct. The Roman jurists were too vividly conscious of the principle Salus publica suprema lex to exempt private property from all legal restrictions. No clearer proof is needed than the numerous easements to which the Roman law subjected property (cf. Puchta, “Kursus der Institutionen”, II, 1842, 551 sqq.). Precisely in order to exclude this erroneous conception, the Roman jurists, following the example of Bartolus, generally define perfect ownership as the right to dispose perfectly of a material thing in so far as is not forbidden by law (Jus perfecte disponendi de re corporali nisi lege prohibeatur). Again, man is essentially a social being. Consequently, all rights granted him are subject to the necessary restrictions which are demanded by the common welfare and more accurately determined by law. This right of disposal which the civil power exercises over property has been called dominium altum, but the term is misleading and should be avoided. Ownership gives to a person the right to dispose of a thing for his private interests as he sees fit. The Government has no right to dispose of the property of its subjects for its private interests, but only as far as the common weal requires.
II. CLASSES OF PROPERTY
If the holder of the right of ownership is considered, property is either individual or collective, according as the owner is an individual (a physical person) or a community (a moral person). Individual property is also called private property. Again, collective property differs as the community. Those estates are not collective property which have for ever been set aside for a fixed purpose and are, by a sort of fiction, considered as a person (persona juridica, ficta), for example, endowments for pious purposes or for the public benefit: hospitals orphanages etc. For the actual administrators or usufructuaries are not to be regarded as proprietors of the endowment. Furthermore, property may be either public or private. Public property is the property of a public community, namely, the State and the Church. Everything else is private property. However, the distinction between private and public property arises not only from difference in ownership, but also from difference in purpose. Public property is intended to serve the interests of the community at large; private property, the interests of a limited circle. Family property is private property, even if it belongs to the family as a whole. Not all collective property is public property. The property of a community remains private as long as that community is able to exclude outsiders from participating in its enjoyment. But when a community can no longer prevent outsiders from settling down in its midst and, like the rest, sharing in its property, that property ceases to be private. If we consider the object of ownership, property may be movable or immovable. Immovable property consists in land (real estate), and in everything so attached to the land that, as a rule, it cannot be transferred from one place to another without undergoing a change in its nature. All the rest is movable property. Lastly, the purpose distinguishes property into goods of consumption and goods of production, according as the goods are directly intended either for production, i. e. for producing new goods, or for consumption.
III. POSSESSION OF PROPERTY
Possession differs essentially from property. At times, possession denotes the thing possessed, but generally it means the state of possessing something. He possesses a thing who has actual control over it and intends to keep it. Possession may be unjust, as is the case with the thief who has knowingly taken the property of another. Since such possession is manifestly unjust, it gives the possessor no right whatever. On the other hand, it may happen that one is bona fide possessor of another’s property. Such possession implies certain rights. It is incumbent on the owner to prove that the thing does not belong to the possessor. If he is unable to furnish this evidence, the law protects the actual possessor of the thing under dispute. The basic reason why possession must not be neglected when ownership is disputed is that under normal conditions possession is the result of ownership. For, generally speaking, the possessor is the owner of a thing. This being the normal state of affairs, the law favours the presumption that the actual possessor is also the legal possessor and consequently holds that nobody has the right to evict him unless the illegality be proved. He who seeks to overturn existing conditions as being unjust must bear the burden of proof. Should this principle be denied, the security of property would be greatly endangered.
IV. OPPONENTS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
The present order of society is largely based on the private property of individuals, families, and communities. Now there are many communists and socialists who condemn this kind of ownership as unjust and injurious, and who aim at abolishing either all private property or at least the private ownership of productive goods, which they wish to replace by a community of goods. Their intention may be good, but it proceeds from a total misunderstanding of human nature as it is, and, if carried out, would result in disastrous failure (cf. COMMUNISM and SOCIALISM). The so-called agrarian, socialists, among whom must be numbered the single-taxists, do not propose to abolish private ownership of all productive goods, but maintain only that the land with the natural bounties which it holds out to mankind essentially belongs to the whole nation. As a logical conclusion they propose that ground rent be confiscated for the community. This theory, too, starts from false premises and arrives at conclusions which are impracticable. (See AGRARIANISM.)
V. INSUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
Outside the communistic and socialistic circles all concede that private property is justified; but in regard to its foundation opinions differ widely. Some derive the justice of private property from personality (personality theory). They look upon private property as a necessary supplement and expansion of personality. Thus H. Ahrens (“Naturrecht”, 6th ed., 1871, § 68) thinks that the “individuality of every human mind, in choosing and attaining its ends, requires property, i. e. the free contract and disposal of holdings, whereby the entire personality is brought into action. Similar views are held by Bluntschli, Stahle, and others. This theory admits of a correct explanation, but is in itself too indefinite and vague. If it is understood to mean only that, as a rule, private property is necessary for the free development of the human personality and for the accomplishment of its tasks, then it is correct, as will appear in the course of our discussion. But if these theorists remain within the pure notion of personality, then they cannot derive from it the necessity of private property, at least of productive goods or land. At most they might prove that everybody is entitled to the necessary means of subsistence. But this is possible without private property strictly so called. Those who are either voluntarily or involuntarily poor and live at the expense of others possess no property and yet do not cease to be persons. Though the children of a family are without property during the lifetime of their parents, still they are true persons. Others derive private property from a primitive contract, express or tacit (contract theory), as Grotius (De jure belli et pacis, II, c. 2, § 2), Pufendorf, and others. This theory is founded on the supposition, which has never been and never can be proved, that such a contract ever has or must have taken place. And even supposing the contract was actually made, what obliges us to-day to abide by it? To this question the theory is unable to give a satisfactory answer.
Others again derive the justice of private property from the laws of the State (legal theory). The first to advance this hypothesis was Hobbes (Leviathan, c. 2). He considers the laws of the State as the fountain-head of all the rights which the subjects have, and consequently also as the source of private ownership. The same view is taken by Montesquieu, Trendelenburg, Wagner, and others, as far as ownership is concerned. Kant (Rechtslehre, p. 1, §§ 8, 9) grants indeed a provisory proprietorship in the condition of nature prior to the formation of the State; but definite and peremptory ownership arises only through the civil laws and under the protection of the coercive power of Government. Most of the partisans of this theory, like Hobbes, proceed from the wrong supposition that there is no natural right properly so called, but that every genuine right is a concession of the civil power. Besides, their appreciation of actual facts is superficial. It is true that the laws everywhere protect private property. But why? A fact, like private property, which we meet in one form or another with all nations, ancient or modern, cannot have its last and true reason in the civil laws which vary with time and clime. A universal, constant effect supposes a universal, constant cause, and the civil laws cannot be this cause. If they were the only basis of private property, then we might abolish it by a new law and introduce communism. But this is impossible. Just as the individual and the family existed prior to the State, so the rights necessary for both, to which belongs the right of property, existed prior to the State. It is the duty of the State to bring these rights into harmony with the interests of the community at large and to watch over them, but it does not create them.
John Locke saw the real foundation of private property in the right which every man has to the products of his labour (labour theory). This theory was loudly applauded by the political economists, especially by Adam Smith, Ricardo, Say, and others. But it is untenable. There is no doubt that labour is a powerful factor in the acquisition of property, but the right to the products of one’s labour cannot be the ultimate source and basis of the right of property. The labourer can call the product of his work his own only when the material on which he works is his property, and then the question arises how he came to be the owner of the material. Suppose, for instance, that a number of workmen have been engaged to cultivate a vineyard; after the work is done, they may indeed claim their wages, but the products of their labour, the grapes and the wine, do not belong to them, but to the owner of the vineyard. Then the further question may be asked: How did the owner of the vineyard acquire his property? The final answer cannot be the right to the product of his labour. There were some who asserted that the Roman law derived private property solely from the right of first occupation (jus primi occupantis), as for instance Wagner (Grundlegung 1, c. § 102). But they confound two things. Though the Roman jurists regarded occupation the original title of acquisition, they supposed as self-evident the right of private property and the right to acquire it.
VI. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
The Catholic Church has always regarded private property as justified, even though there may have existed personal abuses. Far from abolishing the commandments of the Old Law (Thou shalt not steal; thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s house, nor anything that is his) Christ inculcated them anew (Matthew 19:18-19; Mark 10:19; Romans 13:9). And though the Catholic Church, following in the footsteps of her Founder, has always recommended voluntary poverty as an evangelical counsel, yet she has at the same time asserted the justice and, as a rule, the necessity of private property and rejected the contrary theories of the Circumcellions, Waldenses, Anabaptists etc. Moreover, theologians and canonists have at all times taught that private ownership is just. Leo XIII, especially in several encyclicals, strongly insisted on the necessity and justice of private ownership. Thus the encyclical “Rerum novarum” expressly condemns as unjust and pernicious the design of the socialists to abolish private property. The right of acquiring private property has been granted by nature, and consequently he who would seek a solution of the social question must start with the principle that private property is to be preserved inviolate (privatas possessiones inviolate servandas). And Pius X, in his Motu Proprio of 18 Dec., 1903, laid down the following two principles for the guidance of all Catholics: (1) “Unlike the beast, man has on earth not only the right of use, but a permanent right of ownership; and this is true not only of those things which are consumed in their use, but also of those which are not consumed by their use”; (2) “Private property is under all circumstances, be it the fruit of labour or acquired by conveyance or donation, a natural right, and everybody may make such reasonable disposal of it as he thinks fit.”
VII. ECONOMIC THEORY BASED ON THE NATURAL LAW
The doctrine of the Church as here explained points out the right way to a philosophical justification of private property. It is derived from the natural law, since the present order in general demands it for the individual as well as for the family and the community at large; hence it is a postulate of reason and everybody receives by nature the right to acquire private property. This justification of private property, which is outlined by Aristotle (Polit., 2, c. 2), may be called the “economical theory based on the natural law”. The necessity of private ownership arises partly from the external conditions of life under which the human race actually exists, partly and especially from human nature as we know it by experience, with all its needs and faculties, inclinations both good and bad, which the average man reveals at all times and in all places. This theory does not assert that there should be nothing else than private property, much less that there should be private property of individuals only. Families, private corporations, communities, and states, as well as the Church, may own property. Its distribution is not something settled by nature uniformly and immutably for all times and circumstances, but full play is given to human liberty. Generally speaking, what is necessary is that private property should also exist. The boundaries between private and public property may vary from age to age; but, as a rule, private ownership becomes the more necessary and the more prevalent the farther the civilization of a people progresses.
In order to gain a clear insight into the basis of property, we must carefully distinguish three things: (1) The institution of private property, i. e. the actual existence of private property with all its essential rights. In general, it is necessary that private property should exist, at least to a certain extent, or, in other words, the natural law demands the existence of private property. From the necessity of private property follows immediately; (2) every man’s right to acquire property. The institution of private property supposes this right; for the former cannot rightly exist unless everybody has the right to acquire private property. Nature, or rather the Author of nature, requires the institution of private property; hence He must also will the means necessary for it, namely, the right of everyone to acquire private property. This right refers to no object in particular; it is merely the general capacity of acquiring property by licit means, just as one may say that owing to the freedom of trade everybody has the right to engage in any legitimate business. The right to acquire property belongs to every man from the first moment of his existence; even the child of the poorest beggar has this right. (3) From the right of acquisition arises the right of owning a certain concrete object through the medium of some fact.
Nobody, basing his claim on his existence alone, can say: this field or this house is mine. God did not distribute immediately the goods of this earth among men. He left this distribution to man’s activity and to historical development. But since private property and consequently the acquisition of a definite object by a definite person is necessary, there must also be some facts on which such acquisition may be based. Among these facts the first in time and by nature is simple occupation. Originally the goods of this earth were without a definite owner, i. e. there was nobody who could call them his exclusive property. But since they had been given to man and since everybody had the right of acquiring property, the first men could take as much of these goods by simple occupation as seemed useful to them. Later generations, too, could make their own such goods as were still without a master. As time went on and the earth was populated, its goods passed more and more into the hands of individuals, families, or whole tribes. Now in order to acquire or occupy something, the mere will to possess it as private property is not sufficient; the object must, by some exterior fact, be brought under our control and must be permanently marked as our own. These marks may be of various kinds and depend on custom, agreement etc.
Philosophical Explanation
We shall prove first of all that, generally speaking, the institution of private property is necessary for human society and that it is consequently a postulate of the natural law; this established, it follows at once that the right of acquiring property is a natural right. The first reason for the necessity of private property is the moral impossibility of any other disposition of property. If all goods remained without a master and were common to all, so that anybody might dispose of them as he saw fit, then peace and order would be impossible and there would be no sufficient incentive to work. Who indeed would care to cultivate a field or build a house, if everybody else were allowed to harvest the crop or occupy the building? Consequently, the right of ownership must rest either wholly with communities, as the communists and socialists maintain, or with private persons. It is impossible to reduce the doctrines of communism and socialism to practice. All attempts hitherto made have ended in failure. Of longest duration were the experiments of some sects which were founded on a religious basis. But it is manifest that communities based on religious fanaticism cannot become the general rule. History, too, testifies to the necessity of private property. An institution which meets us everywhere and at all times with only a few negligible exceptions, which develops more and more among the nations as their civilization advances, which has always been recognized and protected as just cannot be an arbitrary invention, but must be the necessary outcome of the tendencies and needs of human nature. For a universal and permanent phenomenon supposes a universal and permanent cause, and this cause in the present question can only be human nature with its wants and inclinations, which remain essentially the same. Besides, only private property is a sufficient stimulus for man to work. The earth does not furnish the products and fruits which man needs for the sustenance and development of soul and body, except at the expense of hard, continued labour. Now men will not undertake this labour unless they have a guarantee that they can freely dispose of its fruits for their own benefit and can exclude all others from their enjoyment. This argument, however, does not bind us to the labour theory refuted above. This theory maintains that each one can call his property all that and only that which is the product of his labour. This is wrong. The correct theory on the other hand says, if man had not the right to acquire private property, the necessary stimulus to work would be wanting; and the fruit of labour in this theory signifies private property in the widest sense, for instance, wages.
Private ownership alone is able to harmonize order and freedom in the social life. If no one could exclude others from using his property, order would be impossible. Nobody could lay down in advance a plan of his life and activity, or procure in advance the means and the material for his livelihood. If on the other hand productive goods were the property of the community and subject to its administration, liberty would be impossible. Man is not really free unless he can, at least to a certain degree, dispose of external goods at will, not only of goods of consumption but also of productive goods. The largest portion of human activity, directly or indirectly, aims at procuring external, useful goods; without private property, all would lapse into abject dependence on the community, which would be obliged to assign to each man his office and his share of the work. But with private property, both freedom and order can exist as far as the imperfection of all human conditions allows it. This is proved by history and by daily experience. Thus also the peace of society is best guaranteed. True it is that in spite of private property many disputes arise about “mine and thine.” But these are settled by the law courts and do not disturb the essential order of society. In any other disposition of property among free men, the disputes would be far more numerous and violent, and this would necessarily lead to quarrels and feuds. Just as for the individual, so private property is necessary for the family. The family cannot exist as an independent organizm unless it can freely manage its internal affairs, and unless the parents have to provide for the maintenance and education of their children, and this without any external interference. All this demands property, the exclusive use of a dwelling, food, clothes, and other things, which frequently must be procured in advance so that a well-regulated and secure family life may be made possible. Like the individual, the family, when deprived of all property, easily falls into a vagabond life or becomes wholly dependent on the will of others. The duty to care for the preservation and education of the family urges the father and mother to work unceasingly, while the consciousness that they are responsible for their children before God and men is a powerful stay and support of their moral lives. On the other hand, the consciousness of the children that they are wholly dependent on their parents for their maintenance and start in life is a very important element in their education. The socialists are quite logical in seeking to transfer not only the possession of productive goods, but also the care of the education of children to the community at large. But it is obvious that such a scheme would end in the total destruction of the family, and hence that socialism is an enemy of all genuine civilization.
Private property is also indispensable for human society in general. Progress in civilization is possible only when many co-operate in large and far-reaching enterprises; but this co-operation is out of the question unless there are many who possess more than is required for their ample maintenance and at the same time have an interest in devoting the surplus to such enterprises. Private interest and public welfare here meet each other half way. Private owners, if they consult their own interest, will use their property for public enterprises because these alone are permanently paying investments. The advances and discoveries of the last century would not have been accomplished, at least the greater part of them, without private property. If we but recall the extensive net-work of railroads, steamship lines, telegraphs, and telephones, which is spread around the world, the gigantic tunnels and canals, the progress made in electricity, aerial navigation, aviation, automobiles etc., we must confess that private property is a powerful and necessary factor in civilization. Not only economic conditions, but also the higher fields of culture are bettered by the existence of wealthy proprietors. Though they themselves do not become artists and scholars, still they are indirectly the occasion for the progress of the arts and sciences. Only the rich can order works of art on a large scale, only they have the means that frequently are necessary for the education of artists and scholars. On the other hand, poverty and want are the reason why many become eminent artists and scholars. Their advance in life and their social position depend on their education. How many brilliant geniuses would have been crippled at their birth if fortune had granted them every comfort. Lastly, we must not overlook the moral importance of private property. It urges man to labour, to save, to be orderly, and affords both rich and poor frequent opportunity for the exercise of virtue.
Though private property is a necessity, still the use of earthly goods should in a manner be general, as Aristotle intimated (Polit., 1. 2, c. 5) and as Christian philosophy has proved in detail (St. Thomas, “Summa” II-II, Q. lxvi, a. 2; Leo XIII’s encycl., “De conditione opificum”). This end is obtained when the rich not only observe the laws of justice, by not taking unjust advantage, but also, out of charity and liberality, share their abundance with the needy. Earthly goods are meant to be, in a certain manner, useful to all men, since they have been created for all men, and consequently the rich are strictly obliged to share their superfluities with the poor. True Christian charity will even go beyond this strict obligation. A wide and fertile field is thus opened up to its activity, through the existence of poverty. For the poor themselves, poverty is a hard, but beneficial, school of trust in God, humility, renunciation. It is of course self-evident that poverty should not degenerate into wretchedness, which is no less an abundant source of moral dangers than is excessive wealth. It is the function of a wise Government so to direct the laws and administration that a moderate well-being may be shared by as many as possible. The civil power cannot reach this end by taking away from the rich in order to give to the poor, for “this would be at bottom a denial of private property”; but by regulating the titles of income in strict accordance with the demands of public welfare.
Thus far we have spoken of the necessity of private property and the right to acquire it. It remains only to discuss the title of acquisition by which one becomes the proprietor of a certain concrete thing: a piece of land, a house, a tool etc. As explained above, the primitive title is occupation. The first who took possession of a piece of land became its proprietor. After a whole country has thus been turned into property, occupation loses its significance as conferring a title to real estate. But for movable goods it still remains important. It is sufficient to recall fishing and hunting on unclaimed ground, searching and digging for gold or diamonds in regions which have not yet passed over into private ownership. Many regard labour as the primitive title of acquisition, that is, labour which is different from mere occupation. But in this they are wrong. If one works at an object, then the product belongs to him only when he is proprietor of the object, the material; if not, then the product belongs to another, though the workman has the right to demand his reward in money or other goods. Now the question again recurs: How did this other man obtain possession of these goods? Finally we shall arrive at a primitive title different from labour, and this is occupation. Besides occupation there are other titles of acquisition, which are called subordinate or derived titles, as, for instance, accession, fructification, conveyance by various kinds of contracts, prescription, and especially the right of inheritance. By occupation an ownerless thing passes into the possession of a person, by accession it is extended, by the other derivative titles it passes from one possessor to another. Though all the titles mentioned, with the exception of prescription, are valid by the law of nature, and hence cannot be abolished by human laws, still they are not precisely and universally applied by natural law. To define them in individual cases in accordance with the demands of the public weal and with due regard to all concrete circumstances is the task of legislation.
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ST. THOMAS, Summa, II-II, Q. lxvi.; SOTO, De justitia et jure; DE LUGO, De justitia et jure, disp. 6; MEYER, Institutiones juris naturalis, II (1900), no. 129 sqq.; SCHIFFINI. Disputationes philosophiœ moralis, II, no. 309 sqq.; PESCH, Lehrbuch der Nationalökonomie, I (1905), 179 sqq.; WAGNER, Lehr- u. Handbuch der polit. Oekonomie, I; Grundlegung, II; Abl. (1901), 181 sqq.; VERMEERSCH, Quœstiones de justitia (1901), 187 sqq.; GARRIGUET, Régime de la propriété (1907); WALTER, Das Eigentum nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin u. der Sozialismus (1895); SCHAUB, Die Eigentumslehre nach Thomas von Aquin u. dem modernen Sozialismus (1898); CASTELEIN, Le Socialisme et le droit de propriété; WILLEMS, Philosophia moralis (1908), 295 sqq.; STAMMLER, Eigentum u. Besitz in Handbuch der Staatswissenschaften; BEROLZHEIMER, System der Rechts u. Wirtschaftsphilosophie, IV: Philosophie des Vermögens (1907), 38 sqq.; CATHREIN, Moralphilosophie, II (5th ed., 1911), l. 2; DEVAS, Political Economy (London, 1901); RICKABY, Moral Philosophy (London, 1910); KERBY, Private Property as it is in Catholic World, XCII (New York, 1911), 577; IDEM, The Indictment of Private Property, ibid., XCIII, 30; RYAN, Henry George and Private Property, ibid., XCIII, 289; IDEM, The Ethical Arguments of Henry George against Private Ownership of Land, ibid., XCIII, 483; CAIN, Origin of Private Property, ibid., XLVII, 545; IDEM, Ownership of Private Property, ibid., XLV, 433; DILLON, Rights and Duties of Property in our Legal and Social Systems, XXIX (St. Louis, 1895), 161; BRYCE, Studies in History and Jurisprudence (London, 1901).
V. CATHREIN. Transcribed by Douglas J. Potter Dedicated to the Immaculate Heart of the Blessed Virgin Mary
The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XIICopyright © 1911 by Robert Appleton CompanyOnline Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. KnightNihil Obstat, June 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., CensorImprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York
Fuente: Catholic Encyclopedia
Property
PROPERTY.Under this title two questions arise: (1) Is the possession of private property right according to the principles of the teaching and example of Jesus? (2) In what ways is a follower of Jesus to acquire and to use his property? These questions touch one another when it is suggested that a Christian should give away all his property and not seek to gain any more. They may, however, be kept distinct, and the second discussed on the assumption that the possession of private property is justifiable.
1. A very large section of a mans interest is connected with his possessions. Therefore, inevitably, the teaching and example of Jesus have an important bearing upon the question of property. And further, inasmuch as He gave to men a very different ideal of character and conduct from that of the world, it is to be expected that in regard to property His teaching will show marked divergence from the prevailing worldly view. But it is not therefore to be assumed that the authority of Jesus can be claimed for the socialistic view of property, which may be called the direct negative of the ordinary view which men hold. The question to be settled isMay we infer from the teaching and example of Jesus that the private ownership of property is unjustifiable? The relation of the teaching and example of Jesus to modern Socialism opens up a wide field for discussion, and this is seriously complicated by the difficulty of defining Socialism and disentangling it, as a clear economic theory, from the general revolt against the hardships of poverty and the tyranny of riches, from which it springs, and which is reflected in the generous literature and thought of all ages and countries.
The first point to make clear is that this revolt was certainly present among the Jews, and has left distinct traces in the OT (Isa 5:8) and also in the extra-canonical Jewish literature. There came to exist among them what has been called a genius for hatred of the rich (Peabody, Jesus Christ and the Social Question, p. 206). The popular view among the Jews was that godliness invariably resulted in prosperity; and one of their problems was the prosperity of the ungodly and the adversity of the pious. This problem was exceptionally acute in our Lords day, through the dominance of the Romans, and the wealth of the publicans acquired by their faithlessness to the national cause. Thus precisely the condition from which modern Socialism springs was present. And not only so, but a well-defined socialistic experiment was being made by the Essenes, among whom the strongest tie by which the members were united was absolute community of goods (Schrer, HJP [Note: JP History of the Jewish People.] , ii. ii. 195). It has been maintained that the teaching of Jesus was greatly influenced by that of the Essenes. But as Essenism was in the first place merely Pharisaism in the superlative degree (Schrer, l.c. p. 210), whatever other elements entered into it, this view must be given up (Lightfoot, Col. 397 ff.). However, from the popular feeling about the rich, and the existence of the Essenes as a socialistic community, we may gather that the way was quite open for Jesus to adopt the doctrines of Communism; and the argument that in His teaching we find the seed of Socialism, which only required conditions of thought and life such as are found in modern times to become fully matured, is not justified.
This is the view of the matter which representative Socialists take. As a general rule, Socialists are opposed to the Christian faith, and recognize in it a basis for the present organization of society and a hindrance to the change they desire to see brought about (for citations, see Peabody, op. cit. p. 15). They quote with approval the sayings of Jesus about the blessedness of the poor and the woes of the rich, but they realize distinctly that the basis of His thought is fundamentally different from theirs. The special ground of objection on the part of Socialists to the Christian religion is its teaching as to the future, which they regard as having diverted the moral enthusiasm of religious people from the present to the other world. Some, no doubt, hold that this emphasis on the future is due to the corruption of the pure teaching of Jesus, and so are ready to claim His authority for their views. But even if the contrast between present and future in the teaching of Jesus could be adjusted to the satisfaction of the Socialists, it leaves the contrast between outward circumstance and inward character, in regard to which there is a vital and all-embracing distinction between the principles of Jesus and Socialism. The phenomenon, however, of what is known as Christian Socialism has to be noted. The fierce competition of modern industrial and commercial life, with the cruelties it produces, cannot be accepted as desirable by any man of sensitive Christian convictions. And, moreover, the great hold which Socialism has taken of multitudes, and the fact that it becomes to them the only religion they feel any need of, have led Christians to desire that its influence should be exerted on the side of the Church. The Christian Socialists in England (Maurice and Kingsley) were influenced mainly by the first consideration, and were enthusiastic supporters of the Co-operative movement. The second consideration, as might be expected, appealed more especially to Roman Catholics, who are represented by Abb Lamennais; Baron von Ketteler, Archb. of Mayence; and Count de Nurn. In Germany, among Protestants, Christian Socialism has been represented by Victor Huber and Pastor Stcker. The views of those who may be regarded as entitled to the name Christian Socialists cannot be thought of as an isolated fact. They have been partly the result and partly the cause of a general shifting of the centre of interest from the sphere of doctrinal theology to that of practical teaching. The theological literature of the last 50 years has been largely occupied with the application of the teaching of Jesus to the practical problems of life, and many have held that there is nothing in the Christian faith which is antagonistic to Socialism as an economic theory. But with some exceptions it is agreed that Jesus did not lay down any economic theory of the State, and indeed deliberately refused to take advantage of openings in this direction which He received (Mat 22:15-22; Mat 17:24-27, Luk 12:13-21). To speak of the economics of the New Testament is in my opinion as impossible as to speak of its dietetics (Act 15:20-29), its hermeneutics (1Co 9:4-10), its astronomy (Mat 2:9; Mat 24:29), or its meteorology (Mat 16:23, Luk 12:24-25)(H. Holtzmann, Die ersten Christen und die soziale Frage).
Before the actual teaching and example of Jesus on the subject are analyzed, it is desirable to consider how far the glimpses we receive in the Acts of the Apostles of the social life of the first Christians at Jerusalem form an authoritative commentary upon them. We read that all that believed were together, and had all things common (Act 2:44). And again, neither said any of them that aught of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things common (Act 4:32, cf. also Act 2:45, Act 4:34; Act 4:37). It is worthy of remark that these statements are from the pen of the author of the Third Gospel, in which the sayings of Jesus about the rich and the poor are given in their most uncompromising form (cf. Luk 6:20, Mat 5:3). We may therefore suppose that the communistic aspect of the life of the church at Jerusalem has received full attention in the Book of Acts, and that no inference which goes in the least beyond the statements of that book is justified.* [Note: For discussions on the relation of St. Luke to Ebionism, see Keim, iii. 284; H. Holtzmann, op. cit.; Colin Campbell, Critical Studies in Lukes Gospel; B. Weiss, Life of Christ, vol. i. bks. iv., v.; cf. Peabody, op. cit. p. 192.]
A careful scrutiny of the relevant passages of the Book of Acts shows that: (1) the condition which prevailed in Jerusalem did not continue; (2) the churches organized by St. Paul (whose companion St. Luke was) show no trace of the community of goods, nor is any condemnation expressed because of this; (3) those who had houses and lands sold them; (4) Peter in what he said to Ananias (Act 5:4) clearly indicated that the right to private property was not questioned (Whiles it remained, was it not thine own? and after it was sold, was it not in thine own power?). No theory, therefore, can be established on the basis of what we find prevailing among the first Christians in Jerusalem. We must rather suppose that in the special circumstances of that church an exceptional condition in relation to property was produced.
An analysis of the teaching and example of Jesus brings out quite clearly that the denial of a right to the possession of private property cannot be extracted from them. It is true that many strong statements are found in the Gospels as to the disadvantages of riches, and that the poor are represented as having a special interest in the Kingdom of God (Mat 6:19, Luk 18:22, Mar 10:23, Luk 6:20-24; Luk 12:15, Mat 6:24; Mat 19:24; Mat 11:5). Far-reaching deductions have been drawn from these in condemnation of the prevailing industrial order. And their spirit is manifestly very different from that which the modern industrial and commercial struggle tends to produce. But their full force can be realized in connexion with the common effect of riches upon character, and they do not involve any condemnation of the possession of private property. It is to be remembered, too, in connexion with this, that no single statement of our Lord can be wisely taken by itself and pressed to the extreme conclusion logically possible. This is to forget His method of teaching, which aimed at the greatest clearness in the briefest compass (Wendt, Teaching of Jesus, i. p. 130). One who proposes to follow literally the specific commands of Jesus finds himself immediately plunged into contradictions and absurdities. He accepts the teaching of Jesus concerning non-resistance, to him that smiteth thee on one cheek offer also the other, but soon he hears this same counsellor of peace bid His friends sell their garments and buy a sword (Peabody, ch. i.).
We must therefore set over against the words of Jesus in which He seems to condemn the possession of riches, facts and sayings which forbid any communistic conclusion being drawn from them. Thus Jesus and His disciples had a fund for their common necessities (Joh 13:14). Moreover, the disciples owned boats and nets, to which they returned after the crucifixion (Joh 21:3 ff.). Peters house appears to have been the headquarters of Jesus at Capernaum (Mar 1:29; Mar 2:1). There is no condemnation of the settled life which Martha, Mary, and Lazarus lived at Bethany (Luk 10:38 ff., Joh 12:1 ff.). Zacchaeus, who was a rich man, was not asked to give away all that he had, but rather commended for giving a portion (Luk 19:1-9). Marys action in wasting the costly cruse of ointment (Mat 26:12) was justified and praised. The centurion who had built a synagogue for the Jews in Capernaum (Luk 7:1; Luk 7:10) received the highest praise, but nothing was said about his wealth, evidently considerable. Nicodemus must have been a man of substance, but no question of his relation to his property was raised (Joh 3:1-21). Again, some force must be allowed to the fact that in several of the parables (Luk 19:12, Mat 21:33) Jesus used the rights which men have over their property to illustrate the duty which all owe to God. This argument cannot be pressed too far, but still such illustrations would be practically impossible to one who held that the possession of private property, with the power it gives over others, is wrong.
2. On the assumption, then, that Jesus does not condemn the possession of private property, it remains to discuss the place which property is to hold in the life of a Christian, and the use which he is to make of what he owns. The ruling consideration in this discussion is that Jesus in His teaching looks not so much to the circumstances of mens lives as to the kind of men they are and may become. His teaching, therefore, about property must be considered in relation to the effects of its acquisition and use upon character. In regard to the acquisition of property, the teaching of Jesus is directed against that greedy temper of mind in which worldly advantage is regarded as of supreme importance, and a mans wealth as the sole criterion of his worth. He also condemns dishonesty and oppression in the acquisition of wealth, which spring from this temper (Mat 23:14, Mar 12:40, Luk 20:47). He warns men against covetousness on the ground that a mans life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth (Luk 12:15). He calls the man a fool who had much goods laid up for many years, and was not rich towards God (Luk 12:16-21). He condemns over-care about making provision for the necessities of this life (Luk 12:22-34, Mat 6:19-34). And He declares that whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospels, the same shall save it (Mar 8:35, Mat 10:39; Mat 16:25, Luk 9:24). Thus it is clear that Jesus expects His followers to cultivate a spirit of aloofness and independence in relation to the world and its wealth.
The duty of work and of making provision for worldly needs by work may be clearly inferred from the teaching and example of Jesus, though it is not specifically inculcated. He laboured as a carpenter in Nazareth (Mar 6:3, cf. Mat 13:55). In the miracle of the miraculous draught of fishes (Luk 5:1; Luk 5:6, Joh 21:6) He set His seal of approval upon the industry of the disciples. In some of the parables the duty of faithfulness in secular pursuits is plainly taught (e.g. Luk 16:1-11). This may also be inferred from the words of Mat 6:20-34. If the fowls of the air are provided for and the lilies of the field are arrayed in glory in the way of their nature through the providence of God, so also will men be provided for in the way of their nature, which is declared in the words, In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread (Gen 3:19). Again, the necessity of providing for those dependent upon us is no remote inference from Luk 11:13, Mat 15:5 and Mar 7:11. For the willingness of a father to give bread to his son is taken as an illustration of the willingness of God to hear and answer the prayers of His people. And the method adopted by the Pharisees to escape the practical force of the Fifth Commandment is sternly rebuked (Mat 15:3-6 || Mar 7:6-13).
About the use of property the teaching of Jesus is very full. In the first place, men are to realize that they are stewards of what they possess rather than its owners (Mat 24:45-51; Mat 25:14-20, Luk 19:11-27). They are to use their property, therefore, for the glory of God and the good of men, themselves and others. In relation to the true good of the owners, the danger of riches is very clearly and constantly insisted upon (Mar 10:23-27, Mat 6:19; Mat 6:24; Mat 13:22, Luk 18:24; Luk 6:20-24; Luk 16:19-31; Luk 12:15; Luk 18:14-25; Luk 12:21; Luk 16:11). From these passages it is clear that the tendency of riches is to hinder spiritual wellbeing. To avoid this, the renunciation of wealth is required (Luk 14:33, Mat 19:29, Luk 5:11, Mat 18:19-22, Luk 6:18-22). This renunciation of wealth is a general command holding for all who would be followers of Jesus, but it receives special emphasis in regard to the rich from the way in which the young ruler who had great possessions was dealt with. That the alienation of wealth is involved of necessity in its renunciation cannot be maintained in view of considerations formerly advanced, but, on the other hand, these considerations by no means preclude it in special circumstances (Luk 9:58-62). The way in which renunciation is to be given effect to depends upon the circumstances of each case, and is a matter for the conscience of each individual.
Apart from the general use which a follower of Jesus is to make of all his property, which is to be determined in relation to his own spiritual welfare and that of others, he is called upon also to give (alienate) a portion of his possessions to the poor and to the support of religion. These two directions for giving were fully recognized among the Jews. And so we find that although specific injunctions as to the duty of giving are not wanting in the teaching of Jesus, it is more with the spirit in which this duty is discharged that His sayings are concerned. He definitely commands the duty of giving to the poor (Mat 5:42, Luk 6:38, Mat 19:21, Luk 18:22). We see that He and His disciples were accustomed to give alms (Joh 13:29). The parable of the Good Samaritan, again, is the charter of the Church for all the benevolent work of hospitals, infirmaries, etc. (Luk 10:30-36). Such giving, however, is never to be formal and impersonal, an easy way of satisfying a fugitive emotion of pity. It is the service done rather than the gift made, which is emphasized in the parable of the Good Samaritan. Again, almsgiving is not to be ostentatious (Mat 6:1-4), nor are gifts to be made in the expectation of a return (Luk 14:12-14). The measure of giving is to be generous (Mat 10:8), and response to a claim is to be ready and ungrudging (Luk 11:5-8), and is to be regulated by no consideration but that of need (Luk 10:30-36, Mat 5:42-48).
In regard to giving to the support of religion, the teaching of Jesus must be considered in relation to the ordinance of the law which required a tithe. He does not commend any definite portion of a mans possessions as that which he should devote to religious objects. His teaching in this matter, as in all others, deals with the spirit in which gifts are made rather than the law which regulates their amount. He condemns the ostentation of the Pharisees in their gifts (Mar 12:42, Luk 21:2), and also their idea that a gift to the Temple is acceptable to God from those who are neglecting the weightier matters of the Law (Mat 23:23-26; Mat 6:23-24, Luk 18:9-14). But He is very far from condemning the giving of a tithe (Mat 23:23), and suggests rather that this is not sufficient (Luk 21:2). He distinctly commands giving to God (Mat 22:21), and by the way in which Marys devotion (Mat 26:12) was received we are warned against any narrow utilitarian view of the objects covered by this phrase. See also artt. Socialism and Wealth.
Literature.Wendt, Teaching of Jesus, vol. i.; EBr [Note: Br Encyclopaedia Britannica.] 9 [Note: designates the particular edition of the work referred] xxii. 205 ff., xxxii. 664 ff.; Schrer, HJP [Note: JP History of the Jewish People.] , passim; Robert E. Speer, The Principles of Jesus; Rae, Contemporary Socialism; Peabody, Jesus Christ and the Social Question, and also The Message of Christ to Society; Kaufmann, Christian Socialism; Kirkup, An Inquiry into Socialism; F. Naumann, Das soziale Programm der evangel. Kirche; Flint, Socialism, ch. ix.; Martensen, Chr. Ethics, iii. 126 ff.; H. Holtzmann, Die ersten Christen und die soziale Frage; Nitti, Catholic Socialism; Newman Smyth, Chr. Ethics, 448 ff.; Schaefle, Quintessence of Socialism; Dale, Laws of Christ, ch. ii.; J. F. Maurice, Life of Frederick Denison Maurice; A. Stcker, Christlich-soziale Reden und Aufstze; Herron, The Larger Christianity, and Between Csar and Jesus; Gore, The Sermon on the Mount; Westcott, Social Aspects of Christianity; Lyman Abbott, Christianity and Social Problems; S. Mathews, Social Teaching of Jesus; Keim, Jesus of Nazara, vols. iii. and iv.; Lightfoot, Colossians, p. 397 ff.; Renan, Life of Jesus, passim; Colin Campbell, Crit. Studies in Lukes Gospel; Dykes, Manifesto of the King, 449 ff.; Gladden, Tools and the Man, 55, 86.
Andrew N. Bogle.
Fuente: A Dictionary Of Christ And The Gospels
Property
proper-ti. See AGRARIAN LAWS; JUBILEE; POOR; PORTION; PRIMOGENITURE; WEALTH.
Fuente: International Standard Bible Encyclopedia
Property
In real estate:
– General references
Gen 23:17-18; Gen 26:20
– Rights in, violated
Gen 21:25-33; Gen 26:18-22
– Dedicated
Lev 27:16-25 Land
– Dwellings:
b Alienated for debt
Lev 25:29-30
b Alienated by absence
2Ki 8:1-6
b In villages, inalienable
Lev 25:31-33
b Dedicated
Lev 27:14-15
– Confiscation of (Naboth’s vineyard)
1Ki 21:15-16
– Priests exempt from taxes
Gen 47:22
– Entail of
Num 27:1-11; Num 36:1-9
– Inherited
Ecc 2:21
– Landmarks of, not to be removed
Deu 19:14; Deu 27:17
Personal property:
– Rights in, sacred
Exo 20:17; Deu 5:21
– Laws concerning trespass of, and violence to
Exo 21:28-36; Exo 22:9; Deu 23:25
– Strayed, to be returned to owner
Lev 6:3-4; Deu 22:1-3
– Hired
Exo 22:14-15
– Loaned
Exo 22:10-15
– Sold for debt
Pro 22:26-27
– Rights of redemption of
Jer 32:7
– Dedicated to God, redemption of
Lev 27:9-13; Lev 27:26-33
– In slaves
Exo 21:4
Fuente: Nave’s Topical Bible
Property
(Gr. idion; Lat. proprium) In Aristotle’s logic (1) an attribute common to all members of a species and peculiar to them; (2) an attribute of the above sort not belonging to the essence of the species, but necessarily following from it. — G.R.M.