Value
Value
The contemporary use of the term “value” and the discipline now known as the theory of value or axiology are relatively recent developments in philosophy, being largely results of certain 19th and 20th century movements. See Ethics. “Value” is used both as a noun and as a verb. As a noun it is sometimes abstract, sometimes concrete. As an abstract noun it designates the property of value or of being valuable. In this sense “value” is often used as equivalent to “worth” or “goodness,” in which case evil is usually referred to as “disvalue.” But it is also used more broadly to cover evil or badness as well as goodness, just as “temperature” is used to cover both heat and cold. Then evil is referred to as negative value and goodness as positive value.
As a concrete noun, singular (“a value”) or plural (“values”), our term refers either to things which have this property of value or to things which are valued (see below).
There is also a use of the terms “a value” and “values” which is intermediate between the two uses so far indicated, and which appears mainly in German writings. Here they refer to specific value-qualities (Werte) analogous to colors.
When used as a verb (“to value”) our term denotes a certain mental act or attitude of valuing or valuation.
Now value-theory is concerned both with the property of value and with the process of valuing. About the former it asks various questions. What is its nature? Is it a quality or a relation? Is it objective or subjective? Is it a single property, or is it several properties, value being an ambiguous term? Is its presence in a thing dependent on or reducible to the fact that the thing is valued by someone? About the latter it also has various questions. Is it a mere feeling or desire? Or does it involve judgment and cognition? And if so, is this a cognition of a value already there independently of the act of valuing or of knowing?
A distinction is often drawn between two kinds of value, namely intrinsic value and extrinsic or instrumental value. By extrinsic value is meant the character of being good or of having value as a means to something. By intrinsic value is meant the character of being good or valuable in itself or as an end or for its own sake. See Intrinsic goodness. Value-theorists have been mainly concerned with intrinsic value. The term “worth” has sometimes been used as equivalent to intrinsic value (Kant). But the distinction has often been criticized, e.g., by Dewey and Laird.
Two contrasts in which the term “value” occurs remain to be mentioned. (1) “Value” is sometimes contrasted with “fact” or “existence”. Here the contrast intended is that of the “ought” versus the “is”, and the term “value” is used to cover not only the various kinds of goodness, but also beauty and rightness. And the main problem is that of the relation of value and existence. (2) “Value” is also used more narrowly, being contrasted with rightness. Here the distinction intended is within the “ought” as opposed to the “is” and is between the “good” and the “right”, with “value” taken as equivalent to “goodness”. Then the main problem concerns the relation of value and obligation. In the sense of value involved in the former contrast value-theory will include ethics. In the latter it will not. See Axiology, Ethics, Obligation. — W.K.F.
Fuente: The Dictionary of Philosophy
Value
used intransitively, means “to differ, to excel,” hence “to be of more value,” Mat 6:26, RV, “are (not) ye of (much) more value,” (AV, “better”); Mat 12:12; Luk 12:24, ditto; Mat 10:31; Luk 12:7. See BETTER, (be), CARRY, No. 4, DIFFER, DRIVE, No. 7, EXCELLENT, MATTER, Note (1), PUBLISH, No. 2.
Note: For timao, rendered “to value” in Mat 27:9 (twice), AV, see PRICE.
denotes “a valuing, a price, honor;” in Col 2:23, RV, “(not of any) value (against the indulgence of the flesh)” [AV, “(not in any) honor…”], i.e., the ordinances enjoined by human tradition are not of any value to prevent (pros, “against;” cp. Act 26:14) indulgence of the flesh. See HONOR, PRECIOUS, PRICE, SUM.