Axiology
Axiology
(Gr. axios, of like value, worthy, and logos, account, reason, theory). Modern term for theory of value (the desired, preferred, good), investigation of its nature, criteria, and metaphysical status. Had its rise in Plato’s theory of Forms or Ideas (Idea of the Good); was developed in Aristotle’s Organon, Ethics, Poetics, and Metaphysics (Book Lambda). Stoics and Epicureans investigated the summum bonum. Christian philosophy (St. Thomas) built on Aristotle’s identification of highest value with final cause in God as “a living being, eternal, most good.”
In modern thought, apart from scholasticism and the system of Spinoza (Ethica, 1677), in which values are metaphysically grounded, the various values were investigated in separate sciences, until Kant’s Critiques, in which the relations of knowledge to moral, aesthetic, and religious values were examined. In Hegel’s idealism, morality, art, religion, and philosophy were made the capstone of his dialectic. R. H. Lotze “sought in that which should be the ground of that which is” (Metaphysik, 1879). Nineteenth century evolutionary theory, anthropology, sociology, psychology, and economics subjected value experience to empirical analysis, and stress was again laid on the diversity and relativity of value phenomena rather than on their unity and metaphysical nature. F. Nietzsche’s Also Sprach Zarathustra (1883-1885) and Zur Genealogie der Moral (1887) aroused new interest in the nature of value. F. Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (1889), identified value with love.
In the twentieth century the term axiology was apparently first applied by Paul Lapie (Logique de la volonte, 1902) and E. von Hartmann (Grundriss der Axiologie, 1908). Stimulated by Ehrenfels (System der Werttheorie, 1897), Meinong (Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie, 1894-1899), and Simmel (Philosophie des Geldes, 1900). W. M. Urban wrote the first systematic treatment of axiology in English (Valuation, 1909), phenomenological in method under J. M. Baldwin’s influence. Meanwhile H. Mnsterberg wrote a neo-Fichtean system of values (The Eternal Values, 1909).
Among important recent contributions areB. Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value (1912), a free reinterpretation of Hegelianism; W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God (1918, 1921), defending a metaphysical theism; S. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity (1920), realistic and naturalistic; N. Hartmann, Ethik (1926), detailed analysis of types and laws of value; R. B. Perry’s magnum opus, General Theory of Value (1926), “its meaning and basic principles construed in terms of interest”; and J. Laird, The Idea of Value (1929), noteworthy for historical exposition. A naturalistic theory has been developed by J. Dewey (Theory of Valuation, 1939), for which “not only is science itself a value . . . but it is the supreme means of the valid determination of all valuations.” A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936) expounds the view of logical positivism that value is “nonsense.” J. Hessen, Wertphilosophie (1937), provides an account of recent German axiology from a neo-scholastic standpoint.
The problems of axiology fall into four main groups, namely, those concerning (1) the nature of value, (2) the types of value, (3) the criterion of value, and (4) the metaphysical status of value.
(1) The nature of value experience. Is valuation fulfillment of desire (voluntarismSpinoza, Ehrenfels), pleasure (hedonismEpicurus, Bentham, Meinong), interest (Perry), preference (Martineau), pure rational will (formalismStoics, Kant, Royce), apprehension of tertiary qualities (Santayana), synoptic experience of the unity of personality (personalismT. H. Green, Bowne), any experience that contributes to enhanced life (evolutionismNietzsche), or “the relation of things as means to the end or consequence actually reached” (pragmatism, instrumentalismDewey).
(2) The types of value. Most axiologists distinguish between intrinsic (consummatory) values (ends), prized for their own sake, and instrumental (contributory) values (means), which are causes (whether as economic goods or as natural events) of intrinsic values. Most intrinsic values are also instrumental to further value experience; some instrumental values are neutral or even disvaluable intrinsically. Commonly recognized as intrinsic values are the (morally) good, the true, the beautiful, and the holy. Values of play, of work, of association, and of bodily well-being are also acknowledged. Some (with Montague) question whether the true is properly to be regarded as a value, since some truth is disvaluable, some neutral; but love of truth, regardless of consequences, seems to establish the value of truth. There is disagreement about whether the holy (religious value) is a unique type (Schleiermacher, Otto), or an attitude toward other values (Kant, Hffding), or a combination of the two (Hocking). There is also disagreement about whether the variety of values is irreducible (pluralism) or whether all values are rationally related in a hierarchy or system (Plato, Hegel, Sorley), in which values interpenetrate or coalesce into a total experience.
(3) The criterion of value. The standard for testing values is influenced by both psychological and logical theory. Hedonists find the standard in the quantity of pleasure derived by the individual (Aristippus) or society (Bentham). Intuitionists appeal to an ultimate insight into preference (Martineau, Brentano). Some idealists recognize an objective system of rational norms or ideals as criterion (Plato, Windelband), while others lay more stress on rational wholeness and coherence (Hegel, Bosanquet, Paton) or inclusiveness (T. H. Green). Naturalists find biological survival or adjustment (Dewey) to be the standard. Despite differences, there is much in common in the results of the application of these criteria.
(4) The metaphysical status of value. What is the relation of values to the facts investigated by natural science (Koehler), of Sein to Sollen (Lotze, Rickert), of human experience of value to reality independent of man (Hegel, Pringle-Pattlson, Spaulding)? There are three main answers
subjectivism (value is entirely dependent on and relative to human experience of itso most hedonists, naturalists, positivists);
logical objectivism (values are logical essences or subsistences, independent of their being known, yet with no existential status or action in reality);
metaphysical objectivism (values — or norms or ideals — are integral, objective, and active constituents of the metaphysically realso theists, absolutists, and certain realists and naturalists like S. Alexander and Wieman).
— E.S.B.