Detraction
DETRACTION
In the native importance of the word, signifies the withdrawing or taking off from a thing; and as it is applied to the reputation, it denotes the impairing or lessening a man in point of fame, rendering him less valued and esteemed by others. Dr. Barrow observes (Works, vol. 1: ser. 19, ) that it differs from slander, which involves an imputation of falsehood; from reviling, which includes bitter and foul language; and from censuring, which is of a more general purport, extending indifferently to all kinds of persons, qualities, and laudable actions, the reputation of which it aimeth to destroy. It is a fault opposed to candour. Nothing can be more incongruous with the spirit of the Gospel, the example of Christ, the command of God, and the love of mankind, than a spirit of detraction; and yet there are many who never seem happy but when they are employed in this work: they feed and live upon the supposed infirmities of others; they allow excellence to none; they depreciate every thing that is praise-worthy; and, possessed of no good themselves, they think all others are like them. “O! my soul, come thou not into their secret; unto their assembly, mine honour be not thou united.”
Fuente: Theological Dictionary
detraction
(Latin: detrahere, to take away)
Unjust damaging of another’s good name by the revelation of some fault or crime of which that other is guilty or believed to be guilty by the defamer. The detractor’s guilt varies with the damage done. He is bound to restitution of the defamed’s violated rights. For just reasons one may lawfully divulge another’s offenses, but only to prudent persons and for the purpose of preventing evil to the guilty party or others.
Fuente: New Catholic Dictionary
Detraction
(From Latin detrahere, to take away).
Detraction is the unjust damaging of another’s good name by the revelation of some fault or crime of which that other is really guilty or at any rate is seriously believed to be guilty by the defamer.
An important difference between detraction and calumny is at once apparent. The calumniator says what he knows to be false, whilst the detractor narrates what he at least honestly thinks is true. Detraction in a general sense is a mortal sin, as being a violation of the virtue not only of charity but also of justice. It is obvious, however, that the subject-matter of the accusation may be so inconspicuous or, everything considered, so little capable of doing serious hurt that the guilt is not assumed to be more than venial. The same judgment is to be given when, as not unfrequently happens, there has been little or no advertence to the harm that is being done.
The determination of the degree of sinfulness of detraction is in general to be gathered from the consideration of the amount of harm the defamatory utterance is calculated to work. In order to adequately measure the seriousness of the damage wrought, due regard must be had not only to the imputation itself but also to the character of the person by whom and against whom the charge is made. That is, we must take into account not only the greater or lesser criminality of the thing alleged but also the more or less distinguished reputation of the detractor for trustworthiness, as well as the more or less notable dignity or estimation of the person whose good name has been assailed. Thus it is conceivable that a relatively small defect alleged against a person of eminent station, such as a bishop, might seriously tarnish his good name and be a mortal sin, whilst an offence of considerable magnitude attributed to an individual of a class in which such things frequently happen might constitute only a venial sin, such as, for instance, to say that a common sailor had been drunk. It is worthy of note that the manifestation of even inculpable defects may be a real defamation, such as to charge a person with gross ignorance, etc. When this is done in such circumstances as to bring upon the person so disparaged a more than ordinary measure of disgrace, or perhaps seriously prejudice him, the sin may even be a grievous one.
There are times, nevertheless, when one may lawfully make known the offense of another even though as a consequence the trust hitherto reposed in him be rudely shaken or shattered. If a person’s misdoing is public in the sense that sentence has been passed by the competent legal tribunal or that it is already notorious, for instance, in a city, then in the first case it may licitly be referred to in any place; in the second, within the limits of the town, or even elsewhere, unless in either instance the offender in the lapse of time should have entirely reformed or his delinquency been quite forgotten. When, however, knowledge of the happening is possessed only by the members of a particular community or society, such as a college or monastery and the like, it would not be lawful to publish the fact to others than those belonging to such a body. Finally, even when the sin is in no sense public, it may still be divulged without contravening the virtues of justice or charity whenever such a course is for the common weal or is esteemed to make for the good of the narrator, of his listeners, or even of the culprit. The right which the latter has to an assumed good name is extinguished in the presence of the benefit which may be conferred in this way.
The employment of this teaching, however, is limited by a twofold restriction.
The damage which one may soberly apprehend as emerging from the failure to reveal another’s sin or vicious propensity must be a notable one as contrasted with the evil of defamation.
No more in the way of exposure should be done than is required, and even a fraternal admonition ought rather to be substituted if it can be discerned to adequately meet the needs of the situation.
Journalists are entirely within their rights in inveighing against the official shortcomings of public men. Likewise, they may lawfully present whatever information about the life or character of a candidate for public office is necessary to show his unfitness for the station he seeks. Historians have a still greater latitude in the performance of their task. This is not of course because the dead have lost their claim to have their good name respected. History must be something more than a mere calendar of dates and incidents; the causes and connection of events are a proper part of its province. This consideration, as well as that of the general utility in elevating and strengthening the public conscience, may justify the historian in telling many things hitherto unknown which are to the disgrace of those of whom they are related.
Those who abet another’s defamation in a matter of moment by directly or indirectly inciting or encouraging the principal in the case are guilty of grievous injustice. When, however, one’s attitude is simply a passive one, i.e. that of a mere listener, prescinding from any interior satisfaction at the blackening of another’s good name, ordinarily the sin is not mortal unless one happens to be a superior. The reason is that private persons are seldom obliged to administer fraternal correction under pain of mortal sin (see FRATERNAL CORRECTION). The detractor having violated an unimpeachable right of another is bound to restitution. He must do his best to put back the one whom he has thus outraged in possession of the fair fame which the latter hitherto enjoyed. He must likewise make good whatever other loss he in some measure foresaw his victim would sustain as a result of this unfair defamation, such as damage measurable in terms of money. The obligation in either instance is perfectly clear. The method of discharging this plain duty is not so obvious in the first case. In fact, since the thing alleged is assumed to be true, it cannot be formally taken back, and some of the suggestions of theologians as to the style of reparation are more ingenious than satisfactory. Generally the only thing that can be done is to bide one’s time until an occasion presents itself for a favorable characterization of the person defamed. The obligation of the detractor to make compensation for pecuniary loss and the like is not only personal but becomes a burden on his heirs as well.
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NOLDIN, Summa Theologiae Moralis (Innsbruck, 1905); GENICOT, Theologiae Moralis Institutiones (Louvain, 1898); LEHMKUHL, Theologia Moralis (Freiburg, 1887).
JOSEPH F. DELANY Transcribed by Bob Elder
The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume IVCopyright © 1908 by Robert Appleton CompanyOnline Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. KnightNihil Obstat. Remy Lafort, CensorImprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York
Fuente: Catholic Encyclopedia
Detraction
(Lat. detractio, from detrahere) means primarily taking off from a thing; and in morals it is the act of depreciating another’s reputation. Barrow observes (Works , N. Y. edition, 1:203 sq.) that it differs from slander, which involves an imputation of falsehood; from reviling, which includes bitter and foul language; and from censuring, which is of a more general purport, extending indifferently to all kinds of persons, qualities, and actions; but detraction especially respects worthy persons, good qualities, and laudable actions, the reputation of which it aimeth to destroy. It is a fault opposed to candor. Nothing can be more incongruous with the spirit of the Gospel, the example of Christ, the command of God, and the love of mankind, than a spirit of detraction; and yet there are many who never seem happy but when they are employed in this work; they feed and live upon the supposed infirmities of others; they allow excellence to none; they depreciate every thing that is praiseworthy; and, possessed of no good themselves, they think all others are like them. O! my soul, come thou not into their secret; unto their assembly, mine honor, be not thou united’ (Buck, Theolog. Dict. s.v.). When we consider the motives in which detraction originates, we shall find that most of them spring from, or center in, malevolence. In some persons there is a lust of distinction, which cannot endure an equal, and burns with a desire to level the pre-eminence of every superior.
In whatever degree this disposition may prevail, it is combined with a desire to eclipse the worth, or to deduct from the excellence of those above, or those on a level of ability or merit with itself. Hence, if we would eradicate every propensity to detraction, it is essentially requisite that we cultivate a humble spirit, and that, impressed with a consciousness of our own unworthiness, we learn to think and to speak of others more justly as well as more charitably. Some persons of mean talents, slender capacity, groveling desires, or little industry, who are too timid to undertake any thing good or great, or too feeble or too indolent to execute it, are continually endeavoring to screen themselves from contempt, or to hide their own individual insignificance by depreciating the worth, railing at the audacity, or ridiculing the exertions of those who have more ability, more enterprise, more intellect, and more activity than them; selves. There is no integrity, however pure, no worth, however genuine, which is not exposed to invidious obscuration, to unjust surmises, and wily misrepresentation; and designing and interested men, who abound in the wisdom of this world, well know how to convert these practices to their own advantage, and to the injury of their neighbor. If detraction be found in a greater degree, or of a more mischievous kind, in a court than in a village, it is only because in the former there is a stronger incitement to its exercise, and more ample space for its operations. Detraction tends to reduce the best men to a level with the worst, and thus to bring worth itself into disrepute. It tends to chill the ardor of doing good, and to produce a general belief that all the virtue which exists among men is imaginary and counterfeit. It involves in itself a high degree of depravity, and is connected with the violation of every moral tie. Is it not adverse to justice? Is it not incompatible with charity? Is it not a plain dereliction of our duty to God? For is it not principally occupied in lessening the estimation of the good and wise, who are more especially the objects of his favor, and the excellence of his rational creation? Must not the practice, therefore, bring us under the divine displeasure? Is there not in the habit so large a mixture of malevolence as necessarily implies that we are strangers to the love of God; and, if we will persist in so hateful a practice, can we hope to escape that place of torment in which there are weeping and gnashing of teeth? (Fellowes’s Body of Theology, 2:352, 367; Warner’s System of Divinity and Morality, 2:90).