History, Philosophy of
History, Philosophy of
History investigates the theories concerning the development of man as a social being within the limits of psychophysical causality. Owing to this double puipose the philosophy of history has to study the principles of historiography, and, first of all, their background, their causes and underlying laws, their meaning and motivation. This can be called the metaphysics of history. Secondly, it concerns itself with the cognitive part, i.e. with historic understanding, and then it is called the logic of history. While in earlier times the philosophy of history was predominantly metaphysics, it has turned more and more to the methodology or logic of history. A complete philosophy of history, however, ought to consider the metaphysical as well as the logical problems involved.
I. Logic of History The historical objects under observation (man, life, society, biological and geological conditions) are so diverse that even slight mistakes in evaluation of items and of the historical whole may lead to false results. This can be seen from the modern logic of history. In the 18th century, G. B. Vico contended, under the deep impression of the lawfulness prevailing in natural sciences, that historical events also follow each other according to unswerving natural laws. He assumed three stages of development, that of fantasy, of will, and of science. The encyclopedists and Saint-Simon shared his view. The individual is immersed, and driven on, by the current of social tendencies, so that Comte used to speak of an “histoire sans noms”. His three stages of development were the theological, metaphysical, and scientific stage. H. Spencer and A. Fouillee regard social life as an organism unfolding itself according to immanent laws, either of racial individuality (Gobineau, Vocher de Lapauge) or of a combination of social, physical, and personal forces (Taine). The spirit of a people and of an age outweigh completely the power of an individual personality which can work only along socially conditioned tendencies. The development of a nation always follows the same laws, it may vary as to time and whereabouts but never as to the form (Burkhardt, Lamprecht). To this group of historians belong also O. Spengler and K. Marx; “Fate” rules the civilization of peoples and pushes them on to their final destination.
Idealists regard such an equalization of physical laws and psychological, historical laws as untenable. The “tvpical case” with which physics or chemistry analyzes is a result of logical abstraction; the object of history, however, is not a unit with universal traits but something individual, in a singular space and at a particular time, never repeatable under the same circumstances. Therefore no physical laws can be formed about it. What makes it a fact worthy of historical interest, is iust the fullness of live activity in it; it is a “value”, not a “thing”. Granted that historical events are exposed to influences from biological, geological, racial and traditional sources, they aie always carried by a human being whose singularity of character has assimilated the forces of his environment and surmounted them There is a reciprocal action between man and society, but it is always personal initiative and free productivity of the individual which account for history. Denying, therefore, the logical primacy of physical laws in history, does not mean lawlessness, and that is the standpoint of the logic of history in more recent times. Windelband and H. Rickert established another kind of historical order of laws. On their view, to understand history one must see the facts in their relation to a universally applicable and transcendental system of values. Values “are” not, they “hold”; they are not facts but realities of our reason, they are not developed but discovered. According to Max Weber historical facts form an ideally typical, transcendental whole which, although seen, can never be fully explained. G, Simmel went further into metaphysics”life” is declared an historical category, it is the indefinable, last reality ascending to central values which shaped cultural epochs, such as the medieval idea of God, or the Renaissance-idea of Nature, only to be tragically disappointed, whereupon other values rise up, as humanity, liberty, technique, evolution and others.
This opposition of natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and cultural or socio-historical sciences (Geistestvtssenschaften) is characteristic of idealistic philosophies of history, especially of the modern German variety. See Max Weber, Gesamm. Aufrtze z. Sozio u. Sozialpolitik, 1922; W. Windelband, Geschichte u. Naturwissenschaft, 1894; H. Rickert, Die Grenzen d. Naturwiss. Begriffsbildung, eine logische Einleitung i. d. histor. Wissenschaften, 1899; Dilthey (q.v.); E. Troeltsch, Der Histortsmus u. s. Probleme, 1922; E. Spranger, Die Grundlagen d. Geschichteswissensch., 1905.
For the opposing, more empirical approach and criticisms of the idealistic, organismic philosophies of history, see M. Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge, 1939; F. J. E. Teggart, The Method of History; Ph. P. Wiener, “Methodology in the Phtlos. of Hist.”, Jour. of Philos. (June 5, 1941).
II. Metaphysics of HistoryThe metaphysical interpretations of the meaning of history are either supra-mundane or intra-mundane (secular). The oldest extra-mundane, or theological, interpretation has been given by St. Augustine (Civitas Dei), Dante (Divma Commedia) and J. Milton (Paradise Lost and Regained). All historic events are seen as having a bearing upon the redemption of mankind through Christ which will find its completion at the end of this world. Owing to the secularistic tendencies of modern times the Enlightenment Period considered the final end of human history as the achievement of public welfare through the power of reason. Even the ideal of “humanity” of the classic humanists, advocated by Schiller, Goethe, Fichte, Rousseau, Lord Byron, is only a variety of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, and in the same line of thought we find A. Comte, H. Spencer (“human moral”), Engels and K. Marx. The German Idealism of Kant and Hegel saw in history the materialization of the “moral reign of freedom” which achieves its perfection in the “objective spirit of the State”. As in the earlier systems of historical logic man lost his individuality before the forces of natural laws, so, according to Hegel, he is nothing but an instrument of the “idea” which develops itself through the three dialectic stages of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. (Example. Absolutism, Democracy, Constitutional Monarchy.) Even the great historian L. v. Ranke could not break the captivating power of the Hegelian mechanism. Ranke places every historical epoch into a relation to God and attributes to it a purpose and end for itself. Lotze and Troeltsch followed in his footsteps. Lately, the evolutionistic interpretation of H. Bergson is much discussed and disputed. His “vital impetus” accounts for the progressiveness of life, but fails to interpret the obvious setbacks and decadent civilizations. According to Kierkegaard and Spranger, merely human ideals prove to be too narrow a basis for the tendencies, accomplishments, norms, and defeats of historic life. It all points to a supra-mundane intelligence which unfolds itself in history. That does not make superfluous a natural interpretation, both views can be combined to understand history as an endless struggle between God’s will and human will, or non-willing, for that matter. — S.V.F.