Justice

JUSTICE

A principle of righteousness and equity, controlling our conduct, and securing a due regard to all the rights of others-their persons, property, character, and interests. It has to do, not with pecuniary transactions alone, but with all our intercourse with society. It forms a chief element of the character approved in God’s word; and a truly just man has but to “love mercy, and walk humbly with God,” to fulfil all righteousness. Justice in magistrates, rulers, and judges, must be fearless and impartial, and all its decisions such as will bear revision before the court of heaven, Deu 1:16,17 2Sa 23:3 2Ch 19:6-10 . Judgement is peculiarly the prerogative of God, and every earthly tribunal lies under the shadow of the “great white throne.” A just judgment is the voice of God; and hence an unjust one is doubly hateful in his sight.THE JUSTICE OF GOD is that essential and infinite attribute which makes his nature and his ways the perfect embodiment of equity, and constitutes him the model and the guardian of equity throughout the universe, Deu 32:4 Psa 89:14 . The justice of God could not leave the world without laws, and cannot fail to vindicate them by executing their penalties; and as all mankind perpetually break them, every human soul is under condemnation, and must perish, unless spared through the accepted ransom, the blood of Christ.THE ADMINSITRATION OF JUSTICE among the Hebrews, was characterized by simplicity and promptitude. In early times the patriarch of each family was its judge, Gen 38:24 . Afterwards, in the absence of more formal courts, the elders of a household, tribe, or city, were its judges by natural right. In the wilderness, Moses organized for the Jews a regular system of judges, some having jurisdiction over ten families, others over fifty, one hundred, or one thousand. The difficult cases were referred to Moses, and he often sought divine direction concerning them, Exo 18:21-26 Lev 24:12 . These judges were perhaps the “princes of the congregation,” and the chiefs of the families and tribes of whom we afterwards read, Num 27:3 . In the land of Canaan, local magistrates were appointed for every city and village; and these were instructed to cooperate with the priests, as being all together under the theocracy, the actual government of Jehovah, the supreme Judge of Israel, Deu 16:18 17:8-10 19:17 21:16. Their informal courts were held in the gate of the city, as the most public and convenient place, Deu 21:9 22:15 25:7; and in the same place contracts were ratified, Rth 4:1,9 Jer 32:7-15 . Deborah the prophetess judged Israel beneath a palm-tree, Jdg 4:5 . Samuel established virtually a circuit court, 1Sa 7:16 8:1; and among the kings, Jehoshaphat made special provision for the faithful administration of justice, 2Ch 19:1-11 . The kings themselves were supreme judges, with almost unlimited powers, 1Sa 22:16 2Sa 4:9,10 1Ki 22:26 . They were expected, however, to see that justice was everywhere done, and seem to have been accessible to all who were wronged. Frequent complaints are on record in the sacred books of the maladministration of judges, of bribery and perjury, 1Sa 8:3 1Ki 21:8-14 Isa 1:23 10:1 Mic 3:11 7:3.There was no class among the Jews exactly corresponding to our lawyers. The accuser and the accused stood side by side before the judge, with their witnesses, and pleaded their own cause. The accuser is named in several places, Satan, that is, the adversary, Psa 109:6 Zec 3:1-3 . No one could be condemned without the concurring testimony of at least two witnesses, Num 35:30 ; and these failing, he was obliged to make oath of his innocence, Exo 22:11 Heb 6:16 . The sentence of the judge was instantly executed; and in certain cases the witnesses cast the first stone, Deu 17:5,7 25:2 Jos 7:24 1Sa 22:18 1Ki 2:24 Pro 16:14 . The same frightful celerity still marks the administration of justice in the East. The application of torture to extract evidence is only once mentioned, and that under the authority of Rome, Mal 22:24 . See SANHEDRIM and SYNAGOGUE.

Fuente: American Tract Society Bible Dictionary

Justice

In his analysis of justice (), Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, bk. v.) distinguishes the justice which is co-extensive with virtue-is, in fact, perfect virtue-from the special justice which consists in fairness of dealing with our neighbours. The NT writers use the word almost exclusively in the former sense, connecting it with the righteousness of God (see Righteousness). The lesser righteousness is, however, included under the greater; and though the emphasis is laid on mercy or love as the fulfilling of the law (Rom 13:10), justice is also recognized as a duty towards Him who is just as well as the merciful justifier of them that believe (see Love). Thus the Apostle enumerates things just ( ) in his catalogue of Christian virtues (Php 4:8). He urges his readers likewise to set their thoughts on that which is honourable or seemly (), not only in the sight of the Lord, but also in the sight of men (Rom 12:17, 2Co 8:21; 2Co 13:7). This Christian justice covers the whole round of life. All men are entitled to their full dues, alike of tribute, custom, fear, honour, service and wage. The Christian master respects the honour not merely of his wife and children, but oven of his slaves (Eph 5:22 ff., Col 3:18 ff.). The servant also deals justly with his master, not stealing or purloining, as heathen slaves were wont to do, but with good will doing service, as unto the Lord, and not unto men (Eph 6:5 ff., Col 3:22 ff., Tit 2:10 ff., 1Pe 2:18 ff.). For such service the labourer is worthy of an honest wage (1Ti 5:18, 2Ti 2:6). The same principle applies to the preacher of the gospel, even though he refuse to accept his privileges (1Co 9:13 ff.). In their relations as citizens, Christian men are actuated by the most sensitive regard for honour. Though he stands for Christian freedom, the Apostle feels morally obliged to send back Philemons slave, however helpful he found him to be; and he further takes on his own shoulders full liability for Onesimus misdeeds (Phm 1:10 ff.). In order that public justice may be upheld, too, the Christian is urged to pray for kings and all in high places of authority (1Ti 2:1 f.), and to be subject to all their ordinances for the Lords sake (Tit 3:1 f., 1Pe 2:13 ff.). But he himself is entitled to justice before the law. No man suffered more for his Masters sake than St. Paul; and no one wrote more serious words on the sin of litigiousness (1Co 6:1 ff.). Yet, in defence of his just rights as a citizen, he not only asserted his Roman freedom (Act 16:37; Act 22:25; Act 25:10), but defended himself before the courts to the very last (Act 24:10 ff; Act 25:10 f., 2Ti 4:16 ff.). For to him the courts were there to secure justice for all. See Trial-at-Law.

A. R. Gordon.

Fuente: Dictionary of the Apostolic Church

JUSTICE

Consists in an exact and scrupulous regard to the rights of others, with a deliberate purpose to preserve them on all occasions sacred and inviolate. It is often divided into commutative and distributive justice. The former consists in an equal exchange of benefits; the latter in an equal distribution of rewards and punishments. Dr. Watts gives the following rules respecting justice.

1. It is just that we honour, reverence, and respect those who are superiors in any kind, Eph 6:1; Eph 6:3. 1Pe 2:17. 1Ti 5:17.

2. That we show particular kindness to near relations, Pro 17:17.

3. That we love those who love us, and show gratitude to those who have done us good, Gal 4:15.

4. That we pay the full due to those whom we bargain or deal with, Rom 13:1-14 : Deu 24:14.

5. That we help our fellow-creatures in cases of great necessity, Ex.xxiii. 4.

6. Reparation to those whom we have wilfully injured.” Watts’s Serm. ser. 24, 25, vol. 2: Berry Street Lect. ser. 4. Grove’s Mor. Phil. p. 332, vol.ii. Wollaston’s Relig. of Nature, p. 137, 141; Jay’s Ser. vol. 2: p. 131.

Fuente: Theological Dictionary

justice

Among men, it is ordinarily understood as a virtue by which we give to every one what is his due, what we owe him. God does not owe, nor can He owe anything to anyone. Whatever there is outside of God is the creature of God, and the Creator cannot owe anything to His creature. The justice of God is in this, that He loves good and hates evil, and hence He rewards the good and punishes the evil. He does so necessarily, because both His love and His hatred are necessarily operative not merely in affection.

Fuente: New Catholic Dictionary

Justice

Justice is here taken in its ordinary and proper sense to signify the most important of the cardinal virtues. It is a moral quality or habit which perfects the will and inclines it to render to each and to all what belongs to them. Of the other cardinal virtues, prudence perfects the intellect and inclines the prudent man to act in all things according to right reason. Fortitude controls the irascible passions; and temperance moderates the appetites according as reason dictates. While fortitude and temperance are self-regarding virtues, justice has reference to others. Together with charity it regulates man’s intercourse with his fellow men. But charity leads us to help our neighbour in his need out of our own stores, while justice teaches us to give to another what belongs to him.

Because man is a person, a free and intelligent being, created in the image of God, he has a dignity and a worth vastly superior to the material and animal world by which he is surrounded. Man can know, love, and worship his Creator; he was made for that end, which he can only attain perfectly in the future, immortal, and never-ending life to which he is destined. God gave him his faculties and his liberty in order that he might freely work for the accomplishment of his destiny. He is in duty bound to strive to fulfil the designs of his Creator, he must exercise his faculties and conduct his life according to the intentions of his Lord and Master. Because he is under these obligations he is consequently invested with rights, God-given and primordial, antecedent to the State and independent of it. Such are man’s natural rights, granted to him by nature herself, sacred, as is their origin, and inviolable. Beside these he may have other rights given him by Church or State, or acquired by his own industry and exertion. All these rights, whatever be their source, are the object of the virtue of justice. Justice requires that all persons should be left in the free enjoyment of all their rights.

A right in the strict sense in which the term is used in this connection is not a mere vague and indefinite claim against others, which others are bound to respect, on any grounds whatever. We sometimes say that the unemployed have a right to work, that the needy have a right to assistance, and it may be conceded that those phrases are quite correct, provided that such a right is understood as a claim in charity not as a claim in justice. For, at least if we confine our attention to natural law and ordinary circumstances, the assistance to which a man in need has a claim does not belong to him in justice before it is handed over to him, when it becomes his. His claim to it rests on the fact that he is a brother in distress, and his brotherhood constitutes his title to our pity, sympathy, and help. It may, of course, happen that positive law does something more than this for the poor and needy; it may be that the law of the land has given a legal right to the unemployed to have employment provided for them, or to the poor a legal right to relief; then, of course, the claim will be one of justice.

A claim in justice, or a right in the strict sense, is a moral and lawful faculty of doing, possessing, or exacting something. If it be a moral and lawful faculty of doing something for the benefit of others, it belongs to the class of rights of jurisdiction. Thus a father has the natural right to bring up and educate his son, not for his own, but for the son’s benefit. A lawful sovereign has the right to rule his subjects for the common good. The largest class of rights which justice requires that we should render to others are rights of ownership. Ownership is the moral faculty of using something subordinate to us for our own advantage. The owner of a house may dispose of it as he will. He may live in it, or let it, or leave it unoccupied, or pull it down, or sell it; he may make changes in it, and in general he may deal with it as he likes, because it is his. Because it is his, he has a right to all the uses and advantages which it possesses. It is his property, and as such its whole being should subserve his need and convenience. Because it belongs to him he must be preferred to all others as to the enjoyment of the uses to which it can be put. He has the right to exclude others from the enjoyment of its uses, it belongs with all the advantages which it can confer to him alone. Were anyone else to make use of the house against the reasonable wish of the owner, he would offend against justice, he would not be render- ing to the owner what belongs to him.

The right of ownership may be absolute or qualified. Absolute ownership extends to the substance of the property and to all its uses. Qualified ownership may, in the language of divines, be direct or indirect. The former is ownership of the substance of a thing without its uses, such as the landlord has over a house which he has let. Indirect ownership is the faculty of using, but not of disposing of, a thing. When anything definite and determinate is owned by anyone so that he can say–“This is my property”–he is said by divines to have a right in re. On the other hand if the thing has not yet come into existence though it will come, or it is not separate and determinate, so that he cannot say that it is actually his, but he nevertheless has a strict claim in justice that it should become his, he is said to have a right ad rem. Thus a farmer has a right ad rem to the harvest of the coming year from his land; when he has harvested his crop he will have a right in re.

Ownership in the sense explained is the principal object of the virtue of justice as it regulates the relations of man with man. It sharply distinguishes justice from charity, gratitude, patriotism, and other virtues whose object is a claim against others indeed, but a claim of a less strict and more indefinite character. Justice between man and man is called individual, particular, or commutative justice, because it is chiefly concerned with contracts and exchange. Individual justice is distinguished from social, for not only individuals have claims in justice against other individuals but a subject has claims against the society to which he belongs, as society has claims against him. Justice requires that all should have what belongs to them, and so the just man will render to the society, or State, of which he is a member, what is due to it. The justice which prescribes this is called legal justice. On the other hand, the individual subject has claims against the State. It is the function of the State to protect its subjects in their rights and to govern the whole body for the common good. Authority for this purpose is given to the State by nature and by God, the Author of man’s social nature.

The power of the State is limited by the end for which it was instituted, and it has no authority to violate the natural rights of its subjects. If it does this it commits injustice as individuals would do if they acted in like manner. It may indeed levy taxes, and impose other burdens on its subjects, as far as is required by the common necessity and advantage, but no further. For the common good it has authority to compel individual citizens to risk life for the defence of their country when it is in peril, and to part with a portion of their property when this is required for a public road, but as far as possible it must make suitable compensation. When it imposes taxes, military service, or other burdens; when it distributes rewards, offices, and honours; when it metes out condign punishment for offenses, it is bound to do so according to the various merits and resources of the persons concerned; otherwise the State will sin against that special kind of justice which is called distributive.

There is a controversy among authorities as to whether commutative, legal, and distributive justice are so many species of one common genus, or whether commutative justice is in reality the only species of justice in the strict sense. There is much to be said for the latter view. For justice is something which is due to another; it consists, as Aristotle said, in a certain equality by which the just and definite claim of another, neither more nor less, is satisfied. If I have borrowed a horse and cart from my neighbours, justice requires that I should return that particular horse and cart. The debt in its precise amount must be paid. Consequently, justice in the full and proper sense of the term requires a perfect distinction between debtor and creditor. No one can be bound in justice towards himself; justice essentially regards others. However, between the State and the individuals who compose it there is not this perfect distinction, and so there is something wanting to the proper and complete notion of the virtue in both legal and distributive justice.

The rights which belong to every human being inasmuch as he is a person are absolute and inalienable. The right to life and limb, the essential freedom which is necessary that a man may attain the end for which he is destined by God, the right to marry or remain single, such rights as these may not be infringed by any human authority whatever. A man himself even has no right to dispose of his own life and limbs; God alone is the Lord of life and death. But a man has the duty and the right to use and develop his faculties of soul and body, and if he chooses he may dispose of his right to use these faculties and whatever advantage they can procure him in favour of another. No person then can become the property of another human being, slavery in that sense is repugnant to the dignity of human nature. But a man may by various titles have the right to the labour of another.

All things inferior to man were created for his use and benefit; they fulfil the end of their being by ministering to his wants and necessities. Whatever, therefore, pertains to the animal, vegetable, or inorganic world may be brought under the ownership and made the property of man. The right thus to acquire property which is useful and necessary for an orderly human life, is one of man’s natural rights, and it can not be taken away by the State. She State may indeed make reasonable laws regulating and defining the property rights of its subjects for the common good, but it cannot abrogate them altogether. Such rights are antecedent to the State, and in their substance independent of it; the State was instituted to protect and defend them, not to take them away.

Rights are the appanage of intelligent beings as such, beings who can reflect on themselves, know their own wants, and who can will to supply them by permanently appropriating to themselves objects which are subordinate and which will satisfy those wants. Every human being, therefore, is the subject of rights, even before he has been brought into the world. The unborn child has a right to its life; it may even have property rights as well. Justice then is violated if such rights are interfered with unwarrantably. Minors and married women have their rights like others, but positive law frequently modifies their property rights for the common good. In past ages the property rights of women especially were largely modified by positive law on their being married, the husband acquiring more or less extensive rights over the property of his wife. In modern times, and especially in English-speaking countries, the tendency has been to do away with such positive enactments, and to restore to married women all the property rights which unmarried women possess.

Not only individuals, but societies of men as such are the subjects of rights. For men cannot singly and by their own unaided exertions do everything that is necessary for the security and dignity of human existence. For this end man needs the co-operation of his fellows. He has then a natural right to associate himself with others for the attainment of some lawful end, and when such societies have been formed, they are moral persons which have their rights similar to those of natural persons. Such societies then may own property, and although the State may make laws which modify those rights for the common good, it is beyond its power altogether to abrogate them. Men have this power to form themselves into societies especially for the purpose of offering to God the public and social worship which is due to Him. The Catholic Church, founded by God Himself, is a perfect society and independent of the State. She has her rights, God-given, and necessary for the attainment of her end, and justice is violated if these are unwarrantably interfered with.

As we have seen, human nature, its wants and aims, are the source of the fundamental and natural rights of man. By his industry man may occupy and annex to his person material things which are of use to him and which belong to nobody else. He thus acquires property by the title of occupation. Property once acquired remains in the possession of its owner; all that it is or is capable of is ordained to his use and benefit. If it increases by natural growth or by giving birth to offspring, the increase belongs to the original owner. By the same law of accession increase in value, even unearned increment as it is called, belongs to the owner of that which thus increases–“Res fructificat domino”. Positive law may, as we have seen, modify property rights for the common good. It may also further determine those that are indeterminate by the law of nature; it may even create rights which would not exist without it. Thus a father may by law acquire certain rights over the property of his children, and a husband may in the same way have certain rights over the property of his wife. When such rights exist it is, of course, a matter of justice to respect them. Finally, rights may be transferred from one to another or modified by a great variety of contracts, which are treated of under a special heading. See CONTRACT.

The foregoing is in very brief outline the doctrine on justice which has been gradually elaborated by Catholic philosophers and divines. The foundations of the doctrine are found in Aristotle, but the noble, beautiful, and altogether rational edifice has been raised by the labours of such men as Aquinas, Molina, Lessius, Lugo, and a host of others. The doctrine as it appears at large in their stately folios is one of the chief and most important results of Catholic thought. It fully accounts for the peremptory, sacred, and absolutely binding character with which justice is invested in the minds of men. It was never of greater importance than it is nowadays to insist on these characteristics of justice. They disappear almost if not altogether in the modern theories of the virtue. Most of these theories derive rights and justice from positive law, and when socialists and anarchists threaten to abrogate those laws and make new ones which will regulate men’s rights more equitably, no rational defense of the old order is possible. It becomes a mere question of might and brute force. Even if some with Herbert Spencer endeavour to find a deeper foundation for justice in the conditions of human existence, it is easy to answer that their interpretation of those conditions is essentially individualist and selfish, and that human existence thus conditioned is not worth having; that the new social order peremptorily demands their abolition. The Catholic doctrine of justice will be found one of the main safeguards of order, peace, and progress. With even balance it equally favours all and presses unduly on none. It gives the State ample authority for the attainment of its legitimate end, while it effectually bars the road to tyranny and violence.

———————————–

T. SLATER Transcribed by Rick McCarty

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume VIIICopyright © 1910 by Robert Appleton CompanyOnline Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. KnightNihil Obstat, October 1, 1910. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., CensorImprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York

Fuente: Catholic Encyclopedia

Justice

(, righteousness, as an internal trait of character; , judgment, as a judicial act), as applied to men, is one of the four cardinal virtues. It consists, according to Cicero (De Finibus, lib. 5, cap. 23), in suo cuique tribuendo, in according to every one his right. By the Pythagoreans, and also by Plato, it was regarded as including all human virtue or duty. The word righteousness is used in our translation of the Scriptures in a like extensive signification. As opposed to equity justice ( ) means doing merely what positive law requires, while equity ( ) means doing what is, fair and right in the circumstances of every particular case. Justice is not founded in law, as Hobbes and others hold, but in our idea of what is right. Laws are just or unjust in so far as they do or do not conform to that idea. Justice may be distinguished as ethical, economical, and political. The first consists in doing justice between man and man as men; the second, in doing justice between the members of a family or household; and the third, in doing justice between the members of a community or commonwealth (More, Enchiridion Ethicum; Grove, Moral Philosophy). Dr. Watts gives the following rules respecting justice

“1. It is just that we honor, reverence, and respect those who are superiors in any kind (Eph 6:1; Eph 6:3; 1Pe 2:17; 1Ti 5:17).

2. That we show particular kindness to near relations (Pro 16:17).

3. That we love those who love us, and show gratitude to those who have done us good (Gal 4:15).

4. That we pay the full due to those whom we bargain or deal with (Romans 13; Deu 24:14).

5. That we help our fellow creatures in cases of great necessity (Exo 22:4). 6. Reparation to those whom we have willfully injured” (Watts, Sermons, serm. 24, 26, vol. 2). See Wollaston, Religion of Nature, p. 137, 141; Jay, Sermons, 2, 131.

Fuente: Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature

Justice

is rendering to every one that which is his due. It has been distinguished from equity in this respect, that while justice means merely the doing what positive law demands, equity means the doing of what is fair and right in every separate case.

Fuente: Easton’s Bible Dictionary

JUSTICE

Throughout the Bible, justice is closely connected with righteousness. Both words have a breadth of meaning in relation to character and conduct, and both are commonly concerned with doing right or being in the right (see RIGHTEOUSNESS).

God, the sovereign ruler of the universe, is perfect in justice (Gen 18:25; Deu 32:4; Rev 15:3). At the same time he is merciful. Sinners can have hope only because of the perfect harmony of justice and mercy within the divine nature (Exo 34:6-7; Zep 3:5; cf. Job 4:17; Mal 3:6-7). There is no way that sinners can bring themselves into a right relationship with a just and holy God, but God is merciful to them. Through Jesus Christ, God has provided a way of salvation by which he can bring repentant sinners into a right relationship with himself, yet be just in doing so (Rom 3:26; see JUSTIFICATION).

In addition to the justice that is evident in Gods way of salvation, justice should be evident in the common affairs of human society. This is the aspect of justice that the present article is chiefly concerned with. The perfect expression of justice in governing human society is seen in the authority exercised by Jesus the King-Messiah (Isa 9:7; Joh 5:30; Act 22:14; see KING). But God wants justice in the operations of all earthly governments, and likewise in private dealings between individuals (Deu 16:18-20; Deu 25:13-16).

Basic concerns

Since people exist in Gods image (Gen 1:27), there is within them an awareness of things being right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust. The law of God is, as it were, written on their hearts (Rom 2:14-15). Though sin has hindered peoples understanding and dulled his consciences, the law of God remains within them. This unwritten law is what makes it possible for them to know what justice is and to draw up law-codes to administer justice in society.

The ancient Hebrew law-code demonstrates how the universal and timeless principles of justice can be applied to the cultural and social habits of a particular people and era. Moses law, given by God himself, sets out the sort of justice that God requires (Deu 16:18; Deu 32:44-47).

Justice must be the same for all, rich and poor alike (Exo 23:3; Exo 23:6-7; Deu 1:15-17). Laws must not be designed to suit the people of power and influence, but must protect the rights of those who can be easily exploited, such as foreigners, widows, orphans, debtors, labourers and the poor in general (Exo 21:1-11; Exo 22:21-27; Exo 23:6-12; Deu 14:28-29; Deu 15:11). Also penalties must fit the crime, being neither too heavy nor too light (Exo 21:23-25; see PUNISHMENT).

Although the history of Israel mentions many kings, judges and other administrators who upheld such principles of justice (2Sa 8:15; 2Sa 23:3-4; Psalms 101; Isa 33:15-16; Jer 22:15), it also mentions many who ignored them (1Sa 8:3; 2Ki 21:16; Ecc 5:8; Isa 5:23; Jer 22:17; see RULER). In both Old and New Testament times godly people were fearless in condemning injustice, whether committed by civil authorities or religious leaders. Civil power gives no one the right to do as he likes, and religious exercises are no substitute for common justice (Isa 1:14-17; Isa 1:23; Isa 59:14-15; Amo 5:11-12; Amo 5:21-23; Mic 7:3; Mar 11:15-17; Mar 12:40; Luk 6:25; Luk 16:19-25; Jam 5:1-6).

Influence for good

Gods way of dealing with the sinfulness of human society begins not with changing the social order, but with changing individuals. Those individuals, however, are part of society, and they will help change society as they promote the values of life they have learnt through coming to know God (Mat 5:13; Mat 5:16; 1Co 7:21-24; Eph 4:17-24; Eph 5:8-11). Genuine moral goodness includes within it a concern to correct social injustice. This involves not merely condemning evil, but positively doing good (Isa 1:17; Amo 5:15; Amo 5:24; Mic 6:8; Mat 23:23; Luk 3:10-14; Col 4:1; Jam 1:27).

Political conditions vary from one country to another, and these will largely determine the extent to which Gods people can actively try to persuade the government to improve social justice. Much depends on what rights citizens have to choose their government and influence its decisions (see GOVERNMENT). But no matter what kind of government they live under, Gods people should always work to promote values of human dignity (cf. Psa 8:5-8). In so doing they may undermine unjust practices and eventually see them removed (Eph 2:13-16; Eph 5:25; Eph 6:5-9; Philem 16; see RACE; SLAVE; WOMEN; WORK). No government, however, can relieve them of their personal responsibility to help the disadvantaged in society (Lev 25:35-40; Isa 58:6-7; Mat 5:9; Mat 25:34-36; Luk 10:30-36).

Bearing with injustice

Christians may suffer injustice in the form of discrimination and even persecution, both from governments and from citizens. Like Jesus they must accept any such opposition bravely and not try to retaliate (Rom 12:19-21; 1Pe 2:15; 1Pe 2:21-23; 1Pe 3:13; 1Pe 4:16; see PERSECUTION). There may be cases where they claim their rights in support of those principles of justice that government officials are supposed to administer (Act 16:35-39; Act 22:25; Act 25:10-11), but they should not use their rights for selfish purposes.

When Jesus told his followers that they were not to demand an eye for an eye, he was not undermining the basis of civil justice (which does demand an eye for an eye and positively returns evil for evil by imposing a penalty to fit the offence). Rather Jesus was telling his followers that the spirit ruling in their hearts must not be the same as that which operates in a code of legal justice. Gods people must always be prepared to sacrifice their rights and even do good to those who harm them (Mat 5:38-42; 1Co 6:7-8; Php 2:4; cf. 1Co 9:15).

Fuente: Bridgeway Bible Dictionary

Justice

JUSTICE

In the Authorized Version of NT the word justice does not occur, being always translated righteousness. For the adj. we have just and righteous used interchangeably. God is just (1Jn 1:9, Rev 15:3), righteous (Joh 17:25, 2Ti 4:8); Christ is the Just One (Act 3:14; Act 7:52), and righteous (1Jn 2:1). Men, both as individuals and collectively, are just or righteous (Mat 1:9; Mat 5:45; Mat 10:41; Mat 13:43, Act 10:22; Act 24:15). In Joh 5:30 we have just, and in Rev 16:7 righteous judgment. In Col 4:1 refers to what is due by masters to their slaves; and in Mat 20:4 to a money payment for work done. This haphazard rendering of is partially rectified in the Revised Version NT 1881, OT 1885 . In classical Greek the noun and the adj. are sometimes used in the wider sense of moral rectitude in general; but under the influence of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy its later usage inclines to the narrower sense of political and social justice. Aristotle (Nic. Ethiopic v. 1. 15) qualifies the general idea by making it refer to what is due to ones neighbour; and Plato (Republic, Bks. i. ii. iv.) deals with at great length but almost exclusively in the sense of political and individual justice, though he does attempt to give the idea a wider scope by connecting it with that of the Absolute Good. In Biblical Greek, both in the LXX Septuagint and the NT, the wider meaning is restored, and is the common one. In Luk 1:6 Zacharias and Elisabeth are said to be ; and this is explained, if not defined, by the words . This is the general idea of righteousness; but our word justice must be taken as signifying the recognition and fulfilment of what is due from one to another, righteous dealing between persons, each rendering to others what is their right and due. See also art. Righteous.

1. The justice of God.The justice of God is an aspect of His righteousness, and belongs, therefore, to His essential nature. It may be shown to have significance for the Divine life, even apart from His relation to others. Gods attributes are not all of co-ordinate worth. His omnipotence, e.g., is subordinate to His ethical attributes; it does not use them as a means to accomplish its ends, but they use it. Omnipotence is not a power to do what it wills, but to do what God wills; and as His will is holy, it can be only ethically determined. If in Gods nature mere power were supreme, and holiness and love subordinate, this would be as contrary to justice as when, in a kingdom, the rule of right has been overturned by irresponsible violence. As in the State, justice is the controlling principle which preserves the body politic for the discharge of its several functions, so, in the Divine justice, we have the regulative principle of order in the Divine nature and life.

(1) Gods justice in His relations with men.He shows favour to the righteous. He could not withhold His approval of that in them which is the object of complacency and delight in Himself. This does not mean that they have a claim on God for a happy earthly lot, and exemption from earthly troubles. This doctrine of recompense was the prevalent one during the early and non-reflective stage of Israels religious progress; but it did not bear the strain put on it by the national calamities. In the teaching of Christ it is repudiated: Mat 5:45; Mat 13:28-29, Luk 16:25; Luk 18:1-5, Joh 9:2-3; and in Rom 8:18; Rom 8:39 and Heb 12:11 an explanation of the sufferings of the righteous is given which goes far to remove their seeming variance with the justice of God. They are part of His fatherly discipline by which His children are prepared for their heavenly inheritance (2Co 4:16-17, Heb 5:8). Even here they have their great reward in the favour and friendship of God (Mat 5:10-12; 1Pe 2:19-20; 1Pe 3:12; 1Pe 3:14).

(2) Gods justice in relation to sin.God is just, and will therefore punish sin. This is one of the Christian certainties (Gal 6:7). Different views, however, have been held as to the nature of the punishment and its object. Some think (and this is Ritschls opinion) that the true punishment of sin consists in the sense of guilt and alienation from God which a persuasion of the Divine displeasure awakens; and that the outward evils which are regarded as punishments are really due to natural causes that have no relation to human guilt (Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation, 47 ff., 257 ff.). Now, the sense of Gods displeasure must always be a most important part of punishment, and might almost stand for the whole of it, if we could suppose the sinner as responsive to it as he ought to be, as, e.g., a saint made perfect in holiness would be. To such a saint the sense of alienation from God would be harder to bear than the most untoward outward calamity. But sin increasingly blunts the sinners susceptibility to suffering from this source; and if no effective provision has been made to bring Gods displeasure home to him, he would at last work out his term of punishment. There may be no link of causation between our sin and most of the outward evils of life. Maeterlinck may be right in saying that nature knows nothing of justice; but in that case we should have to believe with him that neither can nature be regarded as the creation of a Being in whom ethical attributes are supreme (Maeterlinck, Buried Temple, Essay on the Mystery of Justice).

Gods justice in relation to sin is at once retributive, educative, and protective. It is retributive because it punishes sin simply as sin; it is educative or reformatory because the punishment is also intended for the moral improvement of the transgressor; it is protective because by the punishment others are restrained from wrong-doing, and are themselves guarded against the evils which would result from the prevalence of unpunished sin. That the Scripture view of Gods justice implies retribution may be shown from many passages: Mat 16:27; Mat 16:24-25, Luk 12:45-48, Rom 2:6; Rom 2:16; Rom 6:23, 2Co 5:10, Col 3:25, 2Th 1:9, Heb 2:2; Heb 10:27. One could scarcely gather from these passages that Gods sole aim in punishment is the reformation of the offender. Yet this is the popular view with many modern theologians. As a protest against the once prevalent opinion that God, in punishing, desires merely to exact vengeance without any regard to the sinners repentance, it has its justification. But, like other reactionary views, it carries us too far in the opposite direction. The whole drift of Biblical teaching is that God punishes sinners because they deserve it. Punishment is the reaction of His holy nature against wrong-doing, and without it the moral order of the world could not be maintained. If sin did not arouse His displeasure, He would not be holy; and if He did not manifest His displeasure objectively by punishment, men could not know that He is holy. But it is said that God is love, and that what love inflicts is chastisement, not punishment in the retributive sense. Holy love, however, cannot accomplish its end unless the sinner is brought to feel that he deserves punishment. How could punishment benefit him if, while undergoing it, he believed that it had not been merited? Retribution does tend to the offenders improvement, and this is part of Gods purpose in it; but its reformatory influence never takes effect until the sinner acknowledges its justice. His improvement begins only when he is brought into this state of mind and feeling. If, indeed, Gods sole aim were reformation, it would follow that, if rewards carried with them the same benefits as punishments, as in many cases they do, then the offender would deserve them, and this because of his sin. In like manner it would be very difficult to persuade people that it is right that they should be protected from the spread of violence by the punishment of those to whom punishment was not justly due.

Gods justice is also shown in the forgiveness of sins on condition of repentance. Repentance is a sign that the disciplinary purpose which accompanies retribution has not missed its mark; and if now God withheld forgiveness, it would imply a failure of justice. According to 1Jn 1:9, God is faithful and just () to forgive. Forgiveness and punishment are alike connected with the justice of God. The justice of forgiveness further appears from this, that the man who repents is a different moral person from the man who had sinned. His relation to his sin has been reversed; for whereas formerly his will was identified with sin, it is now identified with the mind and will of God regarding it. In proportion to the depth and sincerity of his repentance, we feel that he is a changed man, and should no longer be treated as if sin still formed part of the texture of his being. He has separated from, and now unsparingly condemns, his past sinful self; and, having thus come over to the side of righteousness, he is no longer a fit object of the Divine displeasure. Theologians, who first make logical distinctions between the Divine attributes and then reason from these as if they were real distinctions, say that justice cannot, but love alone can, forgive; as if love and justice were two contending powers in Gods nature. In reality, it is holy love that forgives; and this means that love and justice are joined hand in hand in forgiveness as they are in punishment. From a non-moral love gifts would come, but they might not be blessings; and justice without love never could be perfectly just, for love is part of the tribute which justice demands. The OT and NT writers never attempt to reconcile love and justice, because they were not conscious of any contrariety between them (see Mat 6:12; Mat 6:14-15; Mat 12:31-32; Mat 18:15-17; Mat 18:21-35, Luk 6:37; Luk 7:37-50; Luk 13:3; Luk 13:5; Luk 15:11-32; Luk 17:3-4; Luk 18:10-14; Luk 22:61-62; cf. Joh 21:15-17, Act 2:39; Act 3:19; Act 5:31; 2Pe 3:9, 1Jn 1:9). Of course, imperfection clings to all human repentance, because past sin disqualifies even the sincerest penitent for that godly sorrow for sin which worketh repentance not to be repented of (2Co 7:10). Hence the need for the work of Christ and the regenerating influence of the Spirit, by which imperfect repentance is atoned for and made perfect.

2. Justice in man.If man has been created in the image of God, we should expect to find reflected in him the same supremacy of the ethical attributes as exists in God. Thus for him also justice or righteousness will be the supreme law of his being, obligatory, not through any human convention, but in virtue of mans Godlikeness. As supreme, it will be regulative of his whole life, determining his use of his freedom, the outflow of his emotions and thoughts, his activity in all human relations. Justice will regulate his life Godward, for God has definite claims on man for devotion and service; and as in Christ He has made Himself known as a Father and Saviour, these claims are, for the Christian, raised to a higher sphere of obligation. These are duties which man owes to God, and, when they are withheld, justice is violated. God is robbed when that which is His due is not rendered (Mal 3:8). Hence the just or righteous () man is represented as walking in all the commandments of the Lord blameless (Luk 1:6), and of these the first and greatest is, Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart (Mat 22:37). Not until we give God this wholehearted love do we give Him His due. We are then just before God; and from 1Jn 3:10; 1Jn 3:17; 1Jn 4:20-21; 1Jn 5:1 we learn that only when man responds to Gods claim can he fulfil the obligations of love and justice to his fellow-men. That man can be just or unjust in relation to God appears also from passages in which sin is spoken of as a state of indebtednessGod being the creditor and man the debtor (Mat 5:26; Mat 6:12; Mat 18:23-35, Luk 7:41-43); and from those parables in which God and man are related as Master and servant, or King and subject (Mat 20:1-16; Mat 21:33-41; Mat 25:14-30; Mar 12:1-12).

One characteristic of the NT doctrine of justice, as compared with the views current in the Jewish and classical worlds, is a noteworthy enlargement of its sphere. Justice to man as man was a subject of speculation among the Stoics, but in the popular morality its obligation was ignored and even repudiated. The Jew hated the Samaritan (Luk 9:54) and despised the Gentile, with whom he would not share his privileges (Act 21:27-30). Why should they show favour to those whom God had not honoured? The Greek was bound by moralties to his fellow-citizens, but between him and the barbarians there was no moral reciprocity; if he was conscious of any obligation, it was an obligation to do them all the injury he could. Then again there was the slave class, who were regarded as incapable of virtue, and, therefore, like the lower animals, outside the ethical sphere. Thus Jew and Gentile alike acknowledged no moral relationship between themselves and the vast majority of the race. It was, therefore, a great step in advance when Christ proclaimed a universal Kingdom of justice and love, and taught that, since God was the Father of all, they were due to all men, on the ground not of citizenship or nationality, but of humanity and of their common relationship to God (Mat 5:43-48; Mat 28:19, Luk 10:30-37, Joh 3:16; Joh 12:32).

There was also a subjective enlargement of its sphere. Under the influence of Pharisaic teaching and example, the moral law had come to be regarded as merely an external rule of conduct; the inner world of thought and motive and feeling being overlooked or regarded as of only secondary importance. All the virtues had thus suffered deterioration, and justice among them. But in the Sermon on the Mount, Christ claimed this neglected sphere for the moral law. Its authority was extended so as to cover the entire life of men, for in the spiritual realm of being, thoughts and feelings are accounted as deeds, as acts of the moral self. And this was an infinite extension of the sway of justice. Out of the heart proceed adulteries, fornications, murders, thefts (Mar 7:21). Sin is not confined to outward acts; it begins the moment evil thoughts and desires arise in the heart; and a rgime of justice is necessary there. To be angry with our brother without cause is to do him wrong (Mat 5:22); and the man is accounted guilty who, while refraining from actual murder, yet thinks in his heart, I would, if I dared. Our neighbour has a claim on us, that we should think and feel justly regarding him; and when this is withheld, we fail to give him his due. Again, the sin of adultery may be begun and completed by simply looking on a woman to lust after her (Mat 5:28). Before the tribunal of the Kingdom, the man is adjudged to have wronged the woman. The Christian law of justice is embodied in the Golden Rule, All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them (Mat 7:12); and also in the second of the great commandments, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself (Mar 12:31). According to the Golden Rule, we are to regard our fellow-man as an alter ego, to put ourselves in his place, and judge his claims or needs and our duties from his point of view (Php 2:4-8). Then the commandment tells us positively what our obligation is. Thou shalt love him as thyself, not with a non-moral love, which seeks nothing higher than the happiness of its objects. We are to care for him with that holy love which attaches itself to that in him which in ourselves is the legitimate object of our self-love,the moral self or soul which was created in, and can be restored to, the image of God. It is for His moral perfections that we love God; and the claims of Christian justice are met, only when our love for others has as its aim their restoration to Godlikeness (Mat 16:26, Jam 5:20, Heb 13:17). The Christian law requires us not merely to refrain from doing our neighbour wrong, but to promote, even at the cost of self-sacrifice, his highest well-being as we would our own. For a Christian man to say, I have done my neighbour justice, and he has no claim on me for more, is to prove false to the Christian ideal; for, in the Kingdom of righteousness, benevolence is not something that may be withheld, but is simply justice made perfect.

Literature.For meaning of and see Grimm-Thayer, Lex.; Cremer, Bib.-Th. Lex.; Westcott, Ep. of Jn. 24 f.; Sanday-Headlam, Rom. [Note: Roman.] 28 ff. See also T. Aquinas, Sum. i., Qu. xxi. ii. 2, Qu. lviii.lxxxi.; Hodge, Syst. Theol. vol. i.; the Dogmatics of Martensen and Dorner; Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation; Moberly, Atonement and Personality, esp. i.iv.; Clarke, Outline of Theol.; Stevens, Chr. Doct. of Salvation; the Christian Ethics of Martensen (Social), Dorner, Newman Smyth; Luthardt. Hist. of Chr. Ethics; Wendt, Teaching of Jesus, vol. i.; C. Wagner, Justice; Seeley, Ecce Homo. In the following works on General Ethics, Justice is, in the main, treated from the Christian standpoint: Hegel. Phil. [Note: Philistine.] of Right; Bradley, Ethiopic Studies; Green, Proleg. to Ethics, also Principles of Polit. Obligation; MKenzie, Introd. to Social Phil. [Note: Philistine.] ; Seth, Ethical Principles; Maeterlinck, Essay on the Mystery of Justice in his Buried Temple [contains some fine thoughts, but Agnostic in tone and tendency].

A. Bisset.

Fuente: A Dictionary Of Christ And The Gospels

Justice

JUSTICE (I.).Justice, as an attribute of God, is referred to in AV [Note: Authorized Version.] in Job 37:23, Psa 89:14 (RV [Note: Revised Version.] righteousness), and Jer 50:7. In all cases the Heb. is tsedeq or tsedqh, the word generally represented by righteousness (see art.). The Divine justice is that side of the Divine righteousness which exhibits it as absolute fairness. In one passage this justice, in operation, is represented by mishpt (Job 36:17). The thought of the Divine justice is sometimes expressed by the latter word, tr. [Note: translate or translation.] in EV [Note: English Version.] judgment: Deu 32:4, Psa 89:14; Psa 97:2, Isa 30:18. It is implied in Abrahams question (Gen 18:25): Shall not the judge of all the earth do right, rather do justice? (Heb. mishpt). In Dan 4:37 His ways are judgment, the original is dn. In Act 28:4 RV [Note: Revised Version.] has Justice instead of vengeance. As the capital J [Note: Jahwist.] is intended to indicate, the writer must have had in his mind the goddeas of justice of Greek poetry, Dik, the virgin daughter of Zeus, who sat by his side. But the people of Malta were largely Semites, not Hellenes. What was their equivalent? A positive answer cannot be given, but it may be noted that Babylonian mythology represented justice and rectitude as the children of Shamash the sun-god, the judge of heaven and earth, and that the Phnicians had in their pantheon a Divine being named tsedeq.

W. Taylor Smith.

JUSTICE (II.).

1. The administration of justice in early Israel.(a) The earliest form of the administration of justice was that exercised by the head of the family. He was not only the final authority to whom the members of a family appealed when questions of right and wrong had to be decided, and to whose sentence they had to submit, but he also had the power of pronouncing even the death penalty (see Gen 38:24). On the other hand, the rights of each member of the family were jealously safeguarded by all the rest; if harm or injury of any kind were sustained by any member, all the members were bound to avenge him; in the case of death the law of blood-revenge laid upon all the duty of taking vengeance by slaying a member of the murderers family, preferably, but not necessarily, the murderer himself.

(b) The next stage was that in which justice was administered by the elders of a clan or tribe (see Num 11:16). A number of families, united by ties of kinship, became, by the formation of a clan, a unity as closely connected as the family itself. In this stage of the organization of society the procedure in deciding questions of right and wrong was doubtless much the same as that which obtains even up to the present day among the Bedouin Arabs. When a quarrel arises between two members of the tribe, the matter is brought before the acknowledged head, the sheik. He seeks to make peace between them; having beard both sides, he declares who is right and who is wrong, and settles the form of satisfaction which the latter should make; but his judgment has no binding force, no power other than that of moral suasion; influence is brought to bear by the members of the famity of the one declared to be in the wrong, urging him to submit,the earlier rgime thus coming into play, in a modified way; but if he is not to be prevailed upon, the issue is decided by the sword. In Exo 18:13-27 we have what purports to be the original institution of the administration of justice by the elders of clans, Moses himself acting in the capacity of a kind of court of appeal (Exo 18:26); it is, of course, quite possible that, so far as Israel was concerned, this account is historically true, but the institution must have been much older than the time of Moses, and in following Jethros guidance, Moses was probably only re-instituting a rgime which had long existed among his nomad forefathers. It is a more developed form of tribal justice that we read of in Deu 21:18-21; here the father of a rebellious son, finding his authority set at nought, appeals to the elders of the city; in the case of being found guilty the death-sentence is pronounced against the son, and the sentence is carried out by representatives of the community. The passage is an important one, for it evidently contains echoes of very early usage, the mention of the mother may imply a distant reminiscence of the matriarchate; and the fact that the head of the family exercises his power recalls the earlier rgime already referred to, while the present institution of the administration of justice by elders is also borne witness to. See, further, Judges.

Another point of importance which must be briefly alluded to is the judgment of God. In the case of questions arising in which the difficulty of finding a solution appeared insuperable, recourse was had to the judgment of God (see Exo 22:8-9); the judges referred to here (RV [Note: Revised Version.] has God in the text, but judges in the mg.) were those who were qualified to seek a decision from God. See, in this connexion, Deu 21:1-9.

(c) In the monarchical period a further development takes place; the older system, whereby justice was administered by the elders of the cities, is indeed still seen to be in vogue (cf. 1Ki 21:8-13); but two other powers had now arisen, and both tended to diminish the power and moral influence of the elders of the cities, so far as their judicial functions were concerned.

(i) The king.It is probable that at first he decided appeals only, but in course of time all important mattersso far as this was possiblewere apparently brought before him (see 1Sa 8:20, 2Sa 14:4 ff; 2Sa 15:2-6, 1Ki 3:9, 2Ki 15:5); according to 1Ki 7:7, Solomon had a covered place constructed, which was called the porch of judgment, and which was in close proximity to his own palace. But though the king was supreme judge in the land, it would obviously soon have become impossible for him to attend to all the more important causes even; the number of these, as well as other calls upon his time, necessitated the appointment of representatives who should administer justice in the kings name. The appointment of these must have further curtailed the powers of the earlier representatives of justice, already referred to. One of the worst results, however, of this was that the motives of administering justice became different; in the old days, when the sheik, or the city elder, was called upon to decide an issue, he did it rather in the capacity of a friend who desired peace between two other friends than as a strictly legal official; his interest in the disputants, as being both of his own kin, or at all events both members of the same community to which he belonged, impelled him to do his utmost to make peace. It was otherwise when a stranger had to decide between two men of whom he knew nothing; he had no personal interest in them, nor would it have been his main endeavour to try to secure a lasting peace between the two, as had been the case in earlier days among the sheiks and city elders; the tie of kinship was absent. The result was that personal interest of another kind asserted itself, and, as there is abundant evidence to show, the administration of justice was guided rather by the prospect of gain than in the interests of equity. It is an ever-recurring burden in the Prophetical writings that justice is thwarted through bribery: Every one loveth gifts and followeth after rewards (Isa 1:23; see, further, Isa 5:7; Isa 5:20; Isa 5:23, Mic 3:11; Mic 7:3, Eze 18:8; Eze 22:12 etc., and cf. the picture of the ideal judge in Isa 11:3-4). A very aggravated instance of the miscarriage of justice is recorded in 1Ki 21:1-29; but such cases were undoubtedly rare exceptions; so far as Israel and Judah were concerned, it was not from the central authority that the perversion of justice proceeded, but rather from the kings representatives, the princes (srim), who misused their authority for nefarious ends.

(ii) The priesthood.Even before the Exile the administration of justice was to a large extent centred in the hands of the Levitical priesthood; nothing could illustrate this more pointedly than Deu 19:15-21, where the outlines of a regular, formulated, judicial system seem to be referred to, in which the final authority is vested in the priesthood. What must have contributed to this more than anything else was the fact that from early times such matters as seemed to the elders of the city to defy a satisfactory solution were, as we have already seen, submitted to the judgment of God; the intermediaries between God and men were the priests, who carried the matter into the Divine presence, received the Divine answer, and announced that answer to those who came for judgment (see Exo 22:8-9, and esp. Deu 33:8 ff. And of Levi he said, Thy Thummim and thy Urim are with tby godly one.). It is easy to see how, under these circumstances, the authority of the priesthood, in all matters, tended constantly to increase (see, further, Deu 17:8-13; Deu 19:15-21).

But in spite of the rise of these two new factorsthe king and the priesthoodit must be borne in mind that the elders of the cities still continued to carry out their judicial functions.

Regarding what would correspond to the modern idea of a law court, we have no data to go upon so far as the earliest period is concerned; but it may be taken for granted that, among the nomads, those who had a quarrel would repair to the tent of the sheik, in which an informal court would be held. From the time of the settlement in Canaan, however, and onwards, when city life had developed, there is plenty of information on the subject. The open space in the immediate vicinity of the city gate was the usual place for assemblies of the people, and it was here that the more formal courts of law were held (see Amo 5:12; Amo 5:15, Deu 21:19; Deu 22:15; Deu 25:7, Zec 8:16; the porch of judgment of king Solomon [1Ki 7:7], already referred to, was of course exceptional).

2. Post-exilic period.At the time of Ezra we find that the administration of justice by the elders of the city, which had continued throughout the period of the monarchy, is still in vogue (see Ezr 7:25; Ezr 10:14); they presided over the local courts in the smaller provincial towns. These smaller courts consisted of seven members; in the larger towns the corresponding courts consisted of twenty-three members. In the event of these lower courts not being able to come to a decision regarding any matter brought before them, the case was carried to the superior court at Jerusalem, the Sanhedrin (wh. see). The procedure in these courts was of the simplest character: the injured person brought his complaint before the judges, previous notice having been given, and publicly gave his version of the matter; the accused then in his turn defended himself;judging from Job 31:35 a written statement was sometimes read out;the testimony of two witnesses at least was required to substantiate an accusation; according to the Talmud, these witnesses had to be males and of age, but the testimony of a slave was not regarded as valid. Before witnesses gave their testimony they were adjured to speak the truth, and the whole truth. False witnessesand these were evidently not unknownhad to suffer the same punishment as the victim of their false testimony would have had to undergo, or had undergone. If no witnesses were forthcoming, the truth of a matter had, so far as possible, to be obtained by the cross-questioning and acumen of the judges.

3. In the NT.The administration of justice under the Roman rgime comes before us in connexion with St. Paul (Act 24:1-27 ff.). According to Roman law, when a Roman citizen was accused of anything, the magistrate could fix any time that suited him for the trial; however long the trial might be postponed, the accused was nevertheless imprisoned for the whole time. But there were different kinds of imprisonment recognized by Roman law, and it lay within the magistrates power to decide which kind the prisoner should suffer. These different grades of custody were: the public gaol, where the prisoner was bound in chains (cf. Act 12:6; Act 21:33); in the custody of a soldier, who was responsible for the prisoner, and to whom the prisoner was chained; and an altogether milder form, according to which the accused was in custody only so far that he was under the supervision of a magistrate, who stood surety for him; it was only those of high rank to whom this indulgence was accorded. In the case of St. Paul it was the second of these which was put in force.

As regards appeals to the Emperor (Act 25:11-12), the following conditions applied when one claimed this right. In the Roman provinces the supreme criminal jurisdiction was exercised by the governor of the province, whether proconsul, proprtor, or procurator; no appeal was permitted to provincials from a governors judgment; but Roman citizens had the right of appealing to the tribunes, who had the power of ordering the case to be transferred to the ordinary tribunals at Rome. But from the time of Augustus the power of the tribunes was centred in the person of the Emperor; and with him alone, therefore, lay the power of hearing appeals. The form of such an appeal was the simple pronunciation of the word Appello; there was no need to make a written appeal, the mere utterance of the word in court suspended all further proceedings there.

W. O. E. Oesterley.

Fuente: Hastings’ Dictionary of the Bible

Justice

justis (, cedhakah; , cedhek; , dikaiosune): The original Hebrew and Greek words are the same as those rendered righteousness. This is the common rendering, and in about half the cases where we have just and justice in the King James Version, the American Standard Revised Version has changed to righteous and righteousness. It must be constantly borne in mind that the two ideas are essentially the same. See RIGHTEOUSNESS.

1. Human Justice:

Justice had primarily to do with conduct in relation to others, especially with regard to the rights of others. It is applied to business, where just weights and measures are demanded (Lev 19:35, Lev 19:36; Deu 25:13-16; Amo 8:5; Pro 11:1; Pro 16:11; Eze 45:9, Eze 45:10). It is demanded in courts, where the rights of rich and poor, Israelite and sojourner, are equally to be regarded. Neither station nor bribe nor popular clamor shall influence judge or witness. Justice, justice shalt thou follow (Deu 16:20 m; compare Deu 16:18-20; Exo 23:1-3, Exo 23:6-9). In general this justice is contrasted with that wickedness which feared not God, and regarded not man (Luk 18:2).

In a larger sense justice is not only giving to others their rights, but involves the active duty of establishing their rights. So Israel waits upon God’s justice or cries out: The justice due to me (literally, my justice) is passed away from my God (Isa 40:27). Yahweh is to show her to be in the right as over against the nations. Justice here becomes mercy. To seek justice means to relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow (Isa 1:17; compare Isa 11:4; Jer 22:15, Jer 22:16; Psa 82:2-4). The same idea appears in Deu 24:12, Deu 24:13; Psa 37:21, Psa 37:26; Psa 112:4-6, where the translation is righteous instead of just.

In this conception of justice the full meaning of the New Testament is not yet reached. It does not mean sinlessness or moral perfection. Job knows the sin in his heart (Job 13:23, Job 13:26; Job 7:21), and yet speaks of himself as a just or righteous man (Job 12:4; Job 13:18). The Psalmist confidently depends upon the righteousness of God though he knows that no man is righteous in God’s sight (Psa 143:1, Psa 143:2; compare Psa 7:8; Psa 18:20-24). It is not a lack of humility or dependence upon God when the Psalmist asks to be judged according to his righteousness. In relation to God, the just, or righteous, man is the one who holds to God and trusts in Him (Psa 33:18-22). This is not the later Judaistic legalism with its merit and reward, where God’s justice is simply a matter of giving each man what he has earned.

The word justice does not occur in the New Testament, and in most cases where we find just in the King James Version it is changed to righteous in the American Standard Revised Version. The idea of justice or righteousness (remembering that these are essentially the same) becomes more spiritual and ethical in the New Testament. It is a matter of character, and God’s own spirit is the standard (1Jo 3:7; Mat 5:48). The mere give-and-take justice is not enough. We are to be merciful, and that to all. The ideal is righteousness, not rights. As Holtzmann says, The keynote of the Sermon on the Mount is justitia and not jus.

2. Justice of God:

God’s justice, or righteousness, is founded in His essential nature. But, just as with man, it is not something abstract, but is seen in His relation to the world. It is His kingship establishing and maintaining the right. It appears as retributive justice, that reaction of His holy will, as grounded in His eternal being, against evil wherever found. He cannot be indifferent to good and evil (Hab 1:13). The great prophets, Isaiah, Micah, Amos, Hosea, all insist upon Yahweh’s demand for righteousness.

But this is not the main aspect of God’s justice. Theology has been wont to set forth God’s justice as the fundamental fact in His nature with which we must reconcile His mercy as best we may, the two being conceived as in conflict. As a matter of fact, the Scriptures most often conceive God’s justice, or righteousness, as the action of His mercy. Just as with man justice means the relief of the oppressed and needy, so God’s justice is His kingly power engaged on behalf of men, and justice and mercy are constantly joined together. He is a just God and a Saviour (Isa 45:21). I bring near my righteousness (or justice)…and my salvation shall not tarry (Isa 46:13; compare Psa 51:14; Psa 103:17; Psa 71:15; Psa 116:5; Isa 51:5, Isa 51:6). The righteous acts of Yahweh mean His deeds of deliverance (Jdg 5:11). And so Israel sings of the justice, or judgments, or righteousness of Yahweh (they are the same), and proclaims her trust in these (Psa 7:17; Psa 35:23, Psa 35:24, Psa 35:28; Psa 36:6; Psa 140:12, Psa 140:13; Psa 50:5, Psa 50:6; Psa 94:14, Psa 94:15; Psa 103:6; Psa 143:1).

The New Testament, too, does not lack the idea of retributive justice. The Son of Man shall render unto every man according to his deeds (Mat 16:27; compare 25:14-46; Luk 12:45-48; Rom 2:2-16; Rom 6:23; 2Co 5:10; Col 3:24, Col 3:25; 2Th 1:8, 2Th 1:9; Heb 2:2, Heb 2:3; Heb 10:26-31). But God’s justice is far more than this. The idea of merit and reward is really superseded by a higher viewpoint in the teaching of Jesus. He speaks, indeed, of recompense, but it is the Father and not the judge that gives this (Mat 6:1, Mat 6:4, Mat 6:6, Mat 6:18). And it is no mere justice of earth, because the reward transcends all merit (Mat 24:46, Mat 24:47; Mar 10:30; Luk 12:37). This is grace not desert (Luk 17:10). And the parable of Mat 20:1-15 gives at length the deathblow to the whole Judaistic scheme of merit and reward.

And God’s justice is not merely gracious, but redemptive. It not simply apportions rights, it establishes righteousness. Thus, just as in the Old Testament, the judge is the Saviour. The difference is simply here: in the Old Testament the salvation was more national and temporal, here it is personal and spiritual. But mercy is opposed to justice no more here than in the Old Testament. It is by the forgiveness of sins that God establishes righteousness, and this is the supreme task of justice. Thus it is that God is at the same time just, and the justifier of him that hath faith in Jesus (Rom 3:26). He is faithful and righteous (or just; see the King James Version) to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness (1Jo 1:9).

Literature.

See Comm., and Biblical Theologies under Justice and Righteousness, and especially Cremer, Biblical-Theol. Lex. of New Testament Greek.

Fuente: International Standard Bible Encyclopedia

Justice

General references

Exo 23:1-3; Exo 23:6-8; Lev 19:13-15; Deu 16:18-20; Deu 25:1-4; Ezr 7:26; Psa 72:1-2; Psa 82:2-4; Pro 17:15; Pro 17:26; Pro 18:5; Pro 18:17; Pro 20:8; Pro 22:27; Pro 24:23; Pro 28:21; Pro 29:26; Ecc 3:16-17; Ecc 5:8; Ecc 7:7; Isa 1:17; Isa 56:1; Isa 59:14-15; Jer 22:1-4; Lam 3:35-36; Amo 5:7; Amo 5:11-12; Mic 7:3; Hab 1:4; Zec 8:16; Mat 5:23-24; Mat 12:7; Joh 7:24; Joh 7:51; 1Co 13:6 Court; Judges; Witness; Lawyer

Fuente: Nave’s Topical Bible

Justice

primarily “custom, usage,” came to denote “what is right;” then, “a judicial hearing;” hence, “the execution of a sentence,” “punishment,” 2Th 1:9, RV; Jud 1:7, “punishment,” RV (AV, “vengeance”). In Act 28:4 (AV, “vengeance”) it is personified and denotes the goddess Justice or Nemesis (Lat., Justitia), who the Melita folk supposed was about to inflict the punishment of death upon Paul by means of the viper. See PUNISHMENT, VENGEANCE.

Fuente: Vine’s Dictionary of New Testament Words

Justice

is in Scripture taken for that essential perfection in God, whereby he is infinitely righteous and just, both in himself and in all his proceedings with his creatures, Psa 89:14. That political virtue which renders to every man his due; and is first, distributive, which concerns princes, magistrates, &c, Job 29:14; secondly, communicative, which concerns all persons in their dealings one with another, Gen 18:19.

JUSTICE, ADMINISTRATION OF. According to the Mosaic law, there were to be judges in all the cities, whose duty it was likewise to exercise judicial authority in the neighbouring villages; but weighty causes and appeals went up to the supreme judge or ruler of the commonwealth, and, in case of a failure here, to the high priest, Deu 17:8-9. In the time of the monarchy, weighty causes and appeals went up, of course, to the king, who, in very difficult cases, seems to have consulted the high priest, as is customary at the present day among the Persians and Ottomans. The judicial establishment was reorganized after the captivity, and two classes of judges, the inferior and superior, were appointed, Ezr 7:25. The more difficult cases, nevertheless, and appeals, were either brought before the ruler of the state, called , or before the high priest; until, in the age of the Maccabees, a supreme, judicial tribunal was instituted, which is first mentioned under Hyrcanus II. This tribunal is not to be confounded with the seventy-two counsellors, who were appointed to assist Moses in the civil administration of the government, but who never filled the office of judges. See SANHEDRIM.

Josephus states, that in every city there was a tribunal of seven judges, with two Levites as apparitors, and that it was a Mosaic institution. That there existed such an institution in his time, there is no reason to doubt; but he probably erred in referring its origin to so early a period as the days of Moses. (See Judges.) This tribunal, which decided causes of less moment, is denominated in the New Testament, , or the judgment, Mat 5:22. The Talmudists mention a tribunal of twenty-three judges, and another of three judges; but Josephus is silent in respect to them. The courts of twenty-three judges were the same with the synagogue tribunals, mentioned in Joh 16:2; which merely tried questions of a religious nature, and sentenced to no other punishment than forty stripes save one, 2Co 11:24. The court of three judges was merely a session of referees, which was allowed to the Jews by the Roman laws; for the Talmudists themselves, in describing this court, go on to observe, that one judge was chosen by the accuser, another by the accused, and a third by the two parties conjunctly; which shows at once the nature of the tribunal.

The time at which courts were held, and causes were brought before them for trial, was in the morning, Jer 21:12; Psa 101:8. According to the Talmudists, it was not lawful to try causes of a capital nature in the night; and it was equally unlawful to examine a cause, pass sentence, and put it in execution on the same day. The last particular was very strenuously insisted on. It is worthy of remark, that all of these practices, which were observed in other trials, were neglected in the tumultuous trial of Jesus, Mat 26:57; Joh 18:13-18. The places for judicial trials were in very ancient times the gates of cities, which were well adapted to this purpose. (See Gates.) Originally, trials were every where very summary, excepting in Egypt; where the accuser committed the charge to writing, the accused replied in writing, the accuser repeated the charge, and the accused answered again, &c, Job 14:17. It was customary in Egypt for the judge to have the code of laws placed before him, a practice which still prevails in the east. Moses interdicted, in the most express and decided manner, gifts or bribes, which were intended to corrupt the judges, Exo 22:20-21; Exo 23:1-9; Lev 19:15; Deu 24:14-15. Moses also, by legal precautions, prevented capital punishments, and corporal punishments, which were not capital, from being extended, as was done in other nations, both to parents and their children, and thus involving the innocent and the guilty in that misery which was justly due only to the latter, Exo 23:7; Deu 24:16; Dan 6:24.

The ceremonies which were observed in conducting a judicial trial, were as follows:

1. The accuser and the accused both made their appearance before the judge or judges, Deuteronomy xxv, l, who sat with legs crossed upon the floor, which was furnished for their accommodation with carpet and cushions. A secretary was present, at least in more modern times, who wrote down the sentence, and, indeed, every thing in relation to the trial; for instance, the articles of agreement that might be entered into previous to the commencement of the judicial proceedings, Isa 10:1-2; Jer 32:1-14. The Jews assert that there were two secretaries, the one being seated to the right of the judge, who wrote the sentence of not guilty, the other to the left, who wrote the sentence of condemnation, Mat 25:33-46. That an apparitor or beadle was present, is apparent from other sources.

2. The accuser was denominated in Hebrew , or the adversary, Zec 3:1-3; Psa 109:6. The judge or judges were seated, but both of the parties implicated stood up, the accuser standing to the right hand of the accused: the latter, at least after the captivity, when the cause was one of great consequence, appeared with hair dishevelled, and in a garment of mourning.

3. The witnesses were sworn, and, in capital cases, the parties concerned, 1Sa 14:37-40; Mat 26:63. In order to establish the charges alleged, two witnesses were necessary, and, including the accuser, three. The witnesses were examined separately, but the person accused had the liberty to be present when their testimony was given in, Num 35:30; Deu 17:1-15; Mat 26:59. Proofs might be brought from other sources; for instance, from written contracts, or from papers in evidence of any thing purchased or sold, of which there were commonly taken two copies, the one to be sealed, the other to be left open, as was customary in the time of Jerom, Jer 32:10-13.

4. The parties sometimes, as may be inferred from Pro 18:18, made use of the lot in determining the points of difficulty between them, but not without a mutual agreement. The sacred lot of Urim and Thummim was anciently resorted to, in order to detect the guilty, Jos 7:14-24; 1 Samuel 14; but the determination of a case of right or wrong in this way was not commanded by Moses.

5. The sentence, very soon after the completion of the examination, was pronounced; and the criminal, without any delay, even if the offence were a capital one, was hastened away to the place of punishment, Jos 7:22, &c; 1Sa 22:18; 1Ki 2:23.

A few additional remarks will cast some light upon some passages of Scripture: the station of the accused was in an eminent place in the court, that the people might see them, and hear what was alleged against them, and the proofs of it, together with the defence made by the criminals. This explains the reason of the remark by the Evangelist Matthew, concerning the posture of our Lord at his trial: Jesus stood before the governor; and that, in a mock trial, many ages before the birth of Christ, in which some attention was also paid to public forms, Naboth was set on high among the people, 1Ki 21:9. The accusers and the witnesses also stood, unless they were allowed to sit by the indulgence of the judges, when they stated the accusation, or gave their testimony. To this custom of the accusers rising from their seats, when called by the court to read the indictment, our Lord alludes in his answer to the scribes and Pharisees, who expressed a wish to see him perform some miracle: The queen of the south shall rise up in the judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it,

Mat 12:42. According to this rule, which seems to have been invariably observed, the Jews who accused the Apostle Paul at the bar of Festus the Roman governor, stood round about, while they stated the crimes which they had to lay to his charge, Act 25:7. They were compelled to stand as well as the prisoner, by the established usage of the courts of justice, in the east. The Romans often put criminals to the question, or endeavoured to extort a confession from them by torture. Agreeably to this cruel and unjust custom, the chief captain commanded Paul to be brought into the castle, and bade that he should be examined by scourging, Act 22:24. It was usual, especially among the Romans, when a man was charged with a capital crime, and during his arraignment, to let down his hair, suffer his beard to grow long, to wear filthy, ragged garments, and appear in a very dirty and sordid habit; on account of which they were called sordidati. When the person accused was brought into court to be tried, even his near relations, friends, and acquaintances, before the court voted, appeared with dishevelled hair, and clothed with garments foul and out of fashion, weeping, crying, and deprecating punishment. The accused sometimes appeared before the judges clothed in black, and his head covered with dust. In allusion to this ancient custom, the Prophet Zechariah represents Joshua, the high priest, when he appeared before the Lord, and Satan stood at his right hand to accuse him, as clothed with filthy garments, Zec 3:3. After the cause was carefully examined, and all parties impartially heard, the public crier, by command of the presiding magistrate, ordered the judges to bring in their verdict. The most ancient way of giving sentence, was by white and black sea shells, or pebbles. This custom has been mentioned by Ovid in these lines:

Mos erat antiquis, niveis atrisque lapillis, His damnare reos, illis absolvere culpa.

It was a custom among the ancients, to give their votes by white or black stones; with these they condemned the guilty, with those acquitted the innocent. In allusion to this ancient custom, our Lord promises to give the spiritual conqueror a white stone, Rev 2:17; the white stone of absolution or approbation. When sentence of condemnation was pronounced, if the case was capital, the witnesses put their hands on the head of the criminal, and said, Thy blood be upon thine own head. To this custom the Jews alluded, when they cried out at the trial of Christ, His blood be on us and on our children. Then was the malefactor led to execution, and none were allowed openly to lament his misfortune. His hands were secured with cords, and his feet with fetters; a custom which furnished David with an affecting allusion, in his lamentation over the dust of Abner: Thy hands were not bound, nor thy feet put in fetters, 2Sa 3:34; that is, he was put treacherously to death, without form of justice.

2. Executions in the east are often very prompt and arbitrary, when resulting from royal authority. In many cases the suspicion is no sooner entertained, or the cause of offence given, than the fatal order is issued; the messenger of death hurries to the unsuspecting victim, shows his warrant, and executes his orders that instant in silence and solitude. Instances of this kind are continually occurring in the Turkish and Persian histories. When the enemies of a great man among the Turks have gained influence enough over the prince to procure a warrant for his death, a capidgi, the name of the officer who executes these orders, is sent to him, who shows him the order he has received to carry back his head; the other takes the warrant of the grand seignior, kisses it, puts it on his head in token of respect, and then, having performed his ablutions and said his prayers, freely resigns his life. The capidgi, having strangled him, cuts off his head, and brings it to Constantinople. The grand seignior’s order is implicitly obeyed; the servants of the victim never attempt to hinder the executioner, although these capidgis come very often with few or no attendants. It appears from the writings of Chardin, that the nobility and grandees of Persia are put to death in a manner equally silent, hasty, and unobstructed. Such executions were not uncommon among the Jews under the government of their kings. Solomon sent Benaiah as his capidgi, or executioner, to put Adonijah, a prince of his own family, to death; and Joab, the commander-in-chief of the forces in the reign of his father. A capidgi likewise beheaded John the Baptist in prison, and carried his head to the court of Herod. To such silent and hasty executioners the royal preacher seems to refer in that proverb, The wrath of a king is as messengers of death; but a wise man will pacify it, Pro 16:14 : his displeasure exposes the unhappy offender to immediate death, and may fill the unsuspecting bosom with terror and dismay, like the appearance of a capidgi; but by wise and prudent conduct a man may sometimes escape the danger. From the dreadful promptitude with which Benaiah executed the commands of Solomon on Adonijah and Joab, it may be concluded that the executioner of the court was as little ceremonious, and the ancient Jews, under their kings, nearly as passive, as the Turks or Persians. The Prophet Elisha is the only person on the inspired record who ventured to resist the bloody mandate of the sovereign; the incident is recorded in these terms: But Elisha sat in his house, and the elders sat with him; and the king sent a man from before him; but ere the messenger came to him, he said to the elders, See how this son of a murderer hath sent to take away mine head? Look ye, when the messenger cometh, shut the door and hold him fast at the door; is not the sound of his master’s feet behind him? 2Ki 6:32. But if such mandates had not been too common among the Jews, and in general submitted to without resistance, Jehoram had scarcely ventured to despatch a single messenger to take away the life of so eminent a person as Elisha.

Criminals were at other times executed in public; and then commonly without the city. To such executions without the gate, the Psalmist undoubtedly refers in this complaint: The dead bodies of thy saints have they given to be meat unto the fowls of the heaven; the flesh of thy saints unto the beasts of the earth; their blood have they shed like water round about Jerusalem, and there was none to bury them, Psa 79:2-3. The last clause admits of two senses:

1. There was no friend or relation left to bury them.

2. None were allowed to perform this last office.

The despotism of eastern princes often proceeds to a degree of extravagance which is apt to fill the mind with astonishment and horror. It has been thought, from time immemorial, highly criminal to bury those who had lost their lives by the hand of an executioner, without permission. In Morocco, no person dares to bury the body of a malefactor without an order from the emperor; and Windus, who visited that country, speaking of a man who was sawn in two, informs us, that his body must have remained to be eaten by the dogs if the emperor had not pardoned him; an extravagant custom to pardon a man after he is dead; but unless he does so, no person dares bury the body. To such a degree of savage barbarity it is probable the enemies of God’s people carried their opposition, that no person dared to bury the dead bodies of their innocent victims.

In ancient times, persons of the highest rank and station were employed to execute the sentence of the law. They had not then, as we have at present, public executioners; but the prince laid his commands on any of his courtiers whom he chose, and probably selected the person for whom he had the greatest favour. Gideon commanded Jether, his eldest son, to execute his sentence on the kings of Midian; the king of Israel ordered the foot-men who stood around him, and who were probably a chosen body of soldiers for the defence of his person, to put to death the priests of the Lord; and when they refused, Doeg, an Edomite, one of his principal officers. Long after the days of Saul, the reigning monarch commanded Benaiah, the chief captain of his armies, to perform that duty. Sometimes the chief magistrate executed the sentence of the law with his own hands; for when Jether shrunk from the duty which his father required, Gideon, at that time the supreme magistrate in Israel, did not hesitate to do it himself. In these times such a command would be reckoned equally barbarous and unbecoming; but the ideas which were entertained in those primitive ages of honour and propriety, were in many respects extremely different from ours. In Homer, the exasperated Ulysses commanded his son Telemachus to put to death the suitors of Penelope, which was immediately done. The custom of employing persons of high rank to execute the sentence of the law, is still retained in the principality of Senaar, where the public executioner is one of the principal nobility; and, by virtue of his office, resides in the royal palace.

Fuente: Biblical and Theological Dictionary