Knowledge
Knowledge
The distinctive sense in which the apostles speak of knowledge has reference to the knowledge of God, and especially to the knowledge of God and the world through Jesus Christ.
1. The organ of knowledge.-St. Paul teaches clearly (Rom 1:18-23) that, apart from any special revelation, God has exhibited so plainly His attributes of eternal power and divinity in creation that there is given to man an instinctive knowledge of God. There is a certain intelligence in mankind which, apart from the power of the senses, makes God known by the heart when He is not understood by the reason. Indeed, men became darkened in their understandings when they began to indulge in reasoning, and in trying to be wise they became fools. Thus St. Paul places the intuitive moral consciousness as the central organ of the true knowledge of God. When the Apostle speaks of the means by which the Christian knowledge of God is acquired, he develops this principle. It is true that St. Paul admits that for the knowledge of the facts of Christs life he and others are indebted to the testimony of witnesses (1Co 15:3), and that for bringing faith and knowledge the preaching of the word of truth is invaluable, but he insists pre-eminently that in all true knowledge of God in Christ the spirit of man is directly acted upon by the Spirit of God (1Co 2:4-6, Eph 3:5).
St. Paul, who excelled in logic and speculation, cannot be regarded as unnecessarily decrying the logical faculty or the speculative gift, and yet he speaks of reasonings () and of vaunting speculations (every high thing, ) as possible strengths of the enemy that required to be cast down, and of the need of bringing every thought into the obedience of Christ (2Co 10:5). Perhaps this attitude may have been accentuated for the Apostle by the fact that in his own experience so much of his knowledge should have come directly in visions, as in the vision of Jesus, the Exalted Christ (Act 9:3), in the vision of the man of Macedonia (Act 16:10), and in the vision of the third heaven (2Co 12:1).
St. John declares that all men have the organ of spiritual vision by which God, who is light, is revealed to them. Many refuse to exercise this organ, and prefer to dwell in darkness, and thus lose the power of knowing, while spiritual vision becomes clearer and stronger by a purer and better moral life. Those who keep the commandments of God come to a growing knowledge (1Jn 2:3), and only those in whom love is abiding really possess this Divine knowledge (1Jn 4:7). Whoever persists in sinning does not know God (1Jn 3:6). The organ of knowledge is spiritual and ethical, not merely logical or speculative.
Thus both these apostles are alike in their insistence that the organ of Divine knowledge is to be found in this deep faculty of the soul. The apostles would agree in the saying: Pectus facit Christianum, if not: Pectus facit theologum.
2. The object of knowledge.-Much of the earliest teaching of the apostles was to demonstrate that Jesus of Nazareth was the Christ of God (Act 2:36), and the object of all their knowledge and preaching might be summed up in the phrase of St. Paul; to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ (2Co 4:6). This illumination () came first to the apostles with the purpose of being conveyed by them to others who were in ignorance. Thus the object that is made known to all Christians is the glory of God as revealed in the person, character, and work of Jesus Christ, so that what was only dimly discerned before is now clearly seen. This is the open secret that believers in Christ have discovered and delight to make known. This is the that was hidden for long ages but is now revealed, so that the Divine plan of redemption is no longer a secret but is heralded forth in Jesus Christ (Rom 16:25, 1Co 2:7). Thus St. Paul conceives of the glory of God as having been long concealed by the clouds of earth, but at last having shone forth in undimmed splendour; and those who believe that Jesus is the Lord receive a vision of Gods glory that illuminates all life, history, and experience.
To St. John also Jesus Christ is the source of light on all the great matters of life. Through Him we know God (1Jn 2:3), and this provides the key to all knowledge.
The other apostles agree in the central place in their teaching being given to the knowledge of God in Christ, and the Epistle to the Hebrews (Heb 8:11), in announcing that under the New Covenant there has come a universal knowledge of God, not only embodies the hopes of the OT prophets but also declares the faith of the NT teachers.
3. Implications of knowledge.-This Christian knowledge sheds its light on all the facts and aims of life. Thus individuals learn the outstanding features of their own characters (Jam 1:23), the sanctity of their lives as being the temples of God (1Co 3:16), the value of their bodies as members of Christ (1Co 6:15), and the consecration of all the powers of body and mind as an acceptable service to God (Rom 12:1). Christian knowledge leads to a better understanding of all the experiences of life, and to a conviction that in and through every event God is making all things to work together for good to them that love Him (Rom 8:28), and especially to a conviction that the trials of life do not come without Divine planning but are appointed by the will of God (1Th 3:3). Through Christ there comes likewise a better knowledge of social duties, e.g. in the relation of masters and servants. Servants are expected to render a whole-hearted service because they know that their real master is Jesus Christ, by whom they are to be recompensed. Masters are required to carry out all their duties with justice and fairness, for they know that they have to account to their Unseen Master, the Lord in heaven (Col 3:22 ff.). Even minor social problems like those of eating and drinking have new light cast upon them (Rom 14:14), for the light of Jesus Christ has illuminated all life and brought knowledge where formerly there was doubt or ignorance.
In the Epistles of St. John this Christian gnosis has a predominant place, and it is interesting to note how wide and vital this knowledge becomes according to the Apostle. The knowledge of God is at the centre, and it radiates forth in every direction to a wide circumference, for it includes the knowledge of truth (1Jn 2:21), of righteousness (1Jn 2:29), of love (1Jn 3:16), of spiritual life and inspiration (1Jn 3:24, 1Jn 4:2), and of the state of those beyond the grave (1Jn 3:2). In the light of God Christians possess a light that brings enlightenment to them on many problems of experience, perplexities of the present time, and mysteries of the future life.
4. Complements of knowledge.-The apostles uniformly recognize that knowledge of itself is imperfect and must be always associated with other Christian gifts. To reach its fullness it must be accompanied by abnegation (Php 3:6), by fellowship with God and with brethren (1Jn 1:3), by obedience to Gods commands (1Jn 2:3), by attention to apostolic teaching (1Jn 4:6), and by faith, virtue, temperance, patience, godliness, love of the brethren, and love (2Pe 1:6).
Special notice should be taken of the connexion of knowledge and faith, and of knowledge and love. The apostles do not recognize any essential antagonism between faith and knowledge. Faith does not arise from ignorance but from knowledge (Rom 10:17), and knowledge does not supersede faith but includes it (2Pe 1:6). The knowledge of God in Christ is synonymous with faith in Him, and in their essence the two are closely inter-related. In knowledge there is the recognition of the Divine by our spiritual nature, in faith there is the action of the will in virtue of this insight, so that the highest knowledge and the humblest faith go together. There is a kind of knowledge, however, that puffs up (1Co 8:1), and so far from its leading to faith it begets a self-sufficiency and pride that strike at the very foundations of all Christian faith.
At their best there is also no antagonism between knowledge and love. To know God is to love Him, and to reach the highest knowledge love is necessary. Every one that loveth is begotten of God and knoweth him (1Jn 4:7). Christian knowledge is not a matter of the intellect but of the deeper moral and spiritual faculties that find their true expression in love. Still knowledge and love may come into conflict, and in the solution of many practical problems love is even more necessary than knowledge. St. Paul deals with this relation especially in his discussion of the attitude to be adopted to things sacrificed to idols. For his generation the difficulty was intense, as some Christians dreaded the slightest approval being given to idol-worship, while others were so convinced that idolatry was false that they considered it a negligible quantity. Among the latter were many Corinthian Christians, who had announced to the Apostle their conviction that the whole system of idolatry seemed so false that they could eat any food irrespective of its being associated with idol-worship. But St. Paul in his reply (1Co 8:1 ff.) argues that a mere intellectual conviction is not the only or the best guide in such a matter. In theory the Corinthians might be right, but in practice they must not be guided by knowledge alone. Knowledge puffeth up, but love edifieth, and in matters that are intimately concerned with the feelings and prejudices of others love is the safer guide. To a Christian even more than to a philosopher the saying of Aristotle must apply: (Nic. Eth. i. iii. 6).
5. Philosophy and theosophy.-The relation of Christian knowledge to philosophy and theosophy is discussed by St. Paul. The Apostle expounds the gospel as being not only power but also wisdom, yet he refuses to establish this wisdom by any of the current arguments or by the conclusions of Greek philosophy (1Co 2:1 ff.). He is proclaiming a gospel that is folly in the eyes of many, and yet it is the true wisdom to those who understand it. This higher philosophy has been hidden from the sight of men, otherwise they would not have crucified the Lord Jesus Christ. It comes through the indwelling of the Spirit of God, who alone can reveal it. Just as the spirit of man alone can understand the things of a man, so the Spirit of God in man alone can understand the Divine philosophy. The merely intellectual man rejects this philosophy, as he does not possess the spiritual insight to discern its Divine wisdom. Even Christian people may be mere children in this respect, not able to understand this teaching; and among other indications of this childish mind was the party spirit by which so many were impelled. Thus St. Paul argues that the initiated Christians find in Christ a philosophy as well as a gospel.
Christian knowledge came into conflict with the theosophical tendencies that were so prevalent in many ancient schools of thought. In this connexion St. Pauls Epistle to the Colossians is of chief importance. The Apostle deals in this Epistle with claims that had been made by certain Christians to a higher Christian life through means that involved ascetic and ritual practices, and from arguments that rested on speculative and theosophic principles. It is unnecessary for the present purpose to decide whether these heresies arose from a latent Gnosticism or from certain features of Judaism; but, if Judaism was the source, it was a Judaism influenced by the thought and spirit of the Diaspora. This may be judged by the kind of speculations in which they indulge, especially in the cosmical dualism that they shadow forth and in the belief in an endless series of angelic beings as mediators between God and men. St. Paul does not denounce all speculative knowledge, but opposes it by a higher knowledge of Jesus Christ. He develops the teaching about Christ so that He is presented not only as a full and perfect Saviour for men, but also as the Lord of the Universe, in whom all things, even angels, were created, and as the fullness of all things, by whom both men and angels were made at one with God. This insistence on the cosmical value of Christ carries with it the best refutation of all extra-Christian theosophical teaching.
Literature.-H. J. Holtzmann, NT Theologie, 1896, i. 476-486; A. E. Garvie, in Mansfield College Essays, 1909, p. 161; J. Y. Simpson, The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature, 1912, p. 11; J. R. Illingworth, Reason and Revelation, 1902, p. 44; A. Chandler, Faith and Experience, 1911; W. P. DuBose, The Reason of Life, 1911, p. 198; J. Denney, The Way Everlasting, 1911, p. 26; W. M. Macgregor, Jesus Christ the Son of God, 1907, p. 175; W. G. Rutherford, The Key of Knowledge, 1901, p. 1; articles in Hasting’s Dictionary of the Bible (5 vols) (J. Denney), Hastings Single-vol. Dictionary of the Bible (J. H. Maude), and Catholic Encyclopedia (A. J. Maas); see also article Ignorance.
D. Macrae Tod.
Fuente: Dictionary of the Apostolic Church
KNOWLEDGE
Is defined by Mr. Locke to be the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of our ideas. It also denotes learning, or the improvement of our faculties by reading; experience, or the acquiring new ideas or truths, by seeing a variety of objects, and making observations upon them in our own minds. No man, says the admirable Dr. Watts, is obliged to learn and know every thing; this can neither be sought nor required, for it is utterly impossible: yet all persons are under some obligation to improve their own understanding, otherwise it will be a barren desert, or a forest overgrown with weeds and brambles. Universal ignorance, or infinite error, will overspread the mind which is utterly neglected and lies without any cultivation. The following rules, therefore, should be attended to for the improvement of knowledge.
1.Deeply possess your mind with the vast importance of a good judgment, and the rich and inestimable advantage of right reasoning
2.Consider the weaknesses, failings, and mistakes of human nature in general.-
3.Be not satisfied with a slight view of things, but to take a wide survey now and then of the vast and unlimited regions of learning, the variety of questions and difficulties belonging to every science.
4.Presume not too much upon a bright genius, a ready wit, and good parts; for this, without study, will never make a man of knowledge.-
5.Do not imagine that large and laborious reading, and a strong memory, can denominate you truly wise, without meditation and studious thought.-
6.Be not so weak as to imagine that a life of learning is a life of laziness.-
7.Let the hope of new discoveries, as well as the satisfaction and pleasure of known truths, nor take up suddenly with mere appearances.-
8.Once a day, especially in the early years of life and study, call yourselves to an account what new ideas you have gained.-
9.Maintain a constant watch, at all times, against a dogmatical spirit.-
10.Be humble and courageous enough to retract any mistake, and confess an error.-
11.Beware of a fanciful temper of mind, and a humorous conduct.-
12.Have a care of trifling with things important and momentous, or of sporting with things awful and sacred.-
13.Ever maintain a virtuous and pious frame of spirit.-
14.Watch against the pride of your own reason, and a vain conceit of your own intellectual powers, with the neglect of divine aid and blessing.-
15.Offer up, therefore, your daily requests to God, the Father of Lights, that he would bless all your attempts and labours in reading, study, and conversation.
Watts on the Mind, chap. i; Dr. John Edwards’s Uncertainty, Deficiency, and Corruption of Human Knowledge; Reid’s Intellectual Powers of Man; Stennett’s Sermon on Act 26:24-25.
Fuente: Theological Dictionary
knowledge
The act or state of knowing. By reason of its primordial character knowledge cannot be strictly defined, but only described. Philosophically the term implies the consciousness of any object which can be attained by the cognitive faculties, whether this be simply the consciousness of sense experience, or the understanding of general laws and principles. The latter, considered as the fruit of a demonstrative process of reasoning, is properly termed science. From a psychological point of view, knowledge is effected by the vital union of an object with a knowing subject.
Fuente: New Catholic Dictionary
Knowledge
I. Essentials of Knowledge II. Kinds of Knowledge III. The Problem of Knowledge Knowledge, being a primitive fact of consciousness, cannot, strictly speaking, be defined; but the direct and spontaneous consciousness of knowing may be made clearer by pointing out its essential and distinctive characteristics. It will be useful first to consider briefly the current uses of the verb “to know”. To say that I know a certain man may mean simply that I have met him, and recognize him when I meet him again. This implies the permanence of a mental image enabling me to discern this man from all others. Sometimes, also, more than the mere familiarity with external features is implied. To know a man may mean to know his character, his inner and deeper qualities, and hence to expect him to act in a certain way under certain circumstances. The man who asserts that he knows an occurrence to be a fact means that he is so certain of it as to have no doubt concerning its reality. A pupil knows his lesson when he has mastered it and is able to recite it, and this, as the case may be, requires either mere retention in memory, or also, in addition to this retention, the intellectual work of understanding. A science is known when its principles, methods, and conclusions are understood, and the various facts and laws referring to it co-ordinated and explained. These various meanings may be reduced to two classes, one referring chiefly to sense-knowledge and to the recognition of particular experiences, the other referring chiefly to the understanding of general laws and principles. This distinction is expressed in many languages by the use of two different verbs–by gnônai and eidénai, in Greek; by cognoscere and scire, in Latin, and by their derivatives in the Romance languages; in German by kennen and wissen.
I. ESSENTIALS OF KNOWLEDGE
(1) Knowledge is essentially the consciousness of an object, i.e. of any thing, fact, or principle belonging to the physical, mental, or metaphysical order, that may in any manner be reached by cognitive faculties. An event, a material substance, a man, a geometrical theorem, a mental process, the immortality of the soul, the existence and nature of God, may be so many objects of knowledge. Thus knowledge implies the antithesis of a knowing subject and a known object. It always possesses an objective character and any process that may be conceived as merely subjective is not a cognitive process. Any attempt to reduce the object to a purely subjective experience could result only in destroying the fact itself of knowledge, which implies the object, or not-self, as clearly as it does the subject, or self.
(2) Knowledge supposes a judgment, explicit or implicit. Apprehension, that is, the mental conception of a simple present object, is generally numbered among the cognitive processes, yet, of itself, it is not in the strict sense knowledge, but only its starting-point. Properly speaking, we know only when we compare, identify, discriminate, connect; and these processes, equivalent to judgments, are found implicitly even in ordinary sense-perception. A few judgments are reached immediately, but by far the greater number require patient investigation. The mind is not merely passive in knowing, not a mirror or sensitized plate, in which objects picture themselves; it is also active in looking for conditions and causes, and in building up science out of the materials which it receives from experience. Thus observation and thought are two essential factors in knowledge.
(3) Truth and certitude are conditions of knowledge. A man may mistake error for truth and give his unreserved assent to a false statement. He may then be under the irresistible illusion that he knows, and subjectively the process is the same as that of knowledge; but an essential condition is lacking, namely, conformity of thought with reality, so that there we have only the appearance of knowledge. On the other hand, as long as any serious doubt remains in his mind, a man cannot say that he knows. “I think so” is far from meaning “I know it is so”; knowledge is not mere opinion or probable assent. The distinction between knowledge and belief is more difficult to draw, owing chiefly to the vague meaning of the latter term. Sometimes belief refers to assent without certitude, and denotes the attitude of the mind especially in regard to matters that are not governed by strict and uniform laws like those of the physical world, but depend on many complex factors and circumstances, as happens in human affairs. I know that water will freeze when it reaches a certain temperature; I believe that a man is fit for a certain office, or that the reforms endorsed by one political party will be more beneficial than those advocated by another. Sometimes, also, both belief and knowledge imply certitude, and denote states of mental assurance of the truth. But in belief the evidence is more obscure and indistinct than in knowledge, either because the grounds on which the assent rests are not so clear, or because the evidence is not personal, but based on the testimony of witnesses, or again because, in addition to the objective evidence which draws the assent, there are subjective conditions that predispose to it. Belief seems to depend on a great many influences, emotions, interests, surroundings, etc., besides the convincing reasons for which assent is given to truth. Faith is based on the testimony of someone else–God or man according as we speak of Divine or of human faith. If the authority on which it rests has all the required guarantees, faith gives the certitude of the fact, the knowledge that it is true; but, of itself, it does not give the intrinsic evidence why it is so.
II. KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE
(1) It is impossible that all the knowledge a man has acquired should be at once present in consciousness. The greater part, in fact all of it with the exception of the few thoughts actually present in the mind, is stored up in the form of latent dispositions which enable the mind to recall it when wanted. Hence we may distinguish actual from habitual knowledge. The latter extends to whatever is preserved in memory and is capable of being recalled at will. This capacity of being recalled may require several experiences; a science is not always known after it has been mastered once, for even then it may be forgotten. By habitual knowledge is meant knowledge in readiness to come back to consciousness, and it is clear that it may have different degrees of perfection.
(2) The distinction between knowledge as recognition and knowledge as understanding has already been noted. In the same connection may be mentioned the distinction between particular knowledge, or knowledge of facts and individuals, and general knowledge, or knowledge of laws and classes. The former deals with the concrete, the latter with the abstract.
(3) According to the process by which it is acquired, knowledge is intuitive and immediate or discursive and mediate. The former comes from the direct sense perception, or the direct mental intuition of the truth of a proposition, based as it were on its own merits. The latter consists in the recognition of the truth of a proposition by seeing its connection with another already known to be true. The self-evident proposition is of such a nature as to be immediately clear to the mind. No one who understands the terms can fail to know that two and two are four, or that the whole is greater than any one of its parts. But most human knowledge is acquired progressively. Inductive knowledge starts from self-evident facts, and rises to laws and causes. Deductive knowledge proceeds from general self-evident propositions in order to discover their particular application. In both cases the process may be long, difficult, and complex. One may have to be satisfied with negative conception and analogical evidence, and, as a result, knowledge will be less clear, less certain, and more liable to error. (See DEDUCTION; INDUCTION.)
III. THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE.
The question of knowledge belongs to various sciences, each of which takes a different point of view. Psychology considers knowledge as a mental fact whose elements, conditions, laws, and growth are to be determined. It endeavours to discover the behaviour of the mind in knowing, and the development of the cognitive process out of its elements. It supplies the other sciences with the data on which they must work. Among these data are found certain laws of thought which the mind must observe in order to avoid contradiction and to reach consistent knowledge. Formal logic also takes the subjective point of view; it deals with these laws of thought, and neglecting the objective side of knowledge (that is, its materials), studies only the formal elements necessary to consistency and valid proof. At the other extreme, science, physical or metaphysical, postulating the validity of knowlege, or at least leaving this problem out of consideration, studies only the different objects of knowledge, their nature and properties. As to the crucial questions, the validity of knowledge, its limitations, and the relations between the knowing subject and the known object, these belong to the province of epistemology.
Knowledge is essentially objective. Such names as the “given” or the “content” of knowledge may be substituted for that of “object”, but the plain fact remains that we know something external, which is not formed by, but offered to, the mind. This must not, however, cause us to overlook another fact equally evident. Different minds will frequently take different views of the same object. Moreover, even in the same mind, knowledge undergoes great changes in the course of time; judgments are constantly modified, enlarged or narrowed down, in accordance with newly discovered facts and ascertained truths. Sense-perception is influenced by past processes, associations, contrasts, etc. In rational knowledge a great diversity of assents is produced by personal dispositions, innate or acquired. In a word, knowledge clearly depends on the mind. Hence the assertion that it is made by the mind alone, that it is conditioned exclusively by the nature of the thinking subject, and that the object of knowledge is in no way outside of the knowing mind. To use Berkeley’s words, to be is to be known (esse est percipi). The fact of the dependence of knowledge upon subjective conditions however, is far from sufficient to justify this conclusion. Men agree on many propositions, both of the empirical and of the rational order; they differ not so much on objects of knowledge as on objects of opinion, not so much on what they really know as on what they think they know. For two men with normal eyes, the vision of an object, as far as we can ascertain, is sensibly the same. For two men with normal minds, the proposition that the sum of the angles in a triangle equals two right angles has the same meaning, and, both for several minds and for the same mind at different times, the knowledge of that proposition is identical. Owing to associations and differences in mental attitudes, the fringe of consciousness will vary and somewhat modify the total mental state, but the focus of consciousness, knowledge itself, will be essentially the same. St. Thomas will not be accused of idealism, and yet he makes the nature of the mind an essential factor in the act of knowledge: Cognition is brought about by the presence of the known object in the knowing mind. But the object is in the knower after the fashion of the knower. Hence, for any knower, knowledge is after the fashion of his own nature (Summa theol., I, Q. xii, a. 4). What is this presence of the object in the subject? Not a physical presence; not even in the form of a picture, a duplicate, or a copy. It cannot be defined by any comparison with the physical world; it is sui generis, a cognitive likeness, a species intentionalis.
When knowledge, either of concrete realities or of abstract propositions, is said to consist in the presence of an object in the mind, we cannot mean by this object something external in its absolute existence and isolated from the mind, for we cannot think outside of our own thought, and the mind cannot know what is not somehow present in the mind. But this is no sufficient ground for accepting extreme idealism and looking upon knowledge as purely subjective. If the object of an assent or experience cannot be absolute reality, it does not follow that to an assent or experience there is no corresponding reality; and the fact that an object is reached through the conception of it does not justify the conclusion that the mental conception is the whole of the object’s reality. To say that knowledge is a conscious process is true, but it is only a part of the truth. And from this to infer, with Locke, that, since we can be conscious only of what takes place within ourselves, knowledge is only “conversant with ideas”, is to take an exclusively psychological view of the fact which asserts itself primarily as establishing a relation between a mind and an external reality. Knowledge becomes conversant with ideas by a subsequent process, namely by the reflection of the mind upon its own activity. The subjectivist has his eyes wide open to the difficulty of explaining the transition from external reality to the mind, a difficulty which, after all, is but the mystery of consciousness itself. He keeps them obstinately closed to the utter impossibility of explaining the building up by the mind of an external reality out of mere conscious processes. Notwithstanding all theorizing to the contrary, the facts impose themselves that in knowing the mind is not merely active, but also passive; that it must conform, not simply to its own laws, but to external reality as well; that it does not create facts and laws, but discovers them; and that the right of truth to recognition persists even when it is actually ignored or violated. The mind, it is true, contributes its share to the knowing process, but, to use the metaphor of St. Augustine, the generation of knowledge requires another cause: “Whatever object we know is a co-factor in the generation of the knowledge of it. For knowledge is begotten both by the knowing subject and the known object” (De Trinitate, IX, xii). Hence it may be maintained that there are realities distinct from ideas without falling into the absurdity of maintaining that they are known in their absolute existence, that is apart from their relations to the knowing mind. Knowledge is essentially the vital union of both.
It has been said above that knowledge requires experience and thought. The attempt to explain knowledge by experience alone proved a failure, and the favour which Associationism found at first was short-lived. Recent criticism of the sciences has accentuated the fact, which already occupied a central place in scholastic philosophy, that knowledge, even of the physical and mental worlds, implies factors transcending experience. Empiricism fails completely in its endeavour to explain and justify universal knowledge, the knowledge of uniform laws under which facts are brought to unity. Without rational additions, the perception of what is or has been can never give the knowledge of what will certainly and necessarily be. True as this is of the natural sciences, it is still more evident in abstract and rational sciences like mathematics. Hence we are led back to the old Aristotelean and Scholastic view, that all knowledge begins with concrete experience, but requires other factors, not given in experience, in order to reach its perfection. It needs reason interpreting the data of observation, abstracting the contents of experience from the conditions which individualize them in space and time, removing, as it were, the outer envelope of the concrete, and going to the core of reality. Thus knowledge is not, as in Kantian criticism, a synthesis of two elements, one external, the other depending only on the nature of the mind; not the filling up of empty shells–a priori mental forms or categories–with the unknown and unknowable reality. Even abstract knowledge reveals reality, although its object cannot exist outside of the mind without conditions of which the mind in the act of knowing divests it.
Knowledge is necessarily proportioned or relative to the capacity of the mind and the manifestations of the object. Not all men have the same keenness of vision or hearing, or the same intellectual aptitudes. Nor is the same reality equally bright from all angles from which it may be viewed. Moreover, better eyes than human might perceive rays beyond the red and the violet of the spectrum; higher intellects might unravel many mysteries of nature, know more and better, with greater facility, certainty, and clearness. The fact that we do not know everything, and that all our knowledge is inadequate, does not invalidate the knowledge which we possess, any more than the horizon which bounds our view prevents us from perceiving more or less distinctly the various objects within its limits. Reality manifests itself to the mind in different ways and with varying degrees of clearness. Some objects are bright in themselves and are perceived immediately. Others are known indirectly by throwing on them light borrowed elsewhere, by showing by way of causality, similarity, analogy their connection with what we already know. This is essentially the condition of scientific progress, to find connections between various objects, to proceed from the known to the unknown. As we recede from the self-evident, the path may become more difficult, and the progress slower. But, with the Agnostic, to assign clearly defined boundaries to our cognitive powers is unjustifiable, for we pass gradually from one object to another without break, and there is no sharp limit between science and metaphysics. The same instruments, principles, and methods that are recognized in the various sciences will carry us higher and higher, even to the Absolute, the First Cause, the Source of all reality. Induction will lead us from the effect to the cause, from the imperfect to the perfect, from the contingent to the necessary, from the dependent to the self-existent, from the finite to the infinite.
And this same process by which we know God’s existence cannot fail to manifest something–however little–of His nature and perfections. That we know Him imperfectly, by way chiefly of negation and analogy, does not deprive this knowledge of all value. We can know God only so far as He manifests Himself through His works which dimly mirror His perfections, and so far as our finite mind will allow. Such knowledge will necessarily remain infinitely far from being comprehension, but it is only by a misleading confusion of terms that Spencer identifies the unknowable with the incomprehensible, and denies the possibility of any knowledge of the Absolute because we can have no absolute-knowledge. Seeing “through a glass” and “in a dark manner” is far from the vision “face to face” of which our limited mind is incapable without a special light from God Himself. Yet it is knowledge of Him who is the source both of the world’s intelligibility and truth, and of the mind’s intelligence. (See also AGNOSTICISM, CERTITUDE, EPISTEMOLOGY, FAITH.)
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C.A. DUBRAY Transcribed by Rick McCarty
The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume VIIICopyright © 1910 by Robert Appleton CompanyOnline Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. KnightNihil Obstat, October 1, 1910. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., CensorImprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York
Fuente: Catholic Encyclopedia
Knowledge
By this, according to Sir William Hamilton, ” is understood the mere possession of truths,” and the possession of those truths about which our faculties have been previously employed, rather than any separate power of the understanding by which truth is perceived. ” I know no authority,” says Dr. Reid, “besides that of Mr. Locke. for calling knowledge a faculty, any more than for calling opinion a faculty.” Knowledge is of two kinds, viz. historical or empirical, and philosophical, or scientific or rational. Historical is the knowledge that the thing is, philosophical is the knowledge why or how it is. The first is called historical, because in this knowledge we know only the fact only that that phenomenon is; for history is properly only the narration of a consecutive series of phenomena in time, or the description of a co-existent series of phenomena in space; the second philosophical, to imply that there is a way of knowing things more completely than they are known through simple experiences mechanically accumulated in memory or heaped up in cyclopaedias. It seeks for wide and deep truths, as distinguished from the multitudinous detailed truths which the surface of things and actions presents, and therefore a knowledge of the highest degree of generality. ” The truth of philosophy,” says Herbert Spencer, bears the same relation to the highest scientific truths that each of these bears to lower scientific truths. As each widest generalization of science comprehends and consolidates the narrower generalizations of its own division, so the generalizations of philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest generalizations of science. It is therefore a knowledge the extreme opposite in kind to that which experience first accumulates. It is the final product of that process which begins with a mere colligation of crude observations, goes on establishing propositions that are broader and more separated from particular cases, and ends in universal propositions. Or, to bring the definition to its simplest and clearest form, knowledge of the lowest kind is ununified knowledge; science is partially unified knowledge; philosophy is completely unified knowledge.”
This term, however, is associated with the greatest problems and controversies of philosophy, all of which are involved in the discussion of what is meant by knowledge. The different problems, therefore, of the philosophy of mind will be found discussed under those names that severally suggest them. Watts, On the Mind; Dr. John Edwards, Uncertainty, Deficiency, and Corruption of Human Knowledge; Reid, Intellectual Powers of Man; Stennett, Sermon on Acts t 16:24, 25: Upham, Intellectual Philosophy ; Douglas, On the Advancement of Society; Robert Hall, Works; Amer. Library of Useful Knowledge. SEE FAITH AND REASON; SEE IDEALISM; SEE JUDGMENT; SEE MORAL PHILOSOPHY; SEE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY.
Fuente: Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature
KNOWLEDGE
Among the many abilities God gave human beings is the ability to think, know and reason. Their knowledge may range from knowing people to knowing things. It may be both practical and theoretical, and it may cover the concrete and the abstract, the seen and the unseen. Above all, human beings have the capacity to know God. That knowledge is to be valued above all others and will affect all others (Jer 9:23-24; Joh 17:3).
A relationship
God wants the people of his creation to know him. This does not mean merely that they should know about him, but that they should know him personally through coming into a relationship with him (Jer 24:7; Jer 31:34; Hos 6:6; Joh 17:3; 1Jn 4:6; 1Jn 4:8; 1Jn 5:20). Similarly God knows those who are his those whom he has chosen, those whom he has taken into a spiritual union with himself (Deu 34:10; Amo 3:2; Mat 7:23; Joh 10:27; 2Ti 2:19). In fact, people can know God only because God has first known them; that is, loved them, chosen them and made them his own (Exo 33:17; Jer 1:5; Joh 10:14; Gal 4:9).
Because knowledge, in biblical language, can mean to be brought into a close relationship with, a man and a woman were said to know each other when they had sexual relations (Gen 4:25; Gen 19:8; Mat 1:25). Knowledge could also mean to have dealings with, to be concerned with, or to regard (Deu 33:9; Rom 7:7; 2Co 5:16; 2Co 5:21).
The Bible also speaks of knowledge according to the words more common meaning in relation to understanding and learning. Yet even in such cases the knowledge usually has a very practical purpose. When people come to a knowledge of the truth, they grow in that truth through learning more of God and his ways (Psa 119:125; 1Ti 2:4; 2Pe 1:5; 2Pe 3:18; see TRUTH). If people profess to be Gods people but do not know or obey his law, they only bring Gods judgment upon themselves (Isa 5:13; Jer 4:22; Hos 4:6; Joh 9:39-41; Heb 5:12-13). The person who exercises a reverent submission to God has already taken the first step towards true knowledge. To refuse to go further is to act like a fool (Pro 1:7; Pro 1:22; Pro 2:1-5; Pro 8:10; see WISDOM).
Christian experience
People need at least some knowledge before they can have true faith in Jesus Christ as Saviour. Therefore, Christians must make known the facts about Jesus Christ (Rom 10:14). Those who believe must increase their knowledge of God and all that he has done for them through Jesus Christ. As a result they will know more of the power that Christ has made available to them, and will be able to worship him better (Eph 1:17-23).
If Christians are to make correct decisions in life and develop character of true quality, they must increase their knowledge of God and his Word. They cannot expect to do Gods will unless first they know it (Psa 32:8-9; Php 1:9-11; Col 1:9-10; see GUIDANCE).
The knowledge that Christians are to seek can be obtained only as their minds are renewed and developed according to their new life in Christ (Rom 12:2; Col 3:2; Col 3:10; see MIND). They must remember, however, to put into practice what they learn (Psa 119:34; Joh 13:17; Jam 1:22; 1Jn 2:4). They must remember also that in using their knowledge, they should act with humility before God and with love and consideration towards others (Dan 10:12; 1Co 8:1-2; 1Co 13:2).
Knowledge and morality
There is therefore no suggestion in the Bible that knowledge excuses people from self-discipline. This was one of the errors of Gnosticism, a heresy that did much damage to the church during the second century. (The word Gnostic comes from the Greek word gnosis, meaning knowledge.)
Forerunners of the Gnostics appeared in the church in New Testament times. These knowing ones claimed to have a knowledge not shared by ordinary Christians, a claim that Paul strongly denied. The treasures of Gods wisdom are found in Christ, not in Gnosticism, and are available to all Gods people, not just to those who are specially enlightened (Col 2:2-4; Col 2:8-10; Col 2:18-19; Col 3:1-3; cf. Col 1:9; cf. Col 1:28; see COLOSSIANS, LETTER TO THE).
The Gnostics belief that all matter was evil led to opposite extremes of behaviour. Some of the Gnostics kept strict laws in an effort to avoid contact with the material world. Others, realizing that withdrawal from the material world was not possible, made no such effort. They even claimed that behaviour was irrelevant, because by their superior knowledge they had risen above the evil material world into a realm where deeds were of no importance. They could sin as they liked and still be Christians. The apostle John met this claim with a flat contradiction (1Jn 3:9; see JOHN, LETTERS OF).
John pointed out that knowledge, far from being a substitute for morality, leads to morality. If people know God, they will keep his moral commandments (1Jn 2:3-4). If they know Christ, they know that Christ died to save people from sin and turn them to the way that is right (1Jn 2:29; 1Jn 3:5-6; 1Jn 3:24; see ASSURANCE).
Fuente: Bridgeway Bible Dictionary
Knowledge
KNOWLEDGE.See Consciousness, Ignorance, Kenosis, Teaching of Jesus.
Fuente: A Dictionary Of Christ And The Gospels
Knowledge
KNOWLEDGE
I. Human knowledge
1. In the OT.Knowledge, so far as it has a theological use, is moral rather than intellectual. It is assumed that a knowledge of God is possible, but this is the result of a revelation of Himself by God, and not a speculative knowledge achieved by man. So knowledge becomes practically equivalent to religion (Psa 25:14, Isa 11:2), and ignorance to irreligion (1Sa 2:12, Hos 4:1; Hos 6:6). The Messianic age is to bring knowledge, but this will be taught of God (Isa 54:13). This knowledge of God is therefore quite consistent with speculative ignorance about the universe (Job 38:1-41; Job 39:1-30). Perhaps some expressions in the NT which seem to refer to Gnostic ideas may be explained by this view of knowledge.
2. In the NT.(a) In the Gospels knowledge is spoken of in the same sense as in the OT. Christ alone possesses the knowledge of God (Mat 11:25-27). This knowledge gives a new relation to God, and without it man is still in darkness (Mat 5:8, Joh 7:17; Joh 17:3). (b) In St. Pauls Epistles.In the earlier Epistles knowledge is spoken of as a gift of the Spirit (1Co 1:30; 1Co 1:2; 1Co 12:8), although God can to a certain extent be known through nature (Act 14:7, Rom 1:19-20). 1 Cor. especially urges the subordination of knowledge to charity. In Col 2:1-23 and 1Ti 6:20 a wrong kind of knowledge is spoken ofperhaps an early form of Gnosticism. True knowledge, however, centres in Christ, who is the mystery of God (Col 2:2). In Him all questions find their answer, and this knowledge is not, like Gnosticism, the property of a few, but is intended for all men (Col 1:28). In the Pastoral Epp. knowledge is spoken of with reference to a definite body of accepted teaching, which is repeatedly alluded to; it is, however, not merely intellectual but moral (Tit 1:1). (c) In the other NT books knowledge is not prominent, except in 2 Peter, where, however, there is nothing specially characteristic. In Hebrews the ordinary word for knowledge does not occur at all, but the main object of the Epistle is to create and confirm a certain kind of Christian knowledge. Although knowledge in both OT and NT is almost always moral, there is no trace of the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge.
II. Divine knowledge.It is not necessary to show that perfect knowledge is ascribed to God throughout the Scriptures. In some OT booksJob and some Psalmsthe ignorance of man is emphasized in order to bring Gods omniscience into relief (cf. also the personification of the Divine Wisdom in the Books of Proverbs and Wisdom).
III. Divine and human knowledge in Christ.The question has been much debated how Divine and human knowledge could co-exist in Christ, and whether in His human nature He was capable of ignorance. It is a question that has often been argued on a priori grounds, but it should rather be considered with reference to the evidence in the records of His life. The Gospels certainly attribute to Christ an extraordinary and apparently a supernatural knowledge. But even supernatural illumination is not necessarily Divine consciousness, and the Gospel records also seem to attribute to our Lord such limitations of knowledge as may be supposed to make possible a really human experience. 1. There are direct indications of ordinary limitations. He advanced in wisdom (Luk 2:52); He asked for information (Mar 6:38; Mar 8:5; Mar 9:21, Luk 8:30, Joh 11:34); He expressed surprise (Mar 6:38; Mar 8:5; Mar 9:21, Joh 11:34). His use of prayer, and especially the prayer in the garden (Mat 26:39) and the words upon the cross (Mar 15:34), point in the same direction. 2. With regard to one point our Lord expressly disclaimed Divine knowledge (Mar 13:32). 3. In the Fourth Gospel, while claiming unity with the Father, He speaks of His teaching as derived from the Father under the limitations of a human state (Joh 3:34; Joh 5:19-20; Joh 8:28; Joh 12:49-50). 4. While speaking with authority, and in a way which precludes the possibility of fallibility in the deliverance of the Divine message, He never enlarged our store of natural knowledge, physical or historical. If it be true that Christ lived under limitations in respect of the use of His Divine omniscience, this is a part of the self-emptying which He undertook for us men and for our salvation (see Kenosis).
J. H. Maude.
Fuente: Hastings’ Dictionary of the Bible
Knowledge
There are several Greek words translated ‘to know,’ the principal of which are
1. , signifying ‘inward conscious knowledge’ in the mind; and
2. , signifying ‘objective knowledge.’ The latter passes into consciousness, but not vice versa. There are several passages in the N.T. in which both words occur, a study will show that the words are not used promiscuously, and need to be carefully considered .
Mat 24:43. Know [2] this, that if the goodman of the house had known [1] in what watch the thief would come, etc. The same distinction occurs in Luk 12:39.
Mar 4:13. Know [1] ye not this parable? and how then will ye know [2] all parables?
Joh 7:27. We know [1] this man whence he is; but when Christ cometh, no man knoweth [2] whence he is.
Joh 8:55. Ye have not known [2] him; but I know [1] him; and if I should say, I know [1] him not, I shall be a liar like unto you: but I know [1] him, and keep his saying.
Joh 13:7. What I do thou knowest [1] not now; but thou shalt know [2] hereafter.
Joh 21:17. Lord, thou knowest [1] all things; thou knowest [2] that I love thee.
Rom 7:7. I had not known [2] sin, but by the law: for I had not known [1] lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet.
1Co 8:1-2. We know [1] that we all have knowledge [2]. Knowledge [2] puffeth up, but charity edifieth. And if any man think that he knoweth [1] (Editors alter this into [2] ) anything, he knoweth [2] nothing yet as he ought to know. [2]
2Co 5:16. Henceforth know [1] we no man after the flesh: yea, though we have known [2] Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know [2] we him no more.
Heb 8:11. They shall not teach . . . . saying, Know [2] the Lord: for all shall know [1] me, from the least to the greatest.
1Jn 2:29. If ye know [1] that he is righteous, ye know [2] that every one that doeth righteousness is born of him.
1Jn 5:20. We know [1] that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know [2] him that is true.
Both these words are employed for the Lord’s own knowledge. In Mat 12:15, Jesus knew [2] (that they were plotting to destroy him) having heard it. And in Mat 12:25 Jesus knew [1] their thoughts – had the conscious knowledge of it. Respecting our knowledge of the person of Christ, in Luk 10:22, no one knows [2] who the Son is except the Father; but in Mat 11:27, which is a parallel passage, neither of the above words are used, but , which implies a certain objective knowledge, not a mere acquaintance with a person. The knowledge that is partial, and that shall vanish away, is the objective knowledge, 1Co 13:8-9; not the inward conscious knowledge. In 1Co 13:12 it is real knowledge in the future, . The words (both Nos. 1 and 2) often occur separately in John’s gospel and epistles, and their use may be profitably studied in a Greek Testament or Concordance.
Fuente: Concise Bible Dictionary
Knowledge
Of good and evil
Gen 2:9; Gen 2:17; Gen 3:22
Is power
Pro 3:20; Pro 24:5
Desire for
1Ki 3:9; Psa 119:66; Pro 2; Pro 12:1; Pro 15:14; Pro 18:15
Rejected
Hos 4:6
Those who reject are destroyed
Hos 4:6
Fools hate
Pro 1:22; Pro 1:29
A divine gift
1Co 12:8
Is pleasant
Pro 2:10
Shall be increased
Dan 12:4
The earth shall be full of
Isa 11:9
Fear of the Lord is the beginning of
Pro 1:7
Of more value than gold
Pro 8:10
The priest’s lips should keep
Mal 2:7
Of salvation
Luk 1:77
Key of knowledge
Luk 11:52
Now we know in part
1Co 13:9-12
Of God more than burnt offering
Hos 6:6
Of Christ
Phi 3:8 Wisdom
Fuente: Nave’s Topical Bible
Knowledge
(AS. cnawan, know) Relations known. Apprehended truth. Opposite of opinion. Certain knowledge is more than opinion, less than truth. Theory of knowledge, or epistemology (which see), is the systematic investigation and exposition of the principles of the possibility of knowledge. In epistemologythe relation between object and subject. See Epistemology.
Cf. E. Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisprobleme, 1906. — J.K.F.