Mind
Mind
1. The noun.-While in the OT heart is used to represent mans whole mental and moral activity (cf. Gen 6:5 every imagination of the thoughts of his heart), psychological terms begin to be employed in the NT with more discrimination and precision, and mind comes into use to denote the faculty of thinking, and especially the organ of moral consciousness; the fundamental Gr. word being , with which must be associated its derivatives , , . It is suggestive, however, of the persistence of the OT psychology and terminology in the early Apostolic Church that, outside of the Pauline Epistles, , the specific word for mind, occurs only in Luk 24:45, Rev 13:18; Rev 17:9, though and are occasionally found. In the Authorized Version of Act 14:2, Php 1:27, Heb 12:3 mind represents , which in the Revised Version is properly rendered soul; in Phm 1:14, Rev 17:13 it stands for , judgment, opinion; in Rom 8:7; Rom 8:27 for , which denotes not the mental faculty itself, but its thoughts and purposes.
As illustrating St. Pauls use of and helping us to appreciate the distinctive meaning he attaches to the word, it is important to notice two contrasts in which he sets it, in the one case with flesh () and in the other with spirit (). In Rom 7:23; Rom 7:25 he contrasts the mind with the flesh, i.e. with the sinful principle in human nature; and the law of his mind, which is also the law of God, with the law in his members or the law of sin. Here the mind is clearly the conscience or organ of moral knowledge, mans highest faculty, by which he recognizes the will of God for his own life. And when in Rom 8:6 the Apostle speaks of the mind of the flesh (cf. Col 2:18, fleshly mind), the suggestion is that mans highest faculty has been debased to the service of what is lowest in his nature, so that the mind has itself become fleshly and sinful. In 1Co 14:14-15; 1Co 14:19, again, where (which English Version renders here by understanding) is contrasted with , the antithesis is between mans natural faculty of conscious knowledge and reflexion and that higher principle of the Christian life which is Divinely bestowed, and which, as in the case of the gift of tongues, may manifest itself in ways that lie beyond the reach of consciousness. The mind, as mans highest natural faculty, thus stands between the flesh, as the lower and sinful principle in his nature, and the spirit, which is the distinctive principle of the Divinely given Christian life. And, as the mind may be dragged down by the flesh until it becomes a mind of the flesh, so it may be upraised and informed by the spirit until it becomes a mind of the spirit (Rom 8:6; cf. Rom 12:2, Eph 4:23). See articles Flesh, Soul, Spirit.
2. The verb.-The verb to mind is used intransitively, in the sense of to intend or purpose, in Act 20:13 (Gr. , Revised Version intending). With the same signification to be minded occurs in Act 27:39 (Gr. ), Act 27:17 (Textus Receptus , WH [Note: H Westcott-Horts Greek Testament.] ). More frequently to mind (Gr. ) is found in the transitive sense of to think about, to direct ones mind to (Rom 8:5, Php 3:16; Php 3:19). Sometimes is translated to be minded, and in such cases the phrase is equivalent in meaning to the transitive verb (Gal 5:10, Php 3:15). The participle minded is met with in the Authorized Version in a number of phrases-likeminded (Rom 15:5, Php 2:2), feeble-minded (1Th 5:14), doubleminded (Jam 1:8; Jam 4:8), highminded (Rom 11:20, 1Ti 6:17, 2Ti 3:4), soberminded (Tit 2:6), which are represented in the original by various verbs and adjectives. For carnally minded and spiritually minded in Rom 8:6 ( ) should be substituted as in the Revised Version the mind of the flesh, the mind of the spirit.
Literature.-Thayer Grimms Gr.-Eng. Lexicon of the NT, Greek-Eng. Lex. of the NT2, 1890, s.v. ; H. Cremer, Bib.-Theol. Lex. of NT Greek3, 1880, p. 435 ff.; J. Laidlaw, The Bible Doctrine of Man, 1895, p. 123 ff.; B. Weiss, Biblical Theology of the NT, Eng. translation , 1882-83, i. 475 f.; Hasting’s Dictionary of the Bible (5 vols) , article Mind.
J. C. Lambert.
Fuente: Dictionary of the Apostolic Church
MIND
A thinking, intelligent being; otherwise called spirit, or soul.
See SOUL. Dr. Watts has given us some admirable thoughts as to the improvement of the mind. “There are five eminent means or methods, ” he observes, “whereby the mind is improved in the knowledge of things; and these are, observation, reading, instruction by lectures, conversation, and meditation; which last, in a most peculiar manner, is called study.
See Watts on the Mind, a book which no student should be without.
Fuente: Theological Dictionary
Mind
(Greek nous; Latin mens, German Geist, Seele; French ame esprit).
The word mind has been used in a variety of meanings in English, and we find a similar want of fixity in the connotation of the corresponding terms in other languages. Aristotle tells us that Anaxagoras, as compared with other early Greek philosophers, appeared like one sober among drunken men in that he introduced nous, mind, as efficient cause of the general order in the universe. In treating of the soul, Aristotle himself identifies nous with the intellectual faculty, which he conceives as partly active, partly passive (see INTELLECT). It is the thinking principle the highest and most spiritual energy of the soul, separable from the body, and immortal. The Latin word, mens, was employed in much the same sense. – St. Thomas, who represents the general scholastic usage, derives mens from metior (to measure). He identifies mens with the human soul viewed as intellectual and abstracting from lower organic faculties. Angels, or pure spirits, may thus be called minds (De Veritate, X, a. 1). For Descartes the human soul is simply mens, res cogitans, mind. It stands in complete opposition to the body and to matter in general. The vegetative faculties allotted to the soul by Aristotle and the Schoolmen are rejected by him, and those vital functions are explained by him mechanically. The lower animals do not possess minds in any sense; they are for him mere machines. An early usage in English connects the word mind closely with memory, as in the sentence “to bear in mind”. Again it has been associated with the volitional side of our nature, as in the phrases “to mind” and “to have a mind to effect something”. Still when restricted to a particular faculty the general tendency has been to identify mind with the cognitive and more especially with the intellectual powers. In this usage it more closely corresponds to the primary meaning of the Latin mens, understood as the thinking or judging principle. Mind is also conceived as a substantial being, equivalent to the scholastic mens, partly identified with, partly distinguished from the soul. If we define the soul as the principle within me, by which I feel, think, will, and by which my body is animated, we may provide a definition of mind of fairly wide acceptance by merely omitting the last clause. That is, in this usage mind designates the soul as the source of conscious life, feeling, thought, and volition, abstraction being made from the vegetative functions. On the other hand the term soul emphasizes the note of substantiality and the property of animating principle.
In the English psychological literature of the last century there has indeed been exhibited a most remarkable timidity in regard to the use of the term “soul”. Whilst in German at all events the word seele has been in general acceptance among psychologists, the great majority of English writers on mental life completely shun the use of the corresponding English word, as seemingly perilous to their philosophical reputation. Even the most orthodox representatives of the Scotch school rigorously boycotted the word, so that “the nature and attributes of the Human Mind”, came to be recognized as the proper designation of the subject matter of psychology, even amongst those who believed in the reality of an immaterial principle, as the source of man’s conscious life. However, the spread of the positivist or phenomenalist view of the science of psychology has resulted in a very widely adopted identification of mind merely with the conscious states, ignoring any principle or subject to which these states belong. The mind in this sense is only the sum of the conscious processes or activities of the individual with their special modes of operating. This, however, is a quite inadequate conception of the mind. It may, of course, be convenient and quite legitimate for some purposes to investigate certain activities or operations of this mind or soul, without raising the ultimate question of the metaphysical nature of the principle or substance which is the basis and source of these phenomena; and it may also serve as a useful economy of language to employ the term mind, merely to designate mental life as a stream of consciousness. But the adoption of this phraseology must not cause us to lose sight of the fact that along with the action there is the agent, that underlying the forms of mental behaviour there is the being which behaves. The connection of our abiding personal identity, nay the simplest exercise of self-conscious memory, compels us to acknowledge the reality of a permanent principle, the subject and connecting bond of the transitory states. Mind adequately conceived must thus be held to include the subject or agent along with states or activities, and it should be the business of a complete science of mind to investigate both.
All our rational knowledge of the nature of the mind must be derived from the study of its operations. Consequently metaphysical or rational psychology logically follows empirical or phenomenal psychology. The careful observation, description, and analysis of the activities of the mind lead up to our philosophical conclusions as to the inner nature of the subject and the source of those activities. The chief propositions in regard to the human mind viewed as a substantial principle which Catholic philosophers claim to establish by the light of reason are, its abiding unity, its individuality, its freedom, its simplicity, and its spirituality (see CONSCIOUSNESS; INDIVIDUALITY; INTELLECT; SOUL).
MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS
In connection with the investigation of our mental operations there arises the question, whether these are to be deemed coextensive with consciousness. Are there unconscious mental processes? The problem under different forms has occupied the attention of philosophers from Leibniz to J. S. Mill, whilst in recent years the phenomena of hypnotism, “multiple personality”, and abnormal forms of mental life have brought the question of the relation between the unconscious and the conscious processes in the human organism into greater prominence. That all forms of mental life, perception thought, feeling, and volition are profoundly affected in character by nervous processes and by vital activities, which do not emerge into the strata of conscious life, seems to be indisputably established. Whether however, unconscious processes which affect conclusions of the intellect and resolutions of the will, but are in themselves quite unconscious, should be called mental states, or conceived as acts of the mind, has been keenly disputed. In favour of the doctrine of unconscious mental processes have been urged the fact that many of our ordinary sensations arise out of an aggregate of impressions individually too faint to be separately perceivable, the fact that attention may reveal to us experiences previously unnoticed, the fact that unobserved trains of thought may result in sudden reminiscences, and that in abnormal mental conditions hypnotized, somnambulistic, and hysterical patients often accomplish difficult intellectual feats whilst remaining utterly unaware of the rational intermediate steps leading up to the final results. On the other side it is urged that most of those phenomena can be accounted for by merely subconscious processes which escape attention and are forgotten; or, at all events, by unconscious cerebration, the working out of purely physical nervous processes without any concomitant mental state till the final cerebral situation is reached, when the corresponding mental act is evoked. The dispute is probably, at least in part, grounded on differences of definition. If, however, the mind be identified with the soul, and if the latter be allowed to be the principle of vegetative life, there can be no valid reason for denying that the principle of our mental life may be also the subject of unconscious activities. But if we confine the term mind to the soul, viewed as conscious, or as the subject of intellectual operations, then by definition we exclude unconscious states from the sphere of mind. Still whatever terminology we may find it convenient to adopt, the fact remains, that our most purely intelectual operations are profoundly influenced by changes which take place below the surface of consciousness.
ORIGIN OF MENTAL LIFE
A related question is that of the simple or composite character of consciousness. Is mind, or conscious life, an amalgam or product of units which are not conscious? One response is offered in the “mind-stuff” or “mind-dust” theory. This is a necessary deduction from the extreme materialistic evolutionist hypothesis when it seeks to explain the origin of human minds in this universe. According to W. K. Clifford, who invented the term “mind-stuff”, those who accept evolution must, for the sake of consistency, assume that there is attached to every particle of matter in the universe a bit of rudimentary feeling or intelligence, and “when the material molecules are so combined as to form the film on the under-side of a jelly fish, the elements of mind-stuff which go along with them are so combined as to form the faint beginnings of sentience. When the matter takes the complex form of the living human brain, the corresponding mind-stuff takes the form of human consciousness, having intelligence and volition” (Lectures and Essays, 284). Spencer and other thorough-going evolutionists are driven to a similar conclusion. But the true inference is rather, that the incredibility of the conclusion proves the untenableness of the materialistic form of evolution which these writers adopt. There is no evidence whatever of this universal mind-stuff which they postulate. It is of an inconceivable character. As Professor James says, to call it “nascent” consciousness is merely a verbal quibble which explains nothing. No multiplicity and no grouping or fusing of unconscious elements can be conceived as constituting an act of conscious intelligence. The unity and simplicity which characterize the simplest acts of the mind are incompatible with such a theory.
MIND AND MATTER
The opposition of mind and matter brings us face to face with the great controversy of Dualism and Monism. Are there two forms of being in the universe ultimately and radically distinct? or are they merely diverse phases or aspects of one common underlying substratum? Our experience at all events appears to reveal to us two fundamentally contrasted forms of reality. On the one side, there is facing us matter occupying space, subject to motion, possessed of inertia and resistance permanent indestructible, and seemingly independent of our observation. On the other, there is our own mind, immediately revealing itself to us in simple unextended acts of consciousness, which seem to be born and then annihilated. Through these conscious acts we apprehend the material world. All our knowledge of it is dependent on them, and in the last resort limited by them. By analogy we ascribe to other human organisms minds like our own. A craving to find unity in the seeming multiplicity of experience has led many thinkers to accept a monistic explanation, in which the apparent duality of mind and matter is reduced to a single underlying principle or substratum. Materialism considers matter itself, body material substance, as this principle. For the materialist, mind, feelings, thoughts, and volitions are but “functions” or “aspects” of matter; mental life is an epiphenomenon, a by-product in the working of the Universe, which can in no way interfere with the course of physical changes or modify the movement of any particle of matter in the world; indeed, in strict consistency it should be held that successive mental acts do not influence or condition each other, but that thoughts and volitions are mere incidental appendages of certain nerve processes in the brain; and these latter are determined exclusively and completely by antecedent material processes. In other words, the materialistic theory, when consistently thought out, leads invariably to the startling conclusion that the human mind has had no real influence on the history of the human race.
On the other hand, the idealistic monist denies altogether the existence of any extra-mental, independent material world. So far from mind being a mere aspect or epiphenomenon attached to matter, the material universe is a creation of the mind and entirely dependent on it. Its esse is percipi. It exists only in and for the mind. Our ideas are the only things of which we can be truly certain. And, indeed, if we were compelled to embrace monism, it seems to us there can be little doubt as to the logical superiority of the idealistic position. But there is no philosophical compulsion to adopt either a materialistic or an idealistic monism. The conviction of the common sense of mankind, and the assumption of physical science that there are two orders of being in the universe, mind and matter, distinct from each other yet interacting and influencing each other, and the assurance that the human mind can obtain a limited yet true knowledge of the material world which really exists outside and independently of it occupying a space of three dimensions, this view, which is the common teaching of the Scholastic philosophy and Catholic thinkers, can be abundantly justified (see DUALISM; ENERGY, CONSERVATION OF).
MIND AND MECHANISM
Mind is also contrasted with mechanical theories as cause or explanation of the order of the world. The affirmation of mind in this connection is equivalent to teleologism, or idealism in the sense of there being intelligence and purpose governing the working of the universe. This is the meaning of the word in Bacon’s well-known statement: “I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend and the Alcoran than that this universal frame is without a mind” (Essays: Of Atheism). It is, in fact, the doctrine of theism. The world as given demands a rational account of its present character. The proximate explanations of much, especially in the inorganic and non-living portion of it, can be furnished by material energies acting according to known laws. But reason demands an account of all the contents of the universe-living and conscious beings as well as lifeless matter- and, moreover, it insists on carrying the inquiry back until it reaches an ultimate explanation. For this, Mind, an Intelligent Cause, is necessary. Even if the present universe could be traced back to a collection of material atoms, the particular collocation of these atoms from which the present cosmos resulted, would have to be accounted for- because in the mechanical or materialistic theory of evolution, that original collocation contained this universe and no other, and that particular collocation clamours for a sufficient reason just as inevitably as does the present complex result. If we are told that the explanation of a page of a newspaper is to be found in the contact of the paper with a plate of set types, we are still compelled to ask haw the prticular arrangement of the types came about, and we are certain that the sufficient explanation ultimately rests in the action of mind or intelligent being.
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MICHAEL MAHER Transcribed by Tomas Hancil and Joseph P. Thomas
The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XCopyright © 1911 by Robert Appleton CompanyOnline Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. KnightNihil Obstat, October 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., CensorImprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York
Fuente: Catholic Encyclopedia
Mind
the exercise or expression of the spiritual part of man’s nature. It is obviously divisible into the three elementary functions, thought, emotion, and volition; but scientific writers greatly differ as to the subordinate or detailed faculties, as they are called. Reilt thus classifies the mental powers: Perception, memory, conception, abstraction, judgment, reasoning. Stewart thus: Perception, attention, conception, abstraction, association, imagination, reason. Others propose a, deeper analysis of the intellectual faculties, and find three properties which appear fundamental and distinct, to one in any degree implying the other, while the whole taken together are sufficient to explain all intellectual operations: namely, discrimination, retentiveness, and association of ideas. Sir W. Hamilton, departing from common classifications, sums the intellections into six:
(1.) The presentative faculty, or the power of recognising the various aspects of the world and of the mind.
(2.) The conservative faculty or memory, meaning the power of storing up.
(3.) The reproductive faculty, or the means of recalling sleeping impressions or concepts.
(4.) The representative faculty, or imagination.
(5.) The elaborative faculty, or the power of comparison, by which classification, generalization, and reasoning are performed.
(6.) The regulative faculty, or the cognition of the a priori or instinctive notions of the intellect, as space, time, causation, necessary truths, etc.
Noah Porter divides his Human Intellect into four parts:
(a.) He treats of natural consciousness, philosophical consciousness; sense perception, its conditions and process; of the growth and products of sense perception.
(b.) He treats of representation and representative knowledge; by which he means memory, imagining power, etc.
(c.) He treats of thinking and thought knowledge; by which he means the formation and nature of the concept, judgment, reasoning, etc.
(d.) He treats of intuition and intuitive knowledge, in which he discourses on mathematical relations, causation, design, substance, attribute; the finite and conditioned; the infinite and absolute.
Berkeley and his school teach a pure idealism, which asserts that everything we can take cognizance of is mind or self; that we cannot transcend our mental sphere; whatever we know is our own mind. Others, again, as Locke, resolve all into empiricism, and look on mind as simply the result of material organization. These two views contain the extreme angles to which speculation has run. The former is idealism or spiritualism, the latter materialism or empiricism.
The pre-Socratic school of philosophers was materialistic, of which Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, were patrons. Between these and Plato, Socrates was a transitional link. The post-Platonic philosophers were spiritualistic in the main, notwithstanding French materialism and German rationalism. SEE MATERIALISM. Dr. McCosh, in his Intuitions of the Mind, makes a triplet of parts. In part first (which is on the Nature of the Intuitive Convictions of the Mind) he shows that there are no innate mental images; no innate or general notions; no a priori forms imposed by the mind on objects; no intuitions immediately before consciousness as law principles. But there are intuitive principles operating in the mind; these are native convictions of the mind, which are of the nature of perceptions or intuitions. Intuitive convictions rise up when contemplations of objects are presented to the mind. The intuitions of the mind are primarily directed to individual objects. The individual intuitive convictions can be generalized into maxims, and these are entitled to be represented as philosophic principles. In part second he shows that the mind begins its intelligent acts with knowledge; that the simple cognitive powers are sense, perception, and self-consciousness. It is through the bodily organism that the intelligence of man attains its knowledge of all material objects beyond. The qualities of matter extension, divisibility, size density or rarity, figure, incompressibility, mobility, and substance are known by intuition; and it is by cognition we know self as having being, and as not depending for existence on our observation; as being in itself an abiding existence; as exercising potency in spirit and material being Cogito, ergo sum. The primitive cognitions recognise being, substance, mode. quality, personality, number, motion, power.
The primitive beliefs recognise space, time, and the infinite. The mind intuitively observes the relations of identity, of whole to part, of space, time, quantity, property, cause, and effect. The motive and moral convictions as appetencies, will, conscience are involved in the exercise of conscience. In part third he shows that the sources of knowledge are sense, perception, self-consciousness, and faith exercise. But there are limits to our knowledge, ideas, and beliefs. We cannot know any substance other than those revealed by sense, consciousness, or faith. We can never know any qualities or relations among objects except in so far as we have special faculties of knowledge. The material for ideas must be brought from the knowledge sources. These sources are limited, and our belief is limited. Professor Bain, in his book, shows that human knowledge falls under two departments the object department, marked by extension; the subject department, marked by the absence of extension. Subject experience has three functions feeling, will, thought. The brain is the organ of the mind. The nervous systems are only extensions or ramifications of the brain, and through these the mind transmits its influence. In this nervous system, which acts as a channel for the transmission of messages from the mind, are two sets of nerves the in-carrying, the out-carrying. The intellectual functions are commonly expressed by memory, reason, imagination. The primary attributes of intellect are difference, agreement. retentiveness, or continuity. J.S. Mill propounds a psychological theory of the belief in a material world- postulates, expectation, association, laws, substance, matter. The external world is a permanent possibility of sensation. Then follows the distinction of primary and secondary qualities; application to the permanence of mind, etc.
The true theory is both scriptural and scientific, methodic and encyclopedic; and though it may not explain all ideation amply, yet it shows that the nature and functions of mind can only be seen in connection with all the other parts of the human system, just as the nature and functions of a fountain are only seen when considered in connection with the other parts of the cosmos. We can only understand the nature and office of ducts, glands, veins, or arteries when we view them in their mutual relations, and in their relations with all the other parts of the physical system. We can only understand civil polity, social statics, natural phenomena, when taken in their reciprocal relations; and so we can only understand mind when viewed in connection with everything else it touches. Views taken from any other premise must be partial and imperfect. We hold that mind has seven great forces or modes. The so- called scientific writers acknowledge this, at least substantially. These are consciousness, conception, abstraction, association, memory, imagination, reason. Now if science shows us that there are seven great corresponding qualities or forces in the body, and if Scripture (which reveals what science cannot) shows us that there are seven great corresponding powers in the soul which lie back of and control all powers of body and of mind, why not conclude that this trial septenary of forces interlace and overlap each other, so as to constitute a human personality? We do not claim for this theory a scientific status, but is it not worthy of a speculative niche? Our observation shows us that this universe progresses by a duplex method, unfolding and infolding, or evolving and involving. Scripture shows that this unfolding comes from a sevenfold force; science shows that it comes through a sevenfold faculty. The following curious coincidences may not be out of place here, as illustrating a somewhat abstruse problem of this subject. The Revelation by John reveals , or the seven spirits, as the constituent powers of Deity.
The question arises, What are these seven spirits? (Isa 11:2; Psa 111:10; Pro 1:7; Job 28:28). It is held by many influential writers that the spirits mentioned in these references are to be taken in connection with Zechariah’s sevenfold lamp (Zec 4:1). Delitzsch, in his work on Psychology, endeavors to find these elements in the Hebraistic distinctions of the spirit of fear, i.e., of divine veneration (), the spirit of knowledge (), the spirit of power (), etc.; but these are highly mystical and even fanciful. Whatever, however, may be thought of such abstractions, as to what Scripture says, or is imagined to say, about the sevenfold doxa or soul life, science does seem to discover, or at least point out, a sevenfold means of mind representation in the body. She recognizes seven forms of life: the embryonic, the breathing, the blood, the heart, the sensation, containing the five senses, the externalization of the voig by the tongue, and the outpressure of the entire mental phases and spirit feelings through the entire bodily habifus. In the trichotomy of nature the soul is first, the mind- second, the body third. The mind is therefore moulded by the soul, and the body by the mind. As the soul lies at the base of the being, all its ramifications are tinged with the hues of the soul. The mind, nevertheless, is moulded by whatever it plays upon. Thus mind is a middleman standing between the world of morals and of matter (yet interlacing both), communicating the will of the spirit to the external sphere. It is not a monarch, but a marshal; yet it is august in its capacity; in its elasticity, eternal. SEE PSYCHOLOGY.
For further discussion of the mind, see the works mentioned above; also the early Greek writers, as Diogenes, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Democrituis and the Socratic school, as Plato, Aristotle, etc. The modern schoolmen who treat of the subject are chiefly the following: Gassendi (1592-1655), Des Cartes (1596-1650), Geulinx (1625-1699), Spinoza (1632-1677), Malebranche (1688-1715), Hume (1711-1776), Reid (1710- 1796), Brown (1778-1820), Condillac (1715-1780), Collard (1763-1845), Leibnitz (1646-1716), Kant (1724-1804), Schleiermacher (1768-1834). Many of these were rather metaphysicians than mental philosophers; yet their theories and discussions involve the nature and functions of the human mind, especially in its intellectual aspects; and they therefore may be said to have laid the foundations for mental science in its present development. The principal works more expressly relating to the intellectual faculties are Stewart, Treatise and Essay on the Mind; Brown, Philosophy of the Human Mind; Abercrombie, Intellectual Powers; Watts, On the Mind; Cudworth, Intellectual System; Reid, Essays on the active Powers of the Human Mind: Mill (James), Analysis of the Phenomena of the Humans Mind; McCosh, Intuitions of the Mind; Wilson (W.D.), Lectures on the Psychology of Thought and Action; Bain, Mind and Body: the Theories of their Relation; Carpenter, Principles of Mental Physiology; Maudsley, Body and Mind: their Connection and mutual Influence. The works on Mental Science treat likewise of the emotional elements of the mind. SEE PHILOSOPHY. Most of the works named include the third or causative faculty of the mind, i.e. the will; but the importance of this, in its theological bearings, requires a separate treatment. SEE WILL. See also Christian Monthly Spectator, 8:141, 184; Lit. and Theol. Rev. 1:74,169, 614; 2:261, 576; North Amer. Rev. 19:1; 24:56; Monthly Rev. 68:441; Brit. Qu. Rev. December 1871, page 308; Contemporary Rev. April and Oct. 1872; Meth. Qu. Rev. 4:243; April 1870, page 221; Popular Science Monthly, July 1873, art. 10; December art. 4 and 6; The Academy, November 1, 1873, page 445. SEE MONOMANIA.
Fuente: Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature
MIND
Human beings, being made in the image of God, are different from all other animals (Gen 1:27; see IMAGE). One difference is that indefinable human characteristic called the mind. The mind does not result solely from the fact that a human being has a brain, for other animals also have brains. There is something within humans that enables them to commune with God, to think, to reason and to understand in a way that animals do not. The Bible sometimes calls this the mind, though frequently it calls it the heart (Pro 2:2-3; Heb 10:16; see HEART). The point that the Bible emphasizes is that because humans have minds they must think and behave differently from the other animals (Psa 32:8-9; Pro 1:2-6; Pro 18:15; Mat 22:37; Php 1:9-10; 1Pe 1:13-15; 2Pe 2:12-16; see KNOWLEDGE; WISDOM).
Like the rest of human nature, the mind has become corrupted through sin (Rom 1:21; Rom 8:7; 2Co 3:14; 2Co 4:4; Col 1:21; Eph 4:17-18). Therefore, when people repent and believe the gospel, their minds are renewed because of their union with Jesus Christ (Rom 8:5-6; Eph 4:22-24). They must then show that this is so. They must develop new attitudes of mind, which will result in new patterns of behaviour (Rom 12:2; 2Co 10:5; Php 2:5; Php 4:8; Col 3:2; Col 3:10; 1Pe 4:1).
This use of the mind should be seen not only in the way believers behave, but also in the way they worship and serve God. They must use their minds to pray and sing intelligently (1Co 14:15; Col 3:16; see PRAYER; SINGING), to understand Christian teaching (Pro 2:1-5; 1Co 2:11-13; 2Ti 2:7; see INTERPRETATION), to find out Gods will (Rom 12:2; Eph 5:17; Col 1:9; see GUIDANCE), to preach the gospel effectively (Act 17:2-4; Act 19:8-10; see PREACHING), and to teach the Scriptures in a way that builds up the hearers (Col 1:28; Tit 1:9; see TEACHER).
Fuente: Bridgeway Bible Dictionary
Mind
MIND.See Mental Characteristics.
Fuente: A Dictionary Of Christ And The Gospels
Mind
MIND.See Psychology.
Fuente: Hastings’ Dictionary of the Bible
Mind
mnd (, nous, , dianoia, , sunesis):
1. No Precision in the Terms Used:
We look in vain in the Old Testament and New Testament for anything like scientific precision in the employment of terms which are meant to indicate mental operations.
In the Old Testament lebh is made to stand for the various manifestations of our intellectual and emotional nature. We are often misled by the different renderings in the different versions, both early and late.
Sometimes nephesh or soul is rendered by mind (Deu 18:6 the King James Version, desire of his soul or mind); sometimes ruah or spirit (Gen 26:35, grief of mind, ruah). Here Luther renders the term Herzeleid (grief of heart), and the Vulgate (Jerome’s Latin Bible, 390-405 A.D.) animum. Sometimes lebh is used, as in Isa 46:8, bring it to mind (literally, heart), or in Psa 31:12, I am forgotten as a dead man out of mind (literally, heart), as in Septuagint, karda, and in Vulgate, a corde, Luther, im Herzen, new Dutch translated, uit de gedachtenis (i.e. memory).
In the Apocrypha this precision is equally lacking. Thus we read in The Wisdom of Solomon 9:15, For the corruptible body (soma) presseth down the soul (psuche) and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind (nous) that museth upon many things. But these distinctions are alien to the letter and spirit of revelation, a product of the Greek and not of the Hebrew mind.
In the New Testament the words nous and dianoia are used, but not with any precision of meaning.
Here too several terms are rendered by the same word. Thus the Hebrew ruah is rendered by nous in 1Co 2:16 (mind of the Lord, with reference to Isa 40:13, where ruah YHWH (spirit of Yahweh) occurs). Nous evidently means here the organ of spiritual perception – a word borrowed from the Septuagint, where it is sometimes made to stand for lebh (Job 7:17; Isa 41:22); sometimes for ruah (Isa 40:13). In Luk 24:45 – the solitary text, where nous occurs in the Gospels – it is rendered understanding in the King James Version, mind in the Revised Version (British and American).
2. Ethical Sense:
For a true solution we must turn to the Epistles of Paul, where the word frequently occurs in an ethical sense – sometimes in connection with (sinful) flesh as in Col 2:18, puffed up by his fleshly mind, sometimes in direct contrast to it, as in Rom 7:25, ‘with my mind I serve the law of God; with the flesh the law of sin.’ In Tit 1:15 it is brought into parallelism with conscience (Their mind and their conscience are defiled). Phrases like a reprobate mind, corrupted in mind occur elsewhere (Rom 1:28; 1Ti 6:5). From this state of reprobation and corruption man must be saved. Hence, the necessity of complete transformation and renewal of the inner man (Rom 12:2), transformed by the renewing of your mind (nous).
3. Dianoia and Nous:
Another word, with possibly a deeper meaning, is sometimes employed, namely, dianoia, which literally means meditation, reflection. It is found as synonymous with nous in a good sense, as e.g. in 1Jo 5:20 (He hath given us an understanding, that we know him that is true). Evidently the sense here is the same as in Rom 12:2, a renovated mind capable of knowing Christ. It may also bear a bad sense, as in Eph 4:18, where the Gentiles are represented as having a darkened understanding, or in parallelism with sarx: the desires of the flesh and of the mind (Eph 2:3), and with nous: ‘walking in vanity of mind (nous) and a darkened understanding (dianoia)’ in Eph 4:18. At times also heart and mind are joined to indicate human depravity (Luk 1:51 : He hath scattered the proud in the imagination (dianoia) of their heart). It is interesting also to know that the Great Commandment is rendered in Mat 22:37 – Thou shall love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul (psuche), and with all thy understanding (dianoia) (English Versions of the Bible, mind) – though Mark has two renderings in one of which dianoia occurs, and in the other sunesis (Mar 12:30, Mar 12:33), though possibly without any psychological refinement of meaning, for the term sunesis occurs elsewhere in conjunction with pneumatikos (spiritual understanding, Col 1:9). It also stands alone in the sense of an understanding enlightened from above (2Ti 2:7 King James Version: The Lord give thee understanding (sunesis) in all things). The history of these terms is interesting, but not of great theological significance.
4. The Great Commandment:
It seems to us that Godet’s interpretation of the Great Commandment in Luk 10:27 is somewhat far-fetched. He considers the heart as the central focus from which all rays of the moral life go forth, and that in their three principal directions: the powers of feeling, or the affections, nephesh (‘soul’) in the sense of feeling; the active powers, the impulsive aspirations, the might (‘with all thy might’), the will; and in the intellectual powers, analytical or contemplative, dianoia (‘with all thy mind’). The difference between the heart, which resembles the trunk and the three branches, feeling, will, understanding, is emphatically marked in the Alexandrian variation, by the substitution of the preposition en (‘in’) for ek (‘with,’ ‘from’) in the three last members. Moral life proceeds from the heart and manifests itself without, in the three forms of activity. The impulse God-ward proceeds from the heart, and is realized in the life through the will, which consecrates itself actively to the accomplishment of His will; and through the mind, which pursues the track of His thought in all His works (Godet, Commentary on the Gospel of Luke, II, 38, 39).
Fuente: International Standard Bible Encyclopedia
Mind
(Lat. mens) Mind is used in two principal senses(a) The individual mind is the self or subject which perceives, remembers, imagines,feels, conceives, reasons, wills, etc. and which is functionally related to an individual bodily organism. (b) Mind, generically considered, is a metaphysical substance which pervades all individual minds and which is contrasted with matter or material substance. — L.W.