Probabilism
probabilism
The name applied by moralists to the system which holds that whenever a doubt exists concerning the licitness or illicitness of an act, and the doubt cannot be resolved, one is permitted to follow a solidly probable opinion in favor of liberty, even if the opposite opinion in favor of the law is more probable. The motto of probabilism is Lex dubia non obligat, that is, “A doubtful law does not bind.” A doubtful law does not bind, the defenders of probabilism maintain, because a doubtful law has no claim on the will, which by its very nature is in possession of liberty. All authorities agree that when there is question of a certain result which must by all means be secured, for example, the validity of a Sacrament, then a merely probable opinion may not be invoked, but that one must be followed which is absolutely safe and certain. Probabilism was originally given systematic form by Bartholomew Medina (1527-1581). His doctrine met with favor among a large number of moralists. Later, however, the Jansenists raised a fierce storm of opposition against it. The dispute went on for about a century. Finally it was ended by the thorough and scholarly treatment of the question by Saint Alphonsus. Today probabilism, either in the form of requiprobabilism or absqlute though moderate probabilism, is the doctrine commonly held by moral theologians.
Fuente: New Catholic Dictionary
Probabilism
Probabilism is the moral system which holds that, when there is question solely of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action, it is permissible to follow a solidly probable opinion in favour of liberty even though the opposing view is more probable.
I. STATE OF THE QUESTION
When a prohibiting law is certain, the subjects of the law are bound to abstain from performing the action which the law forbids, unless they are excused by one of the ordinary exempting causes. On the other hand, when it is certain that no law forbids an action, there is no obligation to abstain from performing it. Between these two extremes there can be varying degrees of uncertainty about the existence or cessation of a prohibiting law. There is doubt in the strict sense when the intellect neither assents nor dissents, because either there are no positive arguments for and against the law, or the arguments for and against the law are equal in strength. The opinion which favours the law, and which is technically called the safe opinion, can be more probable than the opinion which favours liberty and which still retains solid probability. Again, the opinion which favours the law can be most probable, and the opinion which favours liberty only slightly probable. In the same way the opinion which favours liberty and which is technically called the less safe opinion, can be more probable than the opposing view, or can be most probable.
In estimating the degree which is required and which suffices for solid probability, moralists lay down the general principle that an opinion is solidly probable which by reason of intrinsic or extrinsic arguments is able to gain the assent of many prudent men. All admit that extrinsic authority can have sufficient weight to make an opinion solidly probable; but there is divergence of view in estimating what number of experts is able to give an opinion this solid probability. The prevailing theory amongst Probabilists holds that if five or six theologians, notable for prudence and learning, independently adhere to an opinion their view is solidly probable, if it has not been set aside by authoritative decisions or by intrinsic arguments which they have failed to solve. Even one theologian of very exceptional authority, such as St. Alphonsus Liguori, is able to make an opinion solidly probable, as we know from the official declarations of the Holy See. All moralists agree that mere flimsy reasons are insufficient to give an opinion solid probability, and also that the support of many theologians who are mere collectors of the opinions of others is unable to give solid probability to the view which they maintain.
Non-Catholics who bring charges of laxity against the moral systems which Catholic theologians uphold, often forget that the Catholic Church, in theory and in practice, has condemned various views in favour of liberty which are based on insufficient data.
If the less safe opinion is speculatively uncertain it is unlawful to follow it in practice, until all reasonable effort has been made to remove the uncertainty, by considering the arguments on both sides and by consulting available authorities. It is unlawful, also, to act on the less safe view unless the speculative uncertainty has been changed into practical certainty that the action to be performed is lawful. The whole question at issue between different moral systems concerns the way in which the speculative uncertainty is changed into practical certainty; each system has what is called a reflex principle of its own, by which practical certainty can be obtained that the action to be performed is lawful. Rigorism, or, as it is frequently called, Tutiorism held that the less safe opinion should be most probable, if not absolutely certain, before it could be lawfully put into practice, while Laxism maintained that if the less safe opinion were slightly probable it could be followed with a safe conscience.
These two views, however, never received serious support from Catholic theologians, and were formally condemned by the Holy See. At one time or another in the history of the Church three other opinions gained many adherents. Some theologians, who put forward the system known as Probabiliorism, hold that the less safe opinion can be lawfully followed only when it is more probable than the safe opinion. Others, upholding Æquiprobabilism, maintain that, when the uncertainty concerns the existence of a law, it is lawful to follow the less safe opinion when it has equal or almost equal probability with the safe opinion, but that, when there is question of the cessation of a law, the less safe opinion cannot lawfully be followed unless it is more probable than the safe view. Others again, who adhere to Probabilism, believe that, whether there is question of the existence or of the cessation of a law, it is lawful to act on the less safe opinion if it is solidly probable, even though the safe view is certainly more probable. In recent years a system known as Compensationism has tried to reconcile these three opinions by holding that not only the degree of probability attaching to various opinions must be taken into account, but also the importance of the law and the degree of utility attaching to the performance of the action whose morality is in question. The more important the law, and the smaller the degree of probability attaching to the less safe opinion, the greater must be the compensating utility which will permit the performance of the action of which the lawfulness is uncertain. From what has so far been said it is clear that these various moral systems come into play only when the question concerns the lawfulness of an action. If the uncertainty concerns the validity of an action which must certainly be valid, it is not lawful to act on mere probability unless, indeed, this is of such a nature as to make the Church certainly supply what is needed for the validity of the act. Thus, apart from necessity, it is not lawful to act on mere probability when the validity of the sacraments is in question. Again, it is not lawful to act on mere probability when there is question of gaining an end which is obligatory, since certain means must be employed to gain a certainly required end. Hence, when eternal salvation is at stake, it is not lawful to be content with uncertain means. Moreover, the virtue of justice demands equality, and as such excludes the use of probability when the established rights of another are concerned. Consequently, if a certain debt has not been certainly paid, at least a payment pro rata dubii is required according to the prevailing view. It is evident, then, that the question which arises in connection with the moral systems has to do solely with the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action.
II. HISTORY OF PROBABILISM
Probabilism as a moral system had no history prior to the end of the sixteenth century. Fathers, doctors and theologians of the Church at times solved cases on principles which apparently were probabilist in tendency. St. Augustine declared that marriage with infidels was not to be regarded as unlawful since it was not clearly condemned in the New Testament: “Quoniam revera in Novo Testamento nihil inde praeceptum est, et ideo aut licere creditum est, aut velut dubium derelictum” (“De Fide et Operibus”, c. xix, n. 35 in “P.L.”, XL, 221). St. Gregory of Nazianzus laid down, against a Novatian writer, that a second marriage was not unlawful, since the prohibition was doubtful: “Quo argumento id confirmas. Aut rem ita esse proba, aut, si id nequis, ne condemnes. Quod si res dubia est, vincat humanitas et facilitas” (Or. 39, “In sancta Lumina”, n. 19 in “P.G.”, XXXVI, 358). St. Thomas maintained that a precept does not bind except through the medium of knowledge: “Unde nullus ligatur per praeceptum aliquod nisi mediante scientia illius” (“De Veritate”, Q. xvii, a.3); and Probabilists are accustomed to point out that knowledge implies certainty.
On the other hand many theologians were Probabiliorist in their principles before the sixteenth century. Sylvester Prierias (Opinio, s. 2), Conradus (De Contract., Q. ult), and Cajetan (Opinio) were Probabiliorists; so that Probabiliorism had gained a strong hold on theologians when Medina arrived on the scene. Bartholomew Medina, a Dominican, was the first to expound the moral system which is known as Probabilism. In his “Expositio in 1am 2ae S. Thomae” he taught that, “if an opinion is probable it is lawful to follow it, even though the opposing opinion is more probable”. His system soon became the common teaching of the theologians, so that in the introduction to his “Regula Morum” Father Terill, S.J. (d. 1676) was able to say that until 1638 Catholic theologians of all schools were Probabilists. There were exceptions such as Rebellus (d. 1608), Comitolus (d. 1626), and Philalethis (d. 1642), but the great body of the theologians of the end of the sixteenth and of the first half of the seventeenth century were on the side of Medina. Amongst them were Sa (d. 1596), Toletus (d. 1596), Gregorius de Valentia (d. 1603), Banez (d. 1604), Vasquez (d. 1604), Azor (d. 1607), Thomas Sanchez (d. 1610), Ledesma (d. 1616), Suarez (d. 1617), Lessius (d. 1623), Laymann (d. 1625), Bonacina (d. 1631), Castropalaus (d. 1633), Alvarez (d. 1635), and Ildephonsus (d. 1639).
With the rise of Jansenism and the condemnation of “Augustinus” a new phase in the history of the Probabilist controversies began. In 1653 Innocent X condemned the five propositions taken from “Augustinus”, and in 1655 the Louvain theologians condemned Probabilism. Tutiorism was adopted by the Jansenists, and the Irish Jansenist theologian, Sinnichius (d. 1666), a professor of Louvain, was the foremost defender of the Rigorist doctrines. He held that it is not lawful to follow even a most probable opinion in favour of liberty. Jansenist Rigorism spread into France, and Pascal in his “Lettres Provinciales” attacked Probabilism with the vigour and grace of style which have given his letters their high place in literature. The “Lettres Provinciales” were condemned by Alexander VII in 1657, but Rigorism did not receive its final blow till the year 1690 when Alexander VIII condemned the proposition of Sinnichius: “Non licet sequi opinionem vel inter probabiles probabilissimam “.
After this condemnation a moderate form of Tutiorism was unfolded by theologians like Steyaert (d. 1701), Opstraet (d. 1720), Henricus a S. Ignatio (d. 1719), and Dens (d. 1775). During this period, dating from the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth century, the following were amongst the notable theologians who remained true to Probabilism: Lugo (d. 1660), Lupus (d. 1681), Cardenas (d. 1684), Deschamps (d. 1701), Lacroix (d. 1714), Sporer (d. 1714), Salmanticenses (1717-1724), Mazzotta (d. 1748).
Side by side with Probabilism and Rigorism a party held sway which favoured Laxism, and which maintained in theory or practice that a slightly probable opinion in favour of liberty could safely be followed. The principal upholders of this view were Juan Sanchez (d. 1620), Bauny (d. 1649) Leander (d. 1663), Diana (d. 1663), Tamburini (d. 1675), Caramuel (d. 1682), Moya (d. 1684). Laxism was expressly condemned by Innocent XI in 1679; and Alexander VII (1665-66), and Innocent XI (1679) condemned various propositions which savoured of Laxism.
Besides Rigorism, Probabilism, and Laxism, there was also a theory of Probabiliorism which held that it is not lawful to act on the less safe opinion unless it is more probable than the safe opinion. This view, which was in vogue before the time of Medina, was renewed in the middle of the seventeenth century, as an antidote against Laxism. Its revival was principally due to the efforts of Alexander VII and Innocent XI. In 1656 a general chapter of the Dominicans urged all members of the order to adopt Probabiliorism. Though previously Dominican theologians like Medina, Ledesma, Banez, Alvarez, and Ildephonsus were Probabilists subsequently the Dominicans in the main were Probabiliorists. Amongst them were Mercorius (d. 1669), Gonet (d. 1681), Contenson (d. 1674), Fagnanus (d. 1678), Natalis Alexander (d. 1724) Concina (d. 1756), Billuart (d. 1757), Patuzzi (d. 1769). Probabiliorism was held by many Jesuits such as Gonzalez (d. 1705), Elizalde (d. 1678), Antoine (d. 1743), Ehrentreich (d. 1708), and Taberna (d. 1686). In 1700 the Gallican clergy, under Bossuet, accepted Probabiliorism. The Franciscans as a rule were Probabiliorists, and in 1762 a general chapter of the order, held at Mantua, ordered the members to follow Probabiliorism. In 1598 a general chapter of the Theatines adopted Probabiliorism. The Augustinians, the Carmelites, the Trinitarians, and many Benedictines were also Probabiliorists. The most notable event in the history of the controversy occurred in connection with Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., a professor of Salamanca, who (1670-72) wrote a work, entitled “Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis”, in favour of Probabiliorism. In 1673 the book was sent to the Jesuit General Oliva, who refused permission for its publication. Innocent XI favoured Gonzalez, and in 1680 sent, through the Holy Office, a decree to the General Oliva ordering that liberty be given to the members of the order to write in favour of Probabiliorism and against Probabilism. Gonzalez was elected general of the order in 1687, but his book was not published until 1694.
During the controversies between the Probabilists and the Probabiliorists, the system known as Æquiprobabilism was not clearly brought into prominence. Æquiprobabilism holds that it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion when the safe opinion is certainly more probable; that it is not lawful to act on the less safe opinion even when it is equally probable with the safe opinion, if the uncertainty regards the cessation of a law; but that if the existence of the law is in question, it is lawful to follow the less safe opinion if it has equal or nearly equal probability with the safe opinion. Many of the moderate Probabilists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries foreshadowed in their writings the theory to which, in his later-days, St. Alphonsus adhered. Even Suarez, who is regarded as a typical Probabilist, said: “Major probabilitas est quaedam moralis certitudo, si excessus probabilitatis certus est (De Legibus, 1. VIII, c. 3, n. 19). In the beginning of the eighteenth century Amort. (d. 1775), Rassler (d. 1730), and Mayr (d. 1749), who are sometimes classed as moderate Probabilists, in reality defended Æquiprobabilism.
This view gained vigour and persistence from the teaching of St. Alphonsus, who began his theological career as a Probabiliorist, subsequently defended Probabilism, especially in a treatise entitled “Dissertatio scholastico-moralis pro usu moderato opinionis probabilis in concursu probabilioris” (1749, 1755), and finally, about 1762, embraced Æquiprobabilism. In a new dissertation he laid down the two propositions that it is lawful to act on the less safe opinion, when it is equally probable with the safe opinion, and that it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion when the safe opinion is notably and certainly more probable. In the sixth edition (1767) of his “Moral Theology” he again expressed these views and indeed towards the end of his life frequently declared that he was not a Probabilist.
Probabilists sometimes hold that St. Alphonsus never changed his opinion once he had discarded Probabiliorism for Probabilism, though he changed his manner of expressing his view so as to exclude Laxist teaching and to give an indication of what must be regarded as a solidly probable opinion. As a matter of fact, as can be seen from a comparison between the “Moral Theologies” of moderate Probabilists and of Æquiprobabilists, there is little practical difference between the two systems, so far at least as the uncertainty regards the existence as distinguished from the cessation of a law. Since the time of St. Alphonsus the prevailing moral systems have been Probabilism and Æquiprobabilism. Probabiliorism has to a great extent disappeared, and even many Dominican theologians have espoused the cause of Æquiprobabilism. During the nineteenth century the principal Æquiprobabilists have been Konings, Marc, Aertnys, Ter Haar, de Caigny, Gaude, and Wouters. Quite recently Ter Haar and Wouters have been engaged in controversy with Lehmkuhl who, especially In his “Probabilismus Vindicatus” (1906) and in the eleventh edition of his “Theologia Moralis” (1910), has strongly supported the Probabilist thesis which has been accepted during the nineteenth century by the vast majority of theologians.
In late years the system of Compensationism has arisen, which holds that a compensating reason proportionate to the gravity of the law and to the degree of probability in favour of the existence of the raw, is required in order that a person might lawfully act on the less safe opinion. This theory was proposed by Mannier, Laloux, and Potton; but it has gained little support and has not yet become a rival of the old theories of Probabilism, Æquiprobabilism, or even Probabiliorism.
III. PROBABILISM
A. Teaching of Probabilists
The central doctrine of Probabilism is that in every doubt which concerns merely the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action it is permissible to follow a solidly probable opinion in favour of liberty, even though the opposing view is more probable. Probabilists apply their theory only when there is question merely of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action, because in other cases certainty might be demanded on various grounds, as happens when the validity of the sacraments, the attainment of an obligatory end, and the established rights of another are concerned. They apply their doctrine whether the doubt about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action be a doubt of law, or a doubt of fact which can be reduced to a doubt of law. Thus if it is solidly probable that Friday morning has not yet set in, there is a doubt of fact which can be reduced to a doubt of law as to whether it is lawful in the circumstances to take meat. They also apply their doctrine not merely to human but also to Divine and natural laws, on the ground that the Divine legislator is not more exacting than a human legislator. They apply their principles whether the existence or the cessation of a law is concerned, since, in their estimation, liberty is always in possession. They also apply their doctrine even though the person whose action is in question believes that the safe opinion is the more probable opinion. If, however, he looks on the safe opinion as morally certain, he cannot lawfully use the opinion of others who differ from him. Nor can a person on the same occasion use opposing probabilities in his favour in reference to several obligations of which one or another would be certainly violated; thus a priest cannot lawfully take meat on the probability that Friday has already elapsed, and at the same time postpone the reading of Compline on the probability that Friday will not elapse for some time. Finally, Probabilists insist that the opinion in favour of liberty must be based on solid arguments and not on mere flimsy reasons which are insufficient to gain the assent of prudent men.
B. Arguments for Probabilism
(1) External arguments
(a) Probabilism, if untrue, is seriously detrimental to the spiritual life of the faithful, since it permits actions which ought to be forbidden, and the Church cannot tolerate or give approval to such a moral system. But the Church during many centuries has tolerated Probabilism, and has given it approval in the person of St. Alphonsus. Hence Probabilism is not a false system of morals. That the Church has tolerated Probabilism is shown from the numerous approved authors, who, since the time of Medina, have defended it without interference on the part of ecclesiastical authority. That the Church has given positive approval to Probabilism in the person of St. Alphonsus is proved from the fact that his works including his treatises in favour of Probabilism, received official sanction from the Decree of 18 May, 1803, the reply of the Sacred Penitentiary of 5 July, 1831 the Bull of Canonization of 26 May, 1839 and the Apostolic Letters of 7 July, 1871 (cf. Lehmkuhl, “Theologia Moralis”, I, nn. 165-75).
Æquiprobabilists reply that this argument proves too much for Probabilists, since the Church has also tolerated Æquiprobabilism, and has given it positive approval in the person of St. Alphonsus, whose works in favour of Æquiprobabilism received the sanction of the Holy See in the official documents of 1803, 1831, 1839, and 1871. If Æquiprobabilism is false, it is seriously detrimental to the spiritual life of the faithful, since it imposes burdens which ought not to be imposed. Hence, if any argument can be derived for Probabilism from the toleration or approval of the Church, a similar argument can be derived therefrom for Æquiprobabilism.
(b) In interpreting her own laws the Church applies the principles of Probabilism, since amongst the rules of law in “Sexto Decretalium” we read: “Odia restringi, et favores convenit ampliari” (r. 15); “In obscuris minimum est sequendum” (r. 30); “Contra eum qui legem dicere potuit apertius, est interpretatio facienda” (r. 57); “In poenis benignior est interpretatio facienda” (r. 89). What is true of the Church is equally true of other legislators, because God is not a more exacting Legislator than His Church, nor is the State to be presumed more strict than God and the Church (cf. Tanquerey, “Theologia Moralis fundamentalis”, n. 413).
Æquiprobabilists reply to this argument that when the less safe opinion is certainly less probable than the safe opinion, the former has lost solid probability and consequently cannot, so far as conscience is concerned, obtain the privileges which the Divine Legislator, the Church, and the State concede in the case of really doubtful laws. Moreover, many of these rules of law directly apply to the external forum and ought not, without due limitation, be transferred to the forum of conscience.
(2) Internal arguments
(a) A law which has not been promulgated is not a law in the full and strict sense, and does not impose an obligation. But when there is a solidly probable opinion in favour of liberty, the law has not been sufficiently promulgated, since there has not been the requisite manifestation of the mind of the legislator. Hence when there is a solidly probable opinion in favour of liberty, the law is not a law in the full and strict sense, and does not impose any obligation (cf. Lehmkuhl, “Theologia Moralis”, I, nn. 176-8).
Æquiprobabilists reply that when there is a solidly probable opinion in favour of liberty, the law is probably not sufficiently promulgated, and the question remains whether a law that is probably not sufficiently promulgated imposes any obligation in conscience. It would be begging the question to assume that no obligation is imposed simply because there is a probability that the law has not been sufficiently promulgated. Moreover, if the safe opinion happens to be the true opinion, a material sin is committed by the person who, acting on probability, performs the prohibited action. But, unless the law is promulgated, a material sin cannot be committed by its violation, since promulgation is a necessary condition of a binding law (cf. McDonald, “The Principles of Moral Science”, p. 245).
(b) An obligation, concerning whose existence there is invincible ignorance, is no obligation. But, so long as there is a solidly probable opinion in favour of liberty, there is invincible ignorance about the obligation imposed by the law. Hence a law does not impose an obligation so long as the less safe opinion is solidly probable (cf. Lehmkuhl, “Theologia Moralis”, I, n. 179).
Æquiprobabilists reply that there is not invincible ignorance in regard to a law when the safe opinion is also the more probable opinion, because in these circumstances a person is bound by ordinary prudence to give assent to the safe opinion. Although it is true that an obligation concerning whose existence there is invincible ignorance is no obligation, this is not true when one is compelled to give assent to an opinion as the more probable opinion (cf. Wouters, “De Minusprobabilismo”, p. 121).
(c) According to the axiom: lex dubia non obligat, a doubtful law does not bind. But a law is doubtful when there is a solidly probable opinion against it. Hence it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion in favour of liberty (cf. Tanquerey, “Theologia Fundamentalis”, n. 409).
Æquiprobabilists in reply say that the axiom lex dubia non obligat holds when the law is strictly doubtful, i.e. when the reasons for and against the law are equal or nearly equal. A fortiori the law does not bind when the safe opinion is more probable than the less safe opinion. It would, however, be begging the question to assume that the axiom holds when the less safe opinion is clearly less probable than the safe opinion.
(d) According to Æquiprobabilists, it is lawful to follow the less safe opinion, when it is more probable than the safe opinion. But they must admit that Probabilism is more probable than Æquiprobabilism, since the vast majority of theologians favour the milder view, and Æquiprobabilists do not reject external authority. Hence on their own principles they ought to admit the practical truth of Probabilism.
Æquiprobabilists reply that extrinsic authority is of no avail when the arguments on which the authority rests have been proved to be invalid; and they claim that they have proved the invalidity of the Probabilist arguments. Moreover a reflex principle is useless unless its truth is proved with certainty, since its sole utility is to change speculative uncertainty into practical certainty. But greater probability does not give certainty. Accordingly, even if Æquiprobabilists were to admit the greater probability of Probabilism, that admission would be useless for Probabilists. The case is different with Æquiprobabilism which has practical certainty, since nearly all theologians nowadays admit the lawfulness of following the less safe opinion regarding the existence of a law, when it is equally or almost equally probable with the safe opinion.
(e) Many Probabilists lay stress on a practical argument in favour of their opinion, which is derived from the difficulty of distinguishing between various grades of Probability. It is impossible in practice, especially for ordinary people, to tell when one solidly probable opinion is more probable than another solidly probable opinion. But a moral system, to be of any serious utility, must be universal, so that not merely experts in moral science but also ordinary people can utilize it. Hence the systems which demand a knowledge of the various degrees of probability must be discarded as practically useless, and Probabilism alone must be accepted as a working system.
Æquiprobabilists reply that their system merely asks, that if after due investigation it is found that the less safe opinion is notably and certainly less probable than the safe opinion, the law must be observed. The necessary investigation has frequently been already made by experts, and others, who are not experts, are safe in accepting the conclusions to which the experts adhere.
C. Arguments against Probabilism
In addition to some arguments to be explained in connection with the other modern moral systems, it is necessary to mention a few difficulties which have been urged directly against Probabilism.
(1) When the less safe opinion is notably and certainly less probable than the safe opinion, there is no true probability in favour of liberty, since the stronger destroy the force of the weaker reasons. Hence Probabilists cannot consistently maintain that it is safe in practice to act on the less safe opinion which is also the less probable.
Probabilists reply that the greater probability does not of necessity destroy the solid probability of the less probable opinion. When the foundations of the opposing probabilities are not derived from the same source, then at least the opposing arguments do not detract from one another; and even when the two probabilities are based on a consideration of the same argument, one opinion will retain probability in so far as the opposing opinion recedes from certainty.
(2) A moral system, to be of any use, must be certain, since an uncertain reflex principle cannot give practical certainty. But Probabilism is not certain, because it is rejected by all those theologians who upheld one or another of the opposing views. Hence Probabilism cannot be accepted as a satisfactory solution of the question at issue.
Probabilists reply that their system can be of no use to those who do not look on it as certainly true; but the fact that many theologians do not accept it does not prevent its adherents from regarding it as certain, since these can and do believe that the arguments urged in its favour are insuperable.
(3) Probabilism is an easy road to Laxism, because people are often inclined to regard opinions as really probable which are based on flimsy arguments, and because it is not difficult to find five or six serious authors who approve of opinions which right-minded men consider lax. The only sure way to safeguard Catholic morals is to reject the opinion which opens the way to Laxism.
Probabilists reply that their system must be prudently employed, and that no serious danger of Laxism arises if it is recognized that an opinion is not solidly probable unless there are arguments in its favour which are sufficient to gain the assent of many prudent men. As for the authority of approved authors, it must be remembered that five or six grave authors do not give solid probability to an opinion unless they are notable for learning and prudence, and independently adhere to an opinion which has not been set aside by authoritative decisions or by unanswered arguments.
IV. MORAL SYSTEMS OPPOSED TO PROBABILISM
A. Æquiprobabilism
This system can be expressed in the three following propositions: The opinions for and against the existence of a law having equal or nearly equal probabilities, it is permissible to act on the less safe opinion. The opinions for and against the cessation of a law having equal or nearly equal probabilities, it is not permissible to act on the less safe opinion. The safe opinion being certainly more probable than the less safe opinion, it is unlawful to follow the less safe opinion. With the first of these propositions Probabilists agree — but they deny the truth of the second and third propositions (cf. Marc, “Institutiones Morales”, I, nn. 91-103).
Arguments for Æquiprobabilism: (1) In proof of their first proposition Æquiprobabilists quote the axiom: lex dubia non obligat. When the opposing probabilities are equal or nearly equal, the law is doubtful in the strict sense, and a doubtful law imposes no obligation in conscience. They also apply the rule: in dubio melior est conditio possidentis. When the doubt regards the existence, as distinguished from the cessation of a law, liberty is in possession and accordingly the opinion which favours liberty can be followed in practice.
(2) In proof of their second proposition, Æquiprobabilists quote the same axiom: in dubio melior est conditio possidentis. When the doubt concerns the cessation of a law, the law is in possession, and therefore the law must be observed until it is displaced by a stronger probability in favour of liberty.
Probabilists reply to this argument that liberty is always in possession, since law and obligation presuppose liberty in the subject.
(3) In proof of their third proposition Æquiprobabilists put forward various arguments, of which the following are the most forcible:
(a) A person is bound seriously to endeavour to bring his actions into harmony with objective morality. But a person who follows the less probable opinion in favour of liberty fails to observe this dictate of prudence, and consequently acts unlawfully (cf. Wouters “De Minusprobabilismo”, p. 71).
Probabilists reply that this argument, if carried to its logical conclusion, would end in Rigorism, because the only way efficiently to bring our actions into perfect harmony with objective morality is to follow the safe opinion, so long as the less safe opinion has not acquired moral certainty. This is the only way of preventing all serious danger of committing material sin, and consequently is the only way of observing perfect harmony with objective morality. Since, however, Rigorism is universally condemned, the argument must be rejected, and the principles of Probabilism must be adopted which hold that it is sufficient to observe harmony with objective morality in so far as this is known with moral certainty (cf. Lehmkuhl, “Theologia Moralis”, I, n. 191).
(b) On 26 June, 1680 the Holy Office, under the presidency of Innocent XI, issued, in connection with the teaching of Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., a Decree of which the authentic text was published 19 April 1902, by the Secretary of the Holy Office. So much controversy has recently arisen in regard to the value of decree, that it is opportune to quote the whole text: A report having been made by Father Laurea of the contents of a letter directed by Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., to Our Most Holy Lord; the Most Eminent Lords said that the Secretary of State must write to the Apostolic Nuncio of the Spains [directing him] to signify to the said Father Thyrsus that His Holiness, having received his letter favourably, and having read it with approval, has commanded that he [Thyrsus] shall freely and fearlessly preach, teach, and defend with his pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that in a conflict of a less probable opinion with a more probable, known and estimated as such, it is allowed to follow the less probable; and to inform him that whatever he does and writes on behalf of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness.
Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus, as by order [de ordine] of His Holiness, not only to permit the Fathers of the Society to write in favour of the more probable opinion and to attack the opinion of those who assert that in a conflict of a less probable opinion with a more probable, known and estimated as such, it is allowed to follow the less probable- but also to write to all the Universities of the Society [informing them] that it is the mind of His Holiness that whosoever chooses may freely write in favour of the more probable opinion, and may attack the aforesaid contrary [opinion]; and to order them to submit entirely to the command of His Holiness. Æquiprobabilists say that in this Decree there is a clear expression of the mind of Innocent XI about the morality of teaching that it is permissible to act on the less safe opinion when the safe opinion is certainly more probable. The pope disapproves of this teaching, commends Father Gonzalez for his opposition to It, and orders the General of the Jesuits to allow full liberty so that anyone who pleases may write against it.
Probabilists reply that, though Innocent XI was opposed to Probabilism, his official Decree merely commanded that liberty of teaching be allowed to the members of the order. Moreover, they point out that Gonzalez was not an Æquiprobabilist, but a Probabiliorist of a strict type whom St. Alphonsus regarded as an extremist.
B. Probabiliorism
According to the teaching of Probabiliorists, it is unlawful to act on the less safe opinion unless it is also the more probable opinion. In addition to an argument derived from the Decree of Innocent XI, the principal arguments for Probabiliorism are the following:
(1) It is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion, unless it is truly and expeditely probable. But an opinion which is opposed by a more probable opinion is not truly and expeditely probable, since its arguments are annulled by more potent opposing arguments and cannot in consequence gain the assent of a prudent man. Hence it is not lawful for a person to follow the less safe opinion when he regards the safe opinion as more probable.
As has already been explained in connection with Probabilism, Probabilists maintain that the less safe opinion does not necessarily lose its solid probability because of more probable opposing arguments. This being so, the law is not certain, and consequently does not impose an obligation in regard to action, even though in regard to speculative assent it is rightly looked on as more probable.
(2) As in speculative doubt we are bound to give assent to the new which is more likely to exclude error, so in practical doubt about lawfulness we are bound to adopt the opinion which is more likely to exclude the danger of material sin. But the more probable opinion is the more likely to exclude this danger. (Consequently in practical doubt we are bound to adopt the Probabiliorist view. Probabilists reply that this argument leads to Tutiorism rather than to Probabiliorism, because the only efficacious way of excluding reasonable danger of material sin is to act on the safe opinion so long as the less safe opinion is not morally certain. Moreover, Probabiliorism would impose an intolerable burden on the consciences of timorous minds, since it would demand an investigation into the various degrees of probability, 80 as to enable a person definitely to say that one opinion is more probable than another. In view of the great diversity of opinion, which exists on many moral subjects, this definite judgment is practically impossible, especially in the case of the vast majority of men who are not experts in moral science.
C. Compensationism
This maintains that a doubtful law is not devoid of all binding force, and that there must be a compensating reason, proportionate to the probability and gravity of the law, to justify the performance of the action which is probably forbidden. This teaching is based on an analogy with an act which has two effects, one good and the other bad. It is not lawful to perform such an act unless there is a justifying cause proportionate to the evil. In the case of a doubtful law the bad effect is the danger of material sin, and the good effect is the benefit, which arises from the performance of the action which is probably forbidden. Hence in this as in the former case, a compensating cause, proportionate to the probable evil, is required to justify the performance of the action.
Probabilists reply that this moral system leads to Tutiorism, because it implies that if no compensating benefit exists, it is not lawful to perform an action so long as it certainly is not forbidden. Again, Probabilists say that the preservation of liberty is of itself a sufficient compensating reason when there is question of a law which is not certain. Finally, Probabilists are prepared to admit that, as a point of expediency though not of obligation, it is advisable to look for a compensating cause over and above the preservation of liberty when a confessor is directing penitents in the use of probable opinions. If no such compensating reason exists, the penitent can be advised, though not under pain of sin, to abstain from the performance of the action which is probably forbidden.
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J.M. HARTY Transcribed by Gerard Haffner
The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XIICopyright © 1911 by Robert Appleton CompanyOnline Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. KnightNihil Obstat, June 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., CensorImprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York
Fuente: Catholic Encyclopedia
Probabilism
The Roman Catholic Church recognises no standard of ethics except that of her own construction. Protestants look to the Bible as the source of all doctrines of morality. The Church of Rome accords autlority also to tradition, and to the writers of her own communion who have kept within the list of the faithful ones. SEE MORAL THEOLOGY. The expressed opinion of a Church doctor forms a sufficient basis for a legitimate moral decision. The eternal and objective foundations of the moral law are thus exchanged for the subjective view of individual persons of eminence (see Wuttke, Christian Ethics, 1, 261-263). Not only is the deciding element the individual, instead of the Church, but that individual whose decision best suits the inquirer (see Sanchez, Op. Mor. i, 9, n. 12 sq., n. 24; Laymann, Theol. Mor. [1625] i, 11). Probabilism is a term used in philosophic parlance, as we may SEE IN THE ARTICLE PROBABLE, but in Christian theology it has become synonymous with Roman Catholic ethics. Though its principal source and advocacy are in the Order of the Jesuits, the whole Church of Rome has by its tacit acceptance of this doctrine become identified with it.
Definition. Probabilism designates, in the domain of morals, an object so comprehensive, and including so many different branches, that we shall scarcely be able to delineate it here, even in its fundamental features. In order to define it we must depart from that moral idea which is the centre of the domain in which it moves: this centre is the certitude and firm conviction of the moral subject about the legitimacy of his acts. It is the opposite of this subjective consciousness which forms the object of all probabilistic questions. As the ground of the doctrine, it is assumed, then, that in human actions absolute certainty is not always attainable as to their lawfulness or unlawfulness. Short of this certainty, the intellect passes through the stages of doubt and of probability. Probability is a state of consciousness intermediate between certitude and incertitude, but approaching more or less to certitude, without reaching it entirely. Consciousness, in the state of probability, has risen above incertitude. Doubt is a wavering state between two judgments, between negation and affirmation of the goodness or permissibility of an action; it excludes every positive approbation, every positive consent, every permanent decision in favor of either term of the moral antithesis. Probability has passed this uncertain wavering; it does not move hesitatingly to and fro; it has found a point of support, though the latter may not be absolutely trustworthy. In consequence, a more or less positive decision in favor of one or the other term of the question is possible. Such a decision must not originate in any subjective whim; it must be founded on sufficient objective reasons. This gives us the true idea of the probable conscience: Probabile est id quod probari potest, hoc est, quod rationibus nititur. We may, then, define probability in matters of conscience thus: it is the decision or consent of conscience in regard to the moral permissibility of an action, a decision founded on sufficient reasons, but not excluding all misgivings to the contrary. To the probaeble conscience, then, corresponds, as its foundation, the probable opinion (opinio probubilis). An opinion as to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of an action is the more probable the stronger the reasons on which it rests. These reasons are either intrinsic, a part of the thing itself and its objective nature, or extrinsic, owing their weight to human authorities. The extrinsic probability of an opinion contents itself with the repute and confidence enjoyed by the authorities which support it, while the intrinsic probability endeavors to conceive the rational foundation of the opinion in question. But whichever of these forms probability may assume, it can never be at variance with the decisions and doctrines of the Church. Absence of intrinsic and extrinsic contradictions is the negative condition of probability. To establish true and real probability (probabilitas vera), a positive element is required, to wit, a more or less evident accord with the objective law, either with its spirit or with its more or less clearly expressed dispositions. It results from the nature of opinion that a variety and diversity of opinions be conceived, which, in regard to their legitimacy, are of equal or unequal value. Moreover, in the conflict of views another element will arise as to their comparative safety; that is, the greater or less danger of moral culpability which they involve; and this greater or less moral safety of a view may or may not coincide with its greater or less probability. Hence the gradual scale of probable opinions, the highest degree being the opinio probabilissima, but the opinio tenuiter probabilis being entirely excluded. The ascending degrees of the concurrent probable opinions are marked by the opinio mere probabilis, ceque probabilis, and probabilior.
The doctrine of probabilism is founded upon these distinctions. It is taught, with some variations, by four different schools, all of which agree in professing that it is lawfiul. in certain cases, to act upon opinions which are merely probable. These four schools of probabilism are called: Probabilism Simple, Equiprobabilism, Probabiliorism (from probabilior, more probable), and Tutiorism (from tutior, more safe). The first holds that it is lawful to act upon any probable opinion, no matter how slight its probability. The second requires that the opinion shall be solidly probable, but holds that, provided it be really probable, it is lawful to act upon it, even though the conflicting opinion should be equally probable. The third narrows much more the limits of what is allowed in the conflict of probable opinions, and only permits action on the more probable of the two; but permits this even when the less probable adverse opinion is the more safe. The fourth requires that in all cases the more safe opinion shall be followed, even when the less safe opinion is much the more probable. The extreme rigorism which the last class requires has caused its division into absolute and mollified tutiorism. By the certainty of an opinion, says Fuchs, we are to understand the more or less considerable remoteness of the danger of sin, or of error, or of encroachment on other persons’ rights. The more an opinion removes him who chooses it for his guide from the danger of actual sin, the more certain it is. The opinio tutior is that which declares that an action is not allowed; the opinio minus tuta is that which asserts the legitimacy of the action in question. As the being allowed and the not being allowed of an action stand together in the same relation as liberty and law, it may be said that in the first case liberty, in the second law, is favored (libertati favet, legi favet).
To these probabilistic systems is opposed a system espoused by the more consistent of Romish theologians of the Old Catholic type. It is called Antiprobabilism, and in its austere severity does not allow any influence on man’s actions, even to the most probable opinion. It reouires that an opinion shall be absolutely morally certain, in order that it may be lawful for a man to act upon it in the light of Christian truth. But this system has been rejected by papal authority, declaring erroneous the assertion Non licet sequi opinionem vel inter probabiles probabilissimam. History of Probabilism. It is commonly said that the system of probabilism is modern; but this is only true of the discussions regarding it, for the doctrine itself, in some of its forms, is as old as the study of ethics, even considered as a moral science. The disputes regarding it arose with the science of casuistry, when men, in the 16th and 17th centuries, began to reduce morals to a system. It formed a leading subject of the controversy between the Jesuits and the Jansenists; but even in its modern form probabilism dates back to the close of the scholastic period. At the Council of Constance, in A.D. 1415, a debate had arisen on the subject of the murder of the duke of Orleans, assassinated in Paris Nov. 23, 1407, at the instigation of his political rival, the duke of Burgundy. The Franciscan Jean Petit had endeavored to justify this crime in an assembly of French noblemen held at Paris March 8, 1408; but his proposition had been condemned, at the request of chancellor Gerson, by the university and the bishop of Paris. When the matter was brought before the council, Martin Porree, bishop of Arras, speaking in behalf of the duke of Burgundy, tried to prevent any conclusions unfavorable to Jean Petit, asserting that several authorities were in favor of Petit, and that, in consequence, his opinion was at least probable, and ought not to be peremptorily disposed of by way of rejection and condemnation. Gerson defended a contrary view of the matter, and the council condemned as heretical the doctrine of the legitimacy of murder committed on the persons of tyrants, and stamped with the name of heretic all those who should pertinaciously maintain it (comp. Mansi, Coll. Conc. 27:705, and 28:868). This resolution left probabilism untouched, and condemned only a false application of its principles in a particular case.
The Dominican Bartolomeo de Medina is considered as the founder of probabilism in its usual signification. Through his commentary on the theological Summa of St. Thomas de Aquinas it entered the schools: Si est opinio probabilis, he says (quaest. 19, art. 6, concl. 3), licitum est eam sequi. licet opposita probabilior. Many Thomist theologians adopted this proposition; among them, Bannez, Alvarez, Ledesma, Martinez, and Lopez. Among the Jesuits, the celebrated Vasquez was the first who (1598) positively took sides with the probabilists, and a number of members of his order followed in his footsteps. From this time forth the Jesuits did much for the expansion of the probabilistic doctrines, and the aberrations to which they led. Probabilism came to be synonymous with Jesuitism, so largely were the Jesuits identified with the advocacy of this pernicious dogma. This is, however, easily accounted for. The Jesuits had come on the stage at a time when the Church of Rome was in danger of being broken up, if not of being entirely dismembered. The Reformation had struck her heavy blows, and in some countries she was felled to the ground. Loyola’s order aimed at her recovery and restoration. The bride of Christ they saw endangered, and their mission was the salvation of the Romish Church at any price. In a struggle of life and death, as has been aptly said, one is not very careful in the use of measures; and in all warfare the sentiment holds good, though involving manifold violations of ordinary right, that the end sanctifies the means. The Jesuits were well aware that they were an essentially new phenomenon of the churchly lifethat they stood upon purely human invention and power; it need not surprise us, therefore, that they felt called by their fundamental principles to the development of a special system of morality a system the highest end of which is the glory of God through the exaltation of the visible Church, which, of course, is to them the Romish Church.
The purpose zealously pursued by the Jesuits in the interest of Romish domination of becoming soul-guarding fathers and conscience-counsellors, especially for men and women of eminence, required, on the other hand, that the Jesuits should acquire for themselves the highest possible repute in ethics and hence it was requisite that they should become the literary representatives thereof; and, on the other, that this ethics should be moulded in adaptation to this end should make itself not disagreeable and burdensome, but should become as elastic as possible in view of different wants should be a golden net for catching souls, as the Jesuits themselves were wont to call their own pliableness. The more ramified and complex the network of casuistic ethics became, so much the more indispensable were the practiced conscience-counsellors, or, more properly, conscience-advocates; the more stairways and back doors they were able to turn attention to in conscience affairs, so much the more prized and influential they became. This explains the great compass and the peculiar character of Jesuitic ethics. They were but too well aware that it did not harmonize with the moral consciousness of the ancient Church, and they hesitated not to admit that they did not recognise earlier Church tradition as a criterion for morality, but wished rather to lay the foundations for a new tradition. The sophistical artifices in the doctrine of right and morality were not then first thought out and invented by Jesuitism; but it learned them by listening to weak, corrupt human nature, as others had here and there done before it. Jesuitism, moreover, was the first to set up these sophisms as rules; first brought them into an organized system of doctrine, and formed them as methods of the Christian doctrine of morals; first scientifically constituted, authorized, and sanctioned them as leading principles of Catholic morality; and what is not to be overlooked has first applied them to the allotment of the moral life to the natural weaknesses of the different ranks and classes, in order that the kingdom of heaven henceforth may suffer no violence.
We will not forget, however, that after the Theatines, in a general assembly of their order, in 1598, had formally renounced probabilism, several members of the Society of Jesus likewise raised their voice against the abuses of the system: we mention among them the Portuguese Ferdinand Rebelle and the Italian Comitolus. A short time afterwards the general of the order. Mutius Vileteschi, expressed similar opinions in a series of writings. We read in one of them: Nonnullorum ex societate sententise, in rebus praesertim ad mores spectantibus, plus nimio liberae non modo periculum est ne ipsam evertant, sed ne ecclesise etiam Dei universae insignia afferant detrimenta. Omni itaque studio perficiant tit qui docent scribuntne minime hac regula et norma in delectu sententiarum utantur: Tueri quis potest, probabilis est, auctore non caret. Verum ad eas sententias accedant quse tutiores, quee graviores majorisque nominis doctorum suffragiis sunt frequentatae; quae bonis moribus conducunt magis; quee denique pietatem alere et prodesse queunt, non vastare, non perdere. The Sorboluie, too, opened fire upon the probabilistic aberrations with the condemnation of the Magntos director curatorun, vicariorum, et confessariorum of P. Milhard, and the clergy of France continued the battle with praiseworthy zeal. The University of Louvain made similar declarations. In 1653 the Dominicans, in a general chapter held at Rome, joined their voice to these authorities. Again, some Jesuits, among others Candidus Philalethes (Andre Leblanc), censured those of their order who were advocates of probabilism.
Yet these antagonistic elements within Jesuitism were the exceptions, not the rule. The rank and file of the Society of Jesus were wedded to their new idols; and as the Jesuits were the chief representatives of Romish ethics in the 16th and 17th centuries, those who chose to attack Romanism levelled their guns directly at probabilism; while those who favored Romanism, or were themselves its supporters, but desired the downfall of Jesuitism, directly charged on this particular body of probabilists. Thus, e.g., Jansenism lifted up its voice against probabilism in order to destroy by this detour their enemies the Jesuits. Pascal, the great, if not immortal, advocate of the Port-Royalists, adopted this method. In his Lettres Provinciales he puts together these aberrations of members of the Jesuitic Order; and as he represents the doctrine of probability, it is a curious perversion of the principle of authority the application of it to legitimatize doubt and license. He stigmatized probabilism as the morals of the Jesuits. The great publicity which the Provincial Letters owed to the splendid talent of their author became, especially among the educated classes, an inflexible opinion against Jesuits, which continues to this day. A number of refutations of the Provincial Letters appeared, some of them very awkward. The Jesuit Pirot, in his Apologie pour les Casuistes (Paris, 1657), made the following assertion: If an opinion is probable, it is sure, and can be followed; surety has no degrees, but is indivisible, so far as the moral action connected with a probable opinion is concerned; in consequence, a less probable opinion is as sure as a more probable (Apol. p. 46). Similar opinions were sustained by the Jesuits Matthew de Mova, Honord Lefevre, and Etienne des Champs (Quaestio Facti de Sententia Theologorum Societatis circa Opiniones probabiles, Paris, 1659). The ablest refutation, Riponse aux Lettres provinciales de L. de Montalte; ou Entretiens de Cleandre et Eudoxe, is due to the Jesuit Daniel, the well- known French historian, who gives a very elaborate account of probabilism. He observes that, according to the doctrine of the Jesuits, two conditions are required for the probability of an opinion: first, it can contradict neither the dogmas and truths taught by the Church, nor any evident reason; secondly, it must be founded on sound judgment, and not set up wantonly against the prevailing doctrine of the competent teachers.
Among these tumultuous contests in the domain of Catholic morals, the Apostolic See could not remain silent. The pope condemned the Provincial Letters (Sept. 6. 1657) on one side, and Pirot’s Apology on the other (August, 1659). Pope Alexander VII declared against the dangerous excrescences of probabilism in a decree of Sept. 24, 1665; and his successor, Innocent XI, strictly defined its limits by his bull of 1679. The first-mentioned decree commences with these memorable words: Our most holy father has heard, not without great sorrow, that several opinions, which weaken Christian discipline and prepare destruction to the souls, have been partly revived and partly started for the first time, and that the unbridled license of some extravagant minds increases every day, whereby a way of thinking has crept into the Church which is altogether at variance with Christian simplicity and the doctrine of the holy fathers, and which, should the believers make it the rule of their life, would produce a great moral corruption. Among the moral propositions censured by these two papal decrees, the following concern probabilism: from the first decree, Prop. 27 Si liber sit alicujus junioris et moderni, debet opinio censeri probabilis, dum non constet rejectam esse a Sede apostolica tanquam improbabilem; from the latter, Prop. 1 Non est illicitunm in sacramentis conferendis sequi opinionem probabilem de valore sacramenti, relicta tutiore, nisi id vetet lex, conventio ant periculum gravis damni incurrendi. Hinc seenertia probabili tantum utendnm non est in collatione baptismi, ordinis sacerdotalis aut episcopalis. Prop. 2 Probabiliter existimo judicem posse judicare juxta opinionem etiam minus probabilem. Prop. 3 Generatim, dum probabilitate sive intrinseca sive extrinseca, quantumvis tenui, modo a probabilitatis finibus non exeatur, confisi aliquid agimus, semper prudenter agimus. Prop. 4 Ab infidelitate excusabitur infidelis non credens, ductus opinione minus probabili. The antiprobabilistic extreme, represented by the rigorism of the Jansenists, was met by pope Alexander VIII with the condemnation of the proposition referred to above, a condemnation which is contained in the decree of 1690.
The first consequence of the papal declarations was a sharper separation of the parties. Probabilism found its most redoubtable adversaries in the Carmelite Henry of St. Ignatius, the two Dominicans Daniel Concina (Delia Storia del Probabilismo) and Vincent Patuzzi, and in Franzoja and Pet. Ballerini. But all these efforts did not annihilate probabilism whether inside or outside the Order of the Jesuits. though it had to submit to many restrictions. In their fifth general assembly the Jesuits only protested against making probabilism the doctrine of their order. Oliva, the general of the order (in a letter of Feb. 3, 1669), speaks plainly enough in favor of probabilism; and while he declares certainly and truly probable opinions fit to engender a certain conscience (conscientia certa), he asserts, on the other side, that the requirement sequendi semper in omnibus probabilioremn partem would be too heavy a burden upon mankind. It was shown, however, much more clearly how deeply probabilism was rooted in the Jesuitic Order when the Spaniard Gonzalez, the general of the order, took with great decision, in 1694, the defence of the opposite system. In his work he dissents from the principle that man, in moral matters, must suffer himself to be guided by a sincere love of truth. Hence he draws the inference that we must always choose what we think to be nearest to truth; if objective truth cannot be obtained, we must at least cling to that which, according to our subjective conviction, is nighest to it. For that reason we can follow even the less sure opinion, if we are convinced of its greater probability. The work written from this stand- point, and which the author meant to dedicate to the general of the order, Oliva, found its way into publicity only after many years. Perhaps Gonzalez would not have ventured, even while general of the order, to publish it if the same work which the casuists of the order wished to suppress had not been greatly approved of by pope Innocent XI. Many of the Jesuits claimed that Gonzalez had, by his disapproval of probabilism, made himself unworthy of his place, and pronounced him self-deposed. Only the protection of the pope saved him (see Wolf, Gesch. der Jesuiten, 1, 173). In his Fundamentum Theologioe Moralis (Rome, 1684) Gonzalez put in the background the authority system hitherto so predominant by giving the preference to the ethical province as the more appropriate judgment-seat of the appellate court. Two other theologians followed in his footsteps, Gilbert and Camarillo, representing the probabilioristic tendency. Gilbert, professor at Toulouse, did not in his work attack the principle of probabilism, only its vulgar form. He asserts that we are certain not to sin if we stick to the absolute probability either of law or of liberty; if we judge sensibly that something is allowed, after examining it sufficiently, taking the circumstances into account, and satisfying ourselves of the soundness of our judgment. While Gilbert treated the subject in a more speculative way, Camarillo, professor at Salamanca, in his treatise De Requla Hontestatis Moralis (Naples, 1702), takes a more historical view of the matter, and shows that modern probabilism has not the testimony of antiquity in its favor, and that since its first appearance the most considerable authorities were against it.
While the probabilists continued in their attempts to again turn the scales we shall only mention the Tractatus Probabilitatis by Gabriel Gualdus (under the assumed name of Nicolaus Peginletus, Louvain, 1708) and the Criticisms of Cardenas (Opp. Carden. Ven. 1710) and while the party of the probabiliorists grew in strength every day, mediating tendencies appeared. Ammon the works written in this spirit, the Sententia Medio of Alfonzo de Liguori is the best. This distinguished Romanist developed a system of morals which may be described as a kind of practical probabiliorism, in which, by the use of what are called reflex principles, an opinion which objectively is but probable is made subjectively the basis of a certain and safe practical judgment. Liguori teaches that we are bound to keep our actions, as much as possible, in accordance with truth; or at least, as in the case of a more probable opinion, as near to truth as possible. If it should appear that of two opinions one is more favorable to liberty, the other to law, the latter being at the same time more probable, it must be admitted without hesitation. Liguori, in the case where equally strong reasons speak for law and liberty, professes a somewhat different opinion from Gilbert and the rigid probabiliorists he decides for liberty. Liguori starts in his demonstration from the proposition that a doubtful law is not binding (lex dubia non obligat). A dubious law, he further says, is an uncertain law, and a law of this description cannot engender any obligation (lex incerta non potest certam inducere obligationem); for in this case of doubt, of uncertainty, liberty is in possession, and in consequence has the right on its side, according to the axiom In dubio melior est conditio possidentis. This is the strongest point of Liguori’s argumentation, but also the point with which it stands and falls; here it has to fight a decisive battle against probabiliorism, or against refined tutiorism. Rassler, in his Norma Recti (Ingold. 1713), takes a similar stand-point between the contending parties, while Charles Emanuel Pallavicini, in his letters on the administration of the sacrament of penitence, claims for the confessors the right to choose between probabilism or probabiliorism, both with proper restrictions.
The maxims of the Jesuits disseminated themselves, like an infectious disease, far beyond the circle of their own order, as is shown by the comprehensive works of the Sicilian Antony Diana (Resolutiones Morales, Antv. 1629-37, 4 vols. fol.; Lugd. 1667; Venet. 1728), who taught, under the express approval of his ecclesiastical superiors, and also of the Jesuits, the doctrine of probabilism in its worst forms. One may act according to a probable opinion, and disregard the more probable one; man is not under obligation to follow the more perfect and the more certain, but it suffices to follow the simply certain and perfect; it would be an unendurable burden were one required to hunt out the more probable opinions (Res. Mo. [Antv. 1637] vol. ii, tract. 13; vol. 4, tract. 3; Summanz [1652], p. 214). The most of the Jesuits taught the same thing. In relation to murder, Diana teaches like Escobar: I am at liberty to kill even him who assails my honor if my honor cannot otherwise be rescued (Res. Mor. 3, 5, 90; Summa, p. 210, 212). When some one has resolved upon a great sin, then one is at liberty to recommend to him a lesser one, because such advice does not relate absolutely to an evil, but to a good, namely, the avoiding of the worse; for example, if I cannot otherwise dissuade a person from an intended adultery than by recommending to him fornication instead thereof, then it is allowable to recommend this to him; not, however, in so far as it is a sin, but in so far as it prevents the sin of adultery. Diana appeals in this connection to many like-judging Jesuit doctors (Res. Mol. [Antv. 1637] vol. 3, tract. 5, 37). If a priest commissions Peter to kill Caius, who is weaker than Peter, but nevertheless Peter comes out second best and gets killed himself, still the priest incurs no guilt, and may continue in the administration of his office (ibid. vol. 3, tract. 15,17). He who resolves upon committing all possible venial sins does not thereby involve himself in any mortal sin (ibid. vol. 3, tract. 6, 24).
He who, ex aliqua justa cause, rents a house to another for purposes of prostitution commits no sin (ibid. vol. 3, tract. 6, 45). To eat human flesh, in case of necessity, he holds, with the majority of the Jesuits, as allowable (ibid. tract. 6, 48). He who, in virtue of a promise of marriage, induces a maiden to yield to him is not bound by his promise in case he is of higher rank or richer than she, or in case he can persuade himself that she will not take his promise in serious earnest (ibid. [Antv.] vol. 3, tract. 6, 81; in the spirit of Sanchez and Less). Marriage between brother and sister can be made legitimate by papal dispensation (ibid. vol. 4, tract. 4, 94; sanctioned by several Jesuits). In such moral perversity of view Diana seems only to have been surpassed by the Spanish Netherlander Cistercian Lobkowitz (Theol. Mor. 1645, 1652; comp. Perrault, i, 331 sq.), who, in his scepticism, entirely breaks down the moral consciousness, and declares that nothing is evil per se, but only because it is positively forbidden; hence God can dispense even with all the commandments (comp. the views of Duns Scotus, p. 34) (ibid. 1626); can e.g., allow whoredom and other like sins, for none of these are evils per se. Monks and priests are at liberty to kill the female misused by them when they fear, on her account, for their honor. This writer declares himself expressly and decidedly in favor of the views of the Jesuits. Also the Franciscan Order became infected with the maxims of the Jesuits, as is proved by the very voluminous work of Barthol. Mastrius de Mandula (ibid. 1626), which was published under the express sanction of the officers of the order, and who justifies restrictiones mentales even in oaths (Disp. 11:52, 171, 172, 183, ed. Ven. 1723), and also the murder of tyrants (ibid. 8:27), the murder of the slanderers by an important person, castration, and similar things (ibid. 8:25, 28; 11:110 sq.), as well as probabilism. The moral system of the Jesuits is, we grant, not, strictly speaking, that of the Romish Church; many of their more extreme maxims the Church has condemned, and the more recent Jesuits themselves find it advisable no longer fully to avow their former principles. Nevertheless Jesuitism, together with its system of morals, is, as has been well said by Wuttke (1, 271, 272), the ultimate consequential goal of the Church in its turning aside from the Gospel, just as (though in other respects widely different therefrom) Talmudism was the necessary goal of Judaism in its rejection of the Saviour. The error consists in the placing of human discretion and authority in the stead of the unconditionally valid, revealed will of God. Even as earlier Catholicism had intensified the divine command by self- invented, ascetic work-holiness into a seemingly greater severity-had aimed at a higher moral perfection than that required by God so Jesuitism, with like presumption, lowered the moral law, out of consideration to temporal relations, to a merest minimum requirement; contented itself with a much lower moral perfection than the divine law calls for, and sought out cunning means for lightening even this minimum.
Probabilism, moreover, is not a merely fortuitously discovered expedient, but it is in fact an almost inevitable consequence of the historical essence of Jesuitism. The order itself arose neither on the basis of Scripture nor of ancient Church tradition, but sprang absolutely from the daring inventive power of a single man breaking through the limits of ecclesiastical actuality. It is not therefore at all unnatural that it should make the authority of a single spiritually pre-eminent man its highest determining power, and subordinate to this the historical objective form of the moral consciousness. This, then, is the distinguishing characteristic of Jesuitical ethics-that in the place of the eternal objective ground( and criterion of the moral it substitutes subjective opinion, and in the place of an unconditional eternal end a merely conditionally valid one, viz. the defending of the actual, visible Church against all forms of opposition that in the place of the moral conscience it substitutes the human calculating of circumstantial and fortuitous adaptation to the promotion of this its highest end; that it attempts to realize what is per se and absolutely valid by a wide-reaching isolating of the means, and by so doing subordinates morality to the discretion of the single subject. Though the ethics of the Jesuits are lax and quite too indulgent towards worldly, sinful proclivities and fashions, yet this is only one phase of the matter. A merely worldly-lax moral system, in the usual sense, seems but little applicable to the members of a brotherhood the first rule of which is a perfect renunciation of personal will and personal opinion and self-determination, in a word, unconditional obedience to every command of superiors. and which has actually accomplished in the missionary field the grandest of deeds, and numbers among its members multitudes of heroic martyrs. This lack of strictness in one direction rests by no means on mere worldliness, on pleasure in the delights of this life, but follows, on the one hand, of necessity (as well as does also the rigor of obedience), from the subjectively arbitrary presupposition of the entire order, from the lack of an objective, unshaken foundation, and rests, on the other hand, strictly on calculation; is itself a cunningly devised means to the end; is intended to awaken, especially in the great and mighty of the earth (and the masses of the people are such under some circumstances), a love to the Church, to the mild, friendly, indulgent mother.
Jesuitical ethics is the opposite pole of monastic ethics; where the latter requires too much, the former exacts too little. Monastic morality strives to win God for the sinful world, Jesuitical morality seeks to win the sinful world, not indeed for God, but at least for the Church. Monasticism says to God, though not in an evangelical sense, If I have only thee, then I ask for nothing else in heaven or earth. Jesuitism says about the same thing, but says it to the world, and particularly to the distinguished and powerful. The former turns away in indignant contempt from the worldly life because the world is immersed in sin; the latter generously receives the same into itself, and turns attention away from guilt by denying it. It is true the Jesuits represent also a monastic order, but this order is also a means to an end, and resembles the other nobler orders about as much as wily Reynard resembles the pious pilgrim; and the well-known hostility of the older orders to this brilliantly rising new one was not mere jealousy, but a very natural, and, for the most part, moral protest against the spirit of the same. See Wuttke, Christian Ethics (transl. by Prof. J. P. Lacroix, N. Y. 1874, 2 vols. 12mo), i, 255-272; Staudlin, Gesch. der Sittenlehre Jesu (Gdtting. 1799), i, 441; Schrockh, Kirchengesch. 9:343 sq.; Cotta, De Prob. Morali (Jena, 1728); Rachel, Examen Prob. Jes. (Helmst. 1664, 4to); De Wette, Christl. Sittenlehre, II, ii, 334 sq.; Perrault, Morale des Jesuites (1667, 3 vols.); Ellendorf, Die Moral u. Politik der Jesuiten (1840); Pragmatische Gesch. der Minchsorden (1770), vols. 9 and 10; Deutsches Kirchenblatt, 1875 (review of Gury’s Compendium Theologioe Moralis, new ed. Ratisbon, 1874; one of the worst probabilistic advocates); Mosheim, Eccles. Hist. 4:230; v, 190; Christian Remembrancer, July, 1852, p. 191 sq.; Amer. Quar, Rev. 11:473; Edinb. Rev. 23:320; 92, art. i.
Fuente: Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature
Probabilism
The doctrine of the ancient Skeptics that certainty is unattainable, and that probability is the only guide to belief and action, especially characteristic of the New Academy. See Petrce. — G.R.M.