Ratio
Ratio
According to St. Augustine, reason is the mind’s capacity of distinguishing and connecting the things that are learned. Ratio est mentis motio ea quae discuntur distinguendi et connectendi potens. He also calls it an aspectus animi, quo per seipsum, non per corpus verum intuetur. It precedes the exercise of the intellectual capacity. He says of manNam ideo vult intelligere, quia ratio praecedit. Reason is, however, inferior to the intellect. Man possesses reason before he begins the activity of intellection, which is a contemplation. Action is rather the province of reason. — J.J.R.
For SpinozaKnowledge “of the second kind” (Ethica, II, 40, Schol. 2, cf. also De Em. Int., passim), to be distinguished from opinio or imaginatio and from scientia intuitiva (q.v.). This second type of knowledge is knowledge in the strict sense of the word since, as opposed to opinio, it is certain and true (Ethica, II, 41), and since by means of it, we perceive “under a certain form of eternity” (sub quadam aeternitatis specie, Ibid, II, 42, Cor. 2). Likewise, by means of reason (ratio), we are enabled to distinguish truth from falsity (Ibid, 42), and to master the emotions (Ibid, IV, passim). The objects cognized by reason are (primarily) “common notions” and their derivatives, reason cannot, however, accomplish or bring about the highest virtue of the mind, as can scientia intuitiva by which blessedness and true liberty are conferred (Ibid, V, 36, Schol.). — W.S.W.