Right
Right
Three terms translated right in the English Versions call for notice.
1. (straight) expresses pictorially the simplest notion, which also underlies the Eng. term right, being especially used in connexion with way or path (Act 13:10, 2Pe 2:15). A transitional use, carrying an ethical sense, occurs in Act 8:21 : thy heart is not right ().
2. comes into use when the notion of right emerges on the ethical plane. Whatever accords with established custom (), with a recognized norm, is . That norm is found in the common ethical judgment of men; but the NT accentuates the norm as fixed by God (Act 4:19). And ultimately the only true in the sight of men, is , in the sight of God. That is the element of truth in vox populi vox Dei. In every conceivable position and relation in which a man finds himself there is a course of action or a state of being for him which is as it should be: the one straight line of conduct amongst many more or less crooked. This is , what it is right for a man to do or be.
3. (a right).-The idea of a right easily grows out of the foregoing. It is the power or liberty to be, do, or possess what it is for a man in such and such circumstances to be, do, or possess (cf. 1Co 9:12, Heb 13:10, Rev 22:14). (Regarding as = authority to rule, note that all such authority, to be worth anything, must rest on as its basis.)
Discussions as to the rights of Christians as such soon emerged in the primitive Church. In the NT see especially St. Pauls illuminating treatment in 1 Corinthians 8-10. The widest, boldest claim is made as regards these rights ( ), only to be qualified immediately by a severe reference to the bearing of their exercise on others. Higher ethical judgments, too, many under certain circumstances demand the waiving of undoubted rights. See e.g., how St. Paul deals with the question of marriage, and especially with that of ministerial stipends (1 Corinthians 9).
J. S. Clemens.
Fuente: Dictionary of the Apostolic Church
right
As a substantive (a right), designates a moral or legal claim to a thing or action; also the thing claimed. The claim is founded in law, natural or positive, and established by some title, or fact, in virtue of which the relationship of “mine, thine, his, etc.,” is induced between a given person and a given thing (action). Such a relationship legitimately established has a twofold effect: it validates in the person concerned a definite, morally inviolable claim to the thing; and a corresponding moral obligation in all other persons to leave the claim inviolate. Rights are preceptive to the extent that they induce obligation in others; dominative to the extent that they give power to the claimant. This power may be jurisdictional: power to command others for the common welfare; or proprietary: power to use or exact some thing (action) for one’s own use.
Fuente: New Catholic Dictionary
Right
Right, as a substantive (my right, his right), designates the object of justice. When a person declares he has a right to a thing, he means he has a kind of dominion over such thing, which others are obliged to recognize. Right may therefore be defined as a moral or legal authority to possess, claim, and use a thing as one’s own. It is thus essentially distinct from obligation; in virtue of an obligation we should, in virtue of a right, we may do or omit something. Again, right is a moral or legal authority, and, as such, is distinct from merely physical superiority or pre-eminence; the thief who steals something without being detected enjoys the physical control of the object, but no right to it; on the contrary, his act is an mjustice:, a violation of right, and he is bound to return the stolen object to its owner. Right is called a moral or legal authority, because it emanates from a law which assigns to one the dominion over the thing and imposes on others the obligation to respect this dominion. To the right of one person corresponds an obligation on the part of others, so that right and obligation condition each other. If I have the right to demand one hundred dollars from a person, he is under the obligation to give them to me; without this obligation, right would be illusory. One may even say that the right of one person consists in the fact that, on his account, others are bound to perform or omit something.
The clause, “to possess, claim, and use, anything as one’s own”, defines more closely the object of right. Justice assigns to each person his own (suum cuique). When anyone asserts that a thing is his own, is his private property, or belongs to him, he means that this object stands in a special relation to him, that it is in the first place destined for his use, and that he can dispose of it according to his will, regardless of others. By a thing is here meant not merely a material object, but everything that can be useful to man, including actions, omissions, etc. The connexion of a certain thing with a certain person, in virtue of which the person may declare the thing his own, can originate only on the basis of concrete facts. It is an evident demand of human reason in general that one may give or leave one’s own to anyone; but what constitutes one’s own is determined by facts. Many things are physically connected with the human per-son by conception or birth–his limbs, bodily and mental qualities, health, etc. From the order imposed by the Creator of Nature, we recognize that, from the first moment of his being, his faculties and members are granted a person primarily for his own use, and so that they may enable him to support himself and develop and fulfil the tasks appointed by the Creator for this life. These things (i.e., his qualities, etc.) are his own from the first moment of his existence, and whoever injures them or deprives him of them violates his right. However, many other things are connected with the human person, not physically, but only morally. In other words, in virtue of a certain fact, everyone recognizes that certain things are specially destined for thc use of one person, and must be recognized as such by all. Persons who build a house for themselves, make an implement, catch game in the unreserved forest, or fish in the open sea, become the owners of these things in virtue of occupation of their labour; they can claim these things as their own, and no one can forcibly appropriate or injure these things without a violation of their rights. Whoever has lawfully purchased a thing, or been presented with it by another, may regard such thing as his own, since by the purchase or presentation he succeeds to the place of the other person and possesses his rights. As a right gives rise to a certain connection between person and person with respect to a thing, we may distinguish in right four elements: the holder, the object, the title, and the terminus of the right. The holder of the right is the person who possesses the right, the terminus is the person who has the obligation corresponding to the right, the object is the thing to which the right refers, and the title is the fact on the ground of which a person may regard and claim the thing as his own. Strictly speaking, this fact alone is not the title of thc right, which originates, indeed, in the fact, but taken in connection with thc: principle that one must assign to each his own property; however, since this principle may be presupposed as self-evident, it is customary to regard the simple fact as the title of the right.
The right of which we have hitherto been speaking is individual right, to which the obligation of commutative justice corresponds. Commutative justice regulates the relations of the members of human society to one another, and aims at securing that each member renders to his fellow-members what is equally theirs. In addition to this commutative justice, there is also a legal and distributive justice; these virtues regulate the relations between the complete societies (State and Church) and their members. From the propensities and needs of human nature we recognize the State as resting on a Divine ordinance; only in the State can man support himself and develop according to his nature. But, if the Divine Creator of Nature has willed the existence of the State, He must also will the means necessary for its maintenance and the attainment of its objects. This will can be found only in the right of the State to demand from its members what is necessary for the general good. It must be authorized to make laws, to punish violations of such, and in general to arrange everything for the public welfare, while, on their side, the members must be under the obligation corresponding to this right. The virtue which makes all members of society contribute what is necessary for its maintenance is called legal justice, because the law has to determine in individual cases what burdens are to be borne by the members. According to Catholic teaching, the Church is, like the State, a complete and independent society, wherefore it also must be justified in demanding from its members whatever is necessary for its welfare and the attainment of its object. But the members of the State have not only obligations towards the general body; they have likewise rights. The State is bound to distribute public burdens (e.g. taxation) according to the powers and capability of the members, and is also under the obligation of distributing public goods (offices and honours) according to the degree of worthiness and services. To these duties of the general body or its leaders corresponds a right of the members; they can demand that the leaders observe the claims of distributive justice, and failure to do this on the part of the authorities is a violation of the right of the members.
On the basis of the above notions of right, its object can be more exactly determined. Three species of right and justice have been distinguished. The object of the right, corresponding to even-handed justice, has as its object the securing for the members of human society in their intercourse with one another freedom and independence in the use of their own possessions. For the object of right can only be the good for the attainment of which we recognize right as necessary, and which it effects of its very nature, and this good is the freedom and independence of every member of society in the use of his own. If man is to fulfil freely the tasks imposed upon him by God, he must possess the means necessary for this purpose, and be at liberty to utilize such independently of others. He must have a sphere of free activity, in which he is secure from the interference of others; this object is attained by the right which protects each in the free use of his own from the encroachments of others. Hence the proverbs: “A willing person suffers no injustice” and “No one is compelled to make use of his rights”. For the object of the right which corresponds to commutative justice is the liberty of the possessor of the right in the use of his own, and this right is not attained if each is bound always to make use of and insist upon his rights. The object of the right which corresponds to legal justice is the good of the community; of this right we may not say that “no one is bound to make use of his right”, since the community—or, more correctly, its leaders–must make use of public rights, whenever and wherever the good of the community requires it. Finally, the right corresponding to the object of distributive justice is the defence of the members against the community or its leaders; they must not be laden with public burdens beyond their powers, and must receive as much of the public goods as becomes the condition of their meritoriousness arid services. Although, in accordance with the above, each of the three kinds of rights has its own immediate object, all three tend in common towards one remote object, which, according to St. Thomas (Cont. Gent., III, xxxiv), is nothing else than to secure that peace be maintained among men by procuring for each the peaceful possession of his own.
Right (or more precisely speaking, the obligation corresponding to right) is enforceable at least in general–that is, whoever has a right with respect to some other person is authorized to employ physical force to secure the fulfilment of this obligation, if the other person will not voluntarily fulfil it. This enforceable character of the obligation arises necessarily from the object of right. As already said, this object is to secure for every member of society a sphere of free activity and for society the means necessary for its development, and the attainment of this object is evidently indispensable for social life; but it would not be sufficiently attained if it were left to each one’s discretion whether he should fulfil his obligations or not. In a large community there are always many who would allow themselves to be guided, not by right or justice, but by their own selfish inclinations, and would disregard the rights of their fellowmen, if they were not forcibly confined to their proper sphere of right; consequently, the obligation corresponding to a right must be enforceable in favour of the possessor of the right. But in a regulated community the power of compulsion must be vested in the public authority, since, if each might employ force against his fellowmen whenever his right was infringed, there would soon arise a general conflict of all against all, and order and safety would be entirely subverted. Only in cases of necessity, where an unjust attack on one’s life or property has to be warded off and recourse to the authorities is impossible, has the individual the right of meeting violence with violence.
While right or the obligation corresponding to it is enforceable, we must beware of referring the essence of right to this enforcibility or even to the authority to enforce it, as is done by many jurists since the time of Kant. For enforcibility is only a secondary characteristic of right and does not pertain to all rights; although, for example, under a real monarchy the subjects possess some rights with respect to the ruler, they can usually exercise no compulsion towards him, since he is irresponsible, and is subject to no higher authority which can employ forcible measures against him. Rights are divided, according to the title on which they rest, into natural and positive rights, and the latter are subdivided into Divine and human rights. By natural rights are meant all those which we acquire by our very birth, e.g. the right to live, to integrity of limbs, to freedom, to acquire property, etc.; all other rights are called acquired rights, although many of them are acquired, independently of any positive law, in virtue of free acts, e.g. the right of the husband and wife in virtue of the marriage contract, the right to ownerless goods through occupation, the right to a house through purchase or hire, etc. On the other hand, other rights may be given by positive law; according as the law is Divine or human, and the latter civil or ecclesiastical, we distinguish between Divine or human, civil or ecclesiastical rights. To civil rights belong citizenship in a state, active or passive franchise, etc.
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V. CATHREIN Transcribed by Charlie Martin
The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XIIICopyright © 1912 by Robert Appleton CompanyOnline Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. KnightNihil Obstat, February 1, 1912. Remy Lafort, D.D., CensorImprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York
Fuente: Catholic Encyclopedia
Right
as an adjective, describes the quality of an action as in conformity with moral law; as a substantive, the claim of a person upon others consequent upon the equal subjection of all to moral law. A right action (rectum) is an action agreeable to our duty, but a man’s right (jus) has a very different meaning. What I have a right to do, it is the duty of all men not to hinder me from doing, and what I have a right to demand of any man, it is his duty to perform. A man’s right is that which is vested in him by society, and because its laws may not always be conformable to the supreme rule of human action, viz. the Divine Law, the two words may often be properly opposed. We may say that a poor man has no right to relief, but it is right that he should have it. A rich man has a right to destroy the harvest of his fields, but to do so would not be right. See Fleming and Krauth, Dict. of Phil. Science, s.v.
Fuente: Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature
Right
RIGHT.In the Authorized Version the word right is the equivalent of two distinct Greek words, , righteous (Mat 20:4; Mat 20:7, Luk 12:57), and , correctly (Luk 7:43; Luk 10:28; Luk 20:21). The English word is etymologically associated with Lat. rectus (from regere, to rule; cf. direct and cognates). It implies that which is straight, according to rule. In the Gospels the idea of right, as distinct from the word, runs through the whole of our Lords revelation of God. His teaching is at once a demand for that which is right and the source of all instruction about it.
1. The standard of right is always found in the will of God as expressed in His law. Everything is referred to that. Doing the will of God is the simple but exhaustive summary of all true life (Mar 3:35).
2. The extent of right is to be understood as absolute conformity to the law of God, with no immunity and no reservation. Not only actions and words, but also thoughts, desires, and motives, are always included in its scope (Mat 5:22; Mat 5:28). Since right means conformity to Gods character and will, it necessarily follows that this conformity must be absolute. Our Lord contrasts the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees with that which He demanded from His followers (Mat 5:20). His requirement was higher because of His higher conception of the character, will, and claims of God. To them righteousness was nothing more than a superficial outward conformity to the Divine law as interpreted and altered by their tradition. They measured by means of an imperfect standard, while our Lord laid down an absolute law (Mat 5:48). See art. Righteousness.
3. The motives to right are variously stated and implied, (a) First and foremost is the (always implied) motive based on the truth that right is right and therefore must be done. (b) Then obedience to the will of God, because it is Gods will, is emphasized (Mat 5:33, Mat 7:21). (c) A secondary and yet important motive is found in the spiritual blessings associated with the performance of right (Mat 5:1-11, Mat 6:1; Mat 6:4; Mat 6:6; Mat 6:18). (d) Yet again we have the spiritual influences and effects of right as no inconsiderable motive for righteousness of thought, word, and deed (Mat 5:13-14).
4. The encouragements to right are found in (a) the joy of satisfaction in obedience to God; (b) the approving testimony of conscience as the result of rignteousness; (c) the blessing of God manifestly resting upon the life (Mat 10:28-31); (d) fellowship with Christ in faithful and true living (Mat 10:25, Mat 12:50). These points concerning right are only a bare summary of what is both implicit and expressed in the whole of our Lords teaching, especially in the five great sections of teaching found in Matthew.
5. The secret of right is found in personal union and communion with Christ. There is nothing dry, formal, and abstract in right as conceived of in the NT. It is no question of an impersonal abstract or , but a warm, loving, living, and personal life of right thinking, right speaking, right doing, in union with Him who is pre-eminently and . It is this that differentiates Christian ethics from all others. Christianity not only depicts an ideal and insists on its realization; it proclaims and provides the power to realize it, in union with Him who has Himself lived the life and fulfilled the Divine ideal, and whose grace is sufficient for all who receive it. In all that concerns right, the followers of Christ accept and know by experience the truths of two great statements; one of the Master, and the other of one of His Apostles: Apart from me ye can do nothing (Joh 15:5); I can do all things in him who is empowering me (Php 4:13).
W. H. Griffith Thomas.
Fuente: A Dictionary Of Christ And The Gospels
Right
rt (, yashar, , mishpat; , dkaios, , euthus): Many Hebrew words are translated right, with different shades of meaning. Of these the two noted are the most important: yashar, with the sense of being straight, direct, as right in the sight of Yahweh (Exo 15:26; Deu 12:25, etc.), in one’s own eyes (Jdg 17:6), right words (Job 6:25 the King James Version, yosher), right paths (Pro 4:11 the King James Version); and mishpat judgment cause etc., a forensic term, as Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? (Gen 18:25). In Job 34:17, the Revised Version (British and American) has justice (Job 34:6, right), etc. The word cedhek, cedhakah, ordinarily translated righteousness, are in a few cases rendered right (2Sa 19:28; Neh 2:20; Psa 9:4; Psa 17:1; Psa 119:75; Eze 18:5, etc.). In the New Testament the chief word is dikaios, primarily even, equal (Mat 20:4; Luk 12:57, etc.); more generally the word is rendered just and righteous. Euthus, used by Septuagint for yashar (1Sa 12:23; Hos 14:9), occurs a few times (Act 8:21; Act 13:10; 2Pe 2:15); so orthos, straight, upright (Luk 10:28).
Right-hand or side represents Hebrew yamn and kindred forms (Gen 48:13, Gen 48:14, Gen 48:17; Exo 15:6, etc.); the Greek, in this sense, is dexios (Mat 6:3; Mat 20:21, etc.).
Revised Version, among other changes, has right for the King James Version judgment in Job 27:2; Job 34:5, and for right in the King James Version substitutes straight in Ezr 8:21, skillful in Ecc 4:4, margin successful, etc. In Joh 1:12 the Revised Version (British and American) reads, the right to become children of God for the King James Version the power (exousa); in Mat 20:7, Mat 20:15 right is omitted, with the larger part of the verse. In 2Ti 2:15 rightly dividing (orthotomeo) is changed to handling aright with margin holding a straight course in the word of truth. Or, rightly dividing the word of truth.
Fuente: International Standard Bible Encyclopedia
Right
In an ethical sense an action conforming to the moral law. Also the correlative of duty.
In a legal sense, any claim against others, recognized by law. Political rights, the capacity of exercizing certain functions in the formation and administration of government — the right to vote, to be elected to public office, etc. Natural rights, as against positive rights, those claims or liberties which are not derived from positive law but from a “higher law”, the law of nature. The right to live, the right to work, the “pursuit of happiness”, the right to self-development are sometimes considered natural rights. — W.E.