Science, philosophy of
Science, philosophy of
That philosophic discipline which is the systematic study of the nature of science, especially of its methods, its concepts and presuppositions, and its place in the general scheme of intellectual disciplines.
No very precise definition of the term is possible since the discipline shades imperceptibly into science, on the one hand, and into philosophy in genetal, on the other. A working division of its subject-matter into three fields is helpful in specifying its problems, though the three fields should not be too sharply differentiated or separated.
1. A critical study of the method or methods of the sciences, of the nature of scientific symbols and of the logical structure of scientific symbolic svstems. Presumably such a study should include both the empirical and the rational sciences. Whether it should also include the methods of the valuational studies (e.g., ethics, esthetics) and of the historical studies, will depend upon the working definition or science accepted by the investigator. Valuational studies are frequently characterized as “normative” or “axiological” sciences. Many of the recognized sciences (e.g., anthropology, geology) contain important historical aspects, hence there is some justification for the inclusion of the historical method in this aspect of the philosophy of science. As a study of method, the philosophy of science includes much of the traditional logic and theory of knowledge. The attempt is made to define and further clarify such terms as induction, deduction, hypothesis, data, discovery and verification. In addition, the more detailed and specialized methods of science (e.g., experimentation, measurement, classification and idealization) (q.v.) are subjected to examination. Since science is a symbolic system, the general theory of signs plays an important role in the philosophy of science.
2. The attempted clarification of the basic concepts, presuppositions and postulates of the sciences, and the revelation of the empirical, rational, or pragmatic grounds upon which they are presumed to rest. This aspect of the philosophy of science is closely related to the foregoing but includes, in addition to the logical and epistemological subject-matter, a large portion of metaphysics. Roughly, the task here is two-fold. On the one hand it involves the critical analysis of certain basic notions, such as quantity, quality, time, space, cause and law, which are used by the scientist but not subjected to examination. On the other hand it includes a similar study of certain presupposed beliefs, such as the belief in an external world, the belief in the uniformity of nature, and the belief in the rationality of natural processes.
3. A highly composite and diverse study which attempts to ascertain the limits of the special sciences, to disclose their interrelations one with another, and to examine their implications so fir as these contribute to a theory either of the universe as a whole or of some pervasive aspect of it. This aspect of the philosophy of science is the least precise and definite of the three, and employs the more speculative methods. One of the most characteristic of its problems is that of the classification of the sciences. This involves the attempt to construct a general table, or diagram, or map of the sciences which will properly integrate the sciences according to method, subject-matter, or some other principle of organization. Another characteristic problem is that of the implications of science for some general theory of the universe, e.g., idealism, materialism, positivism, mechanism, teleology, monism, or pluralism. In recent years a new type of problem has appeared which, if it is properly part of the philosophy of science at all, belongs to this aspect of the subject. This is the problem of the social relations of science. It examines such problems as the place of science in a given cultural scheme, e.g., its relations to government, business, art, religion and morality.
Bibliography
Karl Pearson, Grammar of Science, 1892.
Henri Poincare, Science and Hypothesis, 1905.
W. S. Jevons, Principles of Science, 1907.
J. A. Thomson, An Introduction to Science, 1911.
N. Campbell, What is Science?, 1921.
C. D. Broad, Scientific Thought, 1923.
A. D. Ritchie, Scientific Method, 1923.
E. W. Hobson, Domain of Natural Science, 1923.
A. S. Eddington, Nature of the Physical World, 1929.
M. R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, 1931.
A. C. Benjamin, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 1937.
W. H. Werkmeister, A Philosophy of Science, 1940.
— A.C.B.