Truth

Truth

In the apostolic documents the simplest meaning given to truth is that of sincerity. St. Paul, writing of the different motives that had impelled people to make known the gospel of Christ, declared that he rejoiced that Christ was proclaimed whether in pretence or in truth (Php 1:16). The same Apostle called upon the Corinthian Christians to banish all insincerity from their holiest religious ceremonies. Let us keep the feast not with old leaven, neither with the leaven of malice and wickedness, but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth (1Co 5:8). Even in passages like these it is evident that truth tended to acquire a deeper and wider meaning, passing from mere sincerity to conformity with the highest ethical claims. The standard of ethical truth was embodied in Jesus, who was set forth as the example to which Christians should conform. Thus St. Paul warned his readers against a life of lasciviousness by recalling the way in which they had learned Christ, if so be that ye heard him, and were taught in him, even as truth is in Jesus (Eph 4:21). (This passage is sometimes taken as asserting the identity of Jesus and the Christ, but the old reading and interpretation seem preferable.) For the most part, however, the apostles speak of truth as equivalent to truth , the revelation of God that reaches its fullness in the gospel of Christ. St. Paul made it synonymous with the gospel of your salvation (Eph 1:13), and, writing to the Thessalonians, he described the Divine and human sides of conversion as sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth (2Th 2:13). The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews declared that for those who sinned wilfully after they had gained a full knowledge of the truth there could be no further sacrifice for sin (Heb 10:26). In the Pastoral Epistles this use is specially prevalent-e.g. 1Ti 2:4, God willeth that all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth; 1Ti 3:15, where the Church of the living God is described as the pillar and ground of the truth; 2Ti 2:15, a workman that needeth not to be ashamed, handling aright the word of truth. While these various aspects of truth are suggested in the apostolic writings, it would be a mistake to suppose that the apostles regarded truth as consisting of separate entities; rather they regarded it as a unity embodied in Jesus Christ, so that intellectual sincerity, ethical purity, doctrinal enlightenment, and spiritual experience were all manifestations of the one living and true God. This unity of truth seems to be the thought underlying the general principle set forth by St. Paul that we can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth (2Co 13:8). No one has power against truth, for all truth and all kinds of truth are one in God: the only power is given to those who seek to act in the service of truth. Wherefore it is the denial of God to endeavour to advance truth by any means that fails to yield to truth in every department of human thought and life.

Truth was fully embodied and expressed in Jesus Christ, but before His coming there had been partial revelations of truth by divers portions and in divers manners (Heb 1:1), and St. Paul felt free to acknowledge that the Jew might claim that he had in the law the form () of knowledge and of the truth (Rom 2:20). This outward form was determined by the inner truth of which it was the outline or expression, but it was at the best only partial and imperfect. The apostles further taught that the truth of God outlined in the Law and embodied in Christ was brought home to the heart and mind of men by many various methods, but that all these methods received their virtue through the vitalizing influence of the Holy Spirit. The Day of Pentecost left its mark not only on the life but also on the teaching of the Apostolic Church, and St. Paul in his special experience learned on the way to Damascus and in the solitude of the desert that the gospel came to him through no human means but through revelation of Jesus Christ (Gal 1:12). Hence there was constant insistence on the agency of the Holy Spirit as the real source of enlightenment in the truth of God. At the same time it was recognized that there was great diversity in the Spirits working, for there was no dead uniformity in His operations. St. John offers the chief example of the revelation of truth being given by direct vision, and in his Apocalypse he shows how he received in this way the knowledge of things present and future when he was in the spirit on the Lords Day. St. Paul claimed that he also was indebted to visions for knowledge that he had received, and for the hearing of unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter (2Co 12:4). But such experiences were acknowledged by him to be unusual, so that he indulged in some modest boasting on account of the exceptional privilege granted to him. The more usual method of illumination was by the Spirits interpreting the life of Jesus Christ to the needs of human experience, and making the Scriptures of the OT radiate a new meaning in the light of the sacrifice and work of the Saviour. Thus the Suffering Servant of Jahweh of Deutero-Isaiah led to a better understanding of the Crucified Lord (Act 8:35), and prophets as well as private Christians learned the truth better through examination of the Scriptures (Act 17:11).

One source of progressive knowledge was found by the apostles in the facts of their experience, an experience that covered not only their fellowship with Christ in the days of His flesh, but also the mighty working that followed His ascension to the right hand of God. This may be illustrated by the advance in truth that followed the outpouring of the Spirit of God upon Gentiles who believed in Jesus as the Redeemer. To St. Paul especially this fact of experience brought the assurance of Gods readiness to save and bless all men through faith in Jesus Christ without the necessity of their submitting to any rite of Jewish origin. Thus there was heralded forth by him the free grace of God in Christ to all sinners. But in order that the truth of God might be received it was necessary, according to the apostles, that it should be not only understood but also obeyed (Gal 5:7). The heart and will were as powerful as the mind in influencing the attitude to the truth in Christ. This not only was asserted positively, but may be inferred also from the reasons assigned by the apostles for some people not receiving the truth. Stephen in his defence charged those who denied Jesus Christ and His gospel with the crime of resisting the Holy Ghost as their fathers had been guilty likewise in persecuting the prophets (Act 7:51-52), while St. Paul impressed upon his unbelieving hearers the fact that they might see and hear the truth, and yet be so hardened in their hearts that they would not believe (Act 28:26). Indeed in his contrast of and St. Paul asserted that the spiritual truths could not be discerned by the natural man even with his highest intellectual capacity but only by the spiritual man in whom the Divine Spirit is living and working (1Co 2:14; cf. Rom 8:5, 1Jn 4:5). But the apostles never exalted mere spirituality at the expense of the moral side of life, for they insisted that nothing hindered the reception of truth more than a low ethical life. St. Paul foretold a time when men would be guilty of all excesses, loving pleasure more than God, and, led away by divers lusts, would be ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth (2Ti 3:1-7), and the same Apostle ascribed the lack of the free expansion of truth in some people to the fact that they kept it down by their unrighteous lives (Rom 1:18). St. James, as might be expected, associated knowledge of truth with moral qualities such as the grace of meekness, and the absence of bitter envy and rivalry (Jam 3:13-14). St. Peter was marked with the same spirit, for he traced the golden cycle of Christian experience as leading from purity of soul by obedience to the truth onwards inevitably to the love of the brethren (1Pe 1:22). Thus the beginning and the ending of the Christian reception of truth were indissolubly linked to purity and love.

Literature.-F. J. A. Hort, The Way, the Truth, the Life, Cambridge, 1893, p. 41 ff.; W. P. DuBose, Soteriology of the NT, London, 1892, p. 299; H. J. Holtzmann, Lehrbuch der NT Theologie, Freiburg i. B., 1896-97, ii. 375 f.; R. H. Hutton, Theological Essays4, London, 1895, p. 19 ff.

D. Macrae Tod.

Fuente: Dictionary of the Apostolic Church

TRUTH

A term used in opposition to falsehood, and applied to propositions which answer or accord to the nature and reality of the thing whereof something is affirmed or denied. Natural or physical truth is said to be the agreement of our sentiments with the nature of things. Moral truth is the conformity of our words and actions to our sentiments. Evangelical or Gospel truth is taken for Christ; the doctrines of the Gospel; substance or reality, in opposition to the shadows and ceremonies of the law, Joh 1:17. For this truth we ought to be sincere in seeking, zealous in defending, and active in propagating; highly to prize it, constantly to rejoice in it, and uniformly to be obedient to it.

See LYING, SINCERITY; Tatham’s Scale of Truth; Locke on the Understanding; Beattie on Truth; Dr. Stennet’s Sermon on propagating the Truth; Saurin’s Sermons, Eng. trans. vol. 2: ser. 1. and 14.

Fuente: Theological Dictionary

Truth

Truth (Anglo-Saxon tréow, tryw, truth, preservation of a compact, from a Teutonic base Trau, to believe) is a relation which holds (1) between the knower and the known — Logical Truth; (2) between the knower and the outward expression which he gives to his knowledge — Moral Truth; and (3) between the thing itself, as it exists, and the idea of it, as conceived by God — Ontological Truth. In each case this relation is, according to the Scholastic theory, one of correspondence, conformity, or agreement (adoequatio) (St. Thomas, Summa I:21:2).

I. ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH

Every existing thing is true, in that it is the expression of an idea which exists in the mind of God, and is, as it were, the exemplar according to which the thing has been created or fashioned. Just as human creations — a cathedral, a painting, or an epic — conform to and embody the ideas of architect, artist, or poet, so, only in a more perfect way, God’s creatures conform to and embody the ideas of Him who gives them being. (Q. D., De verit., a. 4; Summa 1:16:1.) Things that exist, moreover, are active as well as passive. They tend not only to develop, and so to realize more and more perfectly the idea which they are created to express, but they tend also to reproduce themselves. Reproduction obtains wherever there is interaction between different things, for an effect, in so far as it proceeds from a given cause, must resemble that cause. Now the cause of knowledge in man is — ultimately, at any rate — the thing that is known. By its activities it causes in man an idea that is like to the idea embodied in the thing itself. Hence, things may also be said to be ontologically true in that they are at once the object and the cause of human knowledge. (Cf. IDEALISM; and Summa, I:16:7 and 1:16:8; m 1. periherm., 1. III; Q.D., I, De veritate, a. 4.)

II. LOGICAL TRUTH

A. The Scholastic Theory

To judge that things are what they are is to judge truly. Every judgment comprises certain ideas which are referred to, or denied of, reality. But it is not these ideas that are the objects of our judgment. They are merely the instruments by means of which we judge. The object about which we judge is reality itself — either concrete existing things, their attributes, and their relations, or else entities the existence of which is merely conceptual or imaginary, as in drama, poetry, or fiction, but in any case entities which are real in the sense that their being is other than our present thought about them. Reality, therefore, is one thing, and the ideas and judgments by means of which we think about reality, another; the one objective, and the other subjective. Yet, diverse as they are, reality is somehow present to, if not present in consciousness when we think, and somehow by means of thought the nature of reality is revealed. This being the case, the only term adequate to describe the relation that exists between thought and reality, when our judgments about the latter are true judgments, would seem to be conformity or correspondence. “Veritas logica est adaequatio intellectus et rei” (Summa, I:21:2). Whenever truth is predicable of a judgment, that judgment corresponds to, or resembles, the reality, the nature or attributes of which it reveals. Every judgment is, however, as we have said, made up of ideas, and may be logically analyzed into a subject and a predicate, which are either united by the copula is, or disjoined by the expression is not. If the judgment be true, therefore, these ideas must also be true, i.e. must correspond with the realities which they signify. As, however, this objective reference or significance of ideas is not recognized or asserted except in the judgment, ideas as such are said to be only “materially” true. It is the judgment alone that is formally true, since in the judgment alone is a reference to reality formally made, and truth as such recognized or claimed.

The negative judgment seems at first sight to form an exception to the general law that truth is correspondence; but this is not really the case. In the affirmative judgment both subject and predicate and the union between them, of whatever kind it may be, are referred to reality; but in the negative judgment subject and predicate are disjoined, not conjoined. In other words, in the negative judgment we deny that the predicate has reality in the particular case to which the subject refers. On the other hand, all such predicates presumably have reality somewhere, otherwise we should not talk about them. Either they are real qualities or real things, or at any rate somebody has conceived them as real. Consequently the negative judgment, if true, may also be said to correspond with reality, since both subject and predicate will be real somewhere, either as existents or as conceptions. What we deny, in fact, in the negative judgment is not the reality of the predicate, but the reality of the conjunction by which subject and predicate are united in the assertion which we implicitly challenge and negate. Subject and predicate may both be real, but if our judgment be true, they will be disjoined, not united in reality.

But what precisely is this reality with which true judgments and true ideas are said to correspond? It is easy enough to understand how ideas can correspond with realities that are themselves conceptual or ideal, but most of the realities that we know are not of this kind. How, then, can ideas and their conjunctions or disjunctions, which are psychical in character, correspond with realities which for the most part are not psychical but material? To solve this problem we must go back to ontological truth which, as we saw, implies the creation of the universe by One Who, in creating it, has expressed therein His own ideas very much as an architect or an author expresses his ideas in the things that he creates except that creation in the latter case supposes already existent material. Our theory of truth supposes that the universe is built according to definite and rational plan, and that everything within the universe expresses or embodies an essential and integral part of that plan. Whence it follows that just as in a building or in a piece of sculpture we see the plan or design that is realized therein, so, in our experience of concrete things, by means of the same intellectual power, we apprehend the ideas which they embody or express. The correspondence therefore, in which truth consists is not a correspondence between ideas and anything material as such, but between ideas as they exist in our mind and function in our acts of cognition, and the idea that reality expresses and embodies — ideas which have their origin and prototype in the mind of God.

With regard to judgments of a more abstract or general type, the working of this view is quite simple. The realities to which abstract concepts refer have no material existence as such. There is no such thing, for instance, as action or reaction in general; nor are there any twos or fours. What we mean when we say that “action and reaction are equal and opposite”, or that “two and two make four”, is that these laws, which in their own proper nature are ideal, are realized or actualized in the material universe in which we live; or, in other words, that the material things we see about us behave in accordance with these laws, and through their activities manifest them to our minds.

Perceptual judgments, i.e. the judgments which usually accompany and give expression to acts of perception, differ from the above in that they refer to objects which are immediately present to our senses. The realities in this case, therefore, are concrete existing things. It is, however, rather with the appearance of such things that our judgment is now concerned than with their essential nature or inner constitution. Thus, when we predicate colours, sounds, odours, flavours, hardness or softness, heat or cold of this or that object, we make no statement about the nature of such qualities, still less about the nature of the thing that possesses them. What we assert is that such and such a thing exists, and that it has a certain objective quality, which we call green, or loud, or sweet, or hard, or hot, to distinguish it from other qualities — red, or soft, or bitter, or cold — with which it is not identical; while our statement further implies that the same quality will similarly appear to any normally constituted man, i.e. will affect his senses in the same way that it affects our own. Accordingly, if in the real world such a condition of things obtains — if, that is to say, the thing in question does exist and has in fact some peculiar and distinctive property whereby it affects my senses in a certain peculiar and distinctive way — my judgment is true.

The truth of perceptual judgments by no means implies an exact correspondence between what is perceived and the images, or sensation — complexes, whereby we perceive; nor does the Scholastic theory necessitate any such view. It is not the image, or sensation-complex, but the idea, that in judgment is referred to reality, and that gives us knowledge of reality. Colour and other qualities of objective things are doubtless perceived by means of sensation of peculiar and distinctive quality or tone, but no one imagines that this presupposes similar sensation in the object perceived. It is by means of the idea of colour and its specific differences that colours are predicated of objects, not by means of sensations Such an idea could not arise, indeed, were it not for the sensations which in perception accompany and condition it; but the idea itself is not a sensation, nor is it of a sensation. Ideas have their origin in sensible experience and are indefinable, so far as immediate experience goes, except by reference to such experience and by differentiation from experiences in which other and different properties of objects are presented Granted, therefore, that differences in what is technically known as the “quality” of sensation correspond to differences in the objective properties of things, the truth of perceptual judgments is assured. No further correspondence is required; for the correspondence which truth postulates is between idea and thing, not between sensation and thing. Sensation conditions knowledge, but as such it is not knowledge. It is, as it were, a connecting link between the idea and the thing. Differences of sensation are determined by the causal activity of things; and from the sensation-complex, or image the idea is derived by an instinctive and quasi-intuitive act of the mind which we call abstraction. Thus the idea which the thing unconsciously expresses finds conscious expression in the act of the knower, and the vast scheme of relations and laws which are de facto embodied in the material universe reproduce themselves in the consciousness of man.

Correspondence between thought and reality, idea and thing, or knower and known, therefore, turns out in all cases to be of the very essence of the truth relation. Whence, say the opponents of our theory, in order to know whether our judgments are true or not, we must compare them with the realities that are known — a comparison that is obviously impossible, since reality can only be known through the instrumentality of the judgment. This objection, which is to be found in almost every non-Scholastic book dealing with the subject, rests upon a grave misapprehension of the real meaning of the Scholastic doctrine. Neither St. Thomas nor any other of the great Scholastics ever asserted that correspondence is the scholastic criterion of truth. To inquire what truth is, is one question; to ask how we know that we have judged truly, quite another. Indeed, the possibility of answering the second is supposed by the mere fact that the first is put. To be able to define truth, we must first possess it and know that we possess it, i.e. must be able to distinguish it from error. We cannot define that which we cannot distinguish and to some extent isolate. The Scholastic theory supposes, therefore, that truth has already been distinguished from error, and proceeds to examine truth with a view to discovering in what precisely it consists. This standpoint is epistemologieal, not criteriological. When he says that truth is correspondence, he is stating what truth is, not by what sign or mark it can be distinguished from error. By the old Scholastics the question of the criteria of truth was scarcely touched. They discussed the criteria of valid reasoning in their treatises on logic, but for the rest they left the discussion of particular criteria to the methodology of particular sciences. And rightly so, for there is really no criterion of universal application. The distinction of truth and error is at bottom intuitional. We cannot go on making criteria ad infinitum. Somewhere we must come to what is ultimate, either first principles or facts.

This is precisely what the Scholastic theory of truth affirms. In deference to the modern demand for an infallible and universal criterion of truth, not a few Scholastic writers of late have suggested objective evidence. Objective evidence, however, is nothing more than the manifestation of the object itself, directly or indirectly, to the mind, and hence is not strictly a criterion of truth, but its foundation. As Père Geny puts it in his pamphlet discussing “Une nouvelle théorie de la connaissance”, to state that evidence is the ultimate criterion of truth is equivalent to stating that knowledge properly so called has no need of a criterion, since it is absurd to suppose a knowledge which does not know what it knows. Once grant, as all must grant who wish to avoid absolute sceptieism, that knowledge is possible, and it follows that, properly used, our faculties must be capable of giving us truth. Doubtless, coherence and harmony with facts are pro tanto signs of truth’s presence in our minds; but what we need for the most part are not signs of truth, but signs or criteria of error — not tests whereby to discover when our faculties have gone right, but tests whereby to discover when they have gone wrong. Our judgments will be true, i.e. thought will correspond with its object, provided that object itself, and not any other cause, subjective or objective, determines the content of our thought. What we have to do, therefore, is to take care that our assent is determined by the evidence with which we are confronted, and by this alone. With regard to the senses this means that we must look to it that they are in good condition and that the circumstances under which we are exercising them are normal; with regard to the intellect that we must not allow irrelevant considerations to weigh with us, that we must avoid haste, and, as far as possible, get rid of bias, prejudice, and an over-anxious will to believe. If this be done, granted there is sufficient evidence, true judgments will naturally and necessarily result. The purpose of argument and discussion, as of all other processes that lead to knowledge, is precisely that the object under discussion may manifest itself in its various relations, either directly or indirectly, to the mind. And the object as thus manifesting itself is what the Scholastic calls evidence. It is the object, therefore, which in his view is the determining cause of truth. All kinds of processes, both mental and physical, may be necessary to prepare the way for an act of cognition, but in the last resort such an act must be determined as to its content by the causal activity of the object, which makes itself evident by producing in the mind an idea that is like to the idea of which its own existence is the realization.

B. The Hegelian Theory.

In the Idealism of Hegel and the Absolutism of the Oxford School (of which Mr. Bradley and Mr. Joachim are the leading representatives) both reality and truth are essentially one, essentially an organic whole. Truth, in fact, is but reality qua thought. It is an intelligent act in which the universe is thought as a whole of infinite parts or differences, all organically inter-related and somehow brought to unity. And because truth is thus organic, each element within it, each partial truth, is so modified by the others through and through that apart from them, and again apart from the whole, it is but a distorted fragment, a mutilated abstraction which in reality is not truth at all. Consequently, since human truth is always partial and fragmentary, there is in strictness no such thing as human truth. For us the truth is ideal, and from it our truths are so far removed that, to convert them into the truth, they would have to undergo a change of which we know neither the measure nor the extent.

The flagrantly sceptical character of this theory is sufficiently obvious, nor is there any attempt on the part of its exponents to deny it. Starting with the assumption that to conceive is “to hold many elements together in a connexion necessitated by their several contents”, and that to be conceivable is to be “a significant whole”, i.e. a whole, “such that all its constituent elements reciprocally determine one another’s being as contributory features in a single concrete meaning”, Dr. Joachim boldly identifies the true with the conceivable (Nature of Truth, 66). And since no human intellect can conceive in this full and magnificent sense, he frankly admits that no human truth can be more than approximate, and that to the margin of error which this approximation involves no limits can be assigned. Human truth draws from absolute or ideal truth “whatever being and conservability” it possesses (Green, “Prolegom.”, article 77); but it is not, and never can be, identical with absolute truth, nor yet with any part of it, for these parts essentially and intrinsically modify one another. For his definition of human truth, therefore, the Absolutist is forced back upon the Scholastic doctrine of correspondence. Human truth represents or corresponds with absolute truth in proportion as it presents us with this truth as affected by more or less derangement, or in proportion as it would take more or less to convert the one into the other (Bradley, “Appearance and Reality”, 363). While, therefore, both theories assign correspondence as the essential characteristic of human truth, there is this fundamental difference between them: For the Scholastic this correspondence, so far as it goes, must be exact; but for the Absolutist it is necessarily imperfect, so imperfect, indeed, that “the ultimate truth” of any given proposition “may quite transform its original meaning” (Appearance and Reality, 364).

To admit that human truth is essentially representative is really to admit that conception is something more than the mere “holding together of many elements in a connexion necessitated by their several contents”. But the fallacy of the “coherence theory” does not lie so much in this, nor yet in the identification of the true and the conceivable, as in its assumption that reality, and therefore truth, is organically one. The universe is undoubtedly one, in that its parts are inter-related and inter-dependent; and from this it follows that we cannot know any part completely unless we know the whole; but it does not follow that we cannot know any part at all unless we know the whole. If each part has some sort of being of its own, then it can be known for what it is, whether we know its relations to other parts or not; and similarly some of its relations to other parts can be known without our knowing them all. Nor is the individuality of the parts of the universe destroyed by their inter-dependence; rather it is thereby sustained.

The sole ground which the Hegelian and the Absolutist have for denying these facts is that they will not square with their theory that the universe is organically one. Since, therefore, it is confessedly impossible to explain the nature of this unity or to show how in it the multitudinous differences of the universe are “reconciled”, and since, further, this theory is acknowledged to be hopelessly sceptical, it is surely irrational any longer to maintain it.

C. The Pragmatic Theory

Life for the Pragmatist is essentially practical. All human activity is purposive, and its purpose is the control of human experience with a view to its improvement, both in the individual and in the race. Truth is but a means to this end. Ideas, hypotheses, and theories are but instruments which man has “made” in order to better both himself and his environment; and, though specific in type, like all other forms of human activity they exist solely for this end, and are “true” in so far as they fulfil it. Truth is thus a form of value: it is something that works satisfactorily; something that “ministers to human interests, purposes and objects of desire” (Studies in Humanism, 362). There are no axioms or self-evident truths. Until an idea or a judgment has proved itself of value in the manipulation of concrete experience, it is but a postulate or claim to truth. Nor are there any absolute or irreversible truths. A proposition is true so long as it proves itself useful, and no longer. In regard to the essential features of this theory of truth W. James, John Dewey, and A.W. Moore in America, F.C.S. Schiller in England, G. Simmel in Germany, Papini in Italy, and Henri Bergson, Le Roy, and Abel Rey in France are all substantially in agreement. It is, they say, the only theory which takes account of the psychological processes by which truth is made, and the only theory which affords a satisfactory answer to the arguments of the sceptic.

In regard to the first of these claims there can be no doubt that Pragmatism is based upon a study of truth “in the making”. But the question at issue is not whether interest, purpose, emotion, and volition do as a matter of fact play a part in the process of cognition. That is not disputed. The question is whether, in judging of the validity of a claim to truth, such considerations ought to have weight. If the aim of all cognitive acts is to know reality as it is, then clearly judgments are true only in so far as they satisfy this demand. But this does not help us in deciding what judgments are true and what are not, for the truth of a judgment must already be known before this demand can be satisfled. Similarly with regard to particular interests and purposes; for though such interests and purposes may prompt us to seek for knowledge, they will not be satisfied until we know truly, or at any rate think we know truly. The satisfaction of our needs, in other words, is posterior to, and already supposes, the possession of true knowledge about whatever we wish to use as a means to the satisfaction of those needs. To act efficiently, we must know what it is we are acting upon and what will be the effects of the action contemplated. The truth of our judgments is verified by their consequences only in those cases where we know that such consequences should ensue if our judgment be true, and then act in order to discover whether in reality they will ensue.

Theoretically, and upon Scholastic principles, since whatever is true is also good, true judgments ought to result in good consequences. But, apart from the fact that the truth of our judgment must in many cases be known before we can act upon them with success, the Pragmatic criterion is too vague and too variable to be of any practical use. “Good consequences”, “successful operations on reality”, “beneficial interaction with sensible particulars” denote experiences which it is not easy to recognize or to distinguish from other experiences less good, less successful, and less beneficial. If we take personal valuations as our test, these are proverbially unstable; while, if social valuations alone are admissible, where are they to be found, and upon what grounds accepted by the individual? Moreover, when a valuation has been made, how are we to know that it is accurate? For this, it would seem, further valuations will be required, and so on ad inflnitum. Distinctively pragmatic criteria of truth are both impractical and unreliable, especially the criterion of felt satisfaction, which seems to be the favourite, for in determining this not only the personal factor, but the mood of the moment and even physical conditions play a considerable part. Consequently upon the second head the claim of the Pragmatist can by no means be allowed. The Pragmatist theory is not a whit less sceptical than the theory of the Absolutist, which it seeks to displace. If truth is relative to purposes and interests, and if these purposes and interests are, as they are admitted to be, one and all tinged by personal idiosyncrasy, then what is true for one man will not be true for another, and what is true now will not be true when a change takes place either in the interest that has engendered it or in the circumstances by which it has been verified.

All this the Pragmatist grants, but replies that such truth is all that man needs and all that he can get. True judgments do not correspond with reality, nor in true judgments do we know reality as it is. The function of cognition, in short, is not to know reality, but to control it. For this reason truth is identified with its consequences — theoretical, if the truth be merely virtual, but in the end practical, particular, concrete. “Truth means successful operations on reality” (Studies in Hum., 118). The truth-relation “consists of intervening parts of the universe which can in every particular case be assigned and catalogued” (Meaning of Truth, 234). “The chain of workings which an opinion sets up is the opinion’s truth” (Ibid., 235). Thus, in order to refute the Sceptic, the Pragmatist changes the nature of truth, redefining it as the definitely experienceable success which attends the working of certain ideas and judgments; and in so doing he grants precisely what the Sceptic seeks to prove, namely, that our cognitive faculties are incapable of knowing reality as it is. (See PRAGMATISM.)

D. The “New” Realist’s Theory

As it is a first principle with both Absolutist and Pragmatist that reality is changed by the very act in which we know it, so the negation of this thesis is the root principle of “New” Realism. In this the “New” Realist is at one with the Scholastic. Reality does not depend upon experience, nor is it modified by experience as such. The “New” Realist, however, has not as yet adopted the correspondence theory of truth. He regards both knowledge and truth as unique relations which hold immediately between knower and known, and which are as to their nature indefinable. “The difference between subjeet and object of consciousness is not a differenee of quality or substanee, but a differenee of office or place in a configuration” (Journal of Phil. Psychol. and Scientific Meth., VII, 396). Reality is made up of terms and their relations, and truth is just one of these relations, sui generis, and therefore reeognizable only by intuition. This account of truth is undoubtedly simple, but there is at any rate one point whieh it seems altogether to ignore, viz., the existence of judgments and ideas of which, and not of the mind as such, the truth-relation is predicable. We have not on the one hand objects and on the other bare mind; but on the one hand objects and on the other a mind that by means of the judgment refers its own ideas to objects — ideas which as such, both in regard to their existence and their content, belong to the mind which judges. What then is the relation that holds between these ideas and their objects when our judgments are true, and again when they are false? Surely both logic and criteriology imply that we know something more about such judgments than merely that they are different.

Bertrand Russell, who has given in his adhesion to “The Program and First Platform of Six Realists”, drawn up and signed by six American professors in July, 1910, modifies somewhat the naïveté of their theory of truth. “Every judgment”, he says (Philos. Essays, 181), “is a relation of a mind to several objects, one of which is a relation. Thus, the judgment, ‘Charles I died on the scaffold’, denotes several objects or ‘objectives’ which are related in a certain definite way, and the relation is as real in this case as are the other objectives. The judgment ‘Charles I died in his bed’, on the other hand, denotes the objects, Charles I, death, and bed, and a certain relation between them, which in this case does not relate the objects as it is supposed to relate them. A judgment therefore, is true, when the relation which is one of the objects relates the other objects, otherwise it is false” (loc. cit.). In this statement of the nature of truth: correspondenee between the mind judging and the objects about which we judge is distinctly implied, and it is precisely this correspondcnce which is set down as the distinguishing mark of true judgments. Russell however, unfortunately seems to be at variance with other members of the New Realist school on this point. G.E. Moore expressly rejects the correspondence theory of truth (“Mind”, N. S., VIII, 179 sq.), and Prichard, another English Realist, explicitly states that in knowledge there is nothing between the object and ourselves (Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, 21). Nevertheless, it is matter for rejoicing that in regard to the main points at issue — the non-alteration of reality by acts of cognition, the possibility of knowing it in some respects without its being known in all, the growth of knowledge by “accretion”, the non-spiritual character of some of the objects of experience, and the necessity of ascertaining empirically and not by a priori methods, the degree of unity which obtains between the various parts of the universe -the “New” Realist and the Scholastic Realist are substantially in agreement.

III. MORAL TRUTH, OR VERACITY

Veracity is the correspondence of the outward expression given to thought with the thought itself. It must not be confused with verbal truth (veritas locutionis), which is the correspondence of the outward or verbal expression with the thing that it is intended to express. The latter supposes on the part of the speaker not only the intention of speaking truly, but also the power so to do, i.e. it supposes (1) true knowledge and (2) a right use of words. Moral truth, on the other hand, exists whenever the speaker expresses what is in his mind even if de facto he be mistaken, provided only that he says what he thinks to be true. This latter condition however, is necessary. Hence a better definition of moral truth would be “the correspondence of the outward expression of thought with the thing as conceived by the speaker”. Moral truth, therefore, does not imply true knowledge. But, though a deviation from moral truth would be only materially a lie, and hence not blameworthy, unless the use of words or signs were intentionally incorrect, moral truth does imply a correct use of words or other signs. A lie therefore, is an intentional deviation from moral truth, and is defined as a locutio contra mentem; i.e. it is the outward expression of a thought which is intentionally diverse from the thing as conceived by the speaker. It is important to observe, however, that the expression of the thought, whether by word or by sign, must in all cases be taken in its context; for both in regard to words and to signs, custom and circumstances make a considerable difference with respect to their interprctation. Veracity, or the habit of speaking the truth, is a virtue; and the obligation of practising it arises from a twofold source. First, “since man is a social animal, naturally one man owes to another that without which human society could not go on. But men could not live together if they did not believe one another to be speaking the truth. Hence the virtue of veracity comes to some extent under the head of justice [rationem debiti]” (St. Thomas, Summa, II-II:109:3). The second source of the obligation to veracity arises from the fact that speech is clearly of its very nature intended for the communication of knowledge by one to another. It should be used, therefore, for the purpose for which it is naturally intended, and lies should be avoided. For lies are not merely a misuse, but an abuse, of the gift of speech, since, by destroying man’s instinctive belief in the veracity of his neighbour, they tend to destroy the efficacy of that gift.

For Scholasticism see: scholastic treatises on major logic, s.v. Veritas; Etudes sur la Vérité (Paris, 1909); GENY, Une nouvelle théorie de la connaissance (Tournai, 1909); MIVART, On Truth (London, 1889); JOHN RICKABY, First Principles af Knowledge; ROUSSELOT, L’Intellectualisme de St. Thomas (Paris, 1909); TONQUEDEC, La notion de la vérité dans la philosophie nouvelle in Etudes (1907), CX, 721; CXI, 433; CXII, 68, 335; WALKER, Theories of Knowledge (2d ed., London, 1911); HOBHOUSE, The Theory of Knowledge (London, 1906). Absolutism: BRADLEY, Appearance and Reality (London, 1899); IDEM, Articles in Mind, N.S., LT, LXXI, LXXII (1904, 1909, 1910); JOACHIM, The Nature af Truth (Oxford, 1906); TAYLOR, Elements of Metaphysics (London, 1903); Articles in Mind, N.S., LVII (1906), and Philos. Rev., XIV, 3. Pragmatism: BERGSON, L’Evolution Créatrice (7th ed., Paris, 1911); DEWEY, Studies in Logical Theory (Chicago, 1903); JAMES, Pragmatism (London, 1907); IDEM, The Meaning af Truth (London, 1909); IDEM, Some Problems of Philosophy (London 1911); MOORE, Pragmatism and Its Critics (Chicago, 191O); ABEL REY, La théorie de la physique (Paris, 1907); SCHILLER, Axioms as Postulates in Personal Idealism (London, 1902); IDEM Humanism (London, 1902); IDEM, Studies in Humanism (London 1907); SIMMEL, Die Philosophie des Geldes (Leipsig, 1900), iii. New Realism: Articles in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods (1910, 1911), especially VII, 15 (July 1910); MOORE, The Nature of Judgment in Mind, VIII; PRICHARD, Kant’s Theory af Knowledge (Oxford, 1910); RUSSELL, Philosophical Essays (London, 1910); IDEM, Articles in Mind N.S., LX (1906), and in Proceedings af the Aristotelian Society VII.

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LESLIE J. WALKER Transcribed by Kevin Cawley

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XVCopyright © 1912 by Robert Appleton CompanyOnline Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. KnightNihil Obstat, October 1, 1912. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., CensorImprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York

Fuente: Catholic Encyclopedia

Truth

conformity to fact.

1. It has been distinguished by most philosophical writers, according as it respects being, knowledge, and speech, into

(1.) Veritas entis, or truth of the thing. The foundation of all truth is in truth of being–that truth by which a thing is what it is, by which it has its own nature and properties; and has not merely the appearance, but reality, of being. Philosophy is the knowledge of being; and if there were no real being that is, if truth could not be predicated of things there could be no knowledge.

(2.) Veritas cognitionis, or truth of knowledge. Truth, as predicated of knowledge, is the conformity of our knowledge with the reality of the object known; for, as knowledge is the knowledge of something, when a thing is known as it is that knowledge is formally true. To know that fire is hot is true knowledge. Objective truth is the conformity of the thing or object known with true knowledge.

(3.) Veritas signi, or truth of the sign. This consists in its adequateness or conformity to the thing signified. The truth and adequacy of signs belong to enunciation in logic.

2. Scientific truth consists in the conformity of thoughts to things; and moral truth lies in the correspondence of words with thoughts; while logical truth depends on the self-consistency of thoughts themselves.

3. Truth, in the strict logical sense, applies to propositions, and nothing else; and consists in the conformity of the declaration made to the actual state of the case. In its etymological sense, truth signifies that which the speaker believes to be the fact. In this sense it is opposed to a lie, and may be called moral. Truth is not infrequently applied to arguments, when the proper expressions would be correct, conclusive, valid. The use of truth in the sense of reality should be avoided. People speak of the truth or falsity of facts; whereas, properly speaking, they are either real or fictitious. It is the statement that is true or false.

4. Necessary truths are such as are known independently of inductive proof; are those in which we not only learn that the proposition is true, but that it must be true; are those the opposite of which is inconceivable, contradictory, impossible. Contingent truths are those which, without doing violence to reason, we may conceive to be otherwise.

5. Absolute truth is the knowledge of God, the ground of all relative truth and being. All relative truth is partial because each relation presupposes something which is not relative. As to us relative truth is partial in another sense, because the relations known to us are affected by relations which we do not know, and therefore our knowledge even as relative knowledge is incomplete as a whole and in each of its parts. At the same time, relative knowledge is real knowledge; and if it were possible habitually to realize in consciousness that it is partial, it would be strictly true so far as it goes. See Blunt, Dict. of Hist. Theol. s.v.; Fleming, Vocab. of Philos. Sciences, s.v.

6. In Scripture language, eminently, God is truth; that is, in him is no fallacy, deception, perverseness, etc. Jesus Christ, being God, is also the truth, and is the true way to God, the true representative, image, character, of the Father. The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of truth, who communicates truth, who maintains the truth in believers, guides them in the truth, and who hates and punishes falsehood or lies, even to the death of the transgressor (Psa 31:5; Joh 14:6; Joh 14:17; Act 5:3, etc.).

Especially is truth a name given to the religion of Jesus, in opposition to that of the Jew and that of the heathen. As contrasted with the Jewish system, it was the truth in the sense of reality, as distinguished from the emblems, symbols, representations, of that reality; from the shadow of good things to come, contained in the Levitical law in this sense it is that the apostle tells us the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. As contrasted with paganism, Christianity was truth opposed to falsehood. The heathen mythology not only was not true, but was not even supposed as true: it not only deserved no faith, but it demanded none. Jesus inaugurated a new way of propagating a religion, by inviting converts not to conform to its institutions, but to believe and to to let their actions be agreeable to truth: nothing, then, was more natural than that Christianity should receive names expressive of this grand peculiarity, the truth and the faith. See Whately, Essays on Difficulties of St. Paul, essay 1.

Fuente: Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature

Truth

Used in various senses in Scripture. In Prov. 12:17, 19, it denotes that which is opposed to falsehood. In Isa. 59:14, 15, Jer. 7:28, it means fidelity or truthfulness. The doctrine of Christ is called “the truth of the gospel” (Gal. 2:5), “the truth” (2 Tim. 3:7; 4:4). Our Lord says of himself, “I am the way, and the truth” (John 14:6).

Fuente: Easton’s Bible Dictionary

Truth

The general Hebrew word for truth or truthfulness, and faith or faithfulness, is a derivative of the verb Aman (, Ass. amanu), whence the word Amen draws its origin. Aman in its simple active form signifies to nurse or nourish up; in the passive, to be firm and established, and hence steadfast (Pro 11:13); and in the Hiphil or causative form, to take as established, and hence to regard as true, to realise, or to believe. The last is its most general rendering. The A. V. translates it ‘to have assurance’ in Deu 28:66; and ‘to trust’ in Jdg 11:20; Job 4:18; Job 12:20; Job 15:15; Job 15:31; and Mic 7:5. A form of this word is translated pillars in 2Ki 18:16; compare 1Ti 3:15, ‘the pillar and ground of the truth.’

In Dan 3:14, where the A. V. reads, ‘ is it true, O Shadrach?’ another word () is used, which signifies of a purpose or intentionally in Dan 3:24; Dan 6:12; Dan 7:16; Dan 7:19, itsev (), to be firm or settled, is rendered true.

The form emeth () is usually rendered truth, but is translated right in Gen 24:48; Neh 9:33; Jer 2:21. The form Emunah, generally rendered faithfulness, is found in Hab 2:4, [This passage might be rendered ‘the righteous (man) shall live in his faithfulness.’ The note on the text in Poole’s ‘Synopsis’ is as follows:–‘Qui bonus probusque est manebit constans in expectatione eorum quae dixi, ‘the good and upright man will continue firm in the expectation of those things which I have declared.’ Certainly faith, in this passage, is something more than a bare acquiescence in God’s word. It is such a belief in the revealed word of God as brings the man into contact with the Divine life, and so breathes righteousness or conformity to God’s law into his heart. It worketh, as St. Paul says, by love. Compare Bishop Lightfoot’s excursus on Faith in his Commentary on the Galatians.] where we read, ‘The just shall live by his faith’–words which ought to be read in connection with the fifth verse of the first chapter, ‘I will work a work in your days which ye will not believe, though it be told you.’ Emunah is used of the steadiness of the hands of Moses in Exo 17:12; and of the stability of the times in Isa 33:6 in several other passages it is used of God’s faithfulness; and it would have been well if this rendering had been adopted (instead of truth) in Deu 32:4; Psa 33:4; Psa 96:13; Psa 98:3; Psa 100:5; Psa 119:30. See also Pro 12:17.

The LXX almost always adopts , to believe, as the rendering for the causative form of Aman, as in Gen 15:6, where it first occurs. The adjective is sometimes rendered , faithful; and sometimes , real or true. When these two Greek words come together in the N.T. as characterising the glorified son of God, they express the Hebrew word in all its fulness, and answer to the ‘Amen,’ by which title He is also described. [See Rev 3:14, also Rev 19:11; Rev 21:5; Rev 22:6. ‘Amen’ is usually rendered , verily, or , so be it, in the LXX; and only three times do we find the word in its Greek form . Dr. Sayce points out that at the end of many Babylonian hymns we find amamu.] The substantive is usually , faith; but sometimes , truth.

Fuente: Synonyms of the Old Testament

TRUTH

There are various meanings of the word truth in the Bible, some of which are similar to those we use today. A person or thing may be true, meaning the opposite of false (Deu 13:14; Pro 12:19; Rom 9:1; see LIE) or the opposite of insincere (Gen 42:16; Php 1:18; 1Jn 3:18; see HYPOCRISY). A thing may be called true in contrast to that which is only a shadow or picture (Joh 1:9; Joh 15:1; Heb 9:24; see TYPE). The Bible often uses true with the meaning of reliable, faithful or trustworthy (Gen 24:49; Gen 47:29; Psa 57:10; Rev 22:6).

God is truth

All these meanings are in some way applied to God (Psa 19:9; Jer 10:9-10; Jer 42:5; Mic 6:20; Rom 3:4; 1Th 1:9; Rev 16:7). Truth is Gods very nature. He is the basic reality from which everything else springs (Joh 1:3-4; Joh 1:14; Joh 8:26; Rom 1:25). God became human in Jesus, and therefore Jesus is truth in human form (Joh 14:6; Eph 4:21; Rev 3:7). As the Old Testament spoke of the God of truth or, to use the related word, the God of the Amen (Isa 65:16), so the New Testament speaks of Jesus as the Amen. He is the one in whom Gods truth is perfectly expressed, and through whom Gods promises are perfectly fulfilled (Joh 1:17; 2Co 1:20; Rev 3:14; see AMEN).

Jesus spoke repeatedly about the truth, and those who come to know him come to know the truth. Thereby they are freed from the bondage of sin, brought into a living relationship with the true God, and indwelt by him who is the Spirit of truth (Joh 8:32; Joh 14:17; Joh 16:13; Joh 17:3; 2Jn 1:1-2).

Truth, in the sense spoken of by Jesus, saves people, for it represents the full saving activity of God through Jesus Christ. Jesus life and teaching were directed towards revealing and fulfilling Gods truth (Joh 1:17; Joh 8:32; Joh 8:45-46; Joh 17:17; Joh 17:19; Joh 18:37). A natural development from this was to speak of truth as referring to the whole body of Christian teaching (2Co 4:2; Gal 2:5; Gal 5:7; Eph 1:13; 1Ti 2:4; 2Ti 2:15). This is in keeping with the Old Testament usage of truth as applying to the revealed Word of God (Psa 25:5; Psa 86:11; Psa 119:142; see REVELATION).

Christian character

Truth in all its aspects should characterize the lives of those who have come under the rule of him who is the truth (Exo 18:21; Psa 26:3; Joh 3:21; 2Co 13:8; Eph 4:15; Eph 4:25; Eph 6:14; Tit 1:2; Heb 6:18; 3Jn 1:4). Having become obedient to the truth, they must be loyal to the truth, without any trace of falsehood, insincerity or unfaithfulness (1Co 5:8; 2Co 4:2; Gal 4:16; 1Pe 1:22).

Their possession of Gods truth, however, is no reason for Christians to claim absolute authority for their own theories or opinions. The human mind is limited and, like all human capacities and abilities, is affected by sin (1Co 8:2). God alone is the possessor of absolute truth (Isa 55:8-9; Rom 11:33-34; see KNOWLEDGE).

Fuente: Bridgeway Bible Dictionary

Truth

TRUTH.Apart from the adverbial phrases of a truth (Mar 12:32, Luk 4:25) and truly (e.g. Mar 14:70, Luk 9:27; Luk 12:44), which are used in their ordinary colloquial sense (cf. Dalman, Words of Jesus, p. 227), the only occurrence of this term in the Synoptic Gospels is in the hypocritical address of the Pharisees and Herodians to Jesus (Mat 22:16, Mar 12:14, Luk 20:21), where these soi-disant inquirers compliment Him on His sincerity as a teacher. Here loyalty to the truth is opposed to the disingenuous spirit that allows itself to be swayed by fear or flattery. The impression made by Jesus on His opponents was one of fearless honesty and candour; He was no casuist or time-server, and it was His recognized character of religious frankness and veracity which suggested their trap. For all His sympathies, they knew He would be straightforward. They could count upon His telling dangerous and unpleasant truths, no matter what His word might cost Him. He had the courage without which truthfulness is impossible, and these Jews were cunning enough to trade upon His very virtues.

In the Fourth Gospel, however, truth is used in a special, pregnant sense, characteristic of the writer and of his age. It is one of the leading categories or themes of the book, and its proportions, as well as its perspective, are entirely different from anything in the Synoptics. Occasionally, no doubt, the ordinary sense of the term occurs, as in the phrases about true witness (Joh 5:31-32; Joh 21:24), or credible statements (Joh 8:14); here, as elsewhere, the word means no more than veracity, and its adjective represents trustworthy (cf. Joh 10:41 with Joh 7:18, Joh 8:16 f., Joh 8:40; Joh 8:46 and Joh 16:7). In Pilates remark, Truth! what is truth? (Joh 18:38), however, we are on the way to a more definite conception. There is, no doubt, in this scene the implied censure of a false attitude to truth, as Cowper has pointed out.

But what is truth? Twas Pilates question put

To Truth itself, that deigned him no reply.

And wherefore? will not God impart His light

To them that ask it?Freelytis His joy,

His glory and His nature, to impart.

But to the proud, uncandid, insincere,

Or negligent inquirer, not a spark.

(Task, bk. iii. 1. 270).

Truth, in this passage, however, has the further connotation of speculative or abstract knowledge, and the majority of the references throughout the Gospel are tinged by such associations. They converge on the principle that the spiritual is the real, and that the truth of human life is attainable only in relation to Christ, who is at once the true Life of God and the true means whereby men appropriate that Divine and absolute nature.

Two small linguistic problems lie at the threshold of any attempt to investigate the meaning of truth in the Fourth Gospel. (a) Attempts have been made, notably by Wendt (e.g. in SK [Note: K Studien und Kritiken.] , 1883, p. 511 f., and Teaching of Jesus, i. p. 259 f.), to read as equivalent to faithfulness or rectitude, on the analogy of the LXX Septuagint rendering ( ) for the Hebrew original of grace and truth. Certainly, in Joh 1:14; Joh 1:17, the OT antithesis is unmistakable. But, apart from the fact that is substituted for , the author is evidently using truth. here in a deeper and special meaning of his own. The general usage of the term throughout the Gospel, whether as applied to God or man, cannot be explained by faithfulness or righteous conduct, any more than by mere veracity. Even where the OT form of expression is retained, the content and the substance of the thought are extended and intensified. (b) A cognate difficulty is occasioned by the use of two adjectives, and , in connexion with (see ExpT [Note: xpT Expository Times.] xv. [1904] 505, xvi. 4243). No rigid distinction can be drawn between them in the Gospel (note the variant in Joh 8:16), as if they were equivalent precisely to verax and verus. The latter may be translated true, in the sense of real, as opposed to what is counterfeit (Joh 15:1) or transient and inadequate (Joh 1:9, Joh 6:32; Joh 6:51); but often what is true, in the sense of veracious and sincere, is thereby substantial, the sole reality amid the shadows of falsehood, just as God, who is true (cf. Field, ON [Note: N Otium Norvicense.] iii. p. 104), as opposed to deceptive and disappointing idols, is also real, in the sense of being living and lasting. Hence (Joh 8:26) and (Joh 7:28) are applied equally to God (cf. Joh 3:33), as the Father who has sent the Son, while the former adjective is used (e.g. in Joh 6:55) where the latter, in the sense of real or genuine, would have been equally appropriate (cf. Joh 6:32, Joh 1:9).

Truth, in this specific sense, forms one of the nuclei of the Fourth Gospel. It is equivalent either to the knowledge of Gods being and will, or to the Divine being and will itself; in other words, it represents the higher and heavenly reality of things, transcendent and absolute, and corresponds generally to light (cf. Joh 1:8; Joh 5:33) in its sphere and functions. Like the light, however, the truth is not an abstract entity, much less an intellectual system, to the author, but this Divine reality as manifested in the incarnate Logos, as revealed in the Son. He is the Truth (Joh 14:6); He and it are identified (cf. Joh 8:32; Joh 8:36). All else is transitory and unsubstantial. Whatever appears to compete with this truth is either counterfeit or merely relative. Jesus, as the perfect Son of God, is the final and adequate embodiment of Gods saving will; and the common term for that heavenly nature, in relation to mans errors and ignorance, is the truth. But the errors and ignorance against which it has to struggle are moral rather than intellectual. It is truth to be done (Joh 3:21), not speculation to be understood. The prerequisite for coming to the light of the Logos is a sound moral disposition, faithfulness to the light of conscience, and genuine sincerity of thought and deed. Such is the point pressed by the author of this Gospel. He was surrounded by a world which included earnest seekers for the truth (cf. Joh 12:20 ff.) and so-called philosophers or religious theorists, in Judaism and paganism, who refused to accept the Christian estimate of Jesus, and probably preferred Gnostic presentations of communion with God. To meet both of these contemporary currents, he states his conception of Christ as the Truth. With that Christ all truly sincere souls have an affinity, which, if allowed to develop naturally, will bring them into touch with Him. On the other hand, the objections to Christ, often paraded on intellectual grounds, are run back to moral defects, and failure to see the reality of God in Christ is attributed to some unreality or human character.

The roots of this unique conception may partly be found in Philo, but ultimately they run back to Platonism and the later Stoicism (cf. Grill, p. 204 f.), while even Egyptian theology had crowned the god Thoth with the attribute of the Logos (cf. Reitzenstein, Zwei religionsgesch. Fragen, pp. 56, 80 f.). But the distinctive usage of the Fourth Gospel lies in its correlation of this conception with the historic personality of Jesus Christ. The Asiatic-Greek audience for which the book was immediately composed, learnt that He was a king of truth (Joh 18:36), instead of being king of some realm whose Jewish Messianic associations failed to impress Hellenic readers. This was a timely presentation of the Gospel. It was a reading of Christs personality which could not fail to commend itself to those for whom the more local and national associations of Judaism, or of Jewish Christianity, had lost much, if not all, of their interest and appeal. Hence the emphasis on the two realms of truth and falsehood, or of reality and unreality, which, like the cognate antithesis of light and darkness, helps to body forth the moral dualism of the Gospel. The opposition of men to Christ as the Logos is referred to their connexion with the realm of the devil (Joh 8:40 f.), whose hereditary policy is hatred of the Divine truth. The author does not speculate on any fall of the devil, nor does he discuss the origin of this cosmic feud; he is content to trace it through history, in the practical experience of mankind. Truth and falsehood, reality and unreality, light and darkness, are set in juxtaposition. His Christ is a King of Truth. He reigns as Himself holy and true, by the power of the truth which He revealstruth in the conscience, truth in the heart, and truth in the mindand over those who, through His grace and spirit, have become fundamentally true; who stand in the eternal, abiding relationship of peace and love and holiness towards God (Reith, The Gospel of John, ii. p. 138). The contrast between this and the realm of falsehood and unreality is moral, rather than metaphysical, for the writer, though the metaphysical basis is plain.

Hence there is a distinction between the witness borne to the truth by John the Baptist (Joh 5:33) and that borne by Christ (Joh 8:40, Joh 18:37). The former passage (where the truth is meant to cover more than its ordinary sense, although the language of the latter is employed) is in the line of Joh 1:7 f., 1Jn 1:9 f. But when Jesus is said to bear witness to the truth, or to tell the truth, it is in the sense that He bears witness to Himself (Joh 8:14) as the Truth. His whole Person and work are an adequate revelation of the Fathers inner being. To see Him is to see the Father. His witness, therefore, consists in what may be termed His loyalty to Himself, and His devotion to that vocation of being true to Gods will for which He became incarnate, and from which no fear of death could deter Him (cf. Lidgett, The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement, p. 24 f.). A further line of witness to the truth of God is afforded by those who accept the revelation of Christ (Joh 3:33). Their adhesion to the truth affords to the world fresh evidence of the truths power; they, as it were, accredit the transcendent purpose of God by their obedience to it as the moral ideal of their life. This is indicated already in the Prologue by the words we beheld we have all received. Finally, there is the living witness of the Spirit of Truth (see below) in the Church, which, unlike the so-called Gnostic revelations of fresh knowledge, is ever loyal to the historical personality of Christ, and aims consistently at glorifying, instead of obscuring or diminishing, the vital significance of His life for the human soul.

This note is struck loudly and clearly at the very outset, in the Prologue: And the Logos became flesh and dwelt among us. And we beheld his glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth. For of his fulness we have all received, even grace upon grace. For the law was given through Moses: grace and truth came through Jesus Christ (Joh 1:14; Joh 1:16-17). Here, just as the conception of the Truth is subordinated to that of the Way in Joh 14:5-6, the aspect of grace controls that of truth. Religion, in this definition, is not the arduous aspiration of mans soul, stretching up wistfully to communion with God, but the gracious revelation of God to men through the Person of Jesus Christ; the initiative is on Gods side; and the Divine nature, in its absolute reality, is mediated for the soul by Christ alone, not by any number of theosophic aeons. All that either the OT economy or contemporary Gnosticism could offer the soul was a partial disclosure of Gods inner being. Time-honoured and plausible as rival methods might be, they were at best imperfect. The full revelation was in Christ as the Logos or Son of God par excellence, the Truth of God, and therefore of man, amid shadows and appearances. He is the revealer, or rather the revelation Himself. His personality is the sum and substance of that Divine essence which He alone can communicate in all its fulness to believing men, and through which men realize themselves fully. He is the true way to life. The author emphasizes this central and primary conception on two lines. Not only does he change the mercy of the Gr. OT into grace,a change which is all the more significant that this great Pauline term never recurs in the Gospel,but the companion idea of truth (cf. Exo 34:6) is expanded from faithfulness or veracity to what a modern might describe as the absolute character of the Divine Being, an inner, heavenly reality, or rather the Reality, which Christ alone (Joh 1:18) could disclose. The truth of God is thus neither information to be gained, nor dogmas to be supernaturally revealed, but is at once personal and full of initiative. It is God Himself manifesting His essential life to the faith and need of man. As Maurice once put it, Truth must be a person seeking us, if we are to seek him.

While this mission and ministry of the truth have reached their climax in the brief earthly life of Jesus, the latter phase was only its final, not its first manifestation. Like the Light, the Truth has been in the world prior to its absolute revelation and embodiment in Christ the Logos (Joh 3:20-21). In all ages, and from all quarters (cf. Joh 18:37), Christ draws to Himself those who practise the truth. In the OT and elsewhere (Jos 2:14 [LXX Septuagint ], Ps-Sol 17:17 with , cf. Psa 83:12) this phrase means simply to deal truly or to act sincerely, according to the context. The author of this Gospel, however, follows his usual method of putting into such phrases a deeper and specific content, so that here it denotes rather the active exercise and practical manifestation by good people of what corresponds to Gods real character. To practise the truth is a synonym for doing works in God (Joh 3:21). This is independent of nationality. It is also evidently intended to cover the pre-Christian era; or rather, according to this Gospel, the history of humanity, prior to the coming of Christ, was not wholly out of touch with the true Spirit and Life of God (Joh 1:5; Joh 1:9). The present passage, taken along with a remark like that of Joh 18:37 (every one that is of the truth heareth my voice), suggests a view of paganism similar to that of Rom 2:12 f. Furthermore, it implies that men grasp this truth of God by the exercise of their entire moral nature. The reality of God, as Spirit and as Personal Life, cannot be known except by real men, by those whose character is real to the core. The conditions of that personal knowledge are singleness of mind, purity of conscience, and openness of heart. It is the exercise of these that brings a man into permanent touch with the reality of the Divine nature as manifested in Christ. The locus classicus for this profound conception is Joh 7:17; although the term truth does not occur there, the identification of disinterestedness and candour with the genuine spirit of truth (cf. Joh 7:18) shows that the idea was in the writers mind.

This inwardness, with its corollary of freedom from national or local cults, is brought out with especial clearness in the well-known definition of Christian worship (Joh 4:23-24), where truth is associated with spirit. In contrast to external and ritual worship, the genuine worshipper must approach God inwardly; it is like to like, as in Joh 3:2 f. The spiritual is the inward, the real. As Gods nature is such, His worshippers must correspond to Him; and if worship is offered in the spirit, it is thereby genuine. A similar antithesis to the symbolic and unsubstantial worship of the OT underlies Joh 17:17-19, where truth, in a certain abstract sense, denotes the eternal reality of the Divine nature as revealed to men, the ideal or truth of life realized in Christ, and, through Him, in His people. By His consecration or devotion of Himself to the fulfilment of this purpose of revelation, Christ makes it possible for His disciples to be consecrated to Gods servicea consecration which, as the double meaning of the term allows, implies personal purification from sin. Negatively, the vocation is equivalent to a deliverance from the stains and illusions of the transient world, which is superior to the OT ritual. Positively, it denotes an adherence to the cause of God. His name and His truth are the same. They represent the reality of the Divine revelation in Christ, with the twofold antithesis, running through the entire Gospel, between this final revelation and the inadequate OT religion on the one hand, and contemporary philosophic or theosophic speculations about truth on the other.

A further application of this freedom, inherent in the absolute and inward character of the Christian revelation, occurs in the debate (cf. Peyton, Memorabilia of Jesus, p. 446 f.) between Jesus and the Jews in Joh 8:31 f.a passage which reproduces the great Pauline ideas of Gal 3:7 to Gal 5:13, although redemption as usual is included under the aspect of revelation, rather than vice versa. The effects of truth, when received by men, are here described summarily as freedom (Joh 8:32 f.). The argument is this. As the Father seeks true worshippers, whose note is spirituality, so the Son seeks true disciples, whose characteristic is loyal adherence to His teaching, i.e. to Himself (cf. Joh 8:32; Joh 8:36) as the revelation of the Father. Adherence or obedience of this kind yields a knowledge of Gods real nature; it initiates men into the true purpose and mind of the Father, and invests them with the Divine nature itself (Joh 17:3). Their knowledge, that is to say, is not a process of abstract learning. There is no intellectualism about it. It is not a mastery of theosophic principles or subtle theories, but participation in a personal Life. And contact with this brings a verve and independence into life, a simplicity and a reality, a freedom from bondage and legalism, which can be attained only by a nature whose capacities are set free to realize themselves fully. In another aspect, freedom may be considered as deliverance from sin; although such a reference is not excluded even in Joh 8:32, it is definitely suggested in Joh 17:19, where participation in the Divine life is made to involve personal purification, through the death of Christ. What men needed was to be sanctified, that is, to be consecrated to God. It was not in their powersurely no reason can be conceived for this, but that which lies in their sinto consecrate themselves, and what they were not able to do for themselves Christ did for them in His own person. He consecrated Himself to God in His death (Denney, The Death of Christ, p. 269).

A third aspect of this inward and absolute knowledge of God in Christ is presented in the conception of the Spirit or Paraclete throughout the closing chapters (1417). Considered under the category of a liberating power, these references to the function of the Spirit of Truth (which, it is curious to recollect, were applied to Mohammed by Mohammedan divines) may be defined as a presentation of the liberating effect of the truth, as opposed to traditional and antiquarian views of Jesus which, even within the Church, might restrict the full appreciation of His Person. The author had to meet a twofold danger, and he chose to state his new conception of Christ and Christianity in the form of a Gospel, not of a treatise or an Epistle. One reason for this, as he suggests in the sayings reproduced in Joh 15:26 and Joh 16:13, is his heartfelt conviction that the Person of Christ is the sum and substance of the Divine revelation, and that no fresh statements or progressive views, such as those promulgated by Cerinthus and other Gnostics, are authoritative unless they represent elements already present by implication in the words and works of the incarnate Logos. The deeper interpretation of Christ, with which he came forward to meet the requirement of a later age, is none other than a fresh discovery of latent truths in Christ. The influence of the Spirit on the consciousness of the Church is not directed to the manufacture of independent oracles or to the task of striking out original additions to the revelation of Christ, which would render the latter, in any sense, superfluous or inferior. The test of all such new interpretations is their loyalty to the historic manifestation of the Logos. The Spirit of Truth, bestowed by Christ upon His Church (Joh 14:16 f.), recalls to the mind of all true disciples the bearing and meaning of Christs own teachings; he shall bear witness of me he shall guide you into all the truth (for a different reading in Jerome, etc., cf. Nestles Einfhrung2 [Note: designates the particular edition of the work referred] , p. 98), for he shall not speak from himself he shall glorify me, for he shall take of mine, and shall declare it unto you (cf. Bruce, The Training of the Twelve, pp. 376 f., 418 f.). This great definition of the right and limitations of true freedom of movement within the Christian consciousness, safeguards it alike against the abuses of Gnostic speculation and the disinclination to advance beyond the Jewish-Christian, or rigidly Messianic, interpretation of Christs Person which had been promulgated by the first generation of the disciples. To know Christ after the flesh was far from exhausting the significance of His Person. His Spirit, i.e. His living presence in the Christian Church and consciousness, had still more to unfold of truth and grace. Hence one privilege of being in contact with this Truth, as embodied in Christ, is that disciples, no longer in touch with the earthly Jesus, are fitted to adapt it to varying conditions, to see it in ever fresh bearings, and to apply it with inexhaustible power, while at the same time they preserve its essential meaning. Their training in it, so far from involving any disloyalty to it, is a part of their fidelity to its principles.

They who follow the Spirits guidance will not receive an illumination enabling them to dispense with truth, but the enablement to lay hold of truth. On the one hand, the Truth given in Christ will need from age to age His expounding to unlock its stores; and, on the other hand, the faith in Him and His office in the present shall never loosen men from the Gospel given once for all, or draw them away from the eternal Father, by enabling any voice born only of the present to seem wholly Divine. Standing fast in the unchanging Truth, and an endless progress in taking knowledge of it shall be indissolubly united (Hort, The Way, the Truth, and the Life, p. 58 f.).

Thus, while the author carefully and stringently safeguards the future revelations of religious truth by limiting them to the sphere of the historical Logos, he contemplates fresh advances in the apprehension of Christ (Joh 16:13), just as he does in the practical extension of the Church (Joh 17:20). Revelations in the future, and of the future, fall within the scope of the Spirit of Truth. The latter is not fettered by the past. This prophetic function of the Spirit may seem rather one-sided (so Beyschlag, NT Theol. i. 282) as compared with its ethical presentation in Paul. But it is in line with the Synoptic tradition, where the Spirit is primarily, if not entirely, a spirit of witness; while the other, more ethical aspect, is at least suggested in the context (cf. Joh 14:16-17). The truth or reality of the Divine life, at any rate, includes the future (cf. Psa 25:5 [LXX Septuagint ]); as indeed it must, if Gods purpose is a developing plan throughout history and experience, and if this truth or reality is personal. For as a personality is ex hyothesi full of resources and surprises, the richer is its life. Its spirit must be a perennial self-expression, conditioned only by the receptive powers of men. Consequently the aim of the Fourth Gospel, in these allusions to the progressive witness of the Spirit of Truth, in the future and of the future, is to prevent loyalty to the historic essence of Christianity from degenerating into stagnant adherence to an institution or a creed. What Jesus said, as Cyprian used to insist, was: I am the Truth, not, I am Tradition. Christ is Gods last Word to the world. But, as the writer strikingly implies in the phrase, The Spirit shall guide you into all the truth, the full interpretation of that Word was not attained by the primitive generation of the disciples. They had no monopoly of it. Most friends of truth, said Vinet, love it as Frederick the Great [Note: reat Cranmers Great Bible 1539.] loved music. It used to be said of him that, strictly speaking, he was not fond of music but of the flute, and not indeed fond of the flute but of his flute. It is to prevent any religious aberration of this kind that such words of the Fourth Gospel are put forward. They express the spirit of Christs revelation, which cannot be held by a trivial or narrow life, any more than it can be selfishly grasped or adequately weighed by the most advanced age of Christendom.

Literature.The conception of truth in the Fourth Gospel is handled by all the editors, notably by Westcott and Oscar Holtzmann. Besides the special essays of Wendt (see above) and Rling (NKZ [Note: KZ Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift.] , 1895, 625 f.), see Schrencks Die johann. Anschauung vom Leben (1898), p. 86 f.; J. Grill, Undersuchungen ber die Entstehung des vierten Evang. (1902) pp. 201206; E [Note: Elohist.] . A. Abbott, Johannine Vocabulary (1703, 1727); V. H. Stanton in Hasting’s Dictionary of the Bible iv. 816820; Cheyne in EBi [Note: Bi Encyclopaedia Biblica.] 52175219; Weiss, NT Theol. (English translation ) ii. 147; H. J. Holtzmann, NT Theol. ii. p. 375 f.; Hort, The Way, the Truth, and the Life (1894), p. 41 f.; Du Bose, Soteriology of NT, pp. 291 f., 297 f.; R H. Hutton, Theological Essays (p. 18 f.); Phillips Brooks, The Influence of Jesus (p. 142 f.); E. F. Scott, The Fourth Gospel, 253 ff.

James Moffatt.

Fuente: A Dictionary Of Christ And The Gospels

Truth

TRUTH

1. In OT (meth, mnh).Firmness or stability is the fundamental idea of the root, and to this radical thought most of the uses of the Heb. nouns may be traced. Often they signify truth in the common meaning of the word, the correspondence, viz., between speech and fact (Deu 13:14, Pro 12:17). At first the standards of veracity were low (Gen 12:11 ff; Gen 20:2 ff; Gen 26:7 ff; Gen 27:18 ff. etc.); but truthfulness in witness-bearing is a commandment of the Decalogue (Exo 20:18), and from the prophetic age onwards falsehood of every kind is recognized as a grave sin (Hos 4:2, Psa 59:12, Pro 12:22). See, further, Lie. Sometimes truth denotes justice as administered by a ruler or a judge (Exo 18:21, Pro 20:28), and, in particular, by the Messianic King (Psa 45:4, Isa 42:3). Frequently it denotes faithfulness, especially the faithfulness of a man to God (2Ki 20:3) and of God to men (Gen 32:10). When God is described as a God of truth, His faithfulness to His promises may be especially in view (Psa 31:5). But not far away is the sense of living reality in distinction from the lying vanities in which those trust to whom Jahweh is unknown (Psa 31:6; cf. Deu 32:4). In some later canonical writings there appears a use of truth or the truth as equivalent to Divine revelation (Dan 8:12; Dan 9:13), or as a synonym for the wisdom in which the true philosophy of life consists (Pro 23:23). In the Apocr. [Note: Apocrypha, Apocryphal.] books this use becomes frequent (1Es 4:33 ff., Wis 3:9, Sir 4:28 etc.).

2. In NT (altheia).The Gr. word (which is employed in LXX [Note: Septuagint.] to render both meth and mnh) has the fundamental meaning of reality, as opposed to mere appearance or false pretence. From this the sense of veracity comes quite naturally; and veracity finds a high place among the NT virtues. The OT law forbade the bearing of false witness against ones neighbour; the law of Christ enjoins truth-speaking in all social intercourse (Eph 4:25), and further demands that this truth-speaking shall be animated by love (Eph 4:15; cf. Eph 4:25 for we are members one of another).

Special attention must be paid to some distinctive employments of the word. (a) In the Pauline writings there is a constant use of the truth to describe Gods will as revealedprimarily to the reason and conscience of the natural man (Rom 1:18; Rom 1:25), but especially in the gospel of Jesus Christ (2Co 4:2, Gal 3:1 etc.). The truth thus becomes synonymous with the gospel (Eph 1:13; cf. Gal 2:5; Gal 2:14 etc., where the truth of the gospel evidently means the truth declared in the gospel). In the Pastoral Epistles the gospel as the truth or the word of truth appears to be passing into the sense of a settled body of Christian doctrine (1Ti 3:15, 2Ti 2:16 etc.). It is to be noted that, though the above usages are most characteristic of the Pauline cycle of writings, they are occasionally to be found elsewhere, e.g. Heb 10:26, Jam 1:18, 1Pe 1:22, 2Pe 1:12.

(b) In the Johannine books (with the exception of Rev.) altheia is a leading and significant term in a sense that is quite distinctive (cf. light and life). To Pilates question, What is truth? (Joh 18:38), Jesus gave no answer. But He had just declared that He came into the world to bear witness unto the truth (Joh 18:37), and the Fourth Gospel might be described as an elaborate exposition of the nature of the truth as revealed by Jesus, and of the way in which He revealed it. In John the truth stands for the absolute Divine reality as distinguished from all existence that is false or merely seeming (cf. Joh 8:40 ff., where Jesus contrasts His Father, from whom He had heard the truth, with your father the devil, who stood not in the truth, because there is no truth in him). Jesus came from the bosom of the Father (Joh 1:18), and truth came by Him (Joh 1:17) because as the Word of God He was full of it (Joh 1:14). The truth is incarnated and personalized in Jesus, and so He is Himself the Truth (Joh 14:6). The truth which resides in His own Person He imparts to His disciples (Joh 8:31 f.); and on His departure He bestows the Spirit of truth to abide with them and be in them for ever (Joh 14:17). Hence the truth is in the Christian as the very groundwork and essence of his spiritual being (1Jn 1:8; 1Jn 2:4, 2Jn 1:2). It is there both as a moral and as an intellectual qualitystanding midway, as it were, between life and light, two other ruling Johannine ideas with which it is closely associated. Primarily it is a moral power. It makes Christs disciples free (Joh 8:32)free i.e., as the context shows, from the bondage of sin (Joh 8:33 ff.). It has a sanctifying force (Joh 17:17-19); it ensures the keeping of the commandments (1Jn 2:4) and the life of Christian love (1Jn 3:18 f.). And, while subjectively it is a moral influence, objectively it is a moral vocationsomething not only to be known (Joh 8:32) and believed (Joh 8:45 f.), but requiring to be done (Joh 3:21, 1Jn 1:6). From this moral quality of the truth, however, there springs a power of spiritual Illumination. The truth that is life passes into the truth that is light (Joh 3:21). Every one that is of the truth heareth Christs voice (Joh 18:37); if any man willeth to do His will, he shall know of the doctrine (Joh 7:17); the Spirit of truth, when He is come, shall guide the disciples into all the truth (Joh 16:13).

J. C. Lambert.

Fuente: Hastings’ Dictionary of the Bible

Truth

If I detain the reader at this word, it is not simply to explain what is not plain as to require no comment, as the word is in itself, but it is to remind the reader how sweetly and graciously the Lord Jesus hath applied it to himself, and determined that this is one of his precious names, which, for fragrancy, is as ointment poured forth, (See Joh 14:6) And this is what the Holy Ghost by the wise man meant, when he recommended the church “to buy the truth, and sell it not.” (Pro 23:23)

Who can contemplate the Lord Jesus Christ under this most blessed character, without joining the apostle in his expressive account of Jesus-“This is the true God and eternal life.” (1Jn 5:20) For surely Jesus is the whole sum and substance of all the truths of God; in his divine nature the true God, and eternal life; in his human nature the true man, whom it behoved to be made like unto his brethren in all things; and in the union of both, the true glory-man, and only Mediator between God and man, the man, Christ Jesus, Hail, blessed Lord! I would say, thou art indeed “the way, and the truth, and the life. No man cometh to the Father but by thee: all that the Father giveth thee shall come to thee: and none that cometh unto thee, wilt thou in any wise cast out.” (Joh 6:37) See Testimony.

Fuente: The Poor Mans Concordance and Dictionary to the Sacred Scriptures

Truth

trooth (, ’emeth, , ’emunah, primary idea of firmness, stability (compare Exo 17:12), hence constancy, faithfulness, etc.; the Septuagint’s Apocrypha and the New Testament, , aletheia (Rom 3:7), , pstis (Rom 3:3); in adjectival and adverbial sense, in truth, of a truth, faithful, etc.; , alethos (Luk 21:3; Joh 6:14; Joh 7:40; 1Th 2:13); , alethinos (Joh 17:3); , ontos (1Co 14:25); , pistos (1Ti 3:1); in the King James Version; the Revised Version (British and American), the American Standard Revised Version, as generally, faithful; Anglo-Saxon: treow, tryw with Teutonic stem, trau, to believe, to keep faith):

I.TERMS

II.GENERAL VIEW

1.Aspects of Truth

(1)Ontological

(2)Logical

(3)Moral

(4)Religious

2.Standards of Truth

3.Special Features in Biblical Writings

III.ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

1.Truth in God

2.Truth in Man

3.Truth in Religion

I. Terms.

The English word has developed and maintained the broadest, most general and varied usage, going beyond both Hebrew and Greek, which were already extended in connotation. It is possible to analyze and classify the special applications of the term almost indefinitely, using other terms to indicate specific meanings in special connections, e.g. loyalty (Jdg 9:15); honesty (Exo 18:21); fidelity (Deu 32:4); justice (Rom 2:2); uprightness (Isa 38:3); faith (Isa 26:2); righteousness (Psa 85:10); reality (Joh 17:19); veracity (Gen 42:16). It is unfortunate that translators have generally adhered to single terms to represent the original words. On the other hand, they have sometimes introduced words not represented in the original, and thus unduly limited the meaning. An example is Eph 4:15, where the original meaning being true, i.e. in all respects, is narrowed to speaking the truth.

II. General View.

No term is more familiar and none more difficult of definition.

With applications in every phase of life and thought the word has varying general senses which may be classified as:

1. Aspects of Truth:

(1) Ontological

Ontological truth, i.e. accurate and adequate idea of existence as ultimate reality. In this sense it is a term of metaphysics, and will be differently defined according to the type of philosophical theory accepted. This aspect of truth is never primary in Scripture unless in the question of Pilate (Joh 18:38). He had so far missed the profound ethical sense in which Jesus used the word that Jesus did not at all answer him, nor, indeed, does Pilate seem to have expected any reply to what was probably only the contemptuous thrust of a skeptical attitude. In Proverbs where, if at all, we might look for the abstract idea, we find rather the practical apprehension of the true meaning and method of life (Pro 23:23). Ontological reality and possible ideas of reality apprehending it are obviously presupposed in all Scripture. There is objective reality on which subjective ideas depend for their validity; and all knowing is knowledge of reality. There is also in the whole of Scripture a subjective idea, the product of revelation or inspiration in some form of working, that constitutes an ideal to be realized objectively. The Kingdom of God, for example, is the formative idea of Scripture teaching. In a definite sense the kingdom exists and still it is to be created. It must be kept in mind, however, that only vaguely and indirectly does truth have abstract, meta-physical meaning to the Biblical writers. For John it approaches this, but the primary interest is always concrete.

(2) Logical

Logical truth is expressive of the relation between the knower and that which is known, and depends upon the arrangement of ideas with reference to a central or composite idea. Truth in this sense involves the correspondence of concepts with facts. While this meaning of truth is involved in Scripture, it is not the primary meaning anywhere, save in a practical religious application, as in Eph 4:21; 1Jo 2:4, 1Jo 2:21.

(3) Moral

Moral truth is correspondence of expression with inner conception. Taken in its full meaning of correspondence of idea with fact, of expression with thought and with intention, of concrete reality with ideal type, this is the characteristic sense of the word in the Scriptures. Here the aim of religion is to relate man to God in accordance with truth. In apprehension man is to know God and His order as they are in fact and in idea. In achievement, man is to make true in his own experience the idea of God that is given to him. Truth is thus partly to be apprehended and partly to be produced. The emphatically characteristic teaching of Christianity is that the will to produce truth, to do the will of God, is the requisite attitude for apprehending the truth. This teaching of Jesus in Joh 7:17 is in accord with the entire teaching of the Bible. Eph 1:18 suggests the importance of right attitude for learning, while Eph 4:18 shows the effect of a wrong attitude in ignorance of vital truth.

(4) Religious

Religious truth is a term frequently met in modern literature, but it has no sound basis in reason and it has none at all in the Bible. All truth is ultimately religious and only in a superficial way can religious truth be spoken of as an independent conception. Least of all can religious truth and scientific truth be at variance.

2. Standards of Truth:

Philosophy has continuously tried to find tests for truth, and so has wrought out theories of knowledge – epistemologies, Not to go back into the Greek philosophy, we have in modern times such theories as (1) the Kantian, (2) the scholastic, (3) the Hegelian, (4) the pragmatic, (5) that of the new realism; and these include only such as may be defined with some clearness, for the tendencies of current thought have been toward confusion concerning all standards of truth and reality, and so toward widespread agnosticism and skepticism. This temper has, naturally, reacted on thinking in practical ethics and upon the sanctions of religion. There is thus in religion and morals a tendency to obscure the distinction between what is and what ought to be. See AUTHORITY; ETHICS; PHILOSOPHY; RIGHT; SIN.

In the Bible, the known will of God is final for man as a standard of truth, not as arbitrary, but as expressive of God’s nature. God’s nature is all-comprehensive of fact and goodness, and so is, all and in all, the source, support and objective of all concrete being. The will of God thus reveals, persuades to and achieves the ideals and ends of complete existence. The term truth is sometimes, therefore, nearly equivalent to the revealed will of God.

3. Special Features in Biblical Writings:

(1) The Old Testament uses the term truth primarily of God and applies the principle to man. The practical objective is ever prominent.

(2) The Synoptic Gospels and Acts use the term chiefly in popular idiomatic phrases of a truth, in truth, surely (compare Luk 22:59; Act 4:27). In Mat 22:16 there is a more serious and comprehensive application, but it is in the flattering words of Pharisaic hypocrisy (compare Mar 12:14; Luk 20:21). To be sure, we are to understand that even in the phrases of common speech Jesus employed the term in all seriousness (Luk 4:25; Luk 9:27).

(3) In Paul the sense of divine faithfulness, as in the Old Testament, is occasionally met (Rom 3:3, Rom 3:7; Rom 15:8). Again the term emphasizes sincerity (1Co 5:8; 2Co 7:14). Generally it has direct or clearly implied reference to God’s revelation in Jesus Christ with a view to redeeming men. In a general way the term is thus equivalent to the gospel, but there is never identification of the two terms (see Rom 2:8; Eph 1:13; 1Ti 3:15). In Gal 2:5; Gal 5:7, the truth of the gospel is its content in the purpose of God, in contrast with misconceptions of it: the true gospel as against false representations of the gospel.

(4) In the Johannine writings we find occasionally the emphatic phrase of genuineness (1Jo 3:18; 2Jo 1:1; 3Jo 1:1) and emphatic reality (Joh 8:46; Joh 16:7). In Revelation we have true in the sense of trustworthy, because ultimately real or in accord with ultimate reality (Rev 3:7, Rev 3:14; Rev 6:10; Rev 15:3; Rev 19:9, Rev 19:11, etc.). Generally, as in the Gospel, we approach more nearly than elsewhere in Scripture a metaphysical use, yet always with the practical religious end dominant. Truth is reality in relation to the vital interests of the soul. It is primarily something to be realized and done, rather than something to be learned or known. In the largest aspect it is God’s nature finding expression in His creation, in revelation, in Jesus Christ in whom grace and truth came (Joh 1:17), and finally in man apprehending, accepting and practically realizing the essential values of life, which are the will of God (Joh 1:14; Joh 8:32; Joh 17:19; Joh 18:37 f; 1Jo 2:21; 1Jo 3:19). Truth is personalized in Jesus Christ. He truly expresses God, presents the true ideal of man, in Himself summarizes the harmony of existence and becomes the agent for unifying the disordered world. Hence, He is the Truth (Joh 14:6), the true expression (Logos, Joh 1:1) of God. See the same idea without the terminology in Paul (Col 1:14 ff; Col 2:9). Similarly, the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of truth because His function is to guide into all truth (Joh 16:13; 1Jo 2:27; 1Jo 5:7).

(5) It is understood by many that in James, Peter, Hebrews, and possibly the Pastoral Epistles, the term connotes the body of Christian teaching (compare Jam 1:18; Jam 3:14; 1Pe 1:22; 2Pe 2:2; Heb 10:26; 1Ti 3:15). The use of the article here cannot be conclusive, and instead of the body of Christian teaching, it seems more correct to understand the reality of life values as represented in the gospel plan of salvation and of living. In a general way this would include the body of Christian teaching, but the reference would be less concrete. James is too early a writing to employ the term in this so specific a sense.

III. Analytical Summary.

1. Truth in God:

(1) Truth is presented in Scripture as a chief element in the nature of God (Psa 31:5; Isa 65:16). (2) But this quality is never given as an abstract teaching, but only as qualifying God in His relations and activities. So it is a guaranty of constancy (Deu 32:4; Psa 100:5; Psa 146:6; Jam 1:17); especially a ground of confidence in His promises (Exo 34:6; Psa 91:4; Psa 146:6); of right dealing with men without reference to any explicit pledges (Psa 85:11; Psa 89:14); a basis of security in the correctness of His teachings (Neh 9:13; Psa 119:142; Isa 25:1); of assurance within His covenant relations (Psa 89:5; Isa 55:3). (3) God’s truth is especially noteworthy as a guaranty of merciful consideration of men. This is an important element in theology of the Old Testament, as it is a point guarded also in the New Testament (Psa 25:10; Psa 31:5; Psa 61:7; Psa 85:10; Psa 98:3; Joh 3:16; Rom 3:23-26). (4) Equally is the truth of God an assurance to men of righteous judgment in condemnation of sin and sinners (1Sa 15:29; Psa 96:13; Rom 2:2, Rom 2:8). In general the truth of God stands for the consistency of His nature and guarantees His full response in all the relations of a universe of which He is the Maker, Preserver, and End.

2. Truth in Man:

As related to God in origin and obligation, man is bound morally to see and respond to all the demands of his relations to God and to the order in which he lives under God. (1) Truthfulness in speech, and also in the complete response of his nature to the demand upon it, is urged as a quality to be found in man and is commended where found, as its lack is condemned. It is essential to true manhood. Here, as in the case of truth in God, truth is regarded as revealed in social relations and responsibilities. Truth is not merely in utterance, nor is it only response to a specific command or word, but lies in the response of the will and life to the essential obligations of one’s being (Psa 15:2; Psa 119:30; Pro 12:19; Pro 23:23; Isa 59:4, Isa 59:14, Isa 59:15; Jer 7:28; Jer 9:3; Hos 4:1; Rom 1:18, Rom 1:25; Eph 4:15; 2Th 2:10, 2Th 2:12).

(2) Truth in man is in response to truth in God, and is to be acquired on the basis of a gift from God. This gift comes by way of teaching and also by way of the working of the Divine Spirit in the life of man. Highest truth in correspondence to ideal is possible only by the working of the God of truth in the spirit of the man. Man’s freedom to realize his being is dependent upon his receptive attitude toward the Son of God. Hence salvation in its fullest idea is stated in terms of truth (Joh 11:3 ff; Phi 3:10 ff). See in general, Psa 51:6; Isa 25:1; Joh 3:21; Joh 8:32; Joh 16:13; Joh 17:19; Joh 18:37; Eph 4:21, Eph 4:24; Eph 5:9; Heb 10:26; 1Jo 2:27.

3. Truth in Religion:

The modern study of religion on an evolutionary hypothesis and the comparative study of religions have contributed to an extensive questioning whether there is any absolute truth in religion, or at least any standards by which truth in religion may be known. Isa 43 and 44 and Paul in Acts 17 and Gal 3 accord with modern findings that there is an element of truth in religions generally, and that God’s faithfulness pledges Him to bring the light of fuller truth to all men. This He does through the religion and the testimony of them to whom He has already come with this fuller light. This light is contained in the revealed word of the Old Testament prophets and of the New Testament witnesses to Jesus. In a definite way the Scriptures preserve these standards of religious truth. But always the attitude of the individual, as also of the group, determines the measure of apprehension of the truth and the certainty with which it is held. It is always important to keep in mind that truth in religion is not primarily an intellectualistic affair, to be cognized, but is essentially a voluntaristic experience and a duty to be done for the glory of God in the realization of the complete truth of God. Jesus Christ as the truth of God becomes the standard and test for truth in the religion of men. And this not in any objective and formal way of a series of propositions, to be accepted and contended for, but in the subjective way of experience, in a series of ideals to be realized and propagated. If anyone wishes to do God’s will, he shall be able to decide the truth of religious teaching, and the Son who is true will give the freedom of truth (Joh 7:17; Joh 8:32).

Fuente: International Standard Bible Encyclopedia

Truth

Throughout the scriptures there is that which God designates as ‘the truth.’ It is divine, and above the opinions of men, however wise and pious they may be. In the O.T. the admonition is given, “Buy the truth and sell it not.” Pro 23:23. ‘The truth’ must refer to God, who is true, but is not called ‘the truth:’ hence it comprises all that may be known of God, whether declared by creation or made known by revelation. Truth is not simply that which is held as dogma, but must be received in the soul. Paul asked the Galatians who had hindered them that they should not obey ‘the truth?’ Gal 5:7. Judgement is coming upon Christendom “because they received not the love of ‘the truth’ that they might be saved.” 2Th 2:10. Truth is the real way of liberty: “the truth shall make you free.” Joh 8:32; Joh 8:36. Truth cannot be separated from the Lord Jesus, who is “the way, the truth, and the life.” This is objectively; subjectively the Spirit is the truth as having come from the glorified Christ. In the three Epistles of John ‘the truth’ is constantly referred to, and a Christian woman is warned not to receive any one into her house, nor wish him God-speed unless he holds the doctrines taught by the apostles – in other words, ‘the truth.’

Fuente: Concise Bible Dictionary

Truth

Saints should:

– Worship God in truth

Joh 4:24; Psa 145:18

– Serve God in truth

Jos 24:14; 1Sa 12:24

– Walk before God in truth

1Ki 2:4; 2Ki 20:3

– Keep religious feasts with truth

1Co 5:8

– Esteem truth as inestimable

Pro 23:23

– Love truth

Zec 8:19

– Rejoice in truth

1Co 13:6

– Speak truth to one another

Zec 8:16; Eph 4:25

– Execute judgment with truth

Zec 8:16

– Meditate upon truth

Phi 4:8

– Bind truth about the neck

Pro 3:3

– Write truth upon the tables of the heart

Pro 3:3

The fruit of the Spirit is in truth

Eph 5:9

Ministers should:

– Speak truth

2Co 12:6; Gal 4:16

– Teach in truth

1Ti 2:7

– Approve themselves by truth

2Co 6:7-8

Magistrates should be men of truth

Exo 18:21

Kings are preserved by truth

Pro 20:28

They who speak truth:

– Show forth righteousness

Pro 12:17

– Are the delight of God

Pro 12:22

The wicked:

– Are destitute of truth

Hos 4:1

– Speak not truth

Jer 9:5

– Uphold not truth

Isa 59:14-15

– Plead not for truth

Isa 59:4

– Are not valiant for truth

Jer 9:3

– Are punished for want of truth

Jer 9:5; Jer 9:9; Hos 4:1; Hos 4:3

The gospel as truth, came by Christ

Joh 1:17

Truth is in Christ

1Ti 2:7

John bore witness to the truth

Joh 5:33

Truth is according to godliness

Tit 1:1

Truth is sanctifying

Joh 17:17; Joh 17:19

Truth is purifying

1Pe 1:22

Truth is part of the Christian armor

Eph 6:14

Truth is revealed abundantly to saints

Jer 33:6

Truth abides continually with saints

2Jn 1:2

Should be acknowledged

2Ti 2:25

Should be believed

2Th 2:12-13; 1Ti 4:3

Should be obeyed

Rom 2:8; Gal 3:1

Should be loved

2Th 2:10

Should be manifested

2Co 4:2

Should be rightly divided

2Ti 2:15

The wicked turn away from truth

2Ti 4:4

The wicked resist truth

2Ti 3:8

The wicked destitute of truth

1Ti 6:5

The church is the pillar and ground of truth

1Ti 3:15

The devil is devoid of truth

Joh 8:44

Truth of God:

– Is one of His attributes

Deu 32:4; Isa 65:16

– He keeps, forever

Psa 146:6

– Abundant

Exo 34:6

– Inviolable

Num 23:19; Tit 1:2

– Enduring to all generations

Psa 100:5

– Exhibited in His:

b Ways

Rev 15:3

b Works

Psa 33:4; Psa 111:7; Dan 4:37

b Judicial statutes

Psa 19:9

b Word

Psa 119:160; Joh 17:17

b Fulfillment of promises in Christ

2Co 1:20

b Fulfillment of His covenant

Mic 7:20

b Dealings with saints

Psa 25:10

b Deliverance of saints

Psa 57:3

b Punishment of the wicked

Rev 16:7

– Is a shield and buckler to saints

Psa 91:4

– We should:

b Confide in

Psa 31:5; Tit 1:2

b Plead in prayer

Psa 89:49

b Pray for its manifestation to ourselves

2Ch 6:17

b Pray for its exhibition to others

2Sa 2:6

b Make known, to others

Isa 38:19

b Magnify

Psa 71:22; Psa 138:2

– Is denied by:

b The devil

Gen 3:4-5

b The self-righteous

1Jn 1:10

b Unbelievers

1Jn 5:10

Unclassified scriptures relating to truth

Exo 34:6; Deu 32:4; Psa 31:5; Psa 33:4; Psa 40:10; Psa 51:6; Psa 57:3; Psa 57:10; Psa 85:10-11; Psa 86:15; Psa 89:14; Psa 96:13; Psa 98:3; Psa 100:5; Psa 108:4; Pro 12:19; Pro 16:13; Isa 25:1; Isa 59:14-15; Isa 65:16; Jer 5:3; Dan 4:37; Dan 10:21; Mic 7:20; Joh 1:14; Joh 8:31-32; Joh 14:6; Joh 14:17; Joh 16:13; Joh 17:17; Joh 17:19; Joh 18:37-38; Rom 2:2

Fuente: Nave’s Topical Bible

Truth 1

See also Semiotic 2.

Fuente: The Dictionary of Philosophy

Truth 2

A characteristic of some propositional meanings, namely those which are true. Truth (or falsity) as predicated of “ideas” is today normally restricted to those which are propositional in nature, concepts being spoken of as being exemplified or not rather than as being true or false. Truth is predicable indirectly of sentences or symbols which express true meanings. (See Truth, semantical.)

It is customary to distinguish between the nature of truth and the tests for truth. There are three traditional theories as to the nature of truth, each finding virious expression in the works of different exponents.

According to the correspondence theory, a proposition (or meaning) is true if there is a fact to which it corresponds. if it expresses what is the case. For example, “It is raining here now” is true if it is the case that it is raining here now; otherwise it is false. The nature of the relation of correspondence between fact and true proposition is variously described by different writers, or left largely undescribed. Russell in The Problems of Philosophy speaks of the correspondence as consisting of an identity of the constituents of the fact and of the proposition.

According to the coherence theory (see H. H. JoachimThe Nature of Truth), truth is systematic coherence. This is more than logical consistency. A proposition is true insofar is it is a necessary constituent of a systematically coherent whole. According to some (e.g., Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Truth), this whole must be such that every element in it necessitates, indeed entails, every other element. Strictly, on this view, truth, in its fullness, is a characteristic of only the one systematic coherent whole, which is the absolute. It attaches to propositions as we know them and to wholes as we know them only to a degree. A proposition has a degree of truth proportionate to the completeness of the systematic coherence of the system of entities to which it belongs.

According to the pragmatic theory of truth, a proposition is true insofar as it works or satisfies, working or satisfying being described variously by different exponents of the view. Some writers insist that truth chiracterizes only those propositions (ideas) whose satisfactory working has actually verified them; others state that only verifiability through such consequences is necessary. In either case, writers differ as to the precise nature of the verifying experiences required. See Pragmatism. — C.A.B.

Fuente: The Dictionary of Philosophy

Truth

* For TRUTH see TRUE

Fuente: Vine’s Dictionary of New Testament Words

Truth

is used,

1. In opposition to falsehood, lies, or deceit, Pro 12:17, &c.

2. It signifies fidelity, sincerity, and punctuality in keeping promises; and to truth taken in this sense is generally joined mercy or kindness, as in Gen 24:27, and other places of Scripture.

3. Truth is put for the true doctrine of the Gospel, Gal 3:1-4. Truth is put for the substance of the types and ceremonies of the law, Joh 1:17.

Fuente: Biblical and Theological Dictionary