Will
Will
The consideration of the place of the will in the teaching of the apostolic writings must be carefully distinguished from the question of free will (see art. Freedom of the will). The line between them is not easy to draw in all cases; but the aim of this article is to consider the conception or conceptions of the will implied in the Acts and Epistles, and its relation to views current in modern psychological writings. At the present time there is a strong tendency to throw commanding emphasis on the will. All consciousness, it is agreed, implies the three factors, volition or conation, cognition, and sensation or feeling; but, if any one of these can be said to be primary, it is volition. Consciousness grows by functioning; and, except in its rudimentary stages, functioning is impossible apart from volition. Much attention has naturally been given to the relations between will on the one hand and wish and desire on the other, to the connexion between will and attention and habit, and also to the possibility of action against the will. Is the will a matter of detached impulses or is it properly the expression of the personality, the self? These questions are of great importance to the student of the NT. Schopenhauer, and later Nietzsche, raised the subject of the will to a new importance in philosophic discussion; and the questions mentioned above have been recently emphasized by the various writings of William James, and the important and far-reaching contentions of Eucken and of Bergson. The theist has a further set of questions to answer: What is the relation of the will of man to the will of God? Does the latter compel the former? And is it similar in kind? What is the real meaning of the surrender of the will so often demanded in religious writings? Which should be placed highest in religion, the active and conative, the intellectual, or the emotional element?
All these questions, more or less connected with one another, occur at once to the mind; but in the NT no direct answer to them is to be found. The NT writers were not in any sense psychological analysts; their object was to describe their religious experiences and to induce them in others. Their psychological equipment for doing this-if the adjective can be used at all-was the language of the OT and the simple categories common to the conversation of plain but thoughtful men. In their psychology the Rabbis themselves were no more than thoughtful amateurs-perhaps the world has gained rather than lost thereby. On the other hand, the language of the NT writers on this subject-like their use, e.g., of the Greek prepositions-though simple, is surprisingly careful. They did not work out their theology; but a theology was implicit in all that they wrote; and, without being conscious of doing so, they have given us materials for a reasoned conception of the will, as it may be predicated of both God and man.
To understand this, we must first pay attention to the writers vocabulary. The choice of words is determined as much on subconscious as on conscious levels; we employ one expression and reject another instinctively; and in cases like the present, where a system or a belief is implicit rather than explicit, language yields some of our best evidence. The language of the OT suggests three manifestations of will: (a) desire and aversion-the latter perhaps more often actually expressed terms which can all be applied either to man or to God; (b) satisfaction in a certain state of things, real or contemplated-, with the cognate noun, a; these again are equally applicable to man and to God; (c) a continued and persistent purpose, or the phrase -; the former is more commonly used of man; the latter suggests the familiar connexion between will and attention, -being always regarded by the Hebrews as the seat of thoughts rather than of emotions. The NT writers start from the same circle of ideas. From the undifferentiated material of likes and dislikes are developed deep mental and moral satisfactions, and acute physical desires or loathings. Will, for or against, is the natural precursor of action. Two wills may clash-those of man and man or of man and God. And out of will may grow a steadfast purpose, good or evil, which may fix the destiny of the whole life. When we examine the NT vocabulary more closely, a further distinction emerges. Will is expressed by both and and their cognate nouns, as well as by a further little group of words which must also be noticed.
is nearly always used of man. There are exceptions in Act 18:21, Rom 9:18; Rom 9:22, 1Co 4:19; 1Co 12:18; 1Co 15:38, Php 2:13 (the only occurrence of the word in this Epistle), Col 1:27, and Jam 4:15. In the Gospels, the word in very commonly used of man in general, and of Jesus; rarely of God, outside the quotations from the OT- Hos 6:8 in Mat 9:13 and parallels, and Psa 22:8 in Mat 27:43. The non-classical cognate noun, , however, is almost entirely used of God. There are exceptions in Eph 2:3 (cf. Eph 1:11) and 2Pe 1:21. The word is generally singular, but the plur. occurs in Act 13:22 and Eph 2:3. In Heb 2:4 is found, also of God. The same usage is found in the Gospels, especially in the Fourth Gospel (the will of my Father, of him that sent me); the exceptions really prove the principle (Joh 1:13, Joh 5:30, Joh 6:38).
The above makes it clear that the verb is used quite generally for wish, desire, and want. The distinction common in English psychology since T. H. Green, between more and less conscious self-presentation in the act of will, is absent from the NT. But the verb covers a range wide enough to stretch from St. Pauls favourite phrase, , to the baffling experiences hinted at in Romans 7. It can thus be used of both man and God. On the other hand, the noun is practically confined to the idea of a solemn Divine purpose; hence its inapplicability to human desires.
When we turn to we find that the verb is always used of man, except in Luk 22:42, Heb 6:17 (the only case where the word occurs in Heb.), 2Pe 3:9, and Jam 1:18 (cf. Mat 11:27, 1Co 12:11). The nouns and are rare; is used about equally of God and of man (for the latter use see Act 5:38; Act 19:1; Act 27:12; Act 27:42; for the former Eph 1:11 and Heb 6:17; note also 1Co 4:5, ). In the Gospels it occurs only twice-in Luk 7:30 of God, and in Luk 23:51 of man. is used once of man (Act 27:43), once of God (Rom 9:19), and once of the nations (1Pe 4:3).
The verb thus denotes plan and settled deliberate purpose, rising, however, out of uncertainty, needing effort for its realization, and liable to frustration; hence it is unsuitable for application to God. The noun denotes a deliberate and settled choice, which is more appropriate to the calm omnipotence of God (cf. Act 2:23) than the ignorant strivings of man; it may, of course, imply a choice of alternatives, though not necessarily a long balancing between them. does not occur; is not used of God. , indeed, would seem to correspond somewhat nearly to the Aristotelian (Eth. Nic. iii.). denotes a choice in which satisfaction is found; it is used of both God and man; like the cognate verb, however, it is comparatively rare (cf. Rom 10:1, Php 1:15, 2Th 1:11). In Luk 2:14 corresponds to the Hebrew , and the whole phrase most naturally means men in whom God feels satisfaction, not good-will in the sense of the AV .
, on the other hand, denotes an eager longing or craving, which may pass out of control and become , an overmastering passion. The verb is used only of man. It occurs outside the Gospels six times in a bad sense, twice in a good sense, and twice neutral; in the Gospels, however, out of six instances only one is bad. The noun is generally used in a bad sense, often with reference to bodily desires (note Joh 8:44). Like the verb, it is never used of God. suggests an ungovernable passion in the three places where it occurs (Rom 1:26, Col 3:5, 1Th 4:5). A deep and overmastering longing for a good object is expressed by (e.g. Rom 1:11, 2Co 9:14, Php 1:6, 1Pe 2:2; it also meets us in the obscure passage in Jam 4:5).
Hence, out of the simple material of desires and aversions are developed overpowering cravings or settled purposes; when the latter become thought of as entirely fixed, they are connected exclusively with God. At the same time, NT language shrinks from the idea that God could actually deliberate. Thus the main distinction recognized by the language is religious rather than psychological; it is drawn between the will as manifested in man and in God rather than between the greater and less identification with the self.
But further questions arise at once. (1) What is the relation of a mans will to God? Is a clash, as of two independent wills, really possible, until a point is reached where man says Not as I will but as thou wilt? (2) Is mans will equally independent as regards evil? Here too we shall find no system; but we must ask whether by anything in the apostolic expressions an intelligible system is implied. We shall begin with the second point. Several expressions imply an influence exercised by evil, as itself an independent power, over the will-e.g. Act 5:3 : Why hath Satan filled thy heart? (but note v. 9: How is it that ye have agreed together to tempt the Spirit of the Lord?); 2Co 2:11 : that no advantage may be gained over us by Satan; 2Co 4:4; Jam 1:14 : Each man is tempted, when he is drawn away by his own lust, and enticed (the words used suggest the metaphor of an angler). Act 8:23; Act 13:10 hint at the same idea, and perhaps Gal 3:1; cf. also Rom 7:11; Rom 7:20, where sin itself is spoken of as the agent of deception and death (cf. Rom 8:20). This does not, however, destroy the responsibility of the sinner (Rom 1:24; Rom 1:26; Rom 2:1; Rom 2:5-6, and Act 28:25 ff. quoted from Isa 6:9-10). The last passages imply a state; the evil will is a matter not of acts but of habits, or, as Aristotle would call them, (cf. Nic. Eth. iv. 2, 1122b 1). This state is called death, the absence of all will, or power, i.e. of all will to do good (Eph 2:1, 2Co 4:3). Very similar language is used by St. Paul about the race as a whole-death passed unto all men, for that all sinned (Rom 5:12). On the other hand, a man so dead can be made alive (Eph 2:5, Col 2:13); cf. also 1Jn 3:14 : We know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love the brethren. Life, however, means death to sin and to the Law which enslaved to sin (Rom 7:6, Col 2:20; Col 3:3-4 : Ye died, and your life is hid with Christ in God Christ, who is our life). To this state the term death (to sin) is applied, since here the will is regarded, at least by implication, as being dead to evil impulses, as before to good ones. Yet it is note-worthy that the activity of the will is still called for-Let not sin reign in your mortal body (Rom 6:11-12; Rom 6:15); and that this activity is essential is shown very clearly by the appeals to moral conduct which occur regularly at the close of St. Pauls Epistles, as well as elsewhere in the NT.
A definite cycle seems thus to be contemplated, whether as regards the race, the heathen (Romans 1), or individuals: first, there is the active will to evil; then, evil becomes inevitable; the agent is practically powerless, sold under sin (Rom 7:14); then, after his rescue from this state, the will is again called for, but this time it points habitually in the opposite direction. That is to say, choice is a real thing, but it exists in a world which contains both certain definite uniform sequences and an enticing and enslaving power of sin and lusts (Jam 1:14). This is sometimes but not always connected with the discarnate personality called Satan (see artt. Devil, Sin).
But what of the rescue itself? Is it independent of mans will? Does it simply depend on Gods decision to effect it, in some cases, but evidently not in others? Mans will appears to be clearly called for in such passages as 2Co 5:20, Be ye reconciled to God, but against them Rom 9:18 may be quoted, and perhaps, though it is not dogmatic or doctrinal in tone, Act 2:21 (see Conversion, Freedom of the Will). However this antinomy is reconciled, there is no doubt that St. Paul regards grace and faith as vital to the change (Eph 2:4; Eph 2:8 : God quickened us together with Christ-by grace have ye been saved- for by grace have ye been saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God; cf. also Rom 4:5, Gal 1:15). By itself the reference to grace might imply that man was merely passive; but the call for faith (as we shall see below, faith is an act of the will) shows that this is very far from being the case; indeed, faith is in general emphasized considerably more than grace as the agent in conversion. A still more fundamental connexion between the activities of God and man is expressed in what at first seem wilful contradictions in terms, in Php 2:12-13 and Gal 2:20 (Work out your own salvation for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to work; and I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me). In Gal 3:25 we read of faith as coming, with the result that we are no longer under a tutor, but sons of God through faith (cf. 1Pe 1:13, the grace that is being brought unto you, RVm ). But even in this new sphere of life through faith the will reappears, as a persistent endeavour after progress (Php 3:12, 2Pe 1:10). The new life is marked by special gifts–but they must be strenuously cultivated (Romans 12, 1 Corinthians 12). The whole Church may receive an illumination from the Holy Spirit, yet it will use language that implies co-operation rather than passivity (Act 15:28). The new condition can therefore be rightly called one of freedom (cf. Gal 5:13), and as such it is characterized by the confidence of open speech, as of equal with equal (, Eph 3:12, Heb 3:6, 1Jn 3:21).
It is thus quite clearly, though perhaps even yet not explicitly, recognized that will is something more than an impulse or a series of impulses, good or bad. It is the expression of the self, which, when bad, needs to be changed by an operation which has an external origin. Yet it is manifested in constant choices and struggles. The Christian is conscious of a new power in him (Gal 2:20), seizing him (Php 3:12); yet the result is to produce in him for the first time the true activity. Transformed conation becomes the central thing in his life.
There is another aspect of the subject which is familiar to modern psychologists, and is not as entirely neglected in the NT as might at first appear. Conation is often represented as being almost identical with deliberate attention. Fully developed conation demands that prolonged presentation of on object to consciousness whose basis is voluntary attention. For the cultivation of self-control and the building up of character this truth is of the greatest importance. In the NT the chief elements in the growth of the Christian character are faith, hope, and love. To the new life, and therefore to the new will, these are vital. They have been regarded as being mainly emotional qualities. But this is a mistake. Each involves a trained and cultivated attention. This is clearly the case with Hebrews 11. The psychologist might well describe the conception of faith worked out in that famous chapter as the concentration of attention on what would otherwise be forced up to, or beyond, the margin of consciousness (esp. Heb 11:6; Heb 11:13-16; Heb 11:27; Heb 12:1). A wider rle is assigned to faith in the Pauline Epistles, but the element of unswerving attention therein is clear from Rom 4:20 and Galatians 3, (passim). This is even more marked in the Epistles of St. John. There faith is spoken of as the weapon by which the world is overcome (1Jn 5:4-5). But the nerve of this faith is the conviction that Jesus is the Son of God; in other words, if the attention is concentrated on this object, the universe of evil around him is powerless to harm the Christian. In the Synoptic Gospels faith means confidence in the power of Jesus to do what He offers or is asked to do; but the demand for faith thus made involves the securing of attention by means of a strong suggestion. In Php 4:8, St. Paul appears to recognize the value of wisely directed attention still more clearly.
It is not always easy to distinguish between faith and hope in the apostolic writings; hope, like faith, is directed on the unseen, and it demands endurance (Rom 8:24-25), i.e. the deliberate holding of an idea before the mind; indeed, the connexion of hope with endurance rather suggests that it is the part of faith to set the object before the attention, and of hope to keep it there. Love, as St. Paul describes it in 1 Corinthians 13, is very much more than an emotion; it is distinctly an attitude; the qualities mentioned in 1Co 13:4-6 all point to attention directed to objects which most of us, especially under provocation, find it very hard to bear in mind. In the Epistles of St. John, faith, love, and obedience form an inseparable triad; the Christian character is secured, and fulfilled, by fixing the mind on Christs precepts and carrying them out. Of this process, love is both the pre-requisite and the end; and, if this seems a contradiction, we must remember that to the psychologist, as to the theologian, analysis is but a makeshift; everything that appears in the course of the development of a conscious state was there at the beginning, or it could not have come into existence at all. Love is the going out of the whole soul to God, or to men in eager desire for their highest bliss; but this is impossible apart from definite mental concentration. The three Christian graces thus imply attention, and are all conative.
It is strange that all this was not analyzed further in the NT. But the main interest of the writers, after all, lay in Gods will, not in mans. The patience needed by the descriptive psychologist was impossible for men whose one desire was to express the highest rapture of their lives, the sense of the redeeming and sanctifying will of God surging through every part of their being. And this constant turning of the attention to God led them to emphasize aspects of Gods will which might seem to come near to fatalism, were it not that Gods will is always thought of as acting through the good man, not outside of him. These aspects are four: a certain irresistible compulsion experienced by the Apostles, reminding one of Socrates daimon, but going far beyond it (Act 16:6-7; Act 18:5); a curious sense of the fated, or , as a classical Greek might have called it, which especially pervades Acts 20, 21, 27; the eschatological expectation, prominent in the earlier Epistles of St. Paul and in Rev.; and, side by side with this cosmical aspect of the sovereign will of God, the recognition of a moral necessity, especially in the sufferings of the Messiah, which formed the great fulfilment of prophecy (Act 3:18; Act 3:21, Heb 2:10; Heb 7:26). In fact, we may almost think of Gods will as a kind of primum mobile, the all-embracing sphere by which the other spheres are controlled and set and kept in motion. The maturity of mans will is thus an attainment, not an endowment. It acts properly only when it is roused and directed by Divine grace. The necessity for its exercise will never be superseded; but the more it is exercised under Divine control, the more it becomes Gods will in man, and the more it becomes mans own will, acting at last in complete freedom. St. Pauls metaphors of the soldier and the athlete are quite natural and harmonious. They provide room for the sternest endurance and struggle, and yet they point to the perfect precision and joy of well-disciplined activity. And this perfect precision is not simply in obedience to Gods will; it becomes the actual manifestation of Gods will. So experienced, Gods will is identical with His love. It moves the sun and the other stars; it is the .
We are now in a position to sum up briefly the relation of the NT conception of the will to modern psychological discussions. Cognition, conation, and feeling are all recognized; activity is central and is something more than response to impulse; it is self-expression as opposed to wish or desire. Action against the will is possible, but only when the will is itself imperfect. Surrender of the will is really re-affirmation of the will in a new direction. The conceptions of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, however, the will to life or to power, constitute a perilous self-assertion which can only lead to death. There is much in the thought of St. Paul that recalls Eucken. The controlling force of the world is spiritual; and into the little land-locked pools of our own individuality, soon becoming stagnant if left to themselves, must flow the great tides of the Divine will. But that will is personal and redemptive; it is not a mere force, however exalted; it is the loving activity of the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. St. Paul has less in common with Bergson. The principle of life is not merely change; nor is its action experimental and uncertain. It moves onward through all time with a directness which can also communicate itself to our own wills. Finally, we may refer to the well-known phrase of the pragmatist William James, the will to believe. The expression is not meant to state a relation between will and belief, but is used to suggest that belief (whatever its psychological analysis) is founded only on a subjective and individual choice, not on truth or fact. Mathematical formulae and scientific laws are accepted by us because they work; Gods love and mans immortality are accepted for the same reason. To St. Paul the principle, so stated, would have been incomprehensible or impious. Love and immortality are true because they are revealed, brought to light; it is the function of will to fix the mind on them, and act in accord with them. W. Jamess view is a simple case of . As a psychological or philosophical basis for belief, its correctness is not here in point; what is significant to the student of NT thought is that the great doctrines of Christianity are there felt to become more and more clear as the will accepts and obeys them. The will does not create truth; but there is not a truth which the will does not illumine and test (Joh 7:17, 1Jn 2:20; 1Jn 2:27; 1Jn 5:20).
Literature.-For representative modern discussions of the question of the will in general see J. Martineau, Study of Religion2, 2 vols., Oxford, 1889, vol. ii. bk. iii. ch. ii.; H.Lotze, Microcosmus, Eng. tr. , 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1885, vol. i. p. 256 ff.; J. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, London, 1899; G. F. Stout, Analytic Psychology2, 2 vols., do., 1902, vol. ii. chs. ii., iii., xi.; W. James, Varieties of Religious Experience, do., 1902, lectures ix., x., Will to Believe, do., 1902, pp. 1 ff., 145, ff.; H. Bergson, Time and Free Will, do., 1910, ch. iii. For discussions of the subject from a theistic point of view see T. B. Strong, Christian Ethics, do., 1896, chs. i., ii; W. L. Walker, Christian Theism and a Spiritual Monism, Edinburgh, 1906, pt. ii.; W. R. Inge, Faith and its Psychology, London, 1909; G. Galloway, Philosophy of Religion, Edinburgh, 1914. For the psychology of religion see E. D. Starbuck, Psychology of Religion, London, 1899, chs. xxv.-xxvii.; J. B. Pratt, Psychology of Religious Belief, New York and London, 1907; G. B. Cutten, Psychological Phenomena of Christianity, London, 1909, ch. xxv. For the biblical conceptions of the will see H. Wheeler Robinson, Christian Doctrine of Man, Edinburgh, 1911, Hebrew Psychology in Relation to Pauline Anthropology, in Mansfield College Essays, London, 1909; H. Weinel, St. Paul, the Man and his Work, Eng. tr. , do., 1906; W. P. DuBose, The Gospel according to St. Paul, do., 1907. See also Literature under art. Freedom of the Will.
W. F. Lofthouse.
Fuente: Dictionary of the Apostolic Church
WILL
That faculty of the soul by which it chooses or refuses any thing offered to it. When man was created, he had liberty and power to do what was pleasing in the sight of God; but by the fall, he lost all ability of will to any spiritual good; nor has he any will to that which is good until divine grace enlightens the understanding and changes the heart. “The nature of the will, indeed, is in itself indisputably free. Will, as will, must be so, or there is no such faculty; but the human will, being finite, hath a necessary bound, which indeed so far may be said to confine it, because it cannot act beyond it; yet within the extent of its capacity it necessarily is and ever will be spontaneous. “The limits of the will, therefore, do not take away its inherent liberty. The exercise of its powers may be confined, as it necessarily must, in a finite being; but where it is not confined, that exercise will correspond with its nature and situation. “This being understood, it is easy to perceive that man in his fallen state can only will according to his fallen capacities, and that, however freely his volitions may flow within their extent, he cannot possibly overpass them. He, therefore, as a sinful, carnal, and perverse apostate, can will only according to the nature of his apostacy; which is continually and invaribly evil, without capacity to exceed its bounds into goodness, purity, and truth; or otherwise he would will contrary to or beyond his nature and situation, which is equally impossible in itself, and contradictory to the revelation of God.
See Edwards on the Will; Theol. Misc. vol. 4: p. 391; Gill’s Cause of God and Truth; Toplady’s Historic Proof; Watts’ Essay on the Freedom of the Will; Charnock’s Works, vol. 2: p. 175, and 187; Locke on the Understanding; Reid on the Active Powers, p. 267, 291; and articles LIBERTY and NECESSITY in this work.
Fuente: Theological Dictionary
Will
(Latin voluntas, Gr. boúlesis, “willing” Ger. Wille, Fr. volonté).
This article treats of will in its psychological aspect.
Will and Knowledge Will and Feeling Education of Will Will and Movement Experimental Will-Pyschology The term will as used in Catholic philosophy, may be briefly defined as the faculty of choice; it is classified among the appetites, and is contrasted with those which belong either to the merely sensitive or to the vegetative order: it is thus commonly designated “the rational appetite”; it stands in an authoritative relation to the complex of lower appetites, over which it exercises a preferential control; its specific act, therefore, when it if in full exercise, consists in selecting, by the light of reason, its object from among the various particular, conflicting aims of all the tendencies and faculties of our nature: its object is the good in general (bonum in communi); its prerogative is freedom in choosing among different forms of good. As employed in modern philosophy, the term has often a much wider signification. It is frequently used in a loose, generic sense as coextensive with appetite, and in such a way as to include any vital principle of movement ab intra, even those which are irrational and instinctive. Thus Bain makes appetency a species of volition, instead of vice-versa. We cannot but think this an abuse of terms. In any case–whatever opinion one holds on the free will controversy–some specific designation is certainly required for that controlling and sovereign faculty in man, which every sane philosophy recognizes as unmistakably distinct from the purely physical impulses and strivings, and from the sensuous desires and conations which are the expressions of our lower nature’s needs. And custom has consecrated the term will to this more honourable use.
Will and Knowledge
The description of will, as understood in Catholic philosophy, given above, refers to the will in its fullest and most explicit exercise, the voluntas deliberata or voluntus ut voluntas, as Saint Thomas speaks. There are, however, many manifestations of will that are less complete than this. Formal choice, preceded by methodical deliberation, is not the only or the most frequent type of volition. Most of our ordinary volition takes the form of spontaneous and immediate reaction upon very simple data. We have to deal with some narrow, concrete situation; we aim at some end apprehended almost without reflection and achieved almost at a stroke; in such a case, will expresses itself along the lines of least resistance through the subordinate agencies of instinctive action, habit, or rule of thumb. Will, like the cognitive powers, originates in and is developed by experience. This is expressed in the well-known Scholastic axiom, “Nil volitum nisi præcognitum” (Nothing can be willed which is not foreknown), taken in conjunction with the other great generalization that all knowledge takes its rise in experience: “Nil in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu”. All appetition, according to this theory, emerges out of some conscious state, which may be anything from a clear and distinct perception or representation of an object, to a mere vague feeling of want or discomfort, without any direct representation either of the object or the means of satisfaction. The Aristotelean philosophers did not neglect or ignore the significance of this latter kind of consciousness (sometimes called affective). It is true that here, as in dealing with the psychology of other faculties, the Schoolmen did not attempt a genetic account of the will, nor would they admit continuity between the rational will and the lower appetitive states; but in their theory of the passions, they had worked out a very fair classification of the main phenomena–a classification which has not been substantially improved upon by any modern writer; and they showed their appreciation of the close connection between will and emotions by treating both under the general head of appetition. It is still a debatable question whether modern psychology, since Kant, has not unnecessarily complicated the question by introducing the triple division of functions into knowledge, appetites and feeling, in place of the ancient bi-partite division into knowledge and appetite.
The doctrine that will arises out of knowledge must not be pressed to mean that will is simply conditioned by knowledge, without in turn conditioning knowledge. The relation is not one-sided. “The mental functions interact, i.e. act reciprocally one upon another” (Sully) or, as Saint Thomas expresses it: “Voluntas et intellectus mutuo se includunt” (Summa theol., I, Q. xvi, a. 4 ad 1). Thus, an act of will is the usual condition of attention and of all sustained application of the cognitive faculties. This is recognized in common language. Again the Schoolmen were fond of describing the will as essentially a blind faculty. This means simply that its function is practice, not speculation, doing, not thinking (versatur circa operabilia). But on the other hand they admitted that it was an integral part of reason–according to the Scotists indeed, the superior and nobler part, as being the supreme controller and mover (“Voluntas est motor in toto regno animæ”, Scotus). It is also represented as ruling and exercising command (imperium) over the lower faculties. St. Thomas, however, with his usual preference for the cognitive function, puts the imperium in the reason rather than the will (imperium rationis). Hence arose disputes between the Thomists and other schools, as to whether in the last resort the will was necessarily determined by the practical judgment of the reason. The point, so hotly debated in the medieval schools, concerning the relative dignity of the two faculties, will and intellect, is perhaps insoluble; at all events it is not vital. The two interact so closely as to be almost inseparable. Hence Spinoza could say with some plausibility: “Voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt”.
Will and Feeling
An act of will is generally conditioned not only by knowledge, but also by some mode of affective consciousness or feeling. The will is attracted by pleasure. The capital error of the Hedonist school was the doctrine that the will is attracted only by pleasure, that, in the words of Mill, “to find a thing pleasant and to will it are one and the same”. This is not true. The object of the will is the good apprehended as such. This is wider than the pleasant. Moreover, the primary tendency of appetency or desire is often towards some object or activity quite distinct from pleasure. Thus in the exercise of the chase, or intellectual research, or the performance of acts of benevolence, the primary object of the will is the accomplishment of a certain positive result, the capture of the game, the solution of the problem, the relief of another’s pain, or the like. This may probably awaken pleasant feeling as a consequence. But this pleasure is not the object aimed at, nay the “Hedonistic paradox”, as it is styled, consists in this, that if this consequential pleasure be made the direct object of pursuit, it will thereby be destroyed. Thus, an altruistic act done for the sake of the pleasure it brings to the agent is no longer altruism or productive of the pleasure of altruism.
Indeed, the objects of many of the passions which most powerfully impel the will, are ordinarily not pleasures, though they may include relief from pain. Emotions or feelings associated with certain ideas tend to express themselves in action. They may dominate the field of consciousness to the exclusion of every other idea. Thus, the sight or the thought of extreme suffering may carry with it emotions of pity so intense that considerations of justice and prudence will be brushed aside in the effort to bring relief. Such action is impulsive. An impulse is essentially the forcible prompting of a single, strongly affective idea. The will is, in this case, as it were, borne down by feeling, and action is simply the “release” of an emotional strain, being scarcely more truly volitional than laughter or weeping. Bain’s description of voluntary action as “feeling-prompted movement”, therefore, destroys the essential distinction between voluntary and impulsive action. The same criticism applies to Wundt’s analysis of the volitional process. According to him, “impulsive action” is “the starting-point for the development of all volitional acts”, from which starting-point volitional acts, properly so called, emerge as the result of the increasing complication of impulses; when this complication takes the form of a conflict, there ensues a process called selection or choice, which determines the victory in one direction or another. From this it is clear that choice is simply a sort of circuitous impulse. “The difference between a voluntary activity (i.e. a complex impulse) and a choice activity is a vanishing quantity.” Compare with this the dictum of Hobbes: “I conceive that in all deliberations, that is to say, in all alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the Will”.
The essential weakness of both these accounts and of many others lies in the attempt to reduce choice or deliberation (the specific activity of will, and a patently rational process) to a merely mechanical or biological equation. Catholic philosophy, on the contrary, maintains, on the certain evidence of introspection, that choice is not merely a resultant of impulses, but a superadded formative energy, embodying a rational judgment; it is more than an epitome, or summing-up, of preceding phenomena; it is a criticism of them (see FREE WILL). This aspect the phenomenist psychology of the modern school fails to explain. Though we reject all attempts to identify will with feeling, yet we readily admit the close alliance that exists between these functions. St. Thomas teaches that will acts on the organism only through the medium of feeling, just as in cognition, the rational faculty acts upon the material of experience. (“Sicut in nobis ratio universalis movet, mediante ratione particulari, ita appetites intellectivus qui dicitur voluntas, movet in nobis mediante appetitu sensitivo, unde proximum motivum corporis in nobis est appetitus sensitivus”, Summa theol., I, Q. xx, ad 1.) Just as the most abstract intellectual idea has always its “outer clothing” of sense-imagery so volition, itself a spiritual act, is always embodied in a mass of feeling: on such embodiment depends its motive-value. Thus if we analyze an act of self-control we shall find that it consists in the “checking” or “policing” of one tendency by another, and in the act of selective attention by which an idea or ideal is made dynamic, becomes an idée-force, and triumphs over its neglected rivals. Hence control of attention is the vital point in the education of the will, for will is simply reason in act, or as Kant put it, the causality of reason, and by acquiring this power of control, reason itself is strengthened.
Motives are the product of selective attention. But selective attention is itself a voluntary act, requiring a motive, an effective stimulus of some kind. Where is this stimulus to come from in the first instance? If we say it is given by selective attention, the question recurs. If we say it is the spontaneous necessary force of an idea, we are landed in determinism, and choice becomes, what we have above denied it to be, merely a slow and circuitous form of impulsive action. The answer to this difficulty would be briefly as follows:
(1) Every practical idea is itself a tendency to the act represented; in fact, it is a beginning or rehearsal of the said act, and, if not inhibited by other tendencies or ideas, would in fact pass into execution at once. Attention to such an idea affords reinforcement to its tendency.
(2) Such reinforcement is given spontaneously to any tendency which is naturally interesting.
(3) The law of interest, the uniform principles governing the influence of the feelings upon the will in its earlier stages, these are an enigma which only an exhaustive knowledge of the physiology of the nervous system, of heredity, and possibly of many other as yet unsuspected factors, could enable us to solve. Leibniz applied his doctrine of petites perceptions to its solution, and certainly unconscious elements, whether inherited or stored up from personal experience, have much to do with our actual volitions, and lie at the very bottom of character and temperament; but as yet there is no science, nor even prospect of a science, of these things.
(4) As regards the determinist horn of the dilemma proposed above, the positive truth of human liberty drawn from introspection is too strong to be shaken by any obscurity in the process through which liberty is realized. The facts of consciousness and the postulates of morality are inexplicable on any other than the libertarian hypothesis (see CHARACTER and FREE WILL). Freedom is a necessary consequence of the universal capacity of reason. The power of conceiving and critically contemplating different values or ideals of desirableness, implies that detachment of will in selection (indifferentia activa), in which, essentially, freedom consists.
Education of Will
As we have said, control of attention is the vital point in the education of will. In the beginning, the child is entirely the creature of impulse. It is completely engrossed for the time by each successive impression. It exhibits plenty of spontaneity and random action but the direction of these is determined by the liveliest attraction of the moment. As experience extends, rival tendencies and conflicting motives come more and more into play, and the reflective power of the rational faculty begins to waken into existence. The recollection of the results of past experience rises up to check present impulses. As reason develops, the faculty of reflective comparison grows in clearness and strength, and instead of there being a mere struggle between two or more motives or impulses, there gradually emerges a judicial power of valuing or weighing those motives, with the ability of detaining one or other for a longer or shorter period, in the focus of intellectual consciousness. Here we have the beginning of selective attention. Each exertion of reflection strengthens voluntary, as distinguished from merely spontaneous, attention. The child becomes more and more able to attend to the abstract or intellectual representation, in preference to urgent present feeling which seeks to express itself in immediate action. This is furthered by human intercourse, injunctions from parents and others in regard to conduct, and the like. The power of resistance to impulse grows. Each passing inclination, inhibited for the sake of a more durable good or more abstract motive, involves an increase in the power of self-control. The child becomes able to withstand temptation in obedience to precepts or in accordance with general principles. The power of steady adhesion to fixed purposes grows and, by repeated voluntary acts, habits are formed which in the aggregate constitute formed character.
Will and Movement
The structure of the nervous system of man, it has been well said, prepares us for action. Long before the will, properly so called, comes upon the scene, a whole marvellous vital mechanism has been at work; thus it happens that we find ourselves at the very outset of our rational life possessed of a thousand tendencies, preferences, dexterities–the product partly of inheritance and partly of our infantile experience working by the laws of association and habit. The question, therefore, as to how this early organization and co-ordination of movement take place, though an essential preliminary to the study of will, is nevertheless only a preliminary, and not a constituent, branch of that study. Hence we can deal with it here only briefly. Bain’s theory is perhaps the best known–the theory of random or spontaneous movement. According to this account, the nervous system is in its nature an accumulator of energy, which energy under certain obscure organic conditions breaks out in tumultuous, purposeless fashion, without any sensible stimulation either from without or from within. The result of such outpourings of energy is sometimes pleasurable, sometimes the reverse. Nature, by the law of conservation, preserves those movements which produce pleasure while she inhibits other movements. Thus “nature” really works purposively, for these pleasant movements are also for the most part beneficial to the animal. The process is very much the same as “natural selection” in the biological field. As regards this theory we may briefly note as follows:
(1) It is true, as modern child-psychology shows, that movements are learnt in some way. The child has to learn even the outlines of its own body.
(2) There is a good deal of apparently purposeless movement in children and all young animals, which, no doubt, constitutes their “motor-education”.
(3) At the same time, it is not so clear that these movements are simply a physical discharge of energy, unattended by conscious antecedents. Some vague feeling of discomfort, of pent-up powers, some appetition or conscious tendency to movement in short, may very well be supposed. There would thus be the germ of a purpose in the creature’s first essays at realizing the tendency and satisfying a felt need.
Experimental Will-Psychology
One of the least promising departments of mental life for the experimental psychologist is will. In common with all the higher activities of the soul, the subjection of the phenomena of rational volition to the methods of experimental psychology presents serious difficulties. In addition, the characteristic prerogative of the human will–freedom–would seem to be necessarily recalcitrant against scientific law and measurement, and thus to render hopelessly inapplicable the machinery of the new branch of mental research. However, the problem has been courageously attacked by the Würzburg and Louvain Schools. Different properties of choice, the formation and operation of various kinds of motives, the process of judging values, the transition from volition to habit or spontaneous action, the reaction-time of acts of decision and their realization and other incidental will-phenomena have been made the subject of the most careful investigation and, where possible, calculation.
By the multiplication of experimental choices, and the taking of averages, results of an objective character have been, it is contended, secured. The psychological value of these researches, and the quantity of new light they are likely to shed on all the more important questions connected with the human will, is still a subject of controversy; but the patience skill, and ingenuity, with which these experiments and observations have been carried out, are indisputable.
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MICHAEL MAHERJOSEPH BOLLANDTranscribed by Rick McCarty
The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XVCopyright © 1912 by Robert Appleton CompanyOnline Edition Copyright © 2003 by K. KnightNihil Obstat, October 1, 1912. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., CensorImprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York
Fuente: Catholic Encyclopedia
Will
The English word will is sometimes merely the sign of the future tense, whilst at other times it expresses the willingness of the agent in the Hebrew, as in the Greek, those ideas are represented by different words, and in many passages it is important to notice the distinction.
Avah (, Ass. Abitu) represents the inclination which leads towards action, rather than the volition which immediately precedes it in the LXX, Avah is rendered both by and . It is rendered ‘will’ or ‘willing’ in the following passages: Gen 24:6; Gen 24:8; Exo 10:27 (‘He would not let them go’); Lev 26:21 (‘If ye will not hearken unto me’); Deu 1:26 (‘Ye would not go up’); Deu 2:30 (Sih on ‘would not let us pass by him’), 10:10 (the Lord ‘would not destroy thee’), 23:5, 25:7, 29:20; Jos 24:10; Jdg 11:17; Jdg 19:10; Jdg 19:25; Jdg 20:13; 1Sa 15:9; 1Sa 22:17; 1Sa 26:23; 1Sa 31:4; 2Sa 2:21; 2Sa 6:10; 2Sa 12:17; 2Sa 13:14; 2Sa 13:16; 2Sa 13:25; 2Sa 14:29; 2Sa 23:16-17; 1Ki 22:49; 2Ki 8:19; 2Ki 13:23; 2Ki 24:4; 1Ch 10:4; 1Ch 11:18-19; 1Ch 19:19; 2Ch 21:7; Job 39:9; Psa 81:11; Isa 1:19 (‘If ye be willing’), 28:12, 30:9, 15, 42:24; Eze 3:7 (‘The house of Israel will not hearken unto thee, for they will not hearken unto me’); see also chap.20:8.
It is remarkable that these passages, with two exceptions (Isa 1:19, and Job 39:9), are negative. Where they refer to the disobedience of Israel, they imply that the refusal to hearken to God’s Word was voluntary, and that they were responsible for it. Where reference is made to the Divine action, it is implied that God is a moral governor, and that his dealings with men are deliberate, and to some extent dependent up on their obedience or disobedience.
In Hos 13:10; Hos 13:14, we read, ‘I will be thy king;’ ‘O death, I will be thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction.’ The word for will (ehi, ) might probably be better rendered where? as in the margin and in the R. V.; and this rendering would identify the passage all the more closely with St. Paul’s words in 1Co 15:55.
Chaphets (), to delight, is usually rendered or in the LXX in the A. V., it is rendered ‘will’ in Rth 3:13 (‘If he will not do the part of a kinsman to thee’); 1Sa 2:25; 1Ki 13:33; 1Ch 28:9; Job 9:3; Pro 21:1; Pro 31:13.
This word is used in the phrase ‘there is a time for every purpose’ (Ecc 3:1; Ecc 3:17; Ecc 8:6); also in Ecc 12:10, ‘The preacher sought to find out acceptable words’ The Psalmist uses it when he says, ‘Let them be put to shame that wish me evil’ (Psa 40:14).
Chaphets is rendered please or pleasure in several passages, including Jdg 13:23; Job 21:21; Job 22:3; Psa 5:4; Psa 35:27; Psa 115:3; Isa 42:21; Isa 53:10; Eze 18:23; Eze 18:3; Eze 33:11; Mat 1:10.
It is rendered ‘favour’ in 2Sa 20:11, Psa 35:27; Psa 41:11 in these passages there is no reference to what we call ‘favouritism,’ i.e. the overlooking of the claims of some so as to gratify the wishes of special friends; it is simply recorded that pleasure was found in certain persons, whatever the ground of it might be.
It is often rendered desire, e.g in 1Sa 18:25; Psa 34:12; Psa 40:6; Psa 51:6; Psa 51:16; Hos 6:6. It is also rendered delight very frequently; see especially 1Sa 15:22, ‘Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the Lord?’ 2Sa 22:20, ‘He delivered me because he delighted in me;’ Psa 1:2; Psa 22:8; Psa 40:8; Isa 1:11; Isa 62:4 (Hephzi-bah, ‘My delight is in her’).
on reviewing all the passages where the word Chaphets is used, the reader will probably come to the conclusion that its true meaning is not so much an intense pleasurable emotion, as a favourable disposition, or the prompting of the heart to take a certain course of action from a sense of fitness. It is usually relative rather than absolute. It teaches us that God is naturally disposed to look for obedience, trust, and holiness in those who were created after his own likeness; that He deals tenderly but uprightly with his creatures; that He confers life rather than death, if morally possible; that He administers judicial punishment where necessary; and that He has seen fit to inflict suffering up on the Messiah. It also marks his unwillingness to be put off with ceremonial observances as a substitute for the devotion of the heart.
Rats on (), which properly means good pleasure or acceptance, is occasionally translated ‘will,’ e.g. Gen 49:6, ‘ in their self-will they digged down a wall;’ Lev 1:3, [It is true that the Hebrew word nephesh is used in certain idiomatic expressions with reference to the Divine Being, but not in such a way as to invalidate what is affirmed above.] ‘ of his own voluntary will;’ 19:5, ‘At your own will;’ 22:19, 29; Neh 9:24, ‘ as they would;’ Est 9:5; Psa 40:8, ‘I delight to do thy will;’ 143:10, ‘Teach me to do thy will;’ Dan 8:4, ‘He did according to his will;’ 11:3, 16, 36. The word is less abstract than the previous ones. It sets forth a pleasurable emotion, whether leading to action or not. Both the substantive and the verb are used to represent that which is pleasant, delightful, acceptable, or approved of by God.
The LXX usually adopts , , or as a rendering for this word.
It is interesting to observe what a number of passages there are in the N.T in which reference is made to ‘the will of the Lord.’ God’s good pleasure is everywhere regarded as the law whereby all things, human and divine, are ordered. Christ is regarded as its embodiment and manifestation; and the Christian, being– by profession at least –one with Christ, is supposed to be conformed to that will in all things.
The , answering to Ratson, is that which God decides to have done because it is pleasing to Him; the , which answers to Chaphets, marks his disposition rather than his counsel or purpose. The two words are found together in Eph 1:11. The latter word implies not so much that there has been a consideration of the circumstances which call for action, as that they are in accordance with the nature and attributes of God; whilst the former points to the fact that the course of action determined on gives a real pleasure to Him.
Fuente: Synonyms of the Old Testament
Will
WILL.Every man, says Thomas Reid (Works, 1863 ed., p. 530), is conscious of a power to determine, in things which he conceives to depend upon his determination. To this power we give the name of Will; and, as it is usual, in the operations of the mind, to give the same name to the power and to the act of that power, the term Will is often put to signify the act of determining, which more properly is called volition. On the question of the freedom of the will see Free Will and Liberty; and on the human will of Jesus see Soul, 668b. Our Lord Jesus Christ has given us a perfect example of how our great possession of freedom should be used, has shown us by His own perfect subordination of His will to the will of His Father, that the goal at which we should aim is to have our wills in perfect accord with the will of God, whether it be His will as to our enduring or His will as to our doing. O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt Mt (Mat 26:39); I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me (Joh 6:38). It is our part to seek to have the mind of Christ, and to obey where God would have us to obey, and endure where He would have us to endure.
Our wills are ours to make them thine.
Literature.NT Commentaries; Hasting’s Dictionary of the Bible ; the works of Thomas Reid; R. A. Thompson, Christian Theism; Hill, Lectures in Divinity; A. M. Fairbairn, The Philosophy of the Christian Religion; Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation; and Philosophical and Theological works in general.
George C. Watt.
Fuente: A Dictionary Of Christ And The Gospels
Will
WILL.Will and would are often independent verbs in AV [Note: Authorized Version.] , and being now merely auxiliaries, their force is liable to be missed by the English reader. Thus Mat 11:14 if ye will receive it (RV [Note: Revised Version.] if ye are willing to receive it); Joh 1:43 Jesus would go forth into Galilee (RV [Note: Revised Version.] was minded to go forth).
WILL.See Paul, p. 692a; Testament.
Fuente: Hastings’ Dictionary of the Bible
Will
See TESTAMENT.
Fuente: International Standard Bible Encyclopedia
Will
1. The mental faculty:
– Freedom of, recognized by God
Gen 4:6-10; Deu 5:29; 1Ki 20:42; Isa 1:18-20; Isa 43:26; Jer 36:3; Jer 36:7; Joh 7:17 Blessing, Contingent upon Obedience; Choice; Contingencies
2. Of God, the supreme rule of duty:
– General references
Mat 12:50; Mar 3:35; Mat 26:39; Mar 14:36; Luk 22:42; Mat 26:42; Luk 11:2; Mat 6:10; Joh 4:34; Joh 5:30; Joh 6:38-40; Act 18:21; Rom 12:2; Rom 15:32; 1Co 4:19; 1Co 16:7; Heb 6:3 Agency
3. A testament:
Gen 25:5-6
– Of Jacob
Gen 48
– Of David
1Ki 2:1-9
– Of Jehoshaphat
2Ch 21:3
– May not be annulled
Gal 3:15
– In force after death only
Heb 9:16-17 Testament
Fuente: Nave’s Topical Bible
Will
In the widest sense, will is synonymous with conation. See Conation.
In the restricted sense, will designates the sequence of mental acts eventuating in decision or choice between conflicting conative tendencies. An act of will of the highest type is analyzable into
The envisaging of alternative courses of action, each of which expresses conative tendencies of the subject.
Deliberation, consisting in the examination and comparison of the alternative courses of action with special reference to the dominant ideals of the self.
Decision or choice consisting in giving assent to one of the alternatives and the rejection of the rest.
— L.W.
Fuente: The Dictionary of Philosophy
Will
In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his Creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness, and power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him: yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of divine grace. But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is made a partaker of this regeneration, or renovation, since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing, and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of divine grace. Such were the sentiments of the often misrepresented Arminius on this subject; to which is only to be added, to complete the Scriptural view, that a degree of grace to consider his ways, and to return to God, is through the merit of Christ vouchsafed to every man. Everyone must be conscious that he possesses free will, and that he is a free agent; that is, that he is capable of considering and reflecting upon the objects which are presented to his mind, and of acting, in such cases as are possible, according to the determination of his will. And, indeed, without this free agency, actions cannot be morally good or bad; nor can the agents be responsible for their conduct. But the corruption introduced into our nature by the fall of Adam has so weakened our mental powers, has given such force to our passions, and such perverseness to our wills, that a man cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural, strength and good works to faith and calling upon God. The most pious of those who lived under the Mosaic dispensation often acknowledged the necessity of extraordinary assistance from God: David prays to God to open his eyes, to guide and direct him; to create in him a clean heart, and renew a right spirit within him, Psa 51:10; Psa 119:18; Psa 119:33; Psa 119:35. Even we, whose minds are enlightened by the pure precepts of the Gospel, and urged by the motives which it suggests, must still be convinced of our weakness and depravity, and confess, in the words of the tenth article, that we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will. The necessity of divine grace to strengthen and regulate our wills, and to cooperate with our endeavours after righteousness, is clearly asserted in the New Testament: They that are in the flesh cannot please God, Rom 8:8. Abide in me, says our Saviour, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in me. I am the vine, and ye are the branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit; for without me ye can do nothing, Joh 15:4-5. No man can come to me, except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him. It is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do of his good pleasure, Php 2:13. Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God,
2Co 3:5. We know not what to pray for as we ought, but the Spirit helpeth our infirmities, Rom 8:26. We are said to be led by the Spirit, and to walk in the Spirit, Rom 8:14; Gal 5:16; Gal 5:25. These texts sufficiently prove that we stand in need both of a prevenient and of a cooperating grace. This doctrine we find asserted in many of the ancient fathers, and particularly in Ambrose, who, in speaking of the effects of the fall, uses these words: Thence was derived mortality, and no less a multitude of miseries than of crimes. Faith being lost, hope being abandoned, the understanding blinded, and the will made captive, no one found in himself the means of repairing these things. Without the worship of the true God, even that which seems to be virtue is sin; nor can any one please God without God. But whom does he please who does not please God, except himself and Satan? The nature, therefore, which was good is made bad by habit: man would not return unless God turned him. And Cyprian says, We pray day and night that the sanctification and enlivening, which springs from the grace of God, may be preserved by his protection. Dr. Nicholls, after quoting many authorities to show that the doctrine of divine grace always prevailed in the catholic church, adds, I have spent, perhaps, more time in these testimonies than was absolutely necessary; but whatever I have done is to show that the doctrine of divine grace is so essential a doctrine of Christianity, that not only the Holy Scriptures and the primitive fathers assert it, but likewise that the Christians could not in any age maintain their religion without it,it being necessary, not only for the discharge of Christian duties, but for the performance of our ordinary devotions. And this seems to have been the opinion of the compilers of our excellent liturgy, in many parts of which both a prevenient and a cooperating grace is unequivocally acknowledged; particularly in the second collect for the evening service; in the fourth collect at the end of the communion service; in the collect for Easter day; in the collect for the fifth Sunday after Easter; in the collects for the third, ninth, seventeenth, nineteenth, and twenty-fifth Sundays after Trinity. This assistance of divine grace is not inconsistent with the free agency of men: it does not place them under an irresistible restraint, or compel them to act contrary to their will. Our own exertions are necessary to enable us to work out our salvation; but our sufficiency for that purpose is from God. It is, however, impossible to ascertain the precise boundary between our natural efforts and the divine assistance, whether that assistance be considered as a cooperating or a prevenient grace. Without destroying our character as free and accountable beings, God may be mercifully pleased to counteract the depravity of our hearts by the suggestions of his Spirit: but still it remains with us to chose whether we will listen to those suggestions, or obey the lusts of the flesh. We may rest assured that he will, by the communication of his grace, varied often as to power and distinctness, help our infirmities, invigorate our resolutions, and supply our defects. The promises that if we draw nigh to God, God will draw nigh to us, and pour out his Spirit upon us, Jam 4:8; Act 2:17, and that he will give his Holy Spirit to every one that asketh him, Luk 11:13, imply that God is ever ready to work upon our hearts, and to aid our well doing through the powerful, though invisible, operation of his Spirit: The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit, Joh 3:8. The joint agency of God and man, in the work of human salvation, is pointed out in the following passage: Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure, Php 2:12-13; and therefore we may assure ourselves that free will and grace are not incompatible, though the mode and degree of their cooperation be utterly inexplicable, and though at different times one may appear for a season to overwhelm the other. This doctrine has, however, been the subject of much dispute among Christians: some sects contend for the irresistible impulses of grace, and others reject the idea of any influence of the divine Spirit upon the human mind. The former opinion seems irreconcilable with the free agency of man, if held as the constant unvarying mode in which he carries on his work in the soul of man, and the latter contradicts the authority of Scripture; and therefore, says Veneer, let us neither ascribe nothing to free will, nor too much; let us not, with the defenders of irresistible grace, deny free will, or make it of no effect, not only before, but even under, grace; nor let us suffer the efficacy of saving grace, on the other hand, to be swallowed up in the strength and freedom of our wills; but, allowing the government or superiority to the grace of God, let the will of man be admitted to be its handmaid, but such a one as is free, and freely obeys; by which, when it is freely exerted by the admonitions of prevenient grace, when it is prepared as to its affections, strengthened and assisted as to its powers and faculties, a man freely and willingly cooperates with God, that the grace of God be not received in vain. All men are also to be admonished, observes Cranmer, in his Necessary Doctrine, and chiefly preachers, that in this high matter they, looking on both sides, so temper and moderate themselves, that they neither so preach the grace of God that they take away thereby free will, nor on the other side so extol free will, that injury be done to the grace of God. And Jortin remarks: Thus do the doctrine of divine grace and the doctrine of free will or human liberty unite and conspire, in a friendly manner, to our everlasting good. The first is adapted to excite in us gratitude, faith, and humility; the second, to awaken our caution and quicken our diligence.
Many, indeed, relying on mere abstract arguments, deny free will, in the strict meaning of the term, altogether, and define the mental faculties of man according to their various fancies. But the existence and nature of our moral and rational powers are and ought to be, in true philosophy, the subject of mental observation, not the sport of hypothesis. Those who love metaphysical abstractions may people the worlds of their imagination with beings of whatsoever character they prefer; but the nature and capabilities of man, as he really is, must be determined not by speculation but by experience. It is true that this experience is the object of consciousness, not of the senses; and, accordingly, each man is, in some respect, the judge in his own case, and may, if he chooses, deny his own freedom and his power of self control, or of using those means which God hath appointed to lead to this result. But this is seldom done in ordinary life, except by those abandoned individuals who seek, in such a statement, an excuse for capricious or unprincipled conduct,an excuse which is never admitted by the majority of reasoning persons, much less by the truly pious. The latter, indeed, will always be found attributing any thing good they achieve to the cooperating efficacy of superior assistance. But they will, with equal sincerity, blame themselves for what they have done amiss; or, in other words, acknowledge that they should and might have willed and acted otherwise; and this is exactly the practical question, the very turning point, on which the whole controversy hinges. The only competent judges in such a question, says Dr. R. H. Graves, are those who have made it the subject of mental observation, exertion, and pursuit; or, in other words, those who have sought after righteousness, under whatever dispensation, Act 10:35; Rom 2:7; Rom 2:10. And surely the confessions, the prayers, the repentance, and the sacrifices of the humble and pious of all ages show that they felt, not only that they were themselves to blame for their actions, and therefore that they might have done otherwise, that is, they had a free will, but that, to make this will operative in spiritual matters, they required an aid beyond the reach of mere human attainment. Some may fancy this statement inconsistent in itself; and I allow that it cannot satisfy the mere speculative supporters either of free will or its opponents. But to me it seems the testimony of conscience and experience, which, in natural religion, must, as I conceive, be preferred to abstract hypothesis. The inquiry is not how the mind may be, but how it is actually, constituted. This surely is a question of fact, not of conjecture, and must therefore be decided by an appeal to common sense and experience, not by random speculation. Again: even those who in theory contend for the doctrine of necessity, yet in all the affairs of life where their interests, comforts, or gratifications are concerned, both speak and act as if they disbelieved it, and as if they really imagined themselves capable of such self determination and self control, as to improve their talents, their opportunities, and their acquirements, and so to exercise a material influence on their worldly fortunes. But suppose the assertions of individuals, as to their consciousness in this particular, to disagree. It is then evident, that, the question being as to the nature of man in general, it must be determined by the voice of preponderating testimony. But how, it may be asked, are the suffrages to be collected? Since the judgment of each individual must in this scheme be considered as a separate fact, how is a sufficiently extensive induction to be made? In answer, it may be asserted, that in every civilized nation the induction has been already made, the suffrages have been taken, the case has been tried, and the decision is on record. And the verdict is the most impartial that can be looked for in such a case, because given without any reference to the controversy in dispute. All human laws, forbidding, condemning, and punishing vicious actions, are grounded on the acknowledged supposition that man is possessed of a self control, a self determining power, by which he could, both in will and in deed, have avoided the very actions for which he is condemned, and in the very circumstances in which he has committed them. Nor would it be easy to find a case where the criminal has deceived himself, or hoped to deceive his judges, by pleading that he laboured under a fatal necessity, which rendered his crimes unavoidable, and therefore excusable. The justice of all legislative enactments evidently and essentially depends on the principle, that the things prohibited can be avoided, or, in other words, might have been done otherwise than they were done; and this is the very turning point of the controversy. Accordingly, in whatever instances such freedom of will is not presupposed, (as in the cases of idiots and madmen,) the operation of such enactments is suspended. All nations, therefore, who consent to frame and abide by such laws, do thereby testify their deliberate and solemn assent to the truth of this principle, and, consequently, to the existence of free will in man; and do certify the sincerity of their conviction by staking upon it their properties, their liberties, and their lives. Numberless other instances might be adduced in which the practice of mankind implies their belief in this principle. And so conscious of this are the opponents of free will, that they generally deprecate appeals to common sense and experience, and resort to metaphysical arguments to examine what is in truth a matter of truth, not of conjecture; or, in other words, to determine, not what man is, but what they imagine he must be. In their reasonings they differ, as might have been expected, as much from each other as they do from truth and reality. But the experience of common sense and conscience will always decide, that no man can conscientiously make this excuse for his crimes, that he could not have willed or acted otherwise than he did. The existence of the above faculties in the human mind once acknowledged, leads, by necessary inference, to the admission, that there exists in the great First Cause a power to create them. Not, indeed, that these faculties themselves exist in him in the same manner as in us, but the power of originating and producing them in all possible variety. We can indeed conclude, that having created all these in us, his nature must be so perfect that we cannot attribute to him any line of conduct inconsistent with whatever is excellent in the exercise of these faculties in ourselves. And therefore we cannot ascribe to him, as his special act, any thing we should perceive to be unworthy of any just or merciful, any wise or upright, being. But this furnishes no clue whatever to a knowledge of the real constitution of his nature, or of the manner in which his divine attributes exist together. In truth, we no more comprehend how he wills than how he acts, and therefore we have no better right to assert that he wills evil than that he does evil. Again: we as little understand how he knows as how he sees, and therefore might as well argue that all things exist in consequence of his beholding them, as that all events arise in consequence of his foreknowing them. In short, all that can be inferred by reason concerning the intrinsic nature of the invisible, unsearchable Deity, must be admitted by the candid inquirer to be no better than conjecture. And he who should hope from such doubtful support as his fancied insight into the unknown operations of the divine mind to suspend a system of irrespective decrees, embracing the moral government of the world, would but too much resemble him who should imagine the material globe adequately sustained if upheld by a chain whose highest links were wrapped in clouds and darkness. Thus our affirmative knowledge of the Deity, as derived from this part of our inquiry, consists in the certainty, (though his nature is unknown to us,) that he is the creative source of all that is great, glorious, and good, in heaven or in earth; while we may negatively conclude, that his moral government shall, on the whole, be conducted in a manner not inconsistent with whatever is excellent in the exercise of power and wisdom, justice and mercy, goodness and truth. Nor is it a little important, as connected with the present inquiry, to keep in mind this distinction between our affirmative and negative knowledge in this matter. For it shows us that as, on the one side, we cannot pretend to such an insight into the nature and character of the divine knowledge as to deduce therefrom a system of eternal and irrespective decrees; so neither, on the other, can this system of moral government be ascribed to the Deity, because it would be manifestly unworthy, not merely of him who has created all moral excellence, but of any of those beings on whom he has conferred the most ordinary degrees of mercy and justice. The natural benefits or evils arising out of moral or immoral practices are, in fact, so many rewards or punishments, exhibiting the Being who has so constituted our nature as a moral governor. This part of his government may not be so clearly discernible in individual instances, because much of the happiness and unhappiness attending virtue and vice is mental and invisible. In the case of nations, however, considered merely as bodies politic, the internal sanction of an approving or reproaching conscience, of subdued or distracting passions, can have no existence; and therefore the external sanctions are more uniformly enforced. Hence, whoever carefully examines the dealings of Providence with the human race will admit, that national prosperity has ever kept pace with national wisdom and integrity; whereas, the greatest empires, when once corrupted, have soon become the prey of internal strife or foreign domination. Again: man is made for society, and cannot exist without it: consequently, all the regulations which are really conducive to the maintenance of civil policy and social order must be regarded as evident consequences of our nature, when enlightened to the rational pursuit of its own advantage; and therefore should be considered as intimations of a moral government, carried on through their intervention. In addition to which, it ought to be observed, that these laws may be regarded in another point of view,as a most important class of moral phenomena; inasmuch as they virtually exhibit the most unexceptionable declarations of reason on this subject, because they are collected from the common consent of mankind, and therefore rendered, in a great measure, independent of the obliquities of individual intellect, the errors of private judgment, and the partial views of self interest, prejudice, or passion. But all the laws of civilized nations, both in their enactment and administration, not only presuppose certain notions concerning the freedom and accountableness of man, the merit and demerit of human actions, and the inseparable connection of virtue and vice with rewards and punishments, but greatly contribute to fix and perpetuate these notions. It is therefore evidently the intention of that part of the moral government with which we are acquainted, to impress these principles deeply on the human mind, and to induce the human race to regulate their conduct accordingly. The laws, then, of this moral government under which we find ourselves placed, and from which we cannot escape, correspond with and corroborate the conclusions deduced from the observation of mental phenomena. And from both we conclude that similar principles of government will be adopted, (so far, at least, as man is concerned,) in other worlds and in future ages; only more developed, and therefore more evidently free from its present apparent imperfections. Upon this account we look, in another life, for some such general disclosure and consummation of the ways and wisdom of Providence as shall vindicate, even in the minor details, the grand principles upon which, generally speaking, the government of God is at present obviously conducted. How this may be done, with many questions connected therewith, reason without revelation could, as I conceive, do little more than form plausible conjectures. Though now that it has pleased God in Christ to bring life and immortality to light through the Gospel, it is possible for reason to estimate the beauty and the mercy and the wisdom of the dispensation by which it has been effected.