Will (Scholastic)
Will (Scholastic)
Will is one of the two rational faculties of the human soul. Only man, as a rational animal, possesses will. Animals are prompted to action by the sensory appetites and in this obey the law of their nature, whereas human will is called free insofar as it determines itself towards the line of action it chooses. Though the objects of will are presented by the intellect, this faculty does not determine will which may still act against the intellect’s judgment. The proper object of rational will is good in its universal aspect. Goodness is one of the original (“transcendental”) aspects of being, envisioned under this aspect, it becomes a possible end of will. As such, it is apprehended by reason, arousing a simple volitive movement. Follow the approval of “synderesis” (v. there), striving, deliberation, consent, final approval by reason, choice of means and execution. Thus, there is a complicated interplay of intellectual and volitive performances which finally end with action. Action being necessarily about particulars and these being material, will, an “immaterial” faculty cannot get directly in touch with reality and needs, as does on its part intellect, an intermediary; the sensory appetites are the ultimate executors, while the vis cogitativa or practical reason supplies the link on the side of intellectual performance. True choice exists only in rational beings, animals appearing to deliberate are, in truth, only passively subjected to the interference of images and appetites, and their actions are automatically determined by the relative strength of these factors. While man’s will is essentially free, it is restricted in the exercise of its fi eedom by imagination, emotion, habit. Whatever an end will aims at, it is always a good, be it one of a low degree. — R.A.