Exegetical and Hermeneutical Commentary of Galatians 3:20

Now a mediator is not [a mediator] of one, but God is one.

20. Probably no verse of Scripture has more exercised the ingenuity of commentators. Certainly of none other can it be said that it ‘has received 430 interpretations’ (Jowett), if by that expression contrariant or different interpretations are meant. Some notice of these is reserved for an Appendix (Appendix v. p. 89). The verse may be paraphrased as follows: Now the very fact that at the giving of the Law a Mediator was needed, marks the nature of the transaction as a compact entered into between two parties. The very term Mediator implies two parties between whom he intervenes. But the God of the promise is One and One only. He reveals Himself as the bestower of a free gift to the world. ‘The Giver is everything, the recipient nothing’ (Lightfoot). Hence there was no place in the Gospel revelation for a mediator in the sense in which Moses was mediator between God and the people of Israel. It may be observed that this view of the scope of the passage (which is all that is necessary to its connexion with the preceding and following context) does not militate against, nor is it inconsistent with, the declaration that there is ‘One Mediator between God and man’, (1Ti 2:5). The young student of theology needs to be cautioned against the too common mistake of treating a verse of Scripture as if it were an isolated proposition, instead of regarding it in its relation to the train of thought to the expression of which it contributes.

On Chapter Gal 3:20

Of the many explanations which have been given of this passage a few of the most important may be noticed. They may be classified in three divisions, according to the supposed reference in the term Mediator:

1. The earlier expositors understood the term Mediator in the passage before us to refer to Christ. In favour of this view it may of course be urged that in all other passages of the N. T. (see note on Gal 3:19) where the word occurs it refers to our Lord Jesus Christ. But it no more follows that the word thus applied to our Lord so loses its primary meaning as to be appropriated exclusively to Him, than that the words ‘shepherd’ and ‘bishop’ must necessarily refer to Him in every passage where they occur, because He is ‘the Shepherd and Bishop’ of our souls. Even if the reference to Christ could be established as a simple and natural explanation of the passage, taken by itself, the connexion with the context is obscured or lost, and the force of the Apostle’s argument impaired thereby.

2. More probable is the opinion that in Gal 3:20, as in Gal 3:19, the Mediator is Moses. (The definite article in the Greek may lend equal support to this and to the next explanation.) This opinion, entertained by eminent commentators, both ancient and modern, is in full accord with the scope of the passage. But the reference, though suggested by, is not therefore limited to the giving of the Law. ‘The mediator,’ just spoken of ( Gal 3:19), is undoubtedly Moses, but what was true of him in that capacity is also true of every other human mediator.

3. Lastly, we may regard the first portion of the verse as laying down a general proposition. Those who hold this view adopt the rendering of the English Bible, both A.V. and R.V. alike, as correct, and understand it to express ‘the idea, the specific type,’ and to state a characteristic of the Mediator, as such. The very idea of mediation implies a transaction involving the existence of at least two parties, and mutual conditions. But the Gospel is a promise, the gift of grace. God alone is its author, and its fulfilment depends on His faithfulness on Himself alone.

Under each of these general divisions (especially the last) a great many explanations, differing in some particulars, are found. Many of these, so far from being destructive of one another, are not inconsistent or irreconcilable with one another. The slighter differences help to illustrate and confirm the great truth which St Paul is enforcing, rather than to obscure his meaning or render it uncertain. A more detailed account of these, with the names of their principal authors, may be found in Dr Schaffe’s Commentary, Excursus, p. 38, who gives the following extract from Reuss’s French Commentary, which clearly expresses one, and perhaps the best-supported, view of the passage under consideration: “A mediator implies two contracting parties, consequently two wills, which may be united, but may also disagree; a law therefore given by mediation is conditional and imperfect: but the promise, emanating from God alone, and having His will for its sole source and guarantee, is infinitely more sure and more elevated. The law, then, cannot set aside the promise, its aim can only be secondary.”

Fuente: The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges

Now a mediator is not a mediator of one … – This verse has given great perplexity to commentators. There is, unquestionably, says Bloomfield, no passage in the New Testament that has so much, and to so little purpose, exercised the learning and ingenuity of commentators as the present, which seems to defy all attempts to elicit any satisfactory sense, except by methods so violent as to be almost the same thing as writing the passage afresh. In regard, however, to the truth of the declarations here – that a mediator is not a mediator of one, and that God is one – there can be no doubt, and no difficulty. The very idea of a mediator supposes that there are two parties or persons between whom the mediator comes either to reconcile them or to bear some message from the one to the other; and it is abundantly affirmed also in the Old Testament that there is but one God; see Deu 6:4.

But the difficulty is, to see the pertinency or the bearing of the remark on the argument of the apostle. What does he intend to illustrate by the declaration? and how do the truths which he states, illustrate the point before him? It is not consistent with the design of these notes to detail the numerous opinions which have been entertained of the passage. They may be found in the larger commentaries, and particularly may be seen in Koppe, Excursus vii. on the Galatians. After referring to a number of works on the passage, Rosenmuller adopts the following interpretation, proposed by Noessett, as expressing the true sense. But he (that is, Moses) is not a mediator of one race (to wit, the Abrahamic), but God is the same God of them and of the Gentiles. The sense according to this is, that Moses had not reference in his office as mediator or as internuncius to the descendants of Abraham, or to that one seed or race, referred to in the promise.

He added the hard conditions of the Law; required its stern and severe observances; his institutions pertained to the Jews mainly. They indeed might obtain the favor of God, but by compliance with the severe laws which he had ordained. But to the one seed, the whole posterity of Abraham, they concerning whom the promise was made, the Gentiles as well as the Jews, he had no reference in his institutions: all their favors, therefore, must depend on the fulfillment of the promise made to Abraham. But God is one and the same in reference to all. His promise pertains to all. He is the common God to the Jews and the Gentiles. There is great difficulty in embracing this view of the passage, but it is not necessary for me to state the difficulty or to attempt to show that the view here proposed cannot be defended. Whitby has expressed substantially the same interpretation of this passage. But this mediator (namely, Moses) was only the mediator of the Jews, and so was only the mediator of one party, to whom belonged the blessing of Abraham, Gal 3:8, Gal 3:14. But God, who made the promise, That in one should all the families of the earth be blessed, is one; the God of the other party, the Gentiles as well as the Jews, and so as ready to justify the one as the other.

According to this interpretation, the sense is, that Moses was mediator of one part of Abrahams seed, the Israelites; but was not the mediator of the other part of that seed, the Gentiles; yet there was the same God to both parties, who was equally ready to justify both. Locke has expressed a view of the passage which differs somewhat from this, but which has quite as much plausibility. According to his exposition it means, that God was but one of the parties to the promise. The Jews and the Gentiles made up the other. But at the giving of the Law Moses was a mediator only between God and the Israelites, and, therefore, could not transact anything which would tend to the disannulling of the promise which was between God and the Jews and Gentiles together, the other party to the promise. Or in other words, at the covenant made on Mount Sinai, there was really present but one of the parties, and consequently nothing could be done that would affect the other.

Moses did not appear in behalf of the Gentiles. They had no representative there. He was engaged only for the Jews, for a part only of the one party, and that part could not transact anything for the whole. The giving of the Law, therefore, could not affect the promise which was made to Abraham, and which related to the Jews and the Gentiles as together constituting one party. This view is plausible. It has been adopted by Doddridge, and perhaps may be the true interpretation. No one can deny, however, that it is forced, and that it is far from being obvious. It seems to be making a meaning for the apostle, or furnishing him with an argument, rather than explaining the one which he has chosen to use; and it may be doubted whether Paul would have used an argument that required so much explanation as this before it could be understood. All these expositions proceed on the supposition that the word mediator here refers to Moses, and that the transaction here referred to was that on Mount Sinai. I would suggest a sense of the passage which I have found in none of the commentaries which I have consulted, and which I would, therefore, propose with diffidence.

All that I can claim for it is, that it may possibly be the meaning. According to the view which I shall submit, the words here are to be regarded as used in their usual signification; and the simplest interpretation possible is to be given to the propositions in the verse. One proposition is, that a mediator is not appointed with reference to one party, but to two. This proposition is universal. Wherever there is a mediator there are always two parties. The other proposition is, that God is one; that is, that he is the same one God, in whatever form his will may be made known to people, whether by a promise as to Abraham, or by the Law as to Moses. The interpretation which I would propose embraces the following particulars:

(1) The design of the apostle is, to show that the giving of the Law could not abrogate or affect the promise made to Abraham; and to show at the same time what is its true object. It could not annul the promises, says Paul. It was given long after, and could not affect them, Gal 3:17. It was an addition, an appendage, a subsequent enactment for a specific purpose, yet a part of the same general plan, and subordinate to the Mediator, Gal 3:19. It was to be shown also that the Law was not against the promises of God. It was a good law Gal 3:21; and was not designed to be an opposing system, or intended to counteract the promise, or the scheme of salvation by promise, but was a part of the same great plan.

(2) A mediator always supposes two parties. In all the transactions, therefore, where a mediator is employed, there is supposed to be two parties. When, therefore, the promise was made to Abraham with reference to the Messiah, the great Mediator; and when the Law was given in the hand of the Mediator, and under his control, there is always supposed to be two parties.

(3) The whole arrangement here referred to is under the Mediator, and with reference to him. The promise made to Abraham had reference to him and to those who should believe on him; and the Law given by Moses was also under him, and with reference to him. He was the grand object and agent of all. He was the Mediator with reference to both. Each transaction had reference to him, though in different ways the transaction with Abraham relating to him in connection with a promise; the transaction at the giving of the Law being under his control as Mediator, and being a part of the one great plan. There was an identity of plan; and the plan had reference to the Messiah, the great Mediator.

(4) God is one and the same. He is throughout one of the parties; and he does not change. However the arrangements may vary, whether in giving the Law or imparting a promise, He is the same. There is only one God in all the transaction; and He, throughout, constitutes one of the parties. The other party is man, at first receiving the promise from this one God with reference to the Mediator through Abraham, and then receiving the Law through the same Mediator on Mount Sinai. He is still the one party unchanged; and there is the same Mediator; implying all along that there are two parties.

(5) It follows, therefore, agreeably to the argument of the apostle, that the Law given so long after the promise, could not abrogate it, because they pertained to the same plan, were under the same one God, who was one unchanging party in all this transaction, and had reference to the same Mediator and were alike under his control. It followed, also, that the Law was temporary Gal 3:19; interposed for important purposes until the seed should come, because it was a part of the same general arrangement, and was under the control of the same Mediator, and directed by the same one God, the unchanging one party in all these transactions. It followed, further, that the one could not be against the other Gal 3:21, because they were a part of the same plan, under the control of the same Mediator, and where the same God remained unchanged as the one party. All that is assumed in this interpretation is:

1. That there was but one plan or arrangement; or that the transaction with Abraham and with Moses were parts of one great scheme; and,
2. That the Mediator here referred to was not Moses, but the Messiah, the Son of God.

The following paraphrase will express the sense which I have endeavored to convey. The giving of the Law could not annul or abrogate the promise made to Abraham. It was long after that, and it was itself subservient to that. It was given by the instrumentality of angels, and it was entirely under the control of the Mediator, the Messiah. The plan was one; and all the parts of it, in the promise made to Abraham and in the giving of the Law, were subordinate to him. A mediator always supposes two parties, and the reference to the Mediator, alike in the promise to Abraham and in the giving of the Law, supposes that there were two parties. God is one party, the same unchanging God in all the forms of the promise and of the Law. In this state of things, it is impossible that the Law should clash with the promise, or that it should supersede or modify it. It was a part of the one great plan; appointed with reference to the work which the Mediator came to do; and in accordance with the promise made to Abraham; and therefore they could not be contradictory and inconsistent. It is assumed in all this that the Messiah was contemplated in the whole arrangement, and that it was entered into with reference to him. That this may be assumed no one can deny who believes the scriptures. The whole arrangement in the Old Testament, it is supposed, was designed to be ancillary to redemption; and the interpretation which has been submitted above is based on that supposition.

Fuente: Albert Barnes’ Notes on the Bible

Gal 3:20

Now a mediator is not a mediator of one, but God is one.

I. The key to the apostles argument–One.

1. (Gal 3:16) One is the seed of Abraham, to whom the promise was made. In thee shall all the nations be blessed (Gal 3:8), was the proposition with which St. Paul started to prove (Gal 3:14) that the blessing of Abraham was to come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ.

2. (Gal 3:28-29) The conclusion evidently reverts to the beginning, Ye are all one in Christ Jesus then are ye Abrahams seed, and heirs according to promise.

3. In Gal 3:20, therefore, the oneness in the centre must refer to the same unity. When, in the intermediate argument, designed to refute the plea of the Jews that their covenant was the fulfilment of the promise to Abraham, St. Paul insists on the non-unity or want of oneness connected with a mediator, the presumption is strong that it is to the Mosaic covenant and its mediator that he is denying the oneness which he claims to be fulfilled in the Christian covenant and its Mediator.

II. The steps of the argument.

1. (Gal 3:16) One is the seed of Abraham, to whom the blessing which extends to all nations is promised.

2. (Gal 3:20. The mediator must be a mediator of one (seed), including all Jews and Gentiles! and making all one; and the God (of both) is One.

3. (verses 28-29) But ye are all one in Christ Jesus; and therefore Abrahams seed and heirs according to the promise.

III. The conclusion of the argument.

1. Moses, the mediator of the Jewish covenant, is not such a mediator of one (Gal 3:20), uniting all into one, making all one seed, one body, one with God, one with each other.

2. But Christ is exactly such a mediator.

(1) He is the one seed in whom all find their unity.

(2) In Him God and man are made one, for He is both in one Person.

(3) In Him all men and all nations, the most diverse have become one. (1Co 12:13; Eph 1:10).

3. Christ, as Mediator, is a Mediator of one in the fullest sense as making all one. God, the author of the promise, is one God of all, Jews and Gentiles (Gal 3:20).

4. Ye are all one in Christ Jesus (Gal 3:28), being all baptized into Christ, having put on Christ (Gal 3:27), and if ye be Christs, then ye be Abrahams seed and heirs, etc. (Gal 3:29). (Principal Forbes.)

The law was ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator; but a mediator is not a mediator of one person, but of two–here, in the case under consideration, the mediator was Moses, and the two parties between whom he stood were God and the Israelites. But God is not a Mediator between two parties: He is one; in His promise God acts alone and independently–here, in the case under consideration, in the giving of a promise to Abraham by God, there was no mediator, it was absolute and unconditional, without the intervention of a third party. The covenant which God made with the Israelites at Sinai was given through a mediator, viz., Moses; but the covenant which God made with Abraham that in him and his seed all nations should be blessed, was given without a mediator. The one was conditional, and by law or contract; the other was unconditional, and by promise. (P. J. Gloag, D. D.)

Mediation and Gods oneness

Perhaps no passage in Scripture has received so many interpretations as this–more than two hundred and fifty at least. Who does not see in this an illustration of the honour done to the Word of God? On what other book would the same amount of time, and mental labour, and literary attainment, have been expended for the illustration of an occasional remark? The causes of the diversity of sentiment are various Some suppose the apostle to speak in his own person; others consider either the whole verse, or at any rate the first part of it, as the words of an objector. Some by the mediator understand any mediator; others, Moses; others, Christ. Some understand one as a substantive; others as an adjective which requires a substantive to be supplied to bring out the sense, and that substantive they have supplied very variously: some, of one party; others, of one seed; others, of one law; others, of one race; others, of one thing, etc. Some understand the assertion is not of one of the person; ethers, of the condition, others, of the design and business of the mediator. Some consider the last member of the sentence, God is one, as philosophical or dogmatic; others as historical, looking to the times of Abraham, or of the giving of the law at Sinai. Luthers notion is quite singular–God offendeth no man, and therefore needeth no mediator; but we offend God, and therefore we need a mediator. The mode of connecting the passage has also given origin to diversity of view respecting its meaning. Now, in any discussion of this passage, two things must be kept in mind:

1. The repetition of the word mediator is not in the original. The text reads literally thus: Now a–or the–mediator is not of one.

2. The words must contain in them some statement which lays a foundation for the conclusion deduced in the next verse, that the law is not against the promises of God. However plausible in other respects an interpretation may be, it cannot be the right one if it does not bring out a sense which justifies the apostles inference. The almost innumerable opinions of interpreters may be reduced to two classes–those in which the words, Now a mediator is not of one, are understood as a general proposition, true of all mediators, and applied by the apostle in the course of his reasoning to the subject before him; and those in which they are considered as a particular statement, referring exclusively and directly to the mediator spoken of in preceding verse. Those who are agreed in thinking the words are a general proposition, differ widely in the way in which they understand it, and in which they make it bear on the apostles argument. One class consider the words as equivalent to–Now a mediator does not belong to a state of unity or agreement. The use of a mediator seems to intimate that the parties between whom he mediates are not at one. This mode of interpretation labours under great difficulties. For, first, it is not true that the use of a mediator necessarily supposes disagreement. There are causes of the use of a mediator besides this. God continues to deal with those with whom He is reconciled through a mediator. And secondly, it breaks the connection between the two clauses of the verse, which obviously is very intimate. Another class consider the words as equivalent to–a mediator does not belong exclusively to one party; a mediator belongs to both parties; and they consider the apostle as arguing thus: No man can be a mediator who is not appointed by both parties. There were two parties in the original agreement–God and the spiritual seed of Abraham. Moses was indeed appointed by God; but God was one of the parties, so that whatever such a mediator could do could not affect the interests of the other party. This explanation is not satisfactory, because in the appointment of the Great Mediator of the better covenant, God alone was concerned. A third class consider the words as equivalent to–a mediator is not peculiar to this one dispensation. There have been various mediators, but there is but one God. The mediator may be changed, but God continues the same. But the words do not naturally convey this meaning. The mediator of this verse is evidently the same as the mediator referred to in the preceding verse. The question still remains, then, Who is the mediator thus referred to? Some consider the mediator by whose hands the law was given, as Jesus Christ. But Christ is nowhere in Scripture called the mediator of the law; and surely if the reference had been to Him, the language in verse :19 would not have been a mediator, but the mediator, if not the expression elsewhere used, the one Mediator between God and men. This still further narrows the field of discussion. We have now only–taking for granted that the mediator is Moses–to seek for a meaning which the words of the apostle will bear, and which will support his conclusion, that the law is not, cannot be, against the promises of God. If the first part of the verse be read interrogatively, and if the word one be understood, not numerically, but morally, as signifying uniform and unchangeable, always self-consistent, a plain meaning may be deduced from the words, in harmony with the context. The law was given by the hands of Moses as a mediator. But was he not the mediator of Him who is one and the same for ever? Now God, who appointed Moses mediator, is one and the same–unchanged, unchangeable. Can, then, the law be against the promises of God? (John Brown, D. D.)

The Mediator

God is one. He alone is to be considered in this transaction. It is all His doing. He not only mediates with us, but also for us; He is on our side; He takes part with us. It is His single hand which achieves the issue; the whole depends upon Him, and is consummated by Him.

I. The parties supposed. God; man. These two at variance.

II. The mediator. One who can take up both sides of the case. Necessary that he should receive power and deputation from both, and that each party abide by his determination. In Gods stead, and yet mans substitute and surety. Where shall such an one be found?

III. God provides the mediator. He acts for man, as well as for Himself.

1. God originates the plan.

2. God removes every obstruction.

3. God secures mans co-operation.

4. God alone is to be adored. (R. W. Hamilton, D. D.)

Explanation of the verse

Some two or three hundred interpretations go upon the misconception that the meaning is: A mediator is a mediator, not of one party, but of two parties, and God is one of those two parties. This is, I strongly think, quite erroneous. The structure of the Greek excludes it. The word one clearly points not to number, but to quality; and so the sense will be: A mediator has nothing to do with what is one, whatsoever be the number of individuals constituting that unit, but God is pre-eminently one–one with Himself, as in essence, so in will one in His one method of dealing with all. (Canon T. S. Evans, D. D.)

St. Pauls view of the unity of God

There is more than one sense in which unity may be understood. It may mean one and no more, i.e., numerical unity; or, one and the same to all and always; or, union of many in a collective unit. We may say, there is one king, meaning that there are not two or more; or, there is one king, meaning that all have the same king, that he is the same to all his subjects; and we may say, the kingdom is one, meaning that it is not divided, that it is a collective unit in the monarchy. It is therefore important to observe in what sense St. Paul uses the word when in any passage he speaks of unity, and especially when he refers to the unity of God. Now it is plainly his habit to use the word in senses other than numerical. The following are instances: 1Co 3:8; 1Co 6:16; 1Co 10:17; 1Co 12:13; 2Co 11:2; Gal 3:28; Eph 1:10; Eph 2:14-15; Php 1:27. And so, when St. Paul speaks of God being one, it is certainly not usually, if it is ever, in the numerical sense. The very word , as he understands it, excludes the idea of polytheism; and against polytheism, as implying many actual gods, he is nowhere concerned to argue Brought up in Judaism, he had imbibed, as it were with his mothers milk, the idea of one God only. Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God, had been the central principle of his religion from the first, and expressed a self-evident truth which to his mind was unassailable. But he had been taught also to regard the One God as, in a peculiar sense, the God of Israel only; the whole Gentile world being to the mind of the Jew outside the circle of special Divine favour. Yet, as his mind became enlarged through familiarity with Gentile thought and literature, and through his own musings and his observation of the world, we may believe that he had long been perplexed by the limitation which his creed seemed to imply of the love of the universal Father. His mind craved a conception of God, as not only supreme, but as one in His own nature, one and the same to all, comprehending all alike in the embrace of His own essential unity. Further, it appears from his language in more than one passage, that he had been perplexed not only by the seeming partition between Jew and Gentile, but also by the discords and anomalies Apparent at present in creation generally. The general puzzle of this painful earth had set him musing. Such comprehensive language (as that in Rom 8:19-22) cannot surely be interpreted as referring to humanity alone. It seems to mean that everywhere throughout known sentient creation there is now pain and evil, discordant with the idea of unity in God. But among all the apparent discords of creation those within himself came home to him especially, because personally felt. He was conscious of a law of God within him, demanding his entire allegiance; but he was conscious also of another law in his members–a law of sin and death–warring against the law of his mind–such as to have wrung from him once the almost despairing cry, O wretched man that I am, etc. Such inward experience clashed with his conceived ideal of One God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto Him. And further, it is evident (as is especially seen in his Epistle to the Ephesians) that even beyond this mundane sphere of things his thoughts extended. His religious faith–confirmed doubtless by his observation of the mystery of spiritual evil among men–told him also of spiritual things of wickednesses in the heavenly places, of a prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience; and such dissonance in the heavenly places themselves was inconsistent with his grand ideal. For God was to his mind the one absolute existence, the one eternal Being, of whom are all things: the Father () of whom every family () in heaven and on earth is named; and not only the Father, but also present in all creation still And the God of his conscience being to him Love and Righteousness as well as Power and Life, he craved in all creation a reflection of the whole Divine perfection–such as, in the present state of things, he did not find. Such grand conceptions we conceive to have had possession of St. Pauls mind–after his conversion certainly, as is evident from his writings, and probably long before. To a mind thus prepared, the revelation of God in Christ was as a sudden burst of light. It did not, indeed, show him the original source or purpose of existing evil But the new light from heaven showed him Reconciliation, and discords resolved, in the fulness of time, into eternal harmony In this passage the apostle has been arguing against the notion that the Mosaic law had either fulfilled or abrogated the promise made to Abraham; and the thought that suggests the verse before us is, that in the giving of the law Moses had intervened as a mediator. In reference to this fact he says: Now a mediator is not of one; but God is one. Viewed in the light of St. Pauls dominant conception, with all that it involves, of the unity of God, the following interpretation at once suggests itself to the mind: A mediator is not of one (i.e., of that which is one–whether singly or collectively–mediation has no place where there is unity)

; but God is one (in the sense, with all that follows from it, ever present to St. Pauls mind when he says ): therefore (the conclusion follows, though not expressed) the law, with its intervening mediator, did not manifest Gods unity, and the consequent unity of all in Him. (J. Barmby, B. D.)

That nothing should disturb our deep and settled repose in immutable love and faithfulness of God. That the most rigid enactments of law can never affect the promises of Divine grace, while the grace revealed in the promises mellows and modifies the rigour of law. That both the law and the promise shut us up to one only ground of dependence and hope of eternal life. That Christianity, with its personal Saviour and remedial scheme of mercy, is the only revelation suited to the moral and undeniable necessities of mans fallen nature. That the belief and reception of the Christian revelation is the one simple condition of endless life and blessedness. Such we deem to be the true exegesis of this confessedly difficult text, and such the profound truths involved in its interpretation. There are no various readings to perplex us; there is no necessity for taking a single word out of its ordinary and accepted meaning; there is no pretext for twisting or wresting the apostles language, nor for interfering with the chain of his argument. His aim is to bring out the superiority of the gospel to the law: and this he does by showing that whatever methods God may adopt in the government of our world, nothing can interfere with His promise of grace, since that promise is founded on the immutability of His own nature, no less than on the depth and the exuberance of His own love. God is one, immutably and for ever the same; so that the promise which was given four hundred years before the law remains the same after the law–as rich in grace, and as pregnant with life. In this promise, or rather in Him to whom the promise refers, we can confide with calm and joyous repose, persuaded that neither life nor death, neither angels, nor principalities, etc. (R. Ferguson, LL. D.)

The one Mediator

The argument is based on the fact that when God blessed Abraham, He used a singular and not a plural word, and said, not seeds, but Seed: to Abraham and his seed were the promises made. The Seed, therefore, must be One Individual. And who could that single Individual be, but Christ only? Therefore all the promises in the Old Testament are to Christ. Not primarily, nor chiefly, to Isaac, or to Jacob, or to Judah, or to any other earthly descendants; but to one, to Christ. Stop a moment, and consider what that assertion involves. All the promises in the Old Testament are to Jesus only. Nay more, all the promises in the Bible centre in Jesus. They pass to us only through Him. How often have we taken the comfort of some beautiful promise in Deuteronomy; or in the Psalms; or the Proverbs; or in Isaiah; or any of the Prophets, without thinking of this. But not one of those promises was originally made to us. They were made to Christ. How then, could we dare to appropriate them, or even to touch them? Where do we find a right or a title to any one of them? Only by a union to Him to whom they were made. You must have a part in Christ. You must be in Him; a member in His mystical body. Thus and thus only, does any promise really belong to and to all that are in Him, what is the use of the law. Wherefore then serveth the law? The law is not covenant, it was four hundred and thirty years after covenant. The law does not give us the promises. Wherefore then serveth the law? Our fallen nature, and our sins, made it necessary. It was added (after the covenant) because of transgressions, to prevent transgressions; to punish transgressions; but not to give pardon, or peace, or salvation, or heaven. It was a beautiful and holy law; and if any law could have saved a man, that would have saved him. If there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law. But no law can give life. But now let us consider the mode of the giving of that law which St. Paul introduces as a further link in his chain of argument. It was ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator (see Deu 33:2). It is clear, therefore, that in some way, at the giving of the law on mount Sinai, angels were employed for the ordering, disposing, and arranging the solemnities of that awful occasion. St. Paul introduces the fact to enhance the glory of the second and better covenant; he goes on to a climax; the first covenant was very glorious, it was ordained by angels; but how much more glorious when Christ did all Himself, in His own Person, by His own act, alone! Then St. Paul passes–from the angels, and the order of the solemnities on mount Sinai–to the mediator, Moses, who was employed by God to communicate Gods will to man, the Creators law to His creatures. It was ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator. And at that word mediator St Paul (as is his custom), breaks off to the thoughts which that word mediator suggested to his mind. A mediator!–what is it? What does that word involve? And so we come to the text, Now a mediator is not a mediator of one; but God is one. This short sentence is so difficult in its conciseness, so abstruse, and capable of so many meanings, that it is not too much to say that it has more interpretations than any other passage in the Bible. Amongst all the meanings, however, which have been attached to it, there are two which stand out so distinct, and are far superior (as far as I can judge) to all the rest, that the true understanding of the words must be, I think, in one or the other, or in both unitedly. The one is this. Now a mediator is not a mediator of one. A mediator implies that there are two parties concerned. There cannot be mediators unless there are two between whom the mediator is to act. And the two must be, more or less, at variance, otherwise there would be no need, or occasion, for the mediation. Here, then, there must be two. Two? God is one of the two, one of those two between whom the mediation takes place. Then, who was the other? Man. In what condition, then, must man be? At enmity with God! Else, he would not need a mediation. The other interpretation is this. The words are intended to draw a contrast between the law and the gospel. The mediation of the law–which was conducted by Moses–was of the nature of a contract between two parties–God, on the one side, man on the other. And each must fulfil his part in the contract, or else it would not be valid. Therefore the contract of the law, observe this! leaves the issue uncertain–for it depended, on one side, on mans obedience, which was an exceedingly doubtful thing; it certainly cannot be depended upon! But just the contrary to that is the contract of the gospel. In that contract God is all in all. It depends on the will and power of God. It is all, from beginning to end, His work. He elects the soul: He makes the faith: He makes the obedience: He makes the holiness; and He has provided, and He Himself gives, and is, the reward. There is nothing but God in it. So the unity of God is complete. There is nothing but God. God is one. The mediation is entirely different from the mediation of the law. There, the parties mediated, were two. Here, all are one. God the Author, God the Finisher; only God on either side, in His electing love, in the sinners penitence, in the sinners peace, in the sinners eternal life. It is all God. One; alone. Of these two explanations I myself very much prefer the first. But why may we not embrace the two, reading the verse thus? Man is separate from God. The fact that there is a Mediator, the necessity of a Mediator, proves it. We are all at variance with God. A controversy between a man and God is, on reasonable and rational principles, hopeless. I am one and alone in my deep, sinful degradation. God is one and alone in the solitude of His infinite and unapproachable holiness. There is not the vestige of a hope for me unless there be a Mediator. But God is one. One, up in heaven, in His foreordaining love; one, in my poor heart, working there in His grace and mercy; one, in His eternal sovereignty; one, in His power and will to make me all He would have me to be; one to plan, one to execute, His grand design. One to begin, and one to perfect, my salvation. One to save me and glorify Himself by my everlasting happiness. A mediator is not a mediator of one–then God and I are at enmity. But God is one. And, in His unity, I and God are one for ever. (James Vaughan, M. A.)

A mediator

I. His office–to act between two parties–needed betwixt God and man.

II. His qualifications–friendly relations with both parties–strict justice and impartiality.

III. His functions–to effect reconciliation-by bringing both together–on a common ground.

IV. His authority–Divine, for God is one–consequently there is but one mediator, the man Christ Jesus–Moses was but a shadow of the true. (J. Lyth.)

The mediation of Christ

I. Effects reconciliation between God and man.

II. Is the realization of the idea faintly depicted in the person of Moses–He gives the law of the Spirit–provides the true sacrifice–makes everlasting intercession.

III. Is based upon the original promise (v. 21)–God is one, therefore supreme–unchangeable–almighty to effect His purpose of grace. (J. Lyth.)

Fuente: Biblical Illustrator Edited by Joseph S. Exell

Verse 20. A mediator is not a mediator of one] As a mediator, , signifies a middle person, there must necessarily be two parties, between whom he stands, and acts in reference to both, as he is supposed to have the interests of both equally at heart.

This verse is allowed to be both obscure and difficult; and it is certain that there is little consent among learned men and critics in their opinions concerning it. Rosenmuller thinks that the opinion of Nosselt is to be preferred to all others.

He first translates the words thus: But he (viz. Moses) is not the mediator of that one race of Abraham, viz. the Christians; for relates to the , the seed that should come, Ga 3:19, of which he said, ‘ , as of one, Ga 3:16. If Paul had written , he is not the mediator of one, no person would have had any doubt that , seed, ought to be supplied after , of one, Ga 3:19-20. The same mode of speaking Paul uses, Ro 5:17; , but he, for , Mat 12:3; Mat 12:11; Mat 12:39, , but he said. Though Moses was the Mediator between God and the Israelites, yet he was not the mediator between God and that one seed which was to come; viz. the Gentiles who should believe in Christ.

But God is one.] He is the one God, who is the Father of the spirits of all flesh; the God of the Gentiles as well as the God of the Jews. That this is St. Paul’s meaning is evident from his use of the same words in other places, 1Ti 2:5: , c., for there is one God, and one mediator between God and man, that is, there is only one God and one mediator for the whole human race Eph 4:5-6: One Lord, one faith, one baptism, , ONE GOD and Father of ALL. The sense of the whole is: Moses was the mediator of one part of Abraham’s seed, viz. the Israelites; but of the other seed, the Gentiles, he was certainly not the mediator; for the mediator of that seed, according to the promise of God, and covenant made with Abraham, is Christ.

Though Nosselt has got great credit for this interpretation, it was given in substance long before him by Dr. Whitby, as may be seen in the following words: “But this mediator (Moses) was only the mediator of the Jews, and so was only the mediator of one party, to whom belonged the blessings of Abraham, Gal 3:8; Gal 3:14. But GOD, who made the promise that in one should all the families of the earth be blessed, IS ONE; the God of the other party, the Gentiles, as well as of the Jews, , seeing he is ONE GOD, who will justify the circumcision by faith, and the uncircumcision through faith, Ro 3:30.” This exposition is so plain, and so well supported by the different scriptures already quoted, that there can be but small, if any, doubt of its propriety. The clause has been translated thus: “Now a mediator supposes two parties, of which God is but one.”

Fuente: Adam Clarke’s Commentary and Critical Notes on the Bible

This is a text acknowledged by all interpreters to be very obscure; not so much as considered in itself, (for all know, that a mediator speaks one that goes in the middle between two persons that are at odds, so cannot be of one), as in regard of the connection of it with what went before; where he had told us, that the law was given in the hand of a mediator. There are various senses given of this verse, and the variety much ariseth from mens different understanding of the mediator in whose hand the law was given. To me the apostle seems to magnify the promise above the law, in that the promise was given to Abraham immediately by God, (who is one in essence), but the law was given not immediately by God, but by Moses as mediator, who in that action was a type of Christ. And God thereby showed, that the law would bring no man to life and salvation without the one and only Mediator Christ Jesus. Christ, indeed, is the Mediator of the new testament, he mediated for it, he mediateth in it; but it was mens transgression of the law that brought them in need of a Mediator, sin being the only thing that separateth between God and man.

God is one; and there had been no need of mediating between him and man, but for the law which man had transgressed. Those that by the mediator, Gal 3:19, understand Christ, make this the sense: That as a mediator supposeth two parties at odds, so Christs being Mediator speaks him to have respect to Jews and Gentiles. But this interpretation seems to make Christ the Mediator between Jews and Gentiles, whom (the apostle saith) he made both one, breaking down the partition-wall, Eph 2:14; but we do not find the name of Mediator upon this account any where given unto Christ. Many other senses are given, but the first mentioned seemeth the most probable, viz. that God made use of no mediator in giving the promise, but only in giving the law, which evidenced that justification was not to be by it; nor had there been need of a true Mediator under the gospel, but for the law, mens transgression of which brought in a need of a Mediator; which proved that justification could not be by the law.

Fuente: English Annotations on the Holy Bible by Matthew Poole

20. “Now a mediator cannotbe of one (but must be of two parties whom he mediatesbetween); but God is one” (not two: owing to His essential unitynot admitting of an intervening party between Him and those to beblessed; but as the ONESovereign, His own representative, giving the blessing directlyby promise to Abraham, and, in its fulfilment, to Christ, “theSeed,” without new condition, and without a mediator such as thelaw had). The conclusion understood is, Therefore a mediatorcannot appertain to God; and consequently, the law, with itsinseparable appendage of a mediator, cannot be the normal way ofdealing of God, the one, and unchangeable God, who dealt with Abrahamby direct promise, as a sovereign, not as one forming acompact with another party, with conditions and a mediator attachedthereto. God would bring man into immediate communion with Him, andnot have man separated from Him by a mediator that keeps back fromaccess, as Moses and the legal priesthood did (Exo 19:12;Exo 19:13; Exo 19:17;Exo 19:21-24; Heb 12:19-24).The law that thus interposed a mediator and conditions between manand God, was an exceptional state limited to the Jews, andparenthetically preparatory to the Gospel, God’s normal mode ofdealing, as He dealt with Abraham, namely, face to face directly;by promise and grace, and not conditions; to allnations united by faith in the one seed (Eph 2:14;Eph 2:16; Eph 2:18),and not to one people to the exclusion and severance from the ONEcommon Father, of all other nations. It is no objection to this view,that the Gospel, too, has a mediator (1Ti2:5). For Jesus is not a mediator separating the two parties inthe covenant of promise or grace, as Moses did, but ONEin both nature and office with both God and man(compare “God in Christ,” Ga3:17): representing the whole universal manhood (1Co 15:22;1Co 15:45; 1Co 15:47),and also bearing in Him “all the fulness of the Godhead.”Even His mediatorial office is to cease when its purpose ofreconciling all things to God shall have been accomplished (1Co15:24); and God’s ONENESS(Zec 14:9), as “all inall,” shall be fully manifested. Compare Joh1:17, where the two mediatorsMoses, the severing mediator oflegal conditions, and Jesus, the uniting mediator of gracearecontrasted. The Jews began their worship by reciting the Schemah,opening thus, “Jehovah our God is ONEJehovah”; which words their Rabbis (as JARCHIUS)interpret as teaching not only the unity of God, but the futureuniversality of His Kingdom on earth (Zep3:9). Paul (Ro 3:30) infersthe same truth from the ONENESSof God (compare Eph 4:4-6).He, as being One, unites all believers, without distinction, toHimself (Gal 3:8; Gal 3:16;Gal 3:28; Eph 1:10;Eph 2:14; compare Heb2:11) in direct communion. The unity of God involves the unity ofthe people of God, and also His dealing directly without interventionof a mediator.

Fuente: Jamieson, Fausset and Brown’s Commentary Critical and Explanatory on the Whole Bible

Now a mediator is not a mediator of one,…. A mediator supposes two parties he stands between, and these at a distance from, or disagreeing with each other; where there is but one party, there can be no need of, nor any reason for, a mediator; so Christ is the Mediator between God and men, the daysman, Job 9:33, that lays his hands upon them both; and Moses, he was the mediator between God and the Israelites:

but God is one; not in person, for there are three persons in the Godhead, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one, in nature and essence; so that though there are three persons, there is but one God, and who is the God both of Jews and Gentiles; who is of one mind concerning them, and has taken them into one and the same covenant, and makes use of one and the same method in the justification of them: but the true sense of the phrase here is, that whereas a mediator supposes two parties at variance, “God is one of the two”; as the Ethiopic version reads the words; he is a party offended, that stands off, and at a distance, which the law given by angels in the hand of a mediator shows; so that that is rather a sign of disagreement and alienation, and consequently that justification is not to be expected by it.

Fuente: John Gill’s Exposition of the Entire Bible

Is not a mediator of one ( ). That is, a middleman comes in between two. The law is in the nature of a contract between God and the Jewish people with Moses as the mediator or middleman.

But God is one ( ). There was no middleman between God and Abraham. He made the promise directly to Abraham. Over 400 interpretations of this verse have been made!

Fuente: Robertson’s Word Pictures in the New Testament

Now a mediator is not a mediator of one [ ] . Observe,

1. De is explanatory, not antithetic. The verse illustrates the conception of mediator.

2. The article, the mediator, has a generic force : the mediator according to the general and proper conception of his function. Comp. the apostle (2Co 12:12); the shepherd, the good (Joh 10:11).

3. Enov of one, is to be explained by the following ei=v, so that it is masculine and personal.

We are not to supply party or law. The meaning is : the conception of mediator does not belong to an individual considered singly. One is not a mediator of his single self, but he is a mediator between two contracting parties; in this case between God and the people of Israel, as Lev 26:46; thus differing from Christ, who is called the mediator of a new covenant (Heb 8:6; Heb 9:15; Heb 12:24). The new covenant, the gospel, was not a contract. Accordingly verse 20 serves to define the true conception of a mediator, and through this definition to make clearer the difference between the law, which required a mediator, and the promise, which is the simple expression of God ‘s will. The very idea of mediation supposes two parties. The law is of the nature of a contract between God and the Jewish people. The validity of the contract depends on its fulfillment by both parties. Hence it is contingent, not absolute.

But God is one [ ] . God does not need a mediator to make his promise valid. His promise is not of the nature of a contract between two parties. His promise depends on his own individual decree. He dealt with Abraham singly and directly, without a mediator. The dignity of the law is thus inferior to that of the promise.

Fuente: Vincent’s Word Studies in the New Testament

1) “Now a mediator is not a mediator of one,” (hode mesites heneos ouk estin) “Now the mediator is (exists) not of one;” His work exists as an intercessor between two offended parties, where there is a division, to bring the division or divided parties into unity, into one accord, favor with one another, into harmony – Jesus Christ mediates between God who is holy and man who is unholy to bring them in harmony, 1Ti 2:4-5.

2) “But God is one,” (ho de theos eis estin) “But the God is (exists as) one,” one true God; He has no disharmony, discord in His nature, 1Co 8:6; Eph 4:6.

MEDIATION OF A PRINCE

During one of the journeys of Queen Victoria, a little boy was desirous of seeing her. He determined to go direct to the castle where she was residing, and ask to see her. He was stopped at the gate by the sentry, who demanded what he wanted. “I want to see the queen,” he replied. The soldier laughed at the boy, and told him to be off immediately, or he would shoot him. The boy turned to go away, and gave vent to his grief in tears. He had not gone far when he was met by the Prince of Wales, who inquired why he was crying. “I want to see the queen,” replied the boy, “and that soldier won’t let me.” “Won’t he?” said the prince; “‘then come along with me, and I’ll take you to the queen.” He according took him by the hand, and led him towards the castle. On passing the sentinel, he, as usual, presented arms to the prince; and the boy became terrified, and ran away, fearing that the soldier was going to shoot him. The prince soon quieted his fears, and led him past the gates into the presence of her Majesty. The queen, upon being informed of what had taken place, laughed heartily, spoke kindly to her little visitor, and to his great delight dismissed him with a piece of money. As the prince presented the boy to the queen, so Christ presents us to His Father.

-Gray-Adams

Fuente: Garner-Howes Baptist Commentary

20. Now, a mediator is not a mediator of one. Some are disposed to philosophize on this expression, and would make Paul’s meaning to be, that the twofold nature of Christ is not one in essence. But that Paul is here speaking of the contracting parties, no man of sound judgment entertains a doubt. And so they commonly expound it, that there is no room for a Mediator, unless when one of the parties has a matter to transact with the other. But why that statement should have been introduced they leave undetermined, though the passage manifestly deserves the most careful attention. There may, perhaps, be an Anticipation ( πρόληψις) of some wicked thought that might arise about a change of the divine purpose. Some one might say, “As men, when they change their mind about their covenants, are wont to retract them, so has it happened with the covenants of God.” If you take this to be the meaning, then, in the former clause, Paul would acknowledge that men, who occupy one side of this contract, are unsteady and changeable, while God nevertheless remains the same, is consistent with himself, and partakes not of the unsteadiness of men.

But when I take a closer view of the whole subject, I rather think that it marks a difference between Jews and Gentiles. Christ is not the Mediator of one, because, in respect of outward character, there is a diversity of condition among those with whom, through his mediation, God enters into covenant. But Paul asserts that we have no right to judge in this manner of the covenant of God, as if it contradicted itself, or varied according to the diversities of men. The words are now clear. As Christ formerly reconciled God to the Jews in making a covenant, so now he is the Mediator of the Gentiles. The Jews differ widely from the Gentiles; for circumcision and ceremonies have erected “the middle wall of partition between them.” (Eph 2:14.) They were “nigh” to God, (Eph 2:13,) while the Gentiles were “afar off;” but still God is consistent with himself. This becomes evident, when Christ brings those who formerly differed among themselves to one God, and makes them unite in one body. God is one, because he always continues to be like himself, and, with unvarying regularity, holds fixed and unalterable the purpose which he has once made. (62)

(62) “This is confessedly one of the most obscure passages in the New Testament, and, perhaps, above all others, ‘ vexatus ab interpretibus,’ (tortured by interpreters,) if it be true, as Winer affirms, that there are no less than 250 modes of explanation, most of which are stated and reviewed by Koppe, Berger, Keil, Bonitz, Weigand, and Scheft.” — (Bloomfield.) Schott remarks, that the bare fact of upwards of 250 interpretations makes it impossible to deny that some obscurity attaches to the Apostle’s language in this passage, arising chiefly from mere brevity of style, but judiciously adds, that, had there not been many commentators more eager to bring forward anything that has the appearance of novelty, than to investigate the ordinary meaning of the terms, the scope of the passage, and the doctrinal statements and reasonings contained in the writings of the Apostle Paul, the interpretations would never have swelled to so large an amount. — Ed.

Fuente: Calvin’s Complete Commentary

(20) The mention of the word mediator implies a contract to which there are at least two parties. But where there is a contract there must be also conditions, and if these conditions are not observed the whole falls to the ground. Such was the Law. The Law was not kept, and therefore the blessings annexed to it were forfeited. On the other hand, the promise depends upon God alone. He gave it, and He will assuredly keep it, no matter what man may do. God alone is concerned in it.
This passage is a conspicuous instance of the advance which has been made in New Testament exegesis. It is said to have received as many as 250 or 300 (according to another estimate, even 430) interpretations, but at the present moment there is a tendency to acquiesce in that given above, which, it is hoped, will be thought satisfactory.

Now a mediator is not a mediator of one.The very idea of a mediator involves two parties at least. The Law had a mediator, therefore the Law involves two parties. In other words, it is a contract.

But God is one.On the other hand, God, the giver of the promise, stands alone: therefore the promise is not a contract; and, resting on God, it is indefeasible.

Fuente: Ellicott’s Commentary for English Readers (Old and New Testaments)

20. A mediator, or middle-man, is one who stands between two parties to transact a business in which they are mutually engaged. The two parties to the law were God and the Jews; and Moses was mediator in seeing to the parts to be performed by the two parties.

Not of one Mediation of a law supposes two: a law giver and a law keeper.

But God is one He is LAW GIVER; and he requires, in order that the law may give life, the other, namely, a law keeper. If there fail to be a law keeper, then the saving power of the law fails, and the Galatians must resort to grace and promise, or die.

Fuente: Whedon’s Commentary on the Old and New Testaments

Gal 3:20. Now a mediator, &c. To understand this verse, we must carry in our minds what St. Paul is here doing; and from Gal 3:17 it is manifest that he is proving that the law could not disannul the promise; and he does it upon this known rule, that a covenant, or promise, once ratified, cannot be altered, or disannulled, by any other, but by both the parties concerned. Now, says he, God is but one of the parties concerned in the promise; the Gentiles and Israelites together made up the other, Gal 3:14. But Moses, at the giving of the law, was a mediator only between the Israelites and God, and therefore could not transact my thing to the disannulling the promise which was between God and the Israelites and Gentiles together, because God was but one of the parties to that covenant; the other, which was the Gentiles (as well as Israelites), Moses appeared or transacted not for. And so what was done at Mount Sinai, by the mediation of Moses, could not affect a covenant made between parties, whereof one only was there. How necessary it was for St. Paul to add this, we shall see, if we consider that, without it, his argument, of 430 years’ distance, would have been deficient, and hardly conclusive. For, if both the parties concerned in the promise had transacted by Moses, the mediator, (as they might, if none but the nation of the Israelites had been concerned in the promise made by God to Abraham), they might, by mutual consent, have altered, or set aside, the former promise, as well four hundred years as four days after. That which hindered it was, that, at Moses’ mediation at Mount Sinai, God, who was but one of the parties to the promise, was present; but the other party, Abraham’s seed, consisting of Israelites and Gentiles together, was not there. Moses transacted for the nation of the Israelites alone; the other nations were not concerned in the covenant made at mount Sinai, as they were in the promise made to Abraham and his seed, which, therefore, could not be disannulled without their consent: for that both the promise to Abraham and his seed, as well as the covenant with Israel at mount Sinai, was national, is in itself evi

Fuente: Commentary on the Holy Bible by Thomas Coke

Gal 3:20 down to , Gal 3:21 . “But from the fact that the law was ordained through a mediator, it must not at all be concluded that it is opposed to the promises of God .” The expression just used, , might possibly be turned to the advantage of the law and to the prejudice of the promises, in this way , that it might be said: “Since the idea of a mediator supposes not one subject, to whom his business relates, but more than one , who have to be mutually dealt with, and yet God (who gave the law through a mediator) is one , so that there could not be one God who gave the law and another who gave the promises (for there are not more Gods than one); it might possibly be concluded that, because the law was ordained by God in a different way from the promises, namely, by the calling in of a mediator acting between the two parties, the earlier divine mode of justification (that of faith) opened up in the promises was abolished by the law, and instead of it, another and opposite mode of justification (that of the works of the law) was opened up by God.” Paul conceives the possibility of this inference, and therefore brings it forward, not, however, as an objection on the part of opponents, but as his own reflection; hence he expresses the concluding inference, . . ., in an interrogative form, to which he thereupon replies by the disclaimer, . The explanation of the words, which in themselves are simple enough, is accordingly as follows: “ But the mediator not to leave unnoticed an inference which might possibly be drawn to the prejudice of the promises from the just said but the mediator , that is, any mediator, does not belong to a single person , but intervenes between two or more; God, on the other hand, is a single person , and not a plurality. Is it now when these two propositions are applied in concreto to the law and the promises is it now to be thence inferred that the law , which was given through a mediator, and in which therefore there took part more subjects than one, in point of fact two (namely, God and Israel), between whom the mediator had to deal, is opposed to the divine promises , in which the same one God, who in the case of the law acted through a mediator and so implied two parties, acted directly? God forbid! From this point of difference in the divine bestowal of the law and the promises, by no means is any such conclusion to be arrived at to the prejudice of the latter, as if now, through the law mediatorially given by the one God, another divine mode of justification were to be made valid.” In this view, Gal 3:20 contains two loci communes , from the mutual relation of which in reference to the two concreta under discussion (the law and the promises) in Gal 3:21 a possible inference is supposed to be drawn, and proposed by way of question for a reply. The is in both cases adversative: the first introducing a supposed objection, and the second an incidental point belonging to this objection, the relation of which incidental point to the first proposition strengthens the doubt excited; denotes the mediator absolutely as genus (“quae multa sunt cunctis in unum colligendis,” Hermann, ad Iph. Aul . p. 15, pref.): is predicate, negativing the as regards the mediator, with emphatic stress laid on the prefixed (not on the , as Hofmann thinks), and is masculine , [148] without requiring anything to be supplied: is predicate, and , in conformity with the axiom of monotheism here expressed, is used quite in the same purely numerical sense as previously. Lastly, in the interrogative inference, Gal 3:21 , is used, as the close annexation by sufficiently indicates, in precise correlation to in Gal 3:20 (for the law was given through a mediator , Gal 3:19 ), and to , Gal 3:19 ; but the emphasis in this question of Gal 3:21 is laid upon , for Paul will not allow it to be inferred from the two propositions expressed in Gal 3:20 ( ), that the law stood in a relation to the promises which was antagonistic to them and opposed to their further validity as regards justification.

The numerous different interpretations of this passage and it has had to undergo above 250 of them have specially multiplied in modern times: for the Fathers of the Church pass but lightly over the words which in themselves are clear, without taking into consideration their difficulties in relation to the general scope of the passage, mostly applying the , taken correctly and generally, to Christ, [149] who is the Mediator between God and man, and partly casting side-glances at the opponents of Christ’s divinity (see Chrysostom); although a diversity of interpretation (some referring to Moses , and others to Christ) is expressly mentioned by Oecumenius. Although no special dogmatic interest attached to the passage, nevertheless in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (see Poole’s Synopsis ) the variety of interpretations was already such that almost every interpreter of importance (yet, as a rule, without polemical controversy, because the dogmatic element did not come into play) took a way of his own. It became, however, still greater after the middle of the eighteenth century (especially after grammatico-historical exegesis gained ground, but with an abundant intermixture of its philological aberrations), and is even now continually increasing. How often have the most mistaken fancies and the crudest conjectures sought to gain acceptance in connection with our passage, the explanation of which was regarded as a feat of exegetical skill! For a general view of the mass of interpretations, the following works are of service:

Koppe, Exc . VII. p. 128 ff. ed. Galatians 3 : Bonitz, Plurimor. de I. Gal 3:20 sententiae examinatae novaque ejus interpr. tentata , Lips. 1800; also his Spicileg. observatt. ad Gal 3:20 , Lips. 1802: Anton, Diss. I. Gal 3:20 critice, historice, et exeg. tract . in Pott’s Sylloge , V. p. 141 ff.: Keil (seven programmes), in his Opusc . I. p. 211 ff.: Winer, Exc . III.: Schott, p. 455 ff.: Wieseler, and de Wette ed. Mller, in loc . It is enough that out of the multitude of various interpretations omitting the criticism in detail of the earlier views down to Keil [150] we specify the more recent literature, and adduce the following: 1. Keil, who comes nearest to our view, explains thus (see Opusc . I. p. 365 ff.): “Mediatorem quidem non unius sed duarum certe partium esse, Deum autem, qui Abrahamo beneficii aliquid promiserit, unum modo fuisse; hincque apostolum id a lectoribus suis colligi voluisse, in lege ista Mos. pactum mutuum Deum inter atque populum Israelit. mediatoris opera intercedente initum fuisse, contra vero in promissione rem ab unius tantum (Dei sc., qui solus eam dederit) voluntate pendentem transactam, hincque legi isti nihil plane cum hac rei fuisse, adeoque nec potuisse ea novam illius promissionis implendae conditionem constitui, eoque ipso promissionem hanc omnino tolli.” But ( a ) to take the second half of the verse not generally, like the first, but historically, as if was written, is an arbitrary deviation from the parallelism; and ( b ) the conclusion professedly to be drawn by the reader, hincque legi isti nihil , etc., is quite without warrant, for Paul himself puts as a question in Gal 3:21 the inference which he conceives may be possibly drawn from Gal 3:20 . Gal 3:2 . Schleiermacher’s explanation is essentially similar (in Usteri, Lehrbegr . p. 186 ff.): “ The mediator of an agreement does not exist where there is only one person, but always presupposes two persons; these were God and the Jewish nation. But God is One in reference to His promises; that is, God therein acts quite freely, unconditionally, independently, and for Himself alone, as One numerically, because it is no agreement between two, but His free gift ( ). Does the law therefore conflict , etc.?” [151] But in this view ( a ) the application of Gal 3:20 to the concreta of the law and the promises, which is in fact not made until Gal 3:21 , is imported into and anticipated in Gal 3:20 . Moreover, ( b ) imperceptibly changes from its numerical sense into the idea of aloneness and independence; and ( c ) the idea of free grace is arbitrarily introduced, and is not expressed by Paul. Nearest to this interpretation of Schleiermacher and Usteri comes Hilgenfeld, whose interpretation, [152] accompanied essentially by the same difficulties, ultimately amounts to the non-Pauline idea, that the position of God as a party in regard to the law is not in harmony with the divine unity (that is, with the divine monarchy). Comp. also Lipsius, Rechtfertigungsl . p. 77, according to whom Paul negatively “strikes the law to the ground as incompatible with the sole agency of God.” But how could Paul desire to strike to the ground the law, which to him was , , and (Rom 7:12 ; Rom 7:14 )? No, all he desires to show is, that, notwithstanding the diversity of its divine bestowal from the mode of giving the promise, it is not opposed to the promise. 3. Winer: “ Non potest cogitari aut fingi, qui sit , unius h. e. unius partis: , Deus est unus, una ( altera ) tantummodo pars; ita quaenam est altera? gens Israel. Jam si hoc, sponte efficitur, legem Mos. pertinere etiam ad Judaeos, hosque legi isti observandae adstrictos fuisse.” [153] Thus Gal 3:20 contains only a parenthetical idea, Paul having in view to re-establish the dignity of the law, which appeared weakened by . : “ Lex Mos. data fuit peccatorum gratia; propterea vero non est, quod quis eam tanquam ista longe inferiorem contemnat; data enim et ipsa est auctoritate divina

. gentique Hebr. tanquam agendi norma proposita . .” It cannot be urged against Winer, that Paul must necessarily have written (see Winer, Gramm . p. 110 [E. T. 144]). But ( a ) in the logically exact chain of argument there is no indication at all that Gal 3:20 is to be taken as a parenthesis. ( b ) Since is subject , , which likewise is placed at the beginning of the sentence, may not be arbitrarily understood as predicate . ( c ) It must have been more precisely indicated by Paul, if it were intended that the first should be understood as the copula of a general judgment, and the second as historical ( appears in the giving of the law ); for every reader, if he had understood the first half of the verse as a general judgment, would naturally understand the second in like manner. ( d ) It would not occur to any reader to refer to a suppressed : for had just been used absolutely in a numerical sense, in which therefore at once presents itself; and this the more, because the first sentence, by its negative form, has prepared the way for an antithesis to follow. ( e ) The idea which is supposed to indicate: therefore the law is obligatory on the Israelites , conveys something which is so entirely a matter of course, that it could not be made use of at all as an element of the dignity of the law; for the law was, in fact, given to the Israelites, and even to think of that obligation as non-existent would have been incongruous. And ( f ) even assuming such a superfluous idea, in what a strangely mysterious way would Paul have intimated it! That which he meant to say , he would wholly without reason have concealed , and have given out as it were a riddle. Apart from the unsuitableness of the idea generally, and from the inappropriate , he must have said: . 4. Schulthess has sought to vindicate his interpretation (proposed in Keil and Tzschirner’s Anal . II. 3, p. 133 ff.) in his Engelwelt, Engelgesetz und Engeldienst , Zrich 1833, and in de G. Hermanno, enodatore ep. P. ad Gal ., Zrich 1835, viz.: “ Hic mediator ( Moses ) non est mediator unius, i.e. communis illius Dei, qui olim Abrahamo spopondit, per eum aliquando gentes beatum iri, et qui est unus, s. communis omnium parens, sed est potius mediator angelorum .” [154] But ( a ) how erroneous it is to assume that the anarthrous should denote the universal God of men, and how alien this reference is to the context! ( b ) How opposed is the to the notion, that Moses was “mediator angelorum”! ( c ) How at variance is the idea of the law as the work of angels with the conception throughout the Bible (comp. on Gal 3:19 ) of the law as the work of God! In how wholly different a way must Paul have spoken of and proved such a paradox, and how frequently would he have reverted to it (especially in the Epistle to the Romans) in his antinomistic discussions! 5. Akin to this, as far as the idea is concerned, is the interpretation of Schmieder ( Nova interpr. I. Paul. Gal 3:19 f., Numb. 1826, and in Tholuck’s literar. Anz . 1830, No. 54): “ Quivis minister vel multorum est vel unius: atqui mediator non est unius: ergo est multorum minister. Qui multorum est minister, ad quod genus mediator pertinet, non est unius: atqui Deus (absolute) unus est: ergo cum multorum sit mediator, non est Dei minister .” The connection is supposed to be: “ Concedo legem per angelos datam esse a Deo, non humana arte inventam, sed eo ipso, quod per angelos ministros, non per Deum aut Dei filium promulgata est, inferior est evangelio .” [155] This interpretation is objectionable, ( a ) in a general point of view, because it rests wholly on the erroneous view that in Gal 3:19 applies not to Moses, but to the angelus mediator; ( b ) because Paul could not have expressed so peculiar an antinomistic argument more obscurely or more enigmatically than by thus omitting the essential points; ( c ) because the idea of by no means implies that the is the “minister multorum: ” he may be commissioned as well by one as by many, as, in fact, Christ was commissioned as a by One, viz. by God. See also, in opposition to Schmieder, Lcke in the Stud. u. Krit . 1828, p. 95 ff.; Winer, Exc . III. p. 171 ff. 6. Steudel, in Bengel’s Archiv I. p. 124 ff., supposes that Gal 3:19 is an opponent’s question: “ To what purpose then serves the law? Was it bestowed merely somehow as an additional gift on account of transgressions ( in order to be transgressed ), until the seed should come to whom the promise applied? And yet was it made known through angels, and by the ministry of a mediator? ” To which Paul answers, “ Certainly through the ministry of a mediator; only he was not the mediator of an united seed (of the , Gal 3:16 ), but God is one ( not another for the Gentiles ).” But ( a ) there is nothing that indicates any such division of the passage into dialogue; and ( b ) how strange it would be that Paul should have grasped, and furnished a reply to, nothing but the last part of the opponent’s question, , which, moreover, would be only a subordinate part of it! ( c ) The article must be added to , if it is to apply to the already spoken of (as assumed also by Jatho); but no supplement whatever to is suggested by the context; [156] and if were read, then, according to Gal 3:16 , it would mean not the body of Christians, but Christ Himself. [157] ( d ) and would be taken in different senses: united and one . [158] 7. Sack (in the Tb. Zeitschr . 1831, I. p. 106 f.) supposes that Paul avails himself of the idea of a mediator to limit the recognition of the law, which perhaps some Jewish Christians were disposed to assert to an exaggerated extent, and says: “ The mediator, however, is not of one kind, but God is One and the same. For us Christians there is certainly another mediator than Moses; but God, the God in both Testaments, is nevertheless One and the same .” But it is obvious that cannot mean unius generis est , and it is equally evident that the clause, “for us Christians there is certainly,” etc., is arbitrarily brought in. See also Schneckenburger, Beitr . p. 187 f., and (in opposition to Steudel, Kern, and Sack) Winer, Zeitschr. f. wissensch. Theol . II. 1, p. 31 ff. 8. Hermann: “ Interventor non est unius ( i. e. interventor ubi est, duos minimum esse oportet, inter quos ille interveniat ); Deus autem unus est: ergo apud Deum non cogitari potest interventor; esset enim is, qui intercederet inter Deum et Deum, quod absurdum est .” And the connection is: “ Id agebat P. ut ostenderet, legem Mosis, quae nihil neque cum promissione Abrahamo data neque cum praesente effectione promissionis commune haberet, dumtaxat interim valuisse, jam autem non amplius valere. Rationem reddit hanc, quod superaddita sit ( ideo dixit ), eoque non pertineat ad testamentum, cui non liceat quidquam addi; deinde quod non, sicut testamentum illud, ab ipso Deo condita et data, sed disposita per angelos allataque sit manu interventoris: atqui interventori, quod interventor non sit unius, non esse locum apud Deum, qui unus sit, utpote testator, cujus unius ex voluntate nemine intercedente haereditatem capiat haeres .” But ( a ) it could not be expected that the reader should derive from Gal 3:20 the idea that no mediator is conceivable in the case of God on account of His oneness; nor could it be so conceived by Paul himself, for, in fact, with the one God a mediator may certainly have a place, not, however, “ inter Deum et Deum ,” into which absurdity no one could fall, unless Paul so expressed it, but inter Deum et homines , in which office the history of the theocracy showed so many mediators and at last Christ Himself. ( b ) The question in Gal 3:21 ( ), with the answer expressive of horror, , presupposes that the subject-matter of this question consequently an antagonistic relation of the law to the promises might possibly (although quite unduly) be derived from Gal 3:20 . But according to Hermann, Paul in Gal 3:19-20 has already proved that an antagonism of the law to the promises does not exist, that the law was no longer valid, and had nothing at all in common with the promises. So, in a logical point of view, the question in Gal 3:21 , . . ., could not be asked, nor could the answer be made. ( c ) It may, besides, be urged against Hermann, that not only is . . regarded as lowering the authority of the law, but a quite undue stress is also laid upon ; for in Gal 3:19 the emphasis lies on . . 9. Matthies (as in substance also Rinck, Lucubr. crit . p. 172 ff., and in the Stud. u. Krit . 1834, p. 309 ff.) interprets: “ But the mediator does not relate to one, for his nature is in fact divided or disunited, since he is placed between two sides or parties opposed to one another; and therefore in connection with him we cannot think of unity, but only of duality, or of the variance subsisting between two parties; but God is One, comprehends in Himself nothing but unity, so that His nature contains no variance or disunion .” Thus also, in the main, de Wette, [159] and among the older expositors Jac. Cappellus. But the simple numerical conception of unity is thus arbitrarily transformed into the philosophical idea, and the contrast of plurality is turned into the contrast of disunion . How could a reader discover in anything else than the popular doctrine of Monotheism? 10. Schott: “ Mediator quidem non uni tantum ( eidemque immutabili ) addictus est homini s. parti, i. e. in quavis causa humana, quae mediatore indiget, duae certe adsunt partes, quibus inserviat, sive res inter duos tantum homines singulos transigatur, sive multitudo sit ingens eorum, qui alterutram vel utramque partem constituant ( v. c. populus ) ubi plures imo multi ejusdem foederis participes sunt et fiunt ( praesertim ubi maxima est singulorum vicissitudo, dum mortuis succedunt posteri ), facile etiam mutatis animorum consiliis atque propositis, foedus mutatur aut tollitur , cujus ope constitutum fuerat haud impediente proinde ex eo quidem, quod lex Sinaitica promulgata est (Gal 3:19 ), non sequitur auctoritatem ei competere perpetuam [ his verbis P. corrigere voluit perversam eorum opinionem, qui in defendenda legis auctoritate perpetua valitura ad personam Mosis mediatoris provocarent ] attamen Deus

est unus, qui semper idem manet Deus immutabilis, foedus legislationis Sinaiticae non fuit humanae, sed divinae auctoritatis, neque ab arbitrio hominum, sed a voluntate Dei pendebat immutabilis. His perpendendis quaestio excitabatur (Gal 3:21 ), an forte haec legislatio Sinait. auctoritate divina insignis ipso Deo jubente promissionem Abrahamo datam ejusmodi limitibus circumscribere ( mutare ) voluerit, ut non amplius esset promissio, cujus eventus liberae tantum Dei gratiae adnecteretur.” How much is supplied by the expositor in this interpretation so copiously provided with modifying clauses! But it is decidedly erroneous, on account of the sense of and being changed into the idea of immutabilis (for which Schott should not have appealed to Rom 3:30 , Phi 1:27 ); and also because the proposition is limited to causae humanae , and yet the inference is supposed to be therein conveyed that the Sinaitic legislation is not always valid. Paul assuredly could never have thus illogically corrected the zealots for the law, and then in the very same breath have set aside the inference by attamen Deus est unus . 11. Gurlitt (in the Stud. u. Krit . 1837, p. 805 ff.; 1843, p. 715 ff.) refers to the Gentile Christians , as one of the two divisions of the .: “ The law was given through angels and through a mediator, and God indeed is throughout only One; what proceeds from Him, therefore, demands in every case equal recognition. It must nevertheless be taken into consideration, that the mediator is no mediator of those who were previously Gentiles, and that therefore the law was not destined for the latter by God Himself.” But, apart from the fact that in this view of there must have been previous mention of a twofold posterity of Abraham and must have been here used, and not to mention that the and are not taken as alike in sense, the interpretation must be at once pronounced decidedly wrong, because it depends upon the erroneous view that the , Gal 3:16 ; Gal 3:19 , means not merely Christ Himself, but also the corpus mysticum of Christ. 12. Olshausen, taking as: God is one or a single one, and consequently only one party , explains it thus: “Mediation presupposes a state of separation, and there can be no mediation in the case of one; since God is the one party, there must also have been a second, viz. men, who were separated from God. In the gospel it is otherwise: in Christ, the representative of the Church, all are one; all separations and distinctions are done away in Him” (Gal 3:28 ). Thus Paul, in order to call attention to the inferiority of the law to the gospel, gives a cursory, parenthetic explanation as to the idea of a mediator. This is (1) unsuitable to the context; for in Gal 3:19 , . . has set forth the glory of the giving of the law. (2) The idea: and consequently also only one party , is quite arbitrarily added to . (3) In like manner, all the rest which is supposed properly to constitute the sense of the words (“men, who were separated from God;” “in the gospel it is otherwise,” etc.) is the pure invention of the expositor. 13. Matthias, [160] correctly explaining the first half of the verse, sees in the minor premiss of an enthymeme , which has to be completed by supplying the major premiss and conclusion: “If God is one of those two parties, the law, although ordained by angels, is nevertheless an ordinance of God; but God is this; and consequently the law, etc., is an ordinance, not of angels, but of God.” Against this interpretation we may urge that the special connection with the point is not conveyed by the text; that the explanation of by alter is contrary to the context; that Gal 3:21 would be unsuitably subjoined from a logical point of view (see on , Gal 3:21 ); and lastly, that the idea of the law being an ordinance of God was one altogether undisputed and not needing any proof. 14. Ewald (comp. also his Jahrb . IV. p. 109) assumes that Paul with this “quick flash of thought” intended to say: “The idea of the mediator necessarily presupposes two different living beings between whom, as being at variance or separated, mediation has to take place; because the mediator of one is not , does not exist at all, is an impossibility. But since God is in strictness only One , and does not consist of two inwardly different Gods or of an earlier and later God, it is evident that Moses as mediator did not mediate between the God of the promise and the God of the law, and thereby mix up the law with the promise and cancel the promise by the later law; but he only mediated (as is well known) between God and the people of that time.” But even this interpretation, the thought of which would probably have been expressed most simply by Paul writing , , is liable to the objections urged above (under 8) against Hermann’s explanation. 15. According to Hofmann (compare also his Schrifitbew . II. 2, p. 55 ff.), the first half of the verse is intended to affirm that, where there is only one to whom something is to be given, there is no room for mediatorship; such an individual recipient may receive it directly. Now, as the promise ran to Abraham’s posterity as an unity , it is evident that the giving of the law, just because it was destined for a plurality of individuals, could be no fulfilment of the promise. The second half of the verse, which with passes on to the divine side of the event, places the unity of God in contradistinction to the plurality of angels; that which comes to men through the latter must be of a different kind from the promised gift, which the One was to give to the One the one God to the one Christ . Thus on this side also it is clear that the giving of the law was not the fulfilment of the promise, but was only ordained for the time, until Christ should come. But ( a ) all this artificial interpretation must at once fall to the ground, because it conceives to be opposed to a plurality of recipient subjects; for it is not true that the bestowal through a mediator presupposes such a plurality, seeing that it may take place just as well with one as with, many recipients. ( b ) It is incorrect that the unity of God is placed in contrast with the plurality of angels (which is not even marked, by . or the like): it stands in contrast to the , and it is untrue that the “ mediateness of the giving involved its taking place through many ” just as if the mediate giving could not with equal fitness take place through one, as in fact it has very often been given by God through one! ( c ) Paul’s intention is, not to show that the giving of the law was not the fulfilment of the promise, but, as is clearly evident from Gal 3:21 , to show that the law was not opposed to the promise. 16. Wieseler: “Moses as mediator, however ( being restrictive ), has reference not merely to God ( but also to men ): for a mediator from his nature has not reference to one (but to two parties); but God is one . Consequently the failure of that mediatorial office of Moses was based on the fact, that he as mediator had to do not only with God , but also with men . The fault does not lie with the faithfulness of God , who appointed him as mediator, an idea which cannot be entertained, but rather with the action of men,’ etc. Against this interpretation it may be urged, not only that the words imperceptibly acquire the sense: is only one of the two parties , which Paul would certainly have been able to express otherwise than by the confession of monotheism (Deu 6:4 ; Jas 2:19 ; Rom 3:30 ; 1Co 8:4 ; 1Co 8:6 , et al .), but also that the idea of a failure on the part of the law-giving, and of the blame due for it, was remote from the apostle’s mind, and would here be unsuitable to the divine purpose expressed in Gal 3:19 . The law became to men the (1Co 15:56 ); but this falls to be regarded not as a failure on the part of the law-giving, but as a necessary stage in the development of the divine plan of salvation (Gal 3:22 ff.; Rom 7 ). 17. According to Stlting ( Beitrge z. Exeg. d. Paul. Br . 1869, p. 86 ff.), and are to be taken in the sense of absolute unity . Gal 3:20 is supposed to contain a syllogism with a suppressed conclusion : viz., A mediator does not belong to one; but God is one; consequently a mediator does not belong to God. Accordingly God is absolutely excluded from any mediation through the law : the objects of this mediation are on the one hand the Jews , and on the other hand their contrast, the Gentiles; and the law was to unite these two dissociated parts, which it effected by showing that the Jews were in need of redemption, and by making the Gentiles capable of redemption (Rom 3:22 f., Rom 3:29 f.). The mediator, with the law in his hand, is supposed to have placed himself between Jews and Gentiles , and to have made both equal through the law, an equalization which does not take place with God , as there is not one God of the Jews and another God of the Gentiles, between whom mediation might occur, but only a single God, who treats Jews and Gentiles with equal justice, being, as He is, a single Person without opponent, an absolute unity. Even this acutely carried out interpretation is not tenable: for ( a ) the reader finds no indication in the text that and are to be taken in the pregnant sense of absoluteness; and Paul, in order to be understood, must at least have written, in the second half of the verse, something like (or ) . Nor ( b ) is it correct that absolute unity excludes the being an object of mediation; because the absolutely one God has allowed mediation to take place between Himself and man, not only through Christ, but also in the ancient history of salvation, through His ministers (the angels, Moses, and the prophets), ( c ) There is nothing in the words of the passage to make us think of the Jews and Gentiles as objects of the mediation; since the law is rather to be recognised as the (Eph 2:14 ) between the two, which had to be removed by Christ in order to their union. To the national consciousness, not only of the apostle, but also of his readers, God and Israel could alone occur as the parties reconciled with one another through the . ( d ) It is not correct that the conclusion drawn from Gal 3:20 is not expressed. It is expressed in Gal 3:21 , and rejected as erroneous.

Lastly, Rckert confines himself to the correct translation of the words, “ The mediator does not refer to one (but always to more than one); but God is one; ” from which is to be concluded, “ Therefore the mediator does not refer to God alone, but also to others .” He, however, at the same time confesses that he does not see any way, in which these propositions and this conclusion are to be connected with the foregoing passage, so as to yield any relevant and lucid thought. While Rckert has thus despaired of an explanation on his own part, he has not questioned the title of the passage to receive an explanation. But this course, to which Michaelis was already inclined, [161] has been actually adopted by Lcke (in the Stud. u. Krit . 1828, p. 83 ff.), who holds Gal 3:20 to be a gloss , which had originally served, on the one hand, to explain the conclusion of Gal 3:19 (the mediator was interpreted as applying to Christ, and it was desirable to point out that this mediator belonged not merely to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles), and, on the other, to give a reason for the beginning of Gal 3:21 . But the witnesses in favour of its genuineness [162] are so decisively unanimous, that no other passage can appear better attested. Lcke only makes use of an argumentum a silentio , namely, that Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen do not cite our verse (Clement of Alexandria has it at least once, in the Theodot . ed. Col. p. 797 A); but little stress can be laid on this, when we consider how lightly in general the Fathers were wont to pass over the words in question, without even discerning in them any special importance or difficulty.

[148] Not neuter , as Holsten takes it, although which follows can only indicate the masculine . Holsten, notwithstanding all his subtle acuteness, errs also in making the law itself, in opposition to the tenor of the words, to be the (see on ver. 19), and in explaining the predicate attached to in the sense of the immutability of the divine will; holding that the law stands, not in unity with the promise, but between the two component parts of the latter (the giving of the promise and its fulfilment), and that God’s one saving will reveals itself in the promise and its two parts. See, in opposition to Holsten, Hilgenfeld in his Zeitschr . 1860, p. 230 ff.

[149] Jerome, however, explains the passage as referring to the two natures of Christ: “manu mediatoris potentiam et virtutem ejus debemus accipere, qui cum secundum Deum unum sit ipse cum Patre ( , as God ), secundum mediatoris officium ( ) alius ab eo intelligitur” ( )! Theodoret understands definitely of Moses , who intervened between God and the people ( ), but holds that affirms that it is one and the same God who first gave the promises to Abraham, then gave the law, and now has shown the goal ( ) of the promises. is explained as referring to Moses by Gennadius in Oecumenius (p. 742 C); on the other hand, Chrysostom and Theophylact take as a basis the conclusion, , (Theophylact). Among modern Catholic expositors, Windischmann and Bisping have closely followed Jerome in the reference of the second half of the verse to the two natures of Christ . The meaning is supposed to amount to this, that the promise was directly addressed from God to God ( i.e. to Christ), and the passage is thus a locus classicus in favour of the divinity of Christ . Not so Reithmayr, who in substance follows the interpretation of Theodoret.

[150] Luther, 1519: “Ex nomine mediatoris concludit, nos adeo esse peccatores, ut legis opera satis esse nequeant. Si, inquit, lege justi estis, jam mediatore non egetis, sed neque Deus, cum sit ipse unus, secum optime conveniens. Inter duos ergo quaeritur mediator, inter Deum et hominem, ac si dicat; impiissima sit ingratitudo si mediatorem rejicitis, et Deo, qui unus est, remittitis,” etc. Erasmus in his Paraphr ., understanding Christ as referred to (in the Annotat . he says nothing at all about the passage): “Atqui conciliator, qui intercedit, inter plures intercedat oportet; nemo enim secum ipse dissidet. Deus autem unus est, quocum dissidium erat humano generi. Proinde tertio quopiam erat opus, qui naturae utriusque particeps utramque inter sese reconciliaret, Deum placans sua morte, et homines sua doctrina ad verum Dei cultum pelliciens.” Calvin also, explaining the passage of Christ, considers: “diversitatem hic notari inter Judaeos et gentiles. Non unius ergo mediator est Christus, quia diversa est conditio eorum, quibuscum Deus, ipsius auspiciis, paciscitur, quod ad externam personam. Verum P. inde aestimandum Dei foedus negat, quasi secum pugnet aut varium sit pro hominum diversitate.” Castalio gives the sense of the words correctly: “Sequester autem internuntius est duorum, qui inter sese aliquid paciscuntur: atqui Deus unus est, non duo,” but then draws therefrom the strange inference: “itaque necesse est Mosen Dei et Israelitarum internuntium fuisse, nec enim potest Dei et Dei internuntius fuisse, cum duo Dei non sint;” and from this again he infers that both parties had thus promised something, God promising life and the Israelites obedience; and lastly, with equal arbitrariness: “nunc quoniam legi parere nequeunt, supplicio sunt obnoxii.” Grotius (comp. Beza): “Non solet sequester se interponere inter eos, qui unum sunt ( , neuter), i.e. bene conveniunt; Deus sibi constat,” from which he arbitrarily infers: “quare nisi homines se mutassent, nunquam opus fuisset mediatore neque tum neque nunc.” Comp. Schoettgen, who, however, assumes the first part of the verse to be an objection on the part of the Jews, and to be Paul’s reply. Wolf, although referring in ver. 19 to Moses, yet in ver. 20 understands of Christ : “Ille vero mediator (qui imprimis hic respiciendus est) unius non est (sed duorum), quorum unus est Deus.” Clarke, who understands . in ver. 19 as referring to Christ: “Quilibet vero est duarum partium. Deus est una pars. Ergo quorum erit Christus mediator nisi Dei et hominum?” Bengel discovers the syllogism: “Unus non utitur mediatore illo (i. e. quisquis est unus, is non prius sine mediatore, deinde idem per mediatorem agit); atqui Deus est unus (non est alius Deus ante legem, alius deinceps, sed unus idemque Deus); ergo mediator Sinaiticus non est Dei, sed legis, Dei autem promissio.” Wetstein: “Sicut quando arbitrum vel medium vel sequestrum dicimus, intelligimus ad officium ejus pertinere, ut non uni tantum partium faveat, sed utrique sese aequum praebeat; ita etiam quando Deum dicimus, intelligimus non Judaorum solum, sed omnium hominum patrem. Unde statim colligitur, Mosen, qui inter Judaeos solum et Deum medius fuit, non veri nominis medium fuisse, sed a bonitate Dei expectari debere alium, totius humani generis negotium gerentem, i. e. Christum.” Michaelis (following Locke): “But this law cannot, in respect to the Gentiles, alter anything in the former covenant of God. For one of the parties who had a share in this covenant, namely the Gentiles, had not empowered Moses as a mediator and knew nothing of him; but God Himself is only one party, and cannot alter His covenant through a mediator appointed on one side only.” Nsselt ( Exercitatt. ad s. s. interpr . p. 143 ff.) and Rosenmller: “ Ille autem (Moses nempe) mediator illius unius (prolis Abrahamicae, the Christians! ) non est, Deus autem est unus (communis omnium) Deus .” Morus, interpreting it as a syllogism with an interrogative major: “ Hic vero (Moses) nonne est mediator ejus, qui immutabilis est? Subsumtio: atqui vero Deus est immutabilis. Conclusio; num ergo lex adversari potest , etc?” Gabler ( Prolus. ad 3:20, 1787) has the same alteration in the sense of : “ He (Moses) was not, however, a mediator of something immutable ,” etc. Koppe: “ Jam quidem non Mosis tantum suus est ; ( plures fuerunt, imprimisque . Jesus ,) sed unus tamen idemque Deus est, qui misit omnes, is adeo debet sibi constare nec potest secum ipse pugnare .” So also in substance, Baumgarten-Crusius: means for one matter; and the sense is, “that the law has been one of the many divine institutions, but as such it must stand in connection with the general plan of the divine government.” Some of these interpretations condemn themselves, and others find their refutation in our examination of the more modern interpretations after Keil.

[151] In essential points, Usteri ( Kommentar , p. 121; comp. with Beilage , p. 239) agrees with Schleiermacher in his explanation. Moreover, the substance of Schleiermacher’s interpretation is already to be found in Zachariae, who paraphrases as follows: “A mediator presupposes two parties who make some promise to each other, inasmuch as a promise made on one side without a counter promise does not need any mediation between two. But in the case of Abraham God alone promises, who grants him a promise out of free grace.”

[152] In his Commentary . He takes another view in his Zeitschr . 1860, p. 236 ff.: “Paid wished to express that the covenant of the law, being ordained through angels and a mediator, and consequently through a plurality, shows itself thereby to be entirely different from the covenant of promise which was given by the divine unity, and consequently cannot cancel the latter.” But this cancelling might certainly have been inferred from the very difference; besides, the plurality, which is supposed to be implied in , would have nothing at all to do with the angels, but would necessarily refer only to the mediator, who has to mediate between two in this case, between God and the Israelites.

[153] In the explanation of the words Kern (in the Tb. Zeitschr . 1830, 3) agrees with Winer, only he does not insert tantummodo in the second clause. He looks upon the words as an opponent’s objection, and in he finds the idea intimated, that God in consequence took it upon Himself to bless those who obey the law; whence the question follows: Does therefore the law, by which God has bound Himself to make blessed on account of works, conflict with the promises of God? But against this view it may be urged that there is absolutely nothing to indicate ver. 20 as the language of an opponent; further, that the points brought forward against Winer, under ( b ), ( c ), and ( d ), equally apply here; and lastly, that the idea found in is not suggested by the context, but arbitrarily introduced. Baur also, Paulus , II. p. 215 f. Exo 2 (comp. his neutest. Theol . p. 157), agrees with Winer in his conception of the words: the mediator belongs not to one, but to two parties, but God is only the one of the two parties. By this Paul is supposed to intimate, that the law has a merely subordinate significance, just as that of the mediator, insomuch as he is not himself one of the two parties, is merely subordinate: “ the , as a in which God without having anything to do with it, stands higher than the , which cannot be conceived without the and is essentially conditioned by him .” But in this interpretation Paul would not have said what he meant to say, and would have said what he did not mean. The view of Holsten ( Deutung u. Bedeut. d. Worte Gal 3:20 , Rostock 1853, and Inhalt u. Gedankengang des Gal. Br . 1859, pp. 39 ff., 63 ff.) is allied to the explanation of Baur. Holsten understands as referring to the law, and makes neuter: Between the law and the promise the relation is not that of an , but of an essential distinction: but God is at one with Himself, not presenting any difference with Himself, namely, in the sense of the immutability of the divine will. This explanation cannot be accepted, because it starts from the supposition that the law is placed under the category of the . Paul cannot have so conceived it, because he has said that the law was ordained through a ; therefore law and mediator must have been present to his mind as different ideas . Steinfass (in Guericke’s Zeitschr . 1856, p. 237) understands the literal sense definitely and correctly, but from the words derives the tacit idea: God therefore is not the other party, and consequently is not under the law by which the freedom of Christ as the Son of God from the law is supposed to be proved. But this is an idea foreign to the context and imported into the passage, not even quite Pauline; for submission to the law certainly formed a part of the state of humiliation of the Son of God (Gal 4:4 ), while as to the state of exaltation His elevation above the law is a matter of course.

[154] Similar also is the interpretation of Caspari (in the Strassb. Beitr . 1854, p. 206 ff.), that “Moses, the middle-man of the angels who gave the law, is not the mediator of the One who gave the promise; he is the mediator of many angels, but God is one.” Vogel’s explanation (in the Stud. u. Krit . 1865, p. 524) comes in substance to the same effect: “Where there is a mediator, there is a plurality of those commissioning him; such a plurality existed in the giving of the law; but God is one; consequently the law proceeded from a plurality distinct from God, and the angels form this plurality.” In opposition to Vogel, see Hilgenfeld, in his Zeitschrift , 1865, p. 452 ff.; Matthias, in the monograph quoted at ver. 19, p. 30 ff.; Hauck, in the Stud. u. Krit . 1866, p. 699 ff. Nevertheless Hauck (in the Stud. u. Krit . 1862, p. 541 ff.) has likewise assumed a plurality in the plurality of men , whom Moses represents as one out of the midst of them (but does not mean this); hence he cannot be representative of the one God . Nothing in our passage can be regarded as more certain than that , applied to the act of giving the law, embraces in itself the idea: (not directly, but) (Lev 26:46 ). Buhl, l.c . p. 13, has interpreted the passage similarly to Hauck, but with an incorrect inference from the negation of necessity to the negation of possibility: the mediator always represents a great number of persons; but God is single, and as such does not need any mediator: therefore the mediator (ver. 19) cannot be the representative of God , but, on the contrary, can only accept the law for a plurality of recipients . Thus the law stands in contrast to the covenant of promise, which was given to the One .

[155] Schneckenburger’s explanation (in his Beitr . p. 189 ff., and in the Stud. u. Krit . 1835, p. 121) agrees with Schmieder’s. Huth’s attempt at an explanation ( Comment. de loco Gal . iii. 19f., Altenb., 1854) agrees partly with Schmieder and partly with Schulthess; he understands of an “ angelus mediator,” and then in ver. 20 finds the idea that the law proceeds from angels, and not from God, as follows: “ Mediatore enim, nihil opus fuisset, si unus tantummodo legem tulisset; at si multitudo quaedam, qualis est angelorum, legem ferre vult, tum rei summa exsequenda traditur uni, qui mediatoris vicem inter legis latores et eos gerat, quibus lex destinata est. Haec autem ratio cadere non potest in Deum, quippe qui unus numero sit, ideoque mediatore non indigeat. Ex hoc ipso igitur, quod in ferenda lege Mosaica opus fuit mediatore, colligendum est, originem ejus repeti non debere ab uno Deo, sed a pluribus, h. e. ab angelis, quorum mediator vice fungebatur .”

[156] This applies also against Kaiser’s strange attempt ( de apologetic. Ev. Joh. consiliis , Erl. 1824, p. 7 ff.) to obtrude the entirely foreign supplement of : “ Hic mediator Moses non est unius filius, Deus autem (nempe) est unus: ” Moses is not to be compared with Christ, the only-begotten Son of God.

[157] This remark also applies to the very forced and arbitrary explanation of Mich. Weber ( Paraphr . cap. III. ep. ad Gal . 1863): “ Hic autem interventor ( Moses ) non est interventor unius illius posteritatis Abrahami, quam paulo ante Christianos esse dixi, Israelitarum , sed Israelitarum interventor quippe in quo spem suam fiduciamque ponunt (Joh 2:4-5 ). Ex hac igitur parte, in interventore, Israelitae differunt ab Israelitis , quippe qui spem fiduciamque suam non in Mose, sed in solo Christo ponunt , . (1Ti 2:5 ). In Deo autem ( ) nulla est diversitas; nihil discriminis Israelitis cum Israelitis intercedit, eundem Deum verum colunt illi quem hi, Deus est unus idemque. Utrique habent quidem interventorem, non autem Deum .”

[158] And in the relation of God to the Jews and Gentiles would be arbitrarily assumed. This is also done by the anonymous writer in the Stud. u. Krit . 1867, p. 331 ff., according to whom our passage is intended to assert that the mediator of the law was not only the mediator of God, but also had reference to the Jewish people, whereas God with His promise had reference to all the nations of the earth, both Jews and Gentiles.

[159] According to him, the idea in the second clause is merely: “ that which God in Himself, irrespective of the disunion which has arisen between Him and men, has promised, is elevated above this disunion .”

[160] After several earlier attempts, according to his last view of 1866, in the monograph quoted at ver. 15.

[161] “I wished, in fact, that it were allowable for me in the explanation to pass over the whole verse, and to give it out as a marginal note of some reader not understanding Paul, which had found its way into the text.” Michaelis, Paraphr . p. 33, Exo 2 .

[162] There is not even the slightest variation in the individual words, or in their arrangement, a fact which, judging by critical analogy, would be scarcely conceivable in a text compiled from a double gloss. Only the th. adds duorum at the end, evidently an exegetical addition, the author of which appears to have had in his mind some explanation which bore a similarity to that of Clarke, Locke, Winer, or Gurlitt.

Fuente: Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer’s New Testament Commentary

20 Now a mediator is not a mediator of one, but God is one.

Ver. 20. Is not a mediator of one ] q.d. God and men were at odds, else what use of a mediator? Sin is the makebate (mischief maker), as being a transgression of the law.

But God is one ] One and the same now as of old in taking vengeance on the law’s transgressors. Or, God is one party disagreeing or displeased.

Fuente: John Trapp’s Complete Commentary (Old and New Testaments)

20 .] “The explanations of this verse, so obscure from its brevity, are so numerous (Winer counted 250: Jowett mentions 430) that they require a bibliography of their own.” De Wette. I believe we shall best disentangle the sense as follows. (1) Clearly, and are opposed. (2) As clearly, and are opposed. (3) From this contrast arises an apparent opposition between the law and the promises of God, which (not alone, but as the conclusion of the whole to ) gives occasion to the question of Gal 3:21 . Taking up therefore again (1), , by whose hand the law was enacted, stands opposed to , the giver of the promises. And that, in this respect (2); (a) is not , but (b) is . And herein lies the knot of the verse; that is, in (b), for the meaning of (a) is pretty clear on all hands; viz. that (generic, so ref. Job; ‘qu multa sunt cunctis in unum colligendis,’ Hermann ad Iph. in Aul. p. 15, prf. cited by Meyer) does not belong to one party (masculine) (but to two , as going between one party and another). Then to guide us to the meaning of (b), we must remember, that the numerical contrast is the primary idea: belongs not to one , but is one . Shall we then say, that all reference of (as applied to ) beyond this numerical one is to be repudiated? I cannot think so. The proposition would carry to the mind of every reader much more than the mere numerical unity of God viz. His Unity as an essential attribute , extending through the whole divine Character. And thus, though the proposition would not, by itself, convey any meaning but that a mediator belongs to more than one, it would, when combined with , receive a shade of meaning which it did not bear before, of a state of things involved in the fact of a being employed, which was not according to the of God, or, so to speak, in the main track of His unchanging purpose. And thus (3), the law, administered by the , belonging to a state of , two at variance, is apparently opposed to the , belonging entirely to , the one (faithful) God. And observe, that the above explanation is deduced entirely from the form of the sentence itself , and from the idea which the expression must necessarily raise in the mind of its reader, accustomed to the proposition as the foundation of the faith; not from any preconceived view, to suit which the words, or emphatic arrangement, must be forced. Notice by the way, that the objection, that the Gospel too is , does not apply here: for ( ) there is no question here of the Gospel , but only of the promises , as direct from God: ( ) the of the Gospel is altogether different, and His work different: He has absolutely reconciled the parties at variance, and MADE THEM ONE in Himself. Remember St. Paul’s habit of insulating the matter in hand, and dealing with it irrespective of all such possible objections. To give even an analysis of the various opinions on this verse would far exceed the limits of this commentary: I will only take advantage of Meyer’s long note, and of other sources, to indicate the main branches of the exegesis. (I) The Fathers, for the most part, pass lightly over it, as easy in itself, and do not notice its pragmatic difficulty. Most of them understand by the , Christ, the mediator between God and man. In interpreting and , they go in omnia alia. It may suffice to quote one or two samples. Chrys. says, ; “ ,” , , “ .” , , . ; . ; ; , . And Jerome, ‘manu mediatoris potentiam et virtutem ejus debemus accipere, qui cum secundum Deum unum sit ipse cum patre, secundum mediatoris officium alins ab eo intelligitur.’ Theodoret, having explained the of Moses, proceeds, on , , , . , . (II) The older of the modern Commentators are generally quite at fault: I give a few of them: Grotius says, ‘Etsi Christus mediator Legem Judis tulerit, ut ad agnitionem transgressionum adduceret, eoque ad fdus grati prpararet, non tamen unius est gentis Judaic mediator, sed omnium hominum: quemadmodum Deus unus est omnium.’ Luther (1519), ‘Ex nomine mediatoris concludit, nos adeo esse peccatores, ut legis opera satis esse nequeant. Si, inquit, lege justi estis, jam mediatore non egetis, sed neque Deus, cum sit ipse unus, secum optime conveniens. Inter duos ergo quritur mediator, inter Deum et hominem; ac si dicat, impiissima est ingratitudo, si mediatorem rejicitis, et Deo, qui unus est, remittitis, &c.’ Erasmus, in his paraphrase: ‘Atqui conciliator, qui intercedit, inter plures intercedat oportet, nemo enim secum ipse dissidet. Deus autem unus est, quocum dissidium erat humano generi. Proinde tertio quopiam erat opus, qui natur utriusque particeps utramque inter sese reconciliaret, &c.’ Calvin, as the preferable view, ‘diversitatem hic notari arbitror inter Judos et Gentiles. Non unius ergo mediator est Christus, quia diversa est conditio eorum quibuscum Deus, ipsius auspiciis, paciscitur, quod ad externam personam. Verum Paulus inde stimandum Dei fdus negat, quasi secum pugnet, aut varium sit pro hominum diversitate.’ (III) The later moderns begin to approach nearer to the philological and contextual requirements of the passage, but still with considerable errors and divergences. Bengel, on the first clause, ‘Medius terminus est in syllogismo, cujus major propositio et minor exprimitur, conclusio subauditur. Unus non utitur mediatore illo : atqui Deus est unus . Ergo Deus non prius sine mediatore, deinde per mediatorem egit. Ergo is cujus erat mediator non est unus idemque cum Deo sed diversus a Deo, nempe Lex ergo mediator Sinaiticus non est Dei sed legis: Dei autem, promissio.’ Locke (so also Michaelis): “God is but one of the parties concerned in the promise: the Gentiles and Israelites together made up the other, Gal 3:14 . But Moses, at the giving of the law, was a mediator only between the Israelites and God: and therefore could not transact any thing to the disannulling the promise, which was between God and the Israelites and Gentiles together, because God was but one of the parties to that covenant: the other, which was the Gentiles as well as Israelites, Moses appeared or transacted not for.” (IV) Of the recent Commentators, Keil (Opusc. 1809 12) says: ‘Mediatorem quidem non unius sed duarum certe partium esse, Deum autem qui Abrahamo beneficii aliquid promiserit, unum modo fuisse: hincque apostolum id a lectoribus suis colligi voluisse, in lege ista Mosaica pactum mutuum Deum inter atque populum Israeliticum mediatoris opera intercedente initum fuisse, contra vero in promissione rem ab unius tantum (Dei sc. qui solus eam dederit) voluntate pendentem transactam, hincque legi isti nihil plane cum hac rei fuisse, adeoque nec potuisse ea novam illius promissionis implend conditionem constitui, eoque ipso promissionem omnino tolli.’ And similarly Schleiermacher (in Usteri’s Lehrbegriff, p. 186 ff.), but giving to the sense of freedom and independence; and Meyer, only repudiating the second part of Keil’s explanation from ‘hincque,’ as not belonging to an abstract sentence like this, but being historical, as if it had been , and besides contrary to the Apostle’s meaning, who deduces from our verse a consequence the contrary to this (‘hincque fuisse’), and obviates it by the question in Gal 3:21 . For the numerous other recent interpretations and their refutations I must refer the reader to Meyer’s note (as also to Ellicott’s (in his Exo 1 : see his present view in his Exo 2 ), who preferred Windischmann’s interpretation of , ‘One, because He was both giver and receiver united: giver, as the Father; receiver, as the Son, the .’ But this seems going too deep almost, we may say, arriving at the conclusion by a coup de main , which would not have borne any meaning to the readers): see also Jowett’s note, which seems to me further to complicate the matter by introducing into it God’s unity of dealing with man, and man’s unity with God in Christ. (V) We may profitably lay down one or two canons of interpretation of the verse. ( ) Every interpretation is wrong, which understands Christ by . The context determines it to be abstract, and its reference to be to Moses, the mediator of the Law. ( ) Every interpretation is wrong, which makes mean ‘one party’ in the covenant. itself confutes any such view, being a well-known general proposition, not admitting of a concrete interpretation. ( ) Every interpretation is wrong, which confines (as Meyer) to its mere numerical meaning, and does not take into account the ideas which the general proposition would raise. ( ) Every interpretation is wrong, which deduces from the verse the agreement of the law with the promises: because the Apostle himself, in the next verse, draws the very opposite inference from it, and refutes it on other grounds. ( ) Every attempt to set aside the verse as a gloss is utterly futile.

Fuente: Henry Alford’s Greek Testament

Gal 3:20 . The rendering of the first clause in our versions, Now a mediator is not a mediator of one , reduces it to an unmeaning truism. The author is not treating of mediators in the abstract, but writes of Moses the mediator of the Law that he was not mediator of one chosen family; and so contrasts God’s revelation through him with the previous covenant. That covenant had been made with Abraham in person, and embraced a single chosen family ( cf. Gal 3:16 ) restricted from generation to generation by continuous selection of God’s elect until it centred in Christ Himself. Not so the covenant of Sinai: it was addressed, not to one family ( , sc. ), but to many families of Abraham’s children after the flesh. This change of recipients involved a vital change in the revelation also whereas the promise had quickened faith by an appeal to gratitude and love, the Law used threats of wrath and punishment to deter corrupt and carnal natures from indulging the vices of the flesh.

The stress laid on the unity of the chosen seed in Gal 3:16 and the ellipsis of with in Gal 3:22 justify us in understanding here with . . The recurrence of the same phrase with a corresponding force in Rom 3:30 suggests its true force and connection with the context in this place. The Apostle is there urging the real harmony of God’s dealings with Jews and Gentiles, however different the method employed for justifying the two severally; and argues that it is nevertheless one and the same God who will justify both. So here after differentiating the revelation made through Moses from that to Abraham, he is careful to add that the God of Sinai is one with the God of Abraham, however distinct might be the two revelations. The true force of the clause may be expressed as follows, but the God ( sc. the God of Sinai) is one with the God of promise . The twofold revelation of the name of God to Moses as the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and as the eternal God I am that I am , suggests the same thought of the divine unity in spite of the various aspects in which God reveals Himself to successive generations of men.

Fuente: The Expositors Greek Testament by Robertson

20.] The explanations of this verse, so obscure from its brevity, are so numerous (Winer counted 250: Jowett mentions 430) that they require a bibliography of their own. De Wette. I believe we shall best disentangle the sense as follows. (1) Clearly, and are opposed. (2) As clearly, and are opposed. (3) From this contrast arises an apparent opposition between the law and the promises of God, which (not alone, but as the conclusion of the whole to ) gives occasion to the question of Gal 3:21. Taking up therefore again (1),- , by whose hand the law was enacted, stands opposed to , the giver of the promises. And that, in this respect (2);-(a) is not , but (b) is . And herein lies the knot of the verse; that is, in (b),-for the meaning of (a) is pretty clear on all hands; viz. that (generic, so ref. Job; qu multa sunt cunctis in unum colligendis, Hermann ad Iph. in Aul. p. 15, prf. cited by Meyer) does not belong to one party (masculine) (but to two, as going between one party and another). Then to guide us to the meaning of (b), we must remember, that the numerical contrast is the primary idea: belongs not to one, but is one. Shall we then say, that all reference of (as applied to ) beyond this numerical one is to be repudiated? I cannot think so. The proposition would carry to the mind of every reader much more than the mere numerical unity of God-viz. His Unity as an essential attribute, extending through the whole divine Character. And thus, though the proposition would not, by itself, convey any meaning but that a mediator belongs to more than one, it would, when combined with , receive a shade of meaning which it did not bear before,-of a state of things involved in the fact of a being employed, which was not according to the of God, or, so to speak, in the main track of His unchanging purpose. And thus (3), the law, administered by the , belonging to a state of , two at variance, is apparently opposed to the , belonging entirely to , the one (faithful) God. And observe, that the above explanation is deduced entirely from the form of the sentence itself, and from the idea which the expression must necessarily raise in the mind of its reader, accustomed to the proposition as the foundation of the faith;-not from any preconceived view, to suit which the words, or emphatic arrangement, must be forced. Notice by the way, that the objection, that the Gospel too is , does not apply here: for () there is no question here of the Gospel, but only of the promises, as direct from God: () the of the Gospel is altogether different, and His work different: He has absolutely reconciled the parties at variance, and MADE THEM ONE in Himself. Remember St. Pauls habit of insulating the matter in hand, and dealing with it irrespective of all such possible objections. To give even an analysis of the various opinions on this verse would far exceed the limits of this commentary: I will only take advantage of Meyers long note, and of other sources, to indicate the main branches of the exegesis. (I) The Fathers, for the most part, pass lightly over it, as easy in itself,-and do not notice its pragmatic difficulty. Most of them understand by the , Christ, the mediator between God and man. In interpreting and , they go in omnia alia. It may suffice to quote one or two samples. Chrys. says, ; , , , . , , . ; . ; ; , . And Jerome, manu mediatoris potentiam et virtutem ejus debemus accipere, qui cum secundum Deum unum sit ipse cum patre, secundum mediatoris officium alins ab eo intelligitur. Theodoret, having explained the of Moses, proceeds, on ,- , , . , . (II) The older of the modern Commentators are generally quite at fault: I give a few of them: Grotius says, Etsi Christus mediator Legem Judis tulerit, ut ad agnitionem transgressionum adduceret, eoque ad fdus grati prpararet, non tamen unius est gentis Judaic mediator, sed omnium hominum: quemadmodum Deus unus est omnium. Luther (1519), Ex nomine mediatoris concludit, nos adeo esse peccatores, ut legis opera satis esse nequeant. Si, inquit, lege justi estis, jam mediatore non egetis, sed neque Deus, cum sit ipse unus, secum optime conveniens. Inter duos ergo quritur mediator, inter Deum et hominem; ac si dicat, impiissima est ingratitudo, si mediatorem rejicitis, et Deo, qui unus est, remittitis, &c. Erasmus, in his paraphrase: Atqui conciliator, qui intercedit, inter plures intercedat oportet, nemo enim secum ipse dissidet. Deus autem unus est, quocum dissidium erat humano generi. Proinde tertio quopiam erat opus, qui natur utriusque particeps utramque inter sese reconciliaret, &c. Calvin, as the preferable view, diversitatem hic notari arbitror inter Judos et Gentiles. Non unius ergo mediator est Christus, quia diversa est conditio eorum quibuscum Deus, ipsius auspiciis, paciscitur, quod ad externam personam. Verum Paulus inde stimandum Dei fdus negat, quasi secum pugnet, aut varium sit pro hominum diversitate. (III) The later moderns begin to approach nearer to the philological and contextual requirements of the passage, but still with considerable errors and divergences. Bengel, on the first clause, Medius terminus est in syllogismo, cujus major propositio et minor exprimitur, conclusio subauditur. Unus non utitur mediatore illo: atqui Deus est unus. Ergo Deus non prius sine mediatore, deinde per mediatorem egit. Ergo is cujus erat mediator non est unus idemque cum Deo sed diversus a Deo, nempe Lex ergo mediator Sinaiticus non est Dei sed legis: Dei autem, promissio. Locke (so also Michaelis): God is but one of the parties concerned in the promise: the Gentiles and Israelites together made up the other, Gal 3:14. But Moses, at the giving of the law, was a mediator only between the Israelites and God: and therefore could not transact any thing to the disannulling the promise, which was between God and the Israelites and Gentiles together, because God was but one of the parties to that covenant: the other, which was the Gentiles as well as Israelites, Moses appeared or transacted not for. (IV) Of the recent Commentators, Keil (Opusc. 1809-12) says: Mediatorem quidem non unius sed duarum certe partium esse, Deum autem qui Abrahamo beneficii aliquid promiserit, unum modo fuisse: hincque apostolum id a lectoribus suis colligi voluisse, in lege ista Mosaica pactum mutuum Deum inter atque populum Israeliticum mediatoris opera intercedente initum fuisse, contra vero in promissione rem ab unius tantum (Dei sc. qui solus eam dederit) voluntate pendentem transactam,-hincque legi isti nihil plane cum hac rei fuisse, adeoque nec potuisse ea novam illius promissionis implend conditionem constitui, eoque ipso promissionem omnino tolli. And similarly Schleiermacher (in Usteris Lehrbegriff, p. 186 ff.), but giving to the sense of freedom and independence;-and Meyer, only repudiating the second part of Keils explanation from hincque, as not belonging to an abstract sentence like this, but being historical, as if it had been , and besides contrary to the Apostles meaning, who deduces from our verse a consequence the contrary to this (hincque fuisse), and obviates it by the question in Gal 3:21. For the numerous other recent interpretations and their refutations I must refer the reader to Meyers note (as also to Ellicotts (in his ed. 1: see his present view in his ed. 2), who preferred Windischmanns interpretation of , One, because He was both giver and receiver united: giver, as the Father; receiver, as the Son, the . But this seems going too deep-almost, we may say, arriving at the conclusion by a coup de main, which would not have borne any meaning to the readers): see also Jowetts note, which seems to me further to complicate the matter by introducing into it Gods unity of dealing with man, and mans unity with God in Christ. (V) We may profitably lay down one or two canons of interpretation of the verse. () Every interpretation is wrong, which understands Christ by . The context determines it to be abstract, and its reference to be to Moses, the mediator of the Law. () Every interpretation is wrong, which makes mean one party in the covenant. itself confutes any such view, being a well-known general proposition, not admitting of a concrete interpretation. () Every interpretation is wrong, which confines (as Meyer) to its mere numerical meaning, and does not take into account the ideas which the general proposition would raise. () Every interpretation is wrong, which deduces from the verse the agreement of the law with the promises: because the Apostle himself, in the next verse, draws the very opposite inference from it, and refutes it on other grounds. () Every attempt to set aside the verse as a gloss is utterly futile.

Fuente: The Greek Testament

Gal 3:20. , now a Mediator) The article has the meaning of the relative. That Mediator, Moses, who was far later than the promise, and at the same time severe.-, of one) The middle term of the syllogism, of which the major and minor proposition is expressed, the conclusion is understood, One does not make use of that Mediator (that is, whosoever is one [one and the same unchanging being] does not transact first without a mediator, then the same one through a mediator; nor does he afterwards withdraw himself [after having first dealt with His people immediately and directly], so as to transact through a mediator; for familiar acquaintance does not generally decrease, but increase): but God is one. Therefore God did not transact first without a mediator, then through a mediator. Therefore that party, to which the mediator belonged, is not one and the same with God, but different from God, namely the law.[28]- , but God is one) There is not one God before and another after the giving of the law, but one and the same God. Before the law He transacted without a mediator; therefore the mediator at Mount Sinai does not belong to God, but to the law; whereas the promise belongs to God; comp. on the unity of God, in reference to the same subject, Rom 3:30; also 1Ti 2:5 : and the oneness of God before and after the law agrees most beautifully with the oneness of the seed before and after the law. Thus Paul infers from the very manner of giving the law, that the law was given on account of sin; and thus the new objection in the following verse is in consonance.

[28] The syllogism is one of the first figure in Ferio. The major prop. is: One does not make use of that mediator. The minor is: But God is one; and the conclusion is, therefore God does not use that mediator. But the conclusion drawn by Bengel is not directly from the major prop., but from the explanation of it within the parenthesis, and is perfectly sound according to his statement. The conclusion in the last sentence is not quite so clear. Let it be remembered, however, that there was a double mediation. God delegated the law to angels, who gave it to Moses: therefore Moses came between the law and the people.-TRANSL.

Fuente: Gnomon of the New Testament

Gal 3:20

Gal 3:20

Now a mediator is not a mediator of one; but God is one.-A mediator does not mediate with one, but stands between two parties. God was one of the parties and the Jews the other between whom Moses was mediator.

Fuente: Old and New Testaments Restoration Commentary

the Law Leads to Christ

Gal 3:20-29

The Mosaic law was not designed to be the final code of the religious life, but to prepare the soil of the human heart to receive Jesus Christ in all the fullness of His salvation. It was the tutor of the Hebrew people, to enable them to become the religious teachers of mankind. It could not, therefore, take the place of the great covenant of grace, which had been initiated with Abraham before he had received the rite of circumcision, and when he thus stood for all who believe, whether Jew or Gentile. The mistake of those against whom Paul contended was that they treated as permanent a system which was temporary and parenthetic in its significance.

With many individuals now, as with the Hebrew race, there is often a period in which the conscience is confronted with the holy demands of Gods law, which men cannot keep; but when they discover the full grace of God in Christ, they no longer suffer at the hand of the schoolmaster, but become as children in the Fathers home. They put on Christ and stand accepted in the Beloved, and understand that they are in unity with all who believe. Theirs are all the promises that were made to Abraham, and as his spiritual children they claim their fulfillment.

Fuente: F.B. Meyer’s Through the Bible Commentary

a mediator is: Job 9:33, Act 12:20, 1Ti 2:5

but: Gal 3:17, Gen 15:18, Gen 17:1, Gen 17:2, Deu 6:4, Rom 3:29

Reciprocal: Exo 24:3 – All the words Deu 18:18 – like unto Rom 3:30 – General Heb 8:6 – the mediator Jam 2:19 – General

Fuente: The Treasury of Scripture Knowledge

THE ONE MEDIATOR

How a mediator is not a mediator of one, but God is one.

Gal 3:20

This short sentence is so difficult in its conciseness, so abstruse, and capable of so many meanings, that it is not too much to say that it has more interpretations than any other passage in the Bible. Bishop Lightfoot said, The interpretations which have been given to this passage mount up to two hundred and fifty, or three hundred. The number seems almost incredible! But it at least proves that the language is very full, and the solution exceedingly difficult.

Amongst all the meanings, however, which have been attached to it, there are two which stand out so distinct, and are so far superior to all the rest, that the true understanding of the words must be in one or the other, or in both unitedly.

I. The one is this.Now a Mediator is not a Mediator of one. A Mediator implies that there are two parties concerned. There cannot be mediators unless there are two between whom the mediator is to act. And the two must be, more or less, at variance, otherwise there would be no need, or occasion, for the mediation. Here, then, there must be two. Two? God is one of the two, one of those two between whom the mediation takes place. Then, who was the other? Who was the other? St. Paul leaves an awful blank! Who is the other? Man. In what condition, then, must man be? At enmity with God! Else, he would not need a mediation. Therefore, the fact of the existence of a mediation proves that man is alienated from God. A Mediator is not a Mediator of one, but God is one. Who is the other?

II. The other interpretation is this.The words are intended to draw a contrast between the Law and the Gospel. The mediation of the Lawwhich was conducted by Moseswas of the nature of a contract between two partiesGod on the one side, man on the other. And each must fulfil his part in the contract, or else it would not be valid. Therefore the contract of the Law, observe this! leaves the issue uncertain, for it depended, on one side, on mans obedience, which was an exceedingly doubtful thing; it certainly cannot be depended upon! But just the contrary to that is the contract of the Gospel. In that contract God is all in all. It depends on the will and power of God. It is all, from beginning to end, His work. He elects the soul; He makes the faith; He makes the obedience; He makes the holiness; and He has provided, and He Himself gives, and is, the reward. There is nothing but God in it. So the unity of God is complete. There is nothing but God. God is one. The mediation is entirely different from the mediation of the law. There the parties mediated were two. Here all are one. God the Author, God the Finisher; only God on either side, in His electing love, in the sinners penitence, in the sinners peace, in the sinners eternal life. It is all God. One; alone. Now a Mediator is not a Mediator of one, but God is one.

III. But why may we not embrace the two, and read both in this very deep verse? Thus: man is separated from God. The fact that there is a Mediator, the necessity of a Mediator proves it. We are all at variance with God. A controversy between a man and God is, on reasonable, and rational principles, hopeless. I am one and alone in my deep, sinful degradation. God is one and alone in the solitude of His infinite and unapproachable holiness. There is not the vestige of a hope for me unless there be a Mediator. But God is one. One, up in heaven, in His fore-ordaining love; one, in my poor heart, working there, in His grace and mercy; one, in His eternal sovereignty; one, in His power and will to make me all He would have me to be. One to plan, one to execute, His grand design. One to begin, one to perfect my salvation. One to save me, and glorify Himself by my everlasting happiness.

Rev. James Vaughan.

Fuente: Church Pulpit Commentary

Gal 3:20. , -Now a mediator is not of one, but God is one; equivalent to saying, No mediator can belong to one party- emphatic-but two parties at least are always implied. It is philologically wrong in Hauck to regard as meaning one taken out of the midst, and equivalent to intercessor or representative, for it is middleman. The verse defines by the way what a mediator is, being transitional, and giving the specific idea-virtually every mediator, denoting in an individual a whole class. Winer, 18. Mat 12:35; Joh 10:11; 2Co 12:12. Compare Job 9:33. Meyer quotes Hermann: Articulus definit infinita . . . aut designando certo de multis, aut quae multa sunt cunctis in unum colligendis. Praef. ad Iphig. in Aulide, p. xv. Lipsiae 1831. In every work of mediation there must be more than one party, and thus at the giving of the law in the hand of a mediator there were two parties-God on the one side, and the Jewish people on the other, there being a covenant or contract between them. This view of the clause is held generally by Theodoret, Luther, Keil, Usteri, Rckert, De Wette, etc. The numeral must be masculine, in correspondence with the following ; but Koppe and Bengel supply , Borger , Keil , Sack , Rosenmller and Steudel , understanding by it believers, also Gurlitt who limits it to heathen believers (Stud. u. Kritik. 1843), and Jatho who restricts it to Christ, the one Seed. Some, with a wrong interpretation of the clause ending with , take the singular in contrast: Moses was not a mediator of one, i.e. God, but of many, i.e. angels; as Schultess, Schmieder, Caspari, Huth, Schneckenburger, and Gfrrer in his das Jahrhundert des Heils, 1.228, etc.

But God is one- . adversative; being numerical, so must . God is one, and is therefore mediatorless. God Himself without any intervention speaks the promise to Abraham; the promise is conveyed through no third party, as was the law. Whatever contingency might be in the law and its conveyance by a mediator who went between God and the people, there can be none with regard to the promise, the direct and unconditioned word of Jehovah Himself alone. The all-inclusive One uttered the words, In thy seed shall all nations of the earth be blessed, to Abraham immediately, no one placing himself between them. God the Giver is one (not two-Himself and a mediator) in the bestowment of that absolute promise, which the introduction of the law four centuries afterwards cannot modify or set aside. It is not necessary for this interpretation, as some object, that the historical should be employed, as the present is commonly employed in a definitive sentence. The clause, but God is one, does not announce dogmatically the unity of the Godhead, as do several similar utterances in the Pentateuch. Whatever doctrinal ideas the words might suggest, they are here used on purpose to deny all duality in the bestowment of the promise, the as implying more than one- -being in contrast with God, who is one-. The law, in the period of introduction, in its temporary and provisional nature, and in the mediatorial process by which it was given, is so different from the promise and its method of bestowment, that the apostle next puts the question sharply, Is the law then against the promises of God? This view, which appears to be the simplest, as well as grammatically correct and in harmony with the context, has been opposed by many, who take to refer to the mediator just mentioned-either Christ or Moses-the verse being then regarded as descriptive of his relations or functions; some supposing it to state an objection, others regarding it as the refutation of one.

The interpretations which have been given of this verse, so difficult from its terse brevity, amount to several hundreds; and it would be a vain attempt to enumerate or classify them. Suffice it to say, first, that it is in vain to attempt to displace the verse, as if it were spurious, for it is found without variation in all MSS.,-or as if it were made up of two glosses, first written on the margin, and then carelessly taken into the text (Michaelis, Lcke, Stud. u. Kritik. 1828). Equally vain is it to rewrite it, as if the first words should be (Gdr); or to change the accentuation of , and give it the unwarranted signification of annual-the yearly mediator is no more, (Weigand). As little to the purpose are such eccentric interpretations as that of Bertholdt, who takes to refer to Abraham, because he is called in Isa 51:2; or that of Kaiser, who supplies -Moses is not the son of One, that is God, but Christ is; or that of Holsten, that is the law standing between two things-the promise and the fulfilment; or that of Matthias, who, over-looking the contrast between in the first clause and in the second, understands the second clause thus-God (and not fallible man) is one of the two parties,-his conclusion being, that therefore the law, though given by angels, is of divine origin; and then, giving the of the following verse the sense of under, he makes the question to be, Does the law fall under the idea of promise? or, Does the law belong to the category of the promises?-or that of Hermann, who, preserving the numerical meaning of , and regarding it as part of the minor proposition of a syllogism, brings out this odd sense: Deus autem unus est; ergo apud Deum cogitari non potest interventor, esset enim is, qui intercederet inter Deum et Deum, quod absurdum est;-but the reductio assumed as an inference is wholly foreign to the verse and context, and his further exposition proceeds on the sense of testamentum, as given to ;-or that of Ewald, whose interpretation is not dissimilar in some points, but who, instead of saying between God and God, speaks of two innerly different Gods, or an earlier and a later God. So Bagge-There are not two gods,-one giving the promise, the other the law,-but One only; and similarly Vmel. Bengel’s general view is, The party to whom the mediator belonged is different from God-namely, the law. There is not one God before and another after the giving of the law. Before the law He transacted without a mediator; the mediator belongs to the law, but the promise to God. Quite apart from the meaning and the course of argument is the opinion that makes mean , unus idemque (Semler), or sibi constans (Beza), or that regards as – a mediator implying diversity of opinion (Gabler, Schttgen). The exegesis of Dr. Brown is ingenious but philologically baseless, because and never signify immutable, as Borger and Koppe contend. The law was given by the hands of Moses as a mediator. But was he not the mediator of Him who is one and the same, unchangeable? Now God, who appointed Moses mediator, is one and the same, unchanged and unchangeable. To give a numerical meaning in the first clause, but an ethical meaning in the second clause, is not consistent (Schleiermacher, Usteri). Koppe, Cameron, Sack, and Barnes who gives his exegesis as original, educe this meaning: While there may be many mediators, God is one, consistent with Himself, so that the two dispensations cannot be opposed. Hilgenfeld, after Matthies, in the same way gives the sense of absolute unity-monarchie. See also Baumgarten-Crusius, Lipsius, Rechtfertigung, p. 77. Somewhat similarly Luther: Neque Deus eget mediatore, cum sit ipse unus secum optime conveniens; and again, Deus neminem offendit ergo non indiget ullo mediatore. Luther’s opinion is so far reproduced in Matthies; in Rink-God is eternal unity (Stud. u. Kritik. 1834), and in De Wette-God is essential unity. Windischmann has a more complex and untenable view: God is one-the Giver as the Father, the Receiver as the Son-united,-unmittelbar dem Geber und dem Emptfnger nach. So too his co-religionist Bisping, The promise was given immediately to the Seed, that is Christ, who is God and man in one person. The promise made by God to God needed no mediator. And similarly also Wilke. It is loading the verse with an inferential sense to explain, that as God is but one of the parties concerned, and as Moses was mediator between God and the Jews only, his mediation could have no effect on a promise which included Gentiles as well as Jews (Locke, Whitby, Chandler); or to conjecture that the apostle’s words suggest an allusion to the unity of man-to whom God is one and alike-and to the unity of man with God (Jowett); or to argue, God is one only, one part only, and the Israelites as being the other part are bound to obey the law-Deus est unus, una (altera) tantummodo pars est gens Israel (Winer, with whom agree virtually Kern, Paulus, and Sardinoux); or to affirm, God is one, not the other party, and stands therefore not under the law, so that the freedom of Christ the Son of God from the law is established (Steinfass).

Those interpretations which give a personal reference, and identify it with either Christ or Moses, labour under insuperable difficulties. The fathers generally held the former view, as Chrysostom, Ambros., and Jerome, and many others. The exegesis of some of this class may be thus reported: The law was given in the hand of a mediator-Jesus Christ. Now He is not the mediator of the one dispensation only, but of the other also. But God is one-the one God gave the law and the promises, and in both cases He has employed the same mediator. But the mediator of the context is very plainly Moses, and that paraphrase assumes greatly more than the text asserts. Similar objections may be made to another form of the same exegesis: Now the mediator (Jesus Christ) does not belong to one part of the human race, but to both Jew and Gentile, even as the one God is God of both. Others give it this form: Christ is the mediator between two parties; but God is one of those parties, the elect being the other. Or, God is in Himself One; so likewise was He one of the parties, the other party being the children of Israel. But the majority hold the reference to be to Moses, as Theodoret, Bengel, Schultess, Jatho, Brown, Hofmann, Wieseler. Theodoret explains: But Moses was not the mediator of one, for he mediated between God and the people; but God is one. He gave the promise to Abraham, He appointed the law, and He has shown the fulfilment of the promise. It is not one God who did one of these things, and another God the other. Others, as Noesselt, follow the form already given with Christ as mediator: Moses was not the mediator of the one seed, containing both Jews and Gentiles; but God is one, standing in a common relation to both Jews and Gentiles. The one seed, however, is Christ; and is masculine, as the construction plainly determines. Piscator brings out a different conclusion: God who gave the law by Moses is one, and therefore, being unchanged, still will punish such as break His law; therefore justification by works is impossible. Another form of the exegesis is that of Pareus (1621)-a mediator implies two parties, out of which one must be transgressors, in reference to Gal 3:19. But the transgressing party cannot be God, who is one-justitia et sanctitate semper sibi constans. Cameron puts it thus: A mediator (Moses) does not belong to the Sinaitic covenant only, but also to the Abrahamic or Christian covenant (Christ); but God is one-both covenants originate in Him. Wessel takes the genitive in the sense of dependence-the Mediator Christ is not of one God, i.e. is not subject to Him as a creature, though officially He became a mediator, nay, He is Himself the One God; as if the apostle had wished to vindicate Christ’s divinity from some objection based upon His economic subordination. Turner regards the verse as an assertion of the great characteristic of the gospel, that the illustrious Mediator thereof is not the Mediator of one race or class or body of men, as Moses, but of all, as God is one and the same, equally the Father of all. The objection to this and other similar interpretations need not now be recounted. Wieseler’s notion is, that the failure of the mediation of Moses-since it concerned not God, but man also-arose out of his having to do with men who have not obeyed the law; the apostle’s purpose being to show how the divinity of the law may be reconciled with its sin-working power. The first part of this exegesis is adopted by Kamphausen in Bunsen’s Bibel-werk. Hofmann’s interpretation of the first clause virtually is: The mediator Moses did not concern himself with the one united seed, as such a unity, according to Gal 3:28, exists only in Christ, but with a multitude of individuals; and his interpretation of the second clause is, that it stands in contrast to the phrase ordained by angels, and asserts the divine unity as opposed to the multitude of those spirits. See Meyer and Wieseler on this interpretation.

Fuente: Commentary on the Greek Text of Galatians, Ephesians, Colossians and Phillipians

Gal 3:20. The very meaning of the word mediator indicates that two persons are on unfriendly terms, and the work of a mediator is to get them reconciled. There can be no need for nor work of a mediator in a case where only one person is interested. But God is one (only), therefore the presence of a mediator means that another party is involved. God is always righteous and no unrighteous person can be considered as being on good terms with Him. That is why a mediator was employed, and the party who needed to be reconciled to God was the Israelite

nation, which had estranged itself from God by its “transgressions,” and the law of Moses was the document by which the reconciliation was to be accomplished.

Fuente: Combined Bible Commentary

Gal 3:20. The natural translation and meaning of this famous cross of interpreters seems to be this: Now a mediator (every mediator, including Moses, Gal 3:19)[1] is not of one (of one party only, but always presupposes two or more parties; in this case God and the Jewish people); but God is one (either one numerically, i.e., one party, Israel being the other; or one morally and emphatically, i.e., one only in opposition to every plurality or contradiction). But what is the bearing of this sentence upon the argument? We have here evidently an elliptic syllogism, and must supply a link, either the minor proposition or the conclusion. The Apostle, as by an incidental stroke of lightning, suggests a collateral proof to the main idea of this section, namely, that the promise could not be made void by the law, in this sense: The God who gave both the promise and the law is one and the same, consistent in all his dealings, and cannot contradict himself, therefore the law cannot set aside the promise. Or the Apostle suggests a proof for the inferiority of the law as compared with the promise, in this sense: The law is a covenant between two parties and is conditioned by the obedience of the people; but the promise is the free gift of God alone, and man is merely the recipient; the law may be broken by sinful men, the promise of God is unconditional and irrevocable. These are the two most natural interpretations. I prefer the former because it falls in easier with the preceding Gal 3:15-19.

[1] The definite article in Greek is used here idiomatically in the generic sense, where the English idiom requires the indefinite article. Comp. sin and death, as a power, in Rom 5:12, where the Greek has the definite article (as also the German); also Joh 10:11; 2Co 12:12 (in Greek).

Excursus on Chapter Gal 3:20.

The genius of Paul, by the wealth and depth of his ideas, has stimulated more minds and exercised more pens than any other writer. This verse is counted the most difficult passage in the New Testament, and has given rise to about three hundred interpretations (254, according to Drs. Winer and Weigand in 1821; 430, according to Dr. Jowett.) Most of them are of recent origin, and not a few are more obscure than the text.[1]

[1] The latest monograph is by Dr. Gust. Ad. Fricke, of Leipzig: Das exegetische Problem im Briefe Pauli an die Galater. c. iii. 30. Leipzig, 1880, 5a pages. The older monographs are mentioned by Winer, De Wette, Meyer, and Wieseler.

The sentence is simple enough grammatically; the obscurity arises from its brevity and connection. The interpretations differ (1) as to the sense of the mediator whether it means all mediators as a class (the generic article), or Moses, or Christ; (2) in what is to be supplied to the genitive of one () party, thing, seed, people (the Jews only as distinct from the heathen, but God is the one God of both); (3) as to the meaning of God is one () numerically, or morally, referring to his monarchy, or sovereignty, or faithfulness and unchangeableness; (4) in the logical connection with the preceding and succeeding verses; (5) in the relation of the clauses to each other.

Omitting mere arbitrary conjectures and fancies, we will give only the best interpretations.

1. Christ is the mediator between God and men. Comp. 1Ti 2:5 : There is one God and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus. So most of the fathers who cared little for the logical connection, and hence did not feel the difficulty of the passage. Some saw here even a reference to the two natures of Christ, the human (of one) and the divine.

2. Moses is the mediator between God and the Jewish people; but God is one, the same who gave the promise to Abraham and the law through Moses. So Theodoret and other fathers. Bengel and Wieseler also refer the mediator to Moses, but differ in the conclusion. Wieseler supplies the inference: the failure of the mediatorial office of Moses between God and the people is due to the unfaithfulness of men who did not keep the compact.

3. A mediator (generally) is not of one party, but of two; God is one party, the people the other; and the people are bound to observe the law. The last sentence is supplied. So Winer, who sees here a parenthetical remark in favor of the authority of the law.

4. A mediator occupies a subordinate middle position and belongs to both parties who stand over against each other; but God is one party for himself over and above the mediator. The law belongs to the same subordinate sphere as the mediator, but the promise which is given directly by God without a mediator, stands higher. The law was provisional, the promise is permanent So Baur, followed by Farrar (St. Paul, i. 150).

5. A mediator implies a separation of two parties, God and man, but in God, the author of the promise, is perfect unity. An argument for the superiority of the promise. De Wette.

6. Every mediator intervenes between two or more parties; but God is a single person, not a plurality; hence the law, which is a contract between God and Israel, cannot be opposed to the divine promises of the same one God acting directly. Meyer.

7. The idea of a mediator supposes two different parties to be united; but inasmuch as God is strictly one so that there can be no two Gods, or one God of the law and another of the promise it follows that Moses as mediator did not mediate between the God of the promise and the God of the law and so abolish the promise by the law, but he mediated (as is well known) only between God and the people of Israel. Ewald. Similarly Weiss (Bibl. Theol. d. N. T., 3d ed., p. 266).

8. God in the promise stands and acts alone; therefore in the promise a mediator does not appertain to God. Is then the law which involved a mediator opposed to the promises which rested on God alone? God forbid. Ellicott.

9. The sentence is an attack upon the law and the Judaizers. A mediator, and consequently also the law which was given by mediators (angels and Moses), does not appertain to the promise which proceeds from God alone. Holsten (in the Protestanten-Bibel, 1874).Similarly Fricke: Moses and the law belong to the sphere of mediation between two parties at least; the promises were given by God alone to Abraham (Gal 3:16); consequently the law and the promise do not agree, and cannot be reconciled except in the way pointed out, Gal 3:21-24.

10. The very idea of mediation supposes a contract to which there are at least two parties. But where there is a contract there must be also conditions, and if these conditions are not observed the whole falls to the ground. The law was such a contingent contract, and as it was not kept, the blessings annexed to it were forfeited. On the other hand, the promise is absolute and unconditioned, it depends upon God alone. He gave it freely, and He will assuredly keep it, no matter what man may do.

Fuente: A Popular Commentary on the New Testament

Gal 3:20. Now a mediator is not a mediator of one There must be two parties, or there can be no place or use for a mediator: but God, who made the free promise to Abraham, is only one of the parties; the other, Abraham, was not present at the time of Moses. Therefore, in the affair of the promise, Moses had nothing to do: the law, wherein he was concerned, was a transaction of quite another nature. Or, as Dr. Doddridge paraphrases this difficult passage more at large, following, as he says, Mr. Lockes interpretation, not without attentively comparing a variety of others, A mediator is not merely the mediator of one party, but at least of two, between which he must pass, and, by the nature of his office, transact for both; but God is only one party in that covenant made with Abraham, and Abraham and his seed, including all that believe, both Jews and Gentiles, are the other. As Moses, therefore, when the law was given, stood at that time, between the Lord and Israel, (Deu 5:5,)

and did not pass between the whole collective body of Abrahams seed and the blessed God; so nothing was transacted by him with relation to those for whom he did not appear, and consequently nothing in that covenant wherein he did mediate could disannul the promise, or affect the right accruing to any from a prior engagement, in which the Gentiles were concerned as well as the Israelites; for no covenant can be altered but by the mutual consent of both parties; and in what was done at mount Sinai by the mediation of Moses, there was none to appear for the Gentiles; so that this transaction between God and the Israelites could have no force to abrogate the promise, which extended likewise to the Gentiles, or to vacate a covenant that was made between parties of which one only was there.

Fuente: Joseph Bensons Commentary on the Old and New Testaments

Now a mediator is not a mediator of one; but God is one. [This verse has been interpreted in more than three hundred different ways.]

Fuente: McGarvey and Pendleton Commentaries (New Testament)

Now a mediator is not [a mediator] of one, but God is one.

The term mediator relates to one that comes between two to bring peace. Much as a legal mediator does today. In the spiritual realm there is a rift between God and man, and Christ the mediator is the only one that can mend that rift. The term also can be translated arbitrator. It is someone that brings peace and restores friendship.

Just what is the meaning of the verse? Some suggest that the King James addition for understanding may be incorrect when it puts “[a mediator]” in the verse. Without it we read “Now a mediator is not of one, but God is one.” This seems clear to me – a mediator does not work well, if at all if he is working with one person. You can’t mediate without two parties. You can’t restore something between one.

Not having checked commentaries I have to wonder if the passage is just disclosing that there was division within the God head in the area of the promise – in that it was yet to be completed, and Christ was the one, the mediator that brought peace within the trinity – God is one, but there are three.

Another reference for further study: 1Ti 2:5 “For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus;”

Fuente: Mr. D’s Notes on Selected New Testament Books by Stanley Derickson

3:20 Now a mediator is not [a mediator] of one, {24} but God is one.

(24) A taking away of an objection, lest any man might say that sometimes by consent of the parties which have made a covenant, something is added to the covenant, or the former covenants are broken. This, the apostle says, does not come to pass in God, who is always one, and the very same, and like himself.

Fuente: Geneva Bible Notes

The meaning of this verse has drawn numerous different explanations. [Note: Lightfoot, p. 146, mentioned 250 to 300, and Charles J. Ellicott, A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, with a Revised Translation, p. 83, estimated over 400.] I think Paul probably meant that a mediator (here the angels, Gal 3:19) is necessary when two parties make an agreement in which they both assume responsibilities, as in the reciprocal Mosaic Covenant. However a mediator is not necessary when the covenant is unilateral, as when God made the unconditional Abrahamic Covenant.

Fuente: Expository Notes of Dr. Constable (Old and New Testaments)