Exegetical and Hermeneutical Commentary of Hebrews 9:16
For where a testament [is,] there must also of necessity be the death of the testator.
16. For where a testament is ] In these two verses (16, 17), and these only, Diathk is used in its Greek and Roman sense of “a will,” and not in its Hebrew sense of “a covenant.” The sudden and momentary change in the significance of the word explains itself, for he has just spoken of an inheritance, and of the necessity for a death. It was therefore quite natural that he should be reminded of the fact that just as the Old Covenant ( Diathk) required the constant infliction of death upon the sacrificed victims, and therefore (by analogy) necessitated the death of Christ under the New, so the word Diathk in its other sense of “Will” or “Testament” (which was by this epoch familiar also to the Jews) involved the necessity of death, because a will assigns the inheritance of a man who is dead. This may be called “a mere play on words;” but such a play on words is perfectly admissible in itself; just as we might speak of the “New Testament” (meaning the Book) as “a testament” (meaning “a will”) sealed by a Redeemer’s blood. An illustration of this kind was peculiarly consonant with the deep mystic significance attached by the Alexandrian thinkers to the sounds and the significance of words. Philo also avails himself of both meanings of Diathk ( De Nom. Mutat. 6; De Sacr. Abel, Opp. i. 586. 172). The passing illustration which thus occurs to the writer does not indeed explain or attempt to explain the eternal necessity why Christ must die; he leaves that in all its awful mystery, and merely gives prominence to the fact that the death was necessary, by saying that since under the Old Covenant death was required, so the New Covenant was inaugurated by a better death; and since a Will supposes that some one has died, so this “Will,” by which we inherit, involves the necessity that Christ must die. The Old Covenant could not be called “a Will” in any ordinary sense; but the New Covenant was, by no remote analogy, the Will and Bequest of Christ.
there must also of necessity be the death of the testator ] Wherever there is a will, the supposition that the maker of the will has died is implied, or legally involved ( , constare).
Fuente: The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges
For where a testament is – This is the same word – diatheke – which in Heb 8:6, is rendered covenant. For the general signification of the word, see note on that verse. There is so much depending, however, on the meaning of the word, not only in the interpretation of this passage, but also of other parts of the Bible, that it may be proper to explain it here more at length. The word – diatheke – occurs in the New Testament thirty-three times. It is translated covenant in the common version, in Luk 1:72; Act 3:25; Act 7:8; Rom 9:4; Rom 11:27; Gal 3:15, Gal 3:17; Gal 4:24; Eph 2:12; Heb 8:6, Heb 8:9, twice, Heb 8:10; Heb 9:4, twice, Heb 10:16; Heb 12:24; Heb 13:20. In the remaining places it is rendered testament; Mat 26:28; Mar 14:24; Luk 22:20; 1Co 11:25; 2Co 3:6, 2Co 3:14; Heb 7:22; Heb 9:15-17, Heb 9:20; Rev 11:19. In four of those instances (Mat 26:28; Mar 14:24; Luk 22:20, and 1Co 11:25), it is used with reference to the institution or celebration of the Lords Supper. In the Septuagint it occurs not far from 300 times, in considerably more than 200 times of which it is the translation of the Hebrew word beriyt.
In one instance Zec 11:14 it is the translation of the word brotherhood; once Deu 9:5, of daabaar – word; once Jer 11:2, of words of the covenant; once Lev 26:11), of tabernacle; once Exo 31:7, of testimony; it occurs once Eze 20:37, where the reading of the Greek and Hebrew text is doubtful; and it occurs three times 1Sa 11:2; 1Sa 20:8; 1Ki 8:9, where there is no corresponding word in the Hebrew text. From this use of the word by the authors of the Septuagint, it is evident that they regarded it as the proper translation of the Hebrew – beriyt, and as conveying the same sense which that word does. It cannot be reasonably doubted that the writers of the New Testament were led to the use of the word, in part, at least, by the fact that they found it occurring so frequently in the version in common use, but it cannot be doubted also that they regarded it as fairly conveying the sense of the word beriyt. On no principle can it be supposed that inspired and honest people would use a word in referring to transactions in the Old Testament which did not fairly convey the idea which the writers of the Old Testament meant to express. The use being thus regarded as settled, there are some facts in reference to it which are of great importance in interpreting the New Testament, and in understanding the nature of the covenant which God makes with man. These facts are the following:
(1) The word diatheke – diatheke – is not what properly denotes compact, agreement, or covenant. That word is suntheke – syntheke or in other forms sunthesis and sunthesias; or if the word diatheke is used in that signification it is only remotely, and as a secondary meaning; see Passow; compare the Septuagint in Isa 28:15; Isa 30:1; Dan 11:6, and Wisdom Dan 1:16; 1 Macc. 10:26; 2 Macc. 13:25; 14:26. It is not the word which a Greek would have employed to denote a compact or covenant. He would have employed it to denote a disposition, ordering, or arrangement of things, whether of religious rites, civil customs, or property; or if used with reference to a compact, it would have been with the idea of an arrangement, or ordering of matters, not with the primary notion of an agreement with another.
(2) The word properly expressive of a covenant or compact – suntheke – is never used in the New Testament. In all the allusions to the transactions between God and man, this word never occurs. From some cause, the writers and speakers in the New Testament seem to have supposed that the word would leave an impression which they did not wish to leave. Though it might have been supposed that in speaking of the various transactions between God and man they would have selected this word, yet with entire uniformity they have avoided it. No one of them – though the word diatheke – diatheke – has been used by no less than six of them – has been betrayed in a single instance into the use of the word suntheke – syntheke, or has differed from the other writers in the language employed. This cannot be supposed to be the result of concert or collusion, but it must have been founded on some reason which operated equally on all their minds.
(3) In like manner, and with like remarkable uniformity, the word suntheke – syntheke – is never used in the Septuagint with reference to any arrangement or covenant between God and man. Once indeed in the Apocrypha, and but once, it is used in that sense. In the three only other instances in which it occurs in the Septuagint, it is with reference to compacts between man and man; Isa 28:15; Isa 30:1; Dan 11:6. This remarkable fact that the authors of that version never use the word to denote any transaction between God and man, shows that there must have been some reason for it which acted on their minds with entire uniformity.
(4) It is no less remarkable that neither in the Septuagint nor the New Testament is the word diatheke – diatheke – ever used in the sense of will or testament, unless it be in the case before us. This is conceded on all hands, and is expressly admitted by Prof. Stuart; (Com. on Heb. p. 439), though he defends this use of the word in this passage. – A very important inquiry presents itself here, which has never received a solution generally regarded as satisfactory. It is, why the word diatheke – diatheke – was selected by the writers of the New Testament to express the nature of the transaction between God and man in the plan of salvation. It might be said indeed that they found this word uniformly used in the Septuagint, and that they employed it as expressing the idea which they wished to convey, with sufficient accuracy. But this is only removing the difficulty one step further back.
Why did the Septuagint adopt this word? Why did they not rather use the common and appropriate Greek word to express the notion of a covenant? A suggestion on this subject has already been made in the notes on Heb 8:6; compare Bib. Repository vol. xx. p. 55. Another reason may, however, be suggested for this remarkable fact which is liable to no objection. It is, that in the apprehension of the authors of the Septuagint, and of the writers of the New Testament, the word diatheke – diatheke – in its original and proper signification fairly conveyed the sense of the Hebrew word beriyt, and that the word suntheke – or compact, agreement, would not express that; and that they never meant to be understood as conveying the idea either that God entered into a compact or covenant with man, or that he made a will. They meant to represent; him as making an arrangement, a disposition, an ordering of things, by which his service might be kept up among his people, and by which people might be saved; but they were equally remote from representing him as making a compact, or a will. In support of this there may be alleged.
(1) The remarkable uniformity in which the word diatheke – diatheke – is used, showing that there was some settled principle from which they never departed; and,
(2) It is used mainly as the meaning of the word itself. Prof. Stuart has, undoubtedly, given the accurate original sense of the word. The real, genuine, and original meaning of diatheke (diatheke) is, arrangement, disposition, or disposal of a thing. P. 440. The word from which it is derived – diatithemi – means to place apart or asunder; and then to set, arrange, dispose in a certain order. Passow. From this original signification is derived the use which the word has with singular uniformity in the Scriptures. It denotes the arrangment, disposition, or ordering of things which God made in relation to mankind, by which he designed to keep up his worship on earth, and to save the soul. It means neither covenant nor will; neither compact nor legacy; neither agreement nor testament. It is an arrangement of an entirely different order from either of them, and the sacred writers with an uniformity which could have been secured only by the presiding influence of the One Eternal Spirit, have avoided the suggestion that God made with man either a compact or a will.
We have no word which precisely expresses this idea, and hence, our conceptions are constantly floating between a compact and a will, and the views which we have are as unsettled as they are. unscriptural. The simple idea is, that God has made an arrangement by which his worship may be celebrated and souls saved. Under the Jewish economy this arrangement assumed one form; under the Christian another. In neither was it a compact or covenant between two parties in such a sense that one party would be at liberty to reject the terms proposed; in neither was it a testament or will, as if God had left a legacy to man, but in both there were some things in regard to the arrangement such as are found in a covenant or compact. One of those things – equally appropriate to a compact between man and man and to this arrangement, the apostle refers to here – that it implied in all cases the death of the victim.
If these remarks are well-founded, they should be allowed materially to shape our views in the interpretation of the Bible. Whole treatises of divinity have been written on a mistaken view of the meaning of this word – understood as meaning covenant. Volumes of angry controversy have been published on the nature of the covenant with Adam, and on its influence on his posterity. The only literal covenant which can he supposed in the plan of redemption is that between the Father and the Son – though even the existence of such a covenant is rather the result of devout and learned imagining than of any distinct statement in the volume of inspiration. The simple statement there is, that God has made an arrangement for salvation, the execution of which he has entrusted to his Son, and has proposed it to man to be accepted as the only arrangement by which man can be saved, and which he is not at liberty to disregard.
There has been much difference of opinion in reference to the meaning of the passage here, and to the design of the illustration introduced. If the word used – diatheke – means testament, in the sense of a will, then the sense of that passage is that a will is of force only when he who made it dies, for it relates to a disposition of his property after his death. The force of the remark of the apostle then would be, that the fact that the Lord Jesus made or expressed his will to mankind, implied that he would die to confirm it; or that since in the ordinary mode of making a will, it was of force only when he who made it was dead, therefore it was necessary that the Redeemer should die, in order to confirm and ratify what he made. But the objections to this, which appears to have been the view of our translators, seem to me to be insuperable. They are these:
(1)The word diatheke – diatheke – is not used in this sense in the New Testament elsewhere; see the remarks above.
(2)The Lord Jesus made no such will. He had no property, and the commandments and instructions which he gave to his disciples were not of the nature of a will or testament.
(3)Such an illustration would not be pertinent to the design of the apostle, or in keeping with his argument.
He is comparing the Jewish and Christian dispensations, and the point of comparison in this chapter relates to the question about the efficacy of sacrifice in the two arrangements. He showed that the arrangement for blood-shedding by sacrifice entered into both; that the high priest of both offered blood as an expiation; that the holy place was entered with blood, and that consequently there was death in both the arrangements, or dispensations. The former arrangement or dispensation was ratified with blood, and it was equally proper that the new arrangement should be also. The point of comparison is not that Moses made a will or testament which could be of force only when he died, and that the same thing was required in the new dispensation, but it is that the former covenant was ratified by blood, or by the death of a victim, and that it might be expected that the new dispensation would be confirmed, and that it was in fact confirmed in the same manner. In this view of the argument, what pertinency would there be in introducing an illustration respecting a will, and the manner in which it became efficient; compare notes on Heb 9:18. It seems clear, therefore, to me, that the word rendered testament here is to be taken in the sense in which it is ordinarily used in the New Testament. The opinion that the word here means such a divine arrangement as is commonly denoted a covenant, and not testament, is sanctioned by not a few names of eminence in criticism, such as Pierce, Doddridge, Michaelis, Steudel, and the late Dr. John P. Wilson. Bloomfield says that the connection here demands this. The principal objections to this view are:
(1)That it is not proved that no covenants or compacts were valid except such as were made by the intervention of sacrifices.
(2)That the word rendered testator – diathemenos – cannot refer to the death of an animal slain for the purpose of ratifying a covenant, but must mean either a testator, or a contractor, that is, one of two contracting parties.
(3)That the word rendered dead Heb 9:17 – nekrois – means only dead men, and never is applied to the dead bodies of animals; (see Stuart on the Hebrew, p. 442.)
These objections to the supposition that the passage refers to a covenant or compact, Prof. Stuart says are in his view insuperable, and they are certainly entitled to grave consideration. Whether the view above presented is one which can be sustained, we may be better able to determine after an examination of the words and phrases which the apostle uses. Those objections which depend wholly on the philological argument derived from the words used, will be considered of course in such an examination. It is to be remembered at the outset:
(1)That the word diatheke – diatheke – is never used in the New Testament in the sense of testament, or will, unless in this place;
(2)That it is never used in this sense in the Septuagint; and,
(3)That the Hebrew word beriyt – never has this signification. This is admitted; see Stuart on the Heb. pp. 439, 440. It must require very strong reasons to prove that it has this meaning here, and that Paul has employed the word in a sense differing from its uniform signification elsewhere in the Bible; compare, however, the remarks of Prof. Stuart in Bib. Repos. vol. xx. p. 364.
There must also of necessity be – anagke – That is, it is necessary in order to confirm the covenant, or it would not be binding in cases where this did not occur. The necessity in the case is simply to make it valid or obligatory. So we say now there must necessarily be a seal, or a deed would not be valid. The fair interpretation of this is, that this was the common and established custom in making a covenant with God, or confirming the arrangement with him in regard to salvation. To this it is objected (see the first objection above), that it is yet to be made out that no covenants were valid execpt those by the intervention of sacrifices. In reply to this, we may observe:
(1) That the point to be made out is not that this was a custom in compacts between man and man, but between man and his Maker. There is no evidence, as it seems to me, that the apostle alludes to a compact between man and man. The mistake on this subject has arisen partly from the use of the word testament by our translators, in the sense of will – supposing that it must refer to some transaction relating to man only; and partly from the insertion of the word men in Heb 9:17, in the translation of the phrase – epi nekrois – upon the dead, or over the dead. But it is not necessary to suppose that there is a reference here to any transaction between man and man at all, as the whole force of the illustration introduced by the apostle will be retained if we suppose him speaking only of a covenant between man and God. Then his assertion will be simply that in the arrangement between God and man there was a necessity of the death of something, or of the shedding of blood in order to ratify it. This view will save the necessity of proof that the custom of ratifying compacts between man and man by sacrifice prevailed. Whether that can be made out or not, the assertion of the apostle may be true, that in the arrangement which God makes with man, sacrifice was necessary in order to confirm or ratify it.
(2) The point to be made out is, not that such a custom is or was universal among all nations, but that it was the known and regular opinion among the Hebrews that a sacrifice was necessary in a covenant with God, in the same way as if we should say that a deed was not valid without a seal, it would not be necessary to show this in regard to all nations, but only that it is the law or the custom in the nation where the writer lived, and at the time when he lived. Other nations may have very different modes of confirming or ratifying a deed, and the same nation may have different methods at various times. The fact or custom to which I suppose there is allusion here, is that of sacrificing an animal to ratify the arrangement between man and his Maker, commonly called a covenant. In regard to the existence of such a custom, particularly among the Hebrews, we may make the following observations.
It was the common mode of ratifying the covenant between God and man. That was done over a sacrifice, or by the shedding of blood. So the covenant with Abraham was ratified by slaying an heifer, a she-goat, a ram, a turtle-dove, and a young pigeon. The animals were divided and a burning lamp passed between them; Gen 15:9, Gen 15:18. So the covenant made with the Hebrews in the wilderness was ratified in the same manner; Exo 24:6, seq. Thus, in Jer 34:18, God speaks of the men that had transgressed his covenant which they had made before him when they cut the calf in twain, and passed between the parts thereof; see also Zec 9:11. Indeed all the Jewish sacrifices were regarded as a ratification of the covenant. It was never supposed that it was ratified or confirmed in a proper manner without such a sacrifice. Instances occur, indeed, in which there was no sacrifice offered when a covenant was made between man and man (see Gen 23:16; Gen 24:9; Deu 25:7, Deu 25:9; Rth 4:7), but these cases do not establish the point that the custom did not prevail of ratifying a covenant with God by the blood of sacrifice.
Further; the terms used in the Hebrew in regard to making a covenant with God, prove that it was understood to be ratified by sacrifice, or that the death of a victim was necessary kaarat beriyt, to cut a covenant – the word kaarat meaning to cut; to cut off; to cut down, and the allusion being to the victims offered in sacrifice, and cut in pieces on occasion of entering into a covenant; see Gen 15:10; Jer 34:18-19. The same idea is expressed in the Greek phrases , horkia temnein, temnein spondas, and in the Latin icere foedus; compare Virgil, Aeneid viii. 941.
Et caesa jungebant foedera porca.
These considerations show that it was the common sentiment, alike among the Hebrews and the pagan, that a covenant with God was to be ratified or sanctioned by sacrifice; and the statement of Paul here is, that the death of a sacrificial victim was needful to confirm or ratify such a covenant with God. It was not secure, or confirmed, until blood was thus shed. This was well understood among the Hebrews, that all their covenant transactions with God were to be ratified by a sacrifice; and Paul says that the same principle must apply to any arrangement between God and human beings. Hence, he goes on to show that it was necessary that a sacrificial victim should die in the new covenant which God established by man through the Mediator; see Heb 9:23. This I understand to be the sum of the argument here. It is not that every contract made between man and man was to be ratified or confirmed by a sacrifice – for the apostle is not discussing that point; but it is that every similar transaction with God must be based on such a sacrifice, and that no covenant with him could be complete without such a sacrifice. This was provided for in the ancient dispensation by the sacrifices which were constantly offered in their worship; in the new, by the one great sacrifice offered on the cross. Hence, all our approaches to God are based on the supposition of such a sacrifice, and are, as it were, ratified over it. We ratify or confirm such a covenant arrangement, not by offering the sacrifice anew, but by recalling it in a proper manner when we celebrate the death of Christ, and when in view of his cross we solemnly pledge ourselves to be the Lords.
The death of the testator – According to our common version, the death of him who makes a will. But if the views above expressed are correct, this should be rendered the covenanter, or the victim set apart to be slain. The Greek will admit of the translation of the word diathemenos, diathemenos, by the word covenanter, if the word diatheke – diatheke – is rendered covenant. To such a translation here as would make the word refer to a victim slain in order to ratify a covenant, it is objected that the word has no such meaning anywhere else. It must either mean a testator, or a contractor, that is, one of two covenanting parties. But where is the death of a person covenanting made necessary in order to confirm the covenant? Prof. Stuart, in loc. To this objection I remark respectfully:
(1) That the word is never used in the sense of testator either in the New Testament or the Old, unless it be here. It is admitted of the word diatheke – by Prof. Stuart himself, that it never means will, or testament, unless it be here, and it is equally true of the word used here that it never means one who makes a will. If, therefore, it should be that a meaning quite uncommon, or wholly unknown in the usage of the Scriptures, is to be assigned to the use of the word here, why should it be assumed that that unusual meaning should be that of making a will, and not that of confirming a covenant?
(2) If the apostle used the word diatheke – diatheke – in the sense of a covenant in this passage, nothing is more natural than that he should use the corresponding word diathemenos – diathemenos – in the sense of that by which a covenant was ratified. He wished to express the idea that the covenant was always ratified by the death of a victim – a sacrifice of an animal under the Law, and the sacrifice of the Redeemer under the gospel – and no word would so naturally convey that idea as the one from which the word covenant was derived. It is to be remembered also that there was no word to express that thought. Neither the Hebrew nor the Greek furnished such a word; nor have we now any word to express that thought, but are obliged to use circumlocution to convey the idea. The word covenanter would not do it; nor the words victim, or sacrifice. We can express the idea only by some phrase like this – the victim set apart to be slain to ratify the covenant. But it was not an unusual thing for the apostle Paul to make use of a word in a sense quite unique to himself; compare 2Co 4:17.
(3) The word diatithemi – properly means, to place apart, to set in order, to arrange. It is rendered appoint in Luk 22:29; made, and make, with reference to a covenant, Act 3:25; Heb 8:10; Heb 10:16. It occurs nowhere else in the New Testament, except in the passage before us. The idea of placing, laying, disposing, arranging, etc., enters into the word – as to place wares or merchandise for sale, to arrange a contract, &c; see Passow. The fair meaning of the word here may be, whatever goes to arrange, dispose, or settle the covenant, or to make the covenant secure and firm. If the reference be to a compact, it cannot relate to one of the contracting parties, because the death of neither is necessary to confirm it. But it may refer to that which was well-known as an established opinion, that a covenant with God was ratified only by a sacrifice. Still, it must be admitted that this use of the word is not found elsewhere, and the only material question is, whether it is to be presumed that the apostle would employ a word in a single instance in a special signification, where the connection would not render it difficult to be understood. This must be admitted, that he might, whichever view is taken of the meaning of this passage, for on the supposition that he refers here to a will, it is conceded that he uses the word in a sense which does not once occur elsewhere either in the Old Testament or the New. It seems to me, therefore, that the word here may, without impropriety, be regarded as referring to the victim that was slain in order to ratify a covenant with God, and that the meaning is, that such a covenant was not regarded as confirmed until the victim was slain. It may be added that the authority of Michaelis, Macknight, Doddridge, Bloomfield, and Dr. JohnP. Wilson, is a proof that such an interpretation cannot be a very serious departure from the proper use of a Greek word.
Fuente: Albert Barnes’ Notes on the Bible
Verse 16. For where a testament is] A learned and judicious friend furnishes me with the following translation of this and the 17th verse:-
“For where there is a covenant, it is necessary that the death of the appointed victim should be exhibited, because a covenant is confirmed over dead victims, since it is not at all valid while the appointed victim is alive.”
He observes, “There is no word signifying testator, or men, in the original. is not a substantive, but a participle, or a participial adjective, derived from the same root as , and must have a substantive understood. I therefore render it the disposed or appointed victim, alluding to the manner of disposing or setting apart the pieces of the victim, when they were going to ratify a covenant; and you know well the old custom of ratifying a covenant, to which the apostle alludes. I refer to your own notes on Ge 6:18, and Ge 15:10.-J. C.”
Mr. Wakefield has translated the passage nearly in the same way.
“For where a covenant is, there must be necessarily introduced the death of that which establisheth the covenant; because a covenant is confirmed over dead things, and is of no force at all whilst that which establisheth the covenant is alive.” This is undoubtedly the meaning of this passage; and we should endeavour to forget that testament and testator were ever introduced, as they totally change the apostle’s meaning. See the observations at the end of this chapter.
Fuente: Adam Clarke’s Commentary and Critical Notes on the Bible
For where a testament is: for gives the reason of the Mediators death, even the putting the called into the possession of the bequeathed inheritance, demonstrated by a common, natural law in all nations of the testaments effect on the testators death; a testament being a disposition by will nuncupative, or written, of either goods or lands, which are the persons own, to be the right and possession of others after his death, whom he nominateth in it: such in proportion is the new covenant, where God gives freely all spiritual good things with a heavenly inheritance, as legacies to all his called ones in Christ, by this last and best will and testament of his, written in his Scripture instrument, witnessed by the prophets and apostles, sealed by the two sacraments, especially the Lords supper, Luk 22:20.
There must also of necessity be the death of the testator; he who maketh a testament by the law of nature, as of nations, must die before the legatees have any profit by the will; the son and heir inherits not but on the fathers death; then is the testament firm and valid, the time being come for the heirs inheriting, and for the wills execution, it being now unalterable; the necessity of which is cleared, Heb 9:17.
Fuente: English Annotations on the Holy Bible by Matthew Poole
16. A general axiomatic truth;it is “a testament”; not the testament. Thetestator must die before his testament takes effect (Heb9:17). This is a common meaning of the Greek noundiathece. So in Lu 22:29,”I appoint (by testamentary disposition; the cognate Greekverb diatithemai) unto you a kingdom, as my Father hathappointed unto me.” The need of death before the testamentaryappointment takes effect, holds good in Christ’s relation as MAN tous; Of course not in God’s relation to Christ.
beliterally, beborne”: “be involved in the case”; be inferred;or else, “be brought forward in court,” so as to giveeffect to the will. This sense (testament) of the Greek“diathece” here does not exclude its other secondarysenses in the other passages of the New Testament: (1) a covenantbetween two parties; (2) an arrangement, or disposition, madeby God alone in relation to us. Thus, Mt26:28 may be translated, “Blood of the covenant“;for a testament does not require blood shedding.Compare Ex 24:8 (covenant),which Christ quotes, though it is probable He included in asense “testament” also under the Greek word diathece(comprehending both meanings, “covenant” and”testament”), as this designation strictly and properlyapplies to the new dispensation, and is rightly applicable to the oldalso, not in itself, but when viewed as typifying the new, which isproperly a testament. Moses (Ex24:8) speaks of the same thing as [Christ and] Paul. Moses, bythe term “covenant,” does not mean aught save oneconcerning giving the heavenly inheritance typified by Canaanafter the death of the Testator, which he represented by thesprinkling of blood. And Paul, by the term “testament,”does not mean aught save one having conditions attached to it,one which is at the same time a covenant [POLI,Synopsis]; the conditions are fulfilled by Christ, not by us,except that we must believe, but even this God works in Hispeople. THOLUCK explains,as elsewhere, “covenant . . . covenant . . . mediatingvictim”; the masculine is used of the victim personified,and regarded as mediator of the covenant; especially as in the newcovenant a MAN (Christ)took the place of the victim. The covenanting parties used to passbetween the divided parts of the sacrificed animals; but, withoutreference to this rite, the need of a sacrifice forestablishing a covenant sufficiently explains this verse. Others,also, explaining the Greek as “covenant,” considerthat the death of the sacrificial victim represented in all covenantsthe death of both parties as unalterably bound to the covenant.So in the redemption-covenant, the death of Jesus symbolized thedeath of God (?) in the person of the mediating victim, and the deathof man in the same. But the expression is not “there must be thedeath of both parties making the covenant,” but singular,“of Him who made (aorist, past time; not ‘of Himmaking‘) the testament.” Also, it is “death,”not “sacrifice” or “slaying.” Plainly, the deathis supposed to be past (aorist, “made”); and thefact of the death is brought (Greek) before court togive effect to the will. These requisites of a will, or testament,concur here: (1) a testator; (2) heirs; (3) goods; (4) the death ofthe testator; (5) the fact of the death brought forward incourt. In Mt 26:28 two otherrequisites appear: witnesses, the disciples; and a seal,the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, the sign of His bloodwherewith the testament is primarily sealed. It is true the heiris ordinarily the successor of him who dies and so ceases tohave the possession. But in this case Christ comes to life again, andis Himself (including all that He hath), in the power of His nowendless life, His people’s inheritance; in His being Heir (Heb1:2), they are heirs.
Fuente: Jamieson, Fausset and Brown’s Commentary Critical and Explanatory on the Whole Bible
For where a testament is,…. The covenant of grace, as administered under the Gospel dispensation, is a testament or will. The Jews have adopted the Greek word, here used, into their language, and pronounce it , and by it understand a dying man’s last will and testament d. Some of them make it to be of Hebrew derivation; as if it was said, , “this shall be to confirm” e, or this shall be stable and firm; though others own it to be the same with this Greek word f. The covenant of grace, is properly a covenant to Christ, and a testament or will to his people: it is his and their Father’s will, concerning giving them both grace and glory; it consists of many gifts and legacies; in it Christ is made heir of all things, and his people are made joint heirs with him; they are given to him as his portion; and they have all things pertaining to life and godliness bequeathed to them, even all spiritual blessings; the witnesses of it are Father, Son, and Spirit; and the seals of it are the blood of Christ, and the grace of the Spirit; and this is registered in the Scriptures by holy men as notaries; and is unalterable and immutable: and this being made,
there must also of necessity be the death of the testator; who is Christ; he has various parts in this will or testament; he is the surety and Mediator of it; and he is the executor of it; what is given in it, is first given to him, in order to be given to others; all things are put into his hands, and he has a power to give them to as many as the Father has given him; and here he is called the “testator”: Christ, as God, has an equal right to dispose of the inheritance, both of grace and glory; and as Mediator, nothing is given without his consent; and whatever is given, is given with a view to his “death”, and comes through it, and by virtue of it: hence there is a “necessity” of that, and that on the account of the divine perfections; particularly for the declaration of God’s righteousness, or by reason of his justice; and also because of his purposes and decrees, which have fixed it, and of his promises, which are yea and amen in Christ, and are ratified by his blood, called therefore the blood of the covenant; and likewise on account of the engagements of Christ to suffer and die; as well as for the accomplishment of Scripture prophecies concerning it; and moreover, on account of the blessings which were to come to the saints through it, as a justifying righteousness, pardon of sin, peace and reconciliation, adoption and eternal life.
d T. Hieros. Peah, fol. 17. 4. & T. Bab. Bava Bathra, fol. 152. 2. e T. Bab. Bava Metzia, fol. 19. 1. Maimon & Bartenora in Misn. Moed Katon, c. 3. sect. 3. & in Bava Metzia, c. 1. sect. 7. & in Bava Bathra, c. 8. sect. 6. f Cohen de Lara Ir David, p. 30.
Fuente: John Gill’s Exposition of the Entire Bible
A testament (). The same word occurs for covenant (verse 15) and will (verse 16). This double sense of the word is played upon also by Paul in Ga 3:15f. We say today “The New Testament” (Novum Testamentum) rather than ” The New Covenant.” Both terms are pertinent.
That made it ( ). Genitive of the articular second aorist middle participle of from which comes. The notion of will here falls in with (inheritance, 1Pe 1:4) as well as with (death).
Of force (). Stable, firm as in Heb 3:6; Heb 3:14.
Where there hath been death ( ). “In the case of dead people.” A will is only operative then.
For doth it ever avail while he that made it liveth? ( ;). This is a possible punctuation with in a question (Joh 7:26). Without the question mark, it is a positive statement of fact. Aleph and D read (then) instead of . The use of in a causal sentence is allowable (Joh 3:18, ).
Fuente: Robertson’s Word Pictures in the New Testament
For where a testament is [ ] . “The English Version has involved this passage in hopeless obscurity by introducing the idea of a testament and a testator.” This statement of Rendall (Epistle to the Hebrews, p. 159) is none too strong. That interpretation, however, is maintained by a very strong array of modern expositors. 212 It is based upon klhronomia inheritance; it being claimed that this word changes the whole current of thought. Hence it is said that the new covenant established by Christ is here represented as a testamentary disposition on his part, which could become operative in putting the heirs in possession of the inheritance only through the death of Christ. See Additional Note at the end of this chapter.
There must also of necessity be the death of the testator [ ] . Rend. it is necessary that the death of the institutor (of the covenant) should be born. With the rendering testament, feresqai is well – nigh inexplicable. If covenant the meaning is not difficult. If he had meant to say it is necessary that the institutor die, he might better have used genesqai : ” it is necessary that the death of the institutor take place “; but he meant to say that it was necessary that the institutor die representatively; that death should be born for him by an animal victim. If we render testament, it follows that the death of the testator himself is referred to, for which qanatou feresqai is a very unusual and awkward expression.
Fuente: Vincent’s Word Studies in the New Testament
1) “For where a testament is,” (hopou gar diatheke) “For where there (is) exists a covenant; Where a last will of testimony has been recorded, signed, to be executed or administered by another upon the decease of the testator, the one who made the will.
2) “There must also of necessity be,” (anagke pheresthai) “There is (exists) a necessity to be offered,” must be located physical evidence of, verification of both the existence of a will, that such is a true desire-will or departing, final, will of the deceased.
3) “The death of the testator,” (thanaton tou diathemenou) “Death of the one making covenant,” and evidence of death of the testator, that is, one who made the will. Neither a duly executed will, made by a person alone, nor the disappearance or absence of a person from his legal property for a reasonable time is ground for execution of a will. Two matters must be verified beyond a reasonable doubt: First, it must be legally verified that the deceased in soundness of mind voluntarily made the will, and Second, that the same person has died.
Fuente: Garner-Howes Baptist Commentary
16. For where a testament is, etc. Even this one passage is a sufficient proof, that this Epistle was not written in Hebrew; for ברית means in Hebrew a covenant, but not a testament; but in Greek, διαθήκη, includes both ideas; and the Apostle, alluding to its secondary meaning, holds that the promises should not have been otherwise ratified and valid, had they not been sealed by the death of Christ. And this he proves by referring to what is usually the case as to wills or testaments, the effect of which is suspended until the death of those whose wills they are.
The Apostle may yet seem to rest on too weak an argument, so that what he says may be easily disproved. For it may be said, that God made no testament or will under the Law; but it was a covenant that he made with the ancient people. Thus, neither from the fact nor from the name, can it be concluded that Christ’s death was necessary. For if he infers from the fact, that Christ ought to have died, because a testament is not ratified except by the death of the testator, the answer may be this, that |berit|, the word ever used by Moses, is a covenant made between those who are alive, and we cannot think otherwise of the fact itself. Now, as to the word used, he simply alluded, as I have already said, to the two meanings it has in Greek; he therefore dwells chiefly on the thing in itself. Nor is it any objection to say, that it was a covenant that God made with his people; for that very covenant bore some likeness to a testament, for it was ratified by blood. (152)
We must ever hold this truth, that no symbols have ever been adopted by God unnecessarily or unsuitably. And God in establishing the covenant of the law made use of blood. Then it was not such a contract, as they say, between the living, as did not require death. Besides, what rightly belongs to a testament is, that it begins to take effect after death. If we consider that the Apostle reasons from the thing itself, and not from the word, and if we bear in mind that he avowedly takes as granted what I have already stated, that nothing has been instituted in vain by God, there will be no great difficulty.
If anyone objects and says, that the heathens ratified covenants according to the other meaning by sacrifices; this indeed I admit to be true; but God did not borrow the rite of sacrificing from the practice of the heathens; on the contrary, all the heathen sacrifices were corruptions, which had derived their origin from the institutions of God. We must then return to the same point, that the covenant of God which was made with blood, may be fitly compared to a testament, as it is of the same kind and character.
(152) See Appendix H 2.
Fuente: Calvin’s Complete Commentary
(16) Testament.As has been already pointed out, the greatest difference of opinion has existed in regard to the meaning of the Greek word diathk in this passage. (See Note on Heb. 7:22.) It will be seen at once that the interpretation of this verse and the next entirely depends on that one question. If testament is the correct meaning of the Greek word, the general sense of the verses is well given in the Authorised version. A few commentators even agree with that version in carrying back the idea of testament into Heb. 9:15, although in the other two places in which the word is joined with Mediator (Heb. 8:6; Heb. 12:24) they adhere to the ordinary rendering, covenant. By most, however, it is held that a new thought is introduced in the present verse. The writer, it is urged, having spoken of a promise of an inheritance, (Heb. 9:15), and a promise that cannot be made valid unless death take place, avails himself of the illustration which a second (and very common) meaning of the leading word affords; and though a covenant has hitherto been in his thoughts, he adds interest and force to his argument by calling up the analogy of a testament or will. It is further urged that this procedure will not seem unnatural if we reflect that the diathk between God and man is never exactly expressed by covenant, since it is not of the nature of a mutual compact between equals. (See Heb. 7:22.) The position is chiefly defended by two arguments:(1) Heb. 9:16, being a general maxim, gives no intelligible sense in regard to a covenant, but is easy and natural as applied to a will. (2) A Greek word used in Heb. 9:17, where the literal translation is over (the) dead, cannot be used of sacrifices of slain animals, but of men only. This, we believe, is a fair statement of the case on the one side; and it may be fully acknowledged that, if Heb. 9:16-17 stood alone, and if they were written of Gentile rather than Jewish usage, the case would be very strong. As it is, we are compelled to believe that the difficulties which this interpretation brings with it are beyond comparison more serious than those which it removes. (1) There is no doubt that in the overwhelming majority of New Testament passages the meaning covenant must be assigned. By many high authorities these verses are considered to contain the only exception. (2) In the LXX. the word is extremely common, both for the covenants of God and for compacts between man and man. (See Note on Heb. 7:22). (3) The application of diathk in this Epistle rests on the basis of the Old Testament usage, the key passage being Jer. 31:31-34, quoted at length in Hebrews 8. With that quotation this passage is linked by the association of diathk with Mediator in Heb. 9:15 and Heb. 8:6, and with the first in Heb. 9:15 and in Heb. 8:13; Heb. 9:1. (4) In the verses which follow this passage the meaning covenant must certainly return, as a comparison of Heb. 9:20 with the verse of Exodus which it quotes (Exo. 24:8) will show. (5) It is true that the idea of death has appeared in Heb. 9:15, but it is the death of a sin-offering; and there is no natural or easy transition of thought from an expiatory death to the death of a testator. And yet the words which introduce Heb. 9:16; Heb. 9:18 (For and Wherefore) show that we are following the course of an argument. (6) Though to us Heb. 9:16 may present a very familiar thought, we must not forget that to Jews dispositions by will were almost altogether unknown. Were it granted that a writer might for illustration avail himself of a second meaning which a word he is using might happen to bear, this liberty would only be taken if by that means familiar associations could be reached, and the argument or exhortation could be thus urged home. In an Epistle steeped in Jewish thought such a transition as that suggested would be inexplicable. There are other considerations of some weight which might be added; but these seem sufficient to prove that, even if the difficulties of interpretation should prove serious, we must not seek to remove them by wavering in our rendering of diathk in these verses. We believe, therefore, that the true translation of Heb. 9:16-17, must be the following:For where a covenant is, there must of necessity be brought in the death of the covenanter. For a covenant is of force when there hath been death (literally, over the dead); for hath it ever any strength while the covenanter liveth? In Heb. 9:15 we have seen the two-fold reference of the death of Jesus, to the past and to the future. As High Priest He has offered Himself as a sin-offering to cleanse the conscience from dead works; the same offering is also looked on as a ransom redeeming from the penalty of past transgressions; and, still by means of His death, He has, as Mediator, established a new covenant. We are reminded at once of the words of Jesus Himself, This cup is the new covenant in My blood (1Co. 11:25). It is this very thought which the writer proceeds to develop: a covenant cannot be established without deathcannot exist at all. That amongst Jews and Greeks and Romans alike covenants were confirmed by sacrifice we need not pause to prove; of this usage we have the earliest example in Genesis 15. In such sacrifices, again, there is brought in, or assumed the death of him who makes the covenant. There will not, perhaps, be much difficulty in accepting this as a maxim. The conflict of opinion really begins when we ask in what manner this is assumed. The usual answer is, that the death of victims is emblematic of the punishment which the contracting parties imprecated on themselves if they should break their compact. It may have been so amongst the Greeks and Romans, though this is doubtful.[11] Amongst the Jews, however, the analogy of their general sacrificial system, in which the victim represented the offerer, renders such an explanation very improbable. As to the precise idea implied in this representation, it is not easy to speak with certainty. It has been defined in two opposite ways. In the death of the victim each contracting party may be supposed to die either as to the future, in respect of any power of altering the compact (the covenant shall be as safe from violation through change of intention as if the covenanter were removed by death); or as to the past, to the former state of enmity each is now dead. It is not necessary for our argument to decide such a question as this. The only material points are, that a covenant must be established over sacrifices, and that in such a sacrifice the death of him that made the covenant must in some manner be brought in or assumed. There remains only the application to the particular covenant here spoken of. If this be taken as made between God and man, the sacrificial death of Jesus in mans stead ratified the covenant for ever, the former state of separation being brought to an end in the reconciliation of the gospel. The peculiar character of Heb. 9:15, however (see above), seems rather to suggest that, as Jesus is set forth as High Priest and sacrifice, so He is both the Author of the covenant and the sacrifice which gives to it validity. In this case we see represented in His sacrifice the death of each covenanter. (The transition from Mediator to Giver of the covenant is not greater than that which the other interpretation requiresa transition from a mediator of a testament to a testator.) There are minor points relating to details in the Greek which cannot be dealt with here. Of the two arguments quoted above, the former has, we hope, been fully met; though (it may be said in passing) it would be easier to give up Heb. 9:16 as a general maxim, and to regard it as applying only to a covenant between God and sinful man, than to divorce the whole passage from the context by changing covenant into will. One point of interest must not be omitted. There are coincidences of expression with Psa. 1:5 which make it very probable that that Psalm, memorable in the development of the teaching of the Old Testament, was distinctly in the writers mind. This comparison is also of use in the explanation of some expressions in the original of these two verses.
[11] See Mr. Wratislaws very interesting note in his Notes and Dissertations, pp. 155, 156. The whole subject is very carefully treated in an admirable pamphlet by Professor Forbes, of Aberdeen.
Fuente: Ellicott’s Commentary for English Readers (Old and New Testaments)
16. For Assuming this beautiful view of the covenant as a testament, or bequest by will, the death of the testator is required, as by Jesus fulfilled.
Fuente: Whedon’s Commentary on the Old and New Testaments
‘For where a covenant-testament (diatheke) is, there must of necessity be the death of him that made it. For a testament is of force where there has been death, for it never avails while he who made it is alive.’
Thus having brought out that the new covenant was, as far as God is concerned, a ‘covenant-testament’ he stresses again that it was more than a covenant. It was an unconditional God-to-man covenant (diatheke), with God the Benefactor and man the beneficiary, because it referred to what God had covenanted to bring about, and it was a testament (diatheke) because from the very beginning its bringing about was, in God’s purposes, linked to the death of the Covenantor. Such a covenant testament thus necessarily involves the death of the One Who made it, without which it could not come into force.
The further implication here is that God has in the covenant given all things to His Son (Joh 3:35; Joh 13:3; Joh 16:15; Joh 17:10), Who has therefore become the covenantor as well as the mediator, and that He must die in order for the covenant to come into force because of the special nature of the covenant as a covenant-testament.
This revelation could be expressed in this way because word used for ‘covenant’ in the New Testament (diatheke) regularly means ‘a will’ in popular Greek usage, but was used in LXX to translate God’s ‘covenant’ (berith) with His prospective people. This situation arose because the usual Greek word for covenant (suntheke) rather referred to a covenant between equals, while God’s covenant (diatheke) with His people, was like a will in that it was that of a benefactor to a beneficiary and was initiated solely by God.
However, it was not just a play on the meaning of a word for such a covenant was recognised as regularly accompanied by the symbolised death of one or both of the parties involved, and where a death was not mentioned it would certainly be somewhere in the background (as he will now illustrate). Its fulfilment was totally dependent on His intention that man should benefit through a death (just as a will was an expression of intention). And in this case, because God is unchangeable and the covenant unconditional, it was a binding intention.
So the writer has taken advantage of this dual usage in order to point out that in fact the requirement for a death implicit in the word diatheke emphasises the fact that the new covenant is not only a covenant but a covenant-will, which will be brought into force through death. This is not just clever manoeuvring, a trite play on words. It can be likened to this precisely because it was always God’s necessary intention on making the covenant (the old having been broken) that it would be actioned through death, the death of His own Son through Whom the inheritance was to be passed on. This thus made it a will (but not only a will, for, apart from a deathbed will, a will is revocable), as well as a covenant.
The stress here is thus on what God’s intention in making the new covenant was from the beginning. It was always His direct intention that the fulfilment of the covenant should be dependent on the death of His appointed Benefactor. Thus it was from the beginning also a special kind of covenant, a covenant-will. The making of the covenant and its being actioned was always in God’s eyes linked to a death, the death of His Son.
He illuminates this further by arguing that where there is a will it is the intention that it will not be enforceable while the testator is alive. So in this case too the application of this solemn covenant-will, made by God, can only take place through Christ’s necessary death, solemnising the covenant and bringing it into effect, making it ‘of force’. The change in illustration is valid in this case because of the intention of the covenantor. It was He Who in His eternal purposes tied His covenant to a death, because He knew that without it the fulfilment could not take place. And that is what is being indicated here.
It would lose its force with an ordinary will-maker who does not choose to die and can withdraw his will. There the will is not a covenant but simply a prospective ‘covenant’. So this case is more like the case of a man who has chosen that he will die or is on the point of death and has made his will accordingly knowing it to be irrevocable. It is a covenant-will. In choosing to make a covenant with man He always recognised that the consequence must be His own death in His Son. It was a covenant of blood.
Fuente: Commentary Series on the Bible by Peter Pett
Heb 9:16. For where a testament is, &c. “For where a covenant is engaged in, answerable to that which typified this of which I now speak,to make it firm and binding, there must be necessarily something done, which implies the death of the covenanting party.” Nothing can be more foreign to the apostle’s subject than to speak of testaments and testators, as he is made to do in this and the next verse, and then to return again, Heb 9:18 to the subject of covenants, upon which he had been treating. But let us consider what was the fact, that we may understand, or at least get some light into, this very difficult portion of scripture. A covenant is proposed by God the Father to mankind by a Mediator, Jesus Christ, his own eternal Son; wherein a promise of an eternal inheritance is made to man, provided he is ready and willing to comply with the conditions laid before him: there had been a covenant made by God to the Jewish nation, which engaged to them a present temporal happiness in the land of Canaan, provided they observed the law given to them. Here then a second covenant is proposed by God, not offering a present, but a future good; not a temporal, but an eternal happiness: it is a covenant offered by God,a Being omnipotent, immortal, uncontrolable,to a series of beings weak, frail, infirm, but capable of subsisting after death. Christ, as the eternal Word of God made flesh, assuming human nature and uniting it to his Godhead, is not the party that enters into covenant, but he is the Mediator between the parties covenanting. God the Father is the party on one side, and he offers peace through the blood of his Son: man is , the party with whom the covenant is made; who is through grace to accept and fulfil the conditions, namely, to believe in, love, and obey Christ through the Spirit of God. Christ is the Person who acts between God the Father and offending man, and brings the conditions of our salvation; but offers themto us through the infinite merit of his death and intercession, and with the promise of his Spirit, without whom we could not in the least degree comply with the conditions, or be in the least degree sanctified and prepared for glory.
Fuente: Commentary on the Holy Bible by Thomas Coke
Heb 9:16-17 . Demonstration of the necessity of the by means of a truth of universal application. That Christ might be able to become the Mediator of a new , His death was required. For, to the validity of a , it is essential that the death of the be first proved. Since immediately before (Heb 9:15 ) and immediately after (Heb 9:18 ff.) was employed in the sense of “covenant,” elsewhere usual in our epistle, we might naturally, on account of the conjunction of Heb 9:16-17 , by means of , with Heb 9:15 , and on account of , by which again Heb 9:18 is joined to Heb 9:15-16 , expect this signification of the word to be found also in Heb 9:16-17 . This has accordingly been insisted upon, here too, by Codurcus ( Critt. sacrr . t. VII. P. ii. p. 1067 sqq.), Seb. Schmidt, Peirce, Whitby [in com.], Macknight, Michaelis, Sykes, Cramer, Paulus, and others, lastly also by Ebrard. But it is altogether inadmissible. For if we take as covenant, could only designate him who makes or institutes the covenant; to take as the mediator of the covenant, as is generally done in connection with that view, and to understand this again of the sacrificial victims, by the offering of which the covenant was sealed, is pure caprice. The thought, however, that for the validity of a covenant-act the death of the author of the covenant must first ensue, would be a perfectly irrational one. Irrational the more, inasmuch as, Heb 9:16-17 , only an entirely general truth is contained, passing for a norm in ordinary life. Ebrard finds expressed the thought: “Where a sinful man wishes to enter into a covenant with the holy God, the man must first die, must first atone for his guilt by death (or he must present a substitutionary ).” But all these definings have been arbitrarily imported. For Heb 9:16-17 nothing is said either about a “sinful man,” or about a volition on his part, or about the “holy God,” or about an “atoning for guilt,” or about a “substitutionary .” From what has been said, it follows that , Heb 9:16-17 , can be taken only in the sense, likewise very frequently occurring with the Greek authors, of “testament” or “disposition by will.” It is true there arises therefrom a logical inaccuracy, [93] owing to the fact that is used in these two verses in another sense than before, and the formal demonstrative force of that which is advanced by the author although the underlying thoughts are in themselves perfectly just is thereby sacrificed. It is, however, to be observed that while for us, since we are obliged to employ a twofold expression for the reproducing of the diversity of sense, the transition from the one notion to the other appears abruptly made, this transition for the author, on the other hand, might be an imperceptible one, inasmuch as in the Greek one and the same word included within itself both significations. Thus, accordingly, it has happened that the ancient Greek interpreters explain , Heb 9:16-17 , expressly in the sense of a testament or will, then at once pass over to the declaration contained in Heb 9:18 , without so much as noticing the logical inaccuracy which presents itself. The sense consequently is: where a testament or deed of bequest exists, there it is necessary, in order to give it validity (comp. , Heb 9:17 ), that the death of the testator first be proved . The New Covenant, therefore, which Christ has established between God and man by His sacrificial death, the author here represents in accordance with the figure of the , Heb 9:15 as a testamentary disposition on the part of Christ, which, however, as such could only acquire validity, and put the heirs in possession of the blessings bequeathed to them, by means of the death of Christ.
] emphatically preposed, while , upon which no emphasis falls, comes in at the end of the clause.
] be declared or proved . Wrongly Grotius: the verb to be regarded as equivalent to exspectari (“est enim exspectatio onus quoddam”); Wittich: it denotes the being endured on the part of the relatives; Carpzov, Chr. Fr. Schmid, Schulz, Kuinoel, Klee, Stein, Stengel, Hofmann ( Schriftbew . II. 1, 2 Aufl. p. 428), and others, that it denotes nothing more than ensue or , Heb 9:15 .
[93] For the author does not reason, as de Wette supposes, from the mere “ analogy of a will or testament.” The course, moreover, pursued by Hofmann ( Schriftbew . II. 1, p. 426 ff.), in order to manifest the non-existence of a logical inaccuracy, in that, namely, in the whole section, ver. 15ff., he will have signify neither “covenant” nor “testament,” but throughout the whole only “disposal” (Verfgung), is, as also Delitzsch and Riehm ( Lehrbegr. des Hebrerbr . p. 598, Obs .) acknowledge, an utter breakdown. See likewise the observations of Nickel in Reuter’s Repertor . 1858, Mrz, p. 194 f. Nor will it do, with Kurtz, to set aside the logical inaccuracy, at which he takes so great offence that he thinks himself obliged to designate such inaccuracy, in case it were present, an “inexcusable confusion” (!), in taking not only at vv. 16, 17, but also in like manner at vv. 15, 18, the in the special sense of “establishing as heir .” For the connection with that which precedes (comp. Heb 7:22 , Heb 8:6 ff., Heb 9:1 ; Heb 9:4 ) leads at vv. 15, 18 exclusively to the idea of a covenant.
Fuente: Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer’s New Testament Commentary
III
In the concluding of this New Covenant the blood of Christ was indispensable
Heb 9:16-22
16For where a testament is, there must also of necessity be [be adduced or declared, ] the death of the testator. 17For a testament is of force after men are dead: otherwise it is of no strength at all [since it scarcely is of any force] while the testator 18liveth. Whereupon [whence, ] neither [not even, ]9 the first testament was [has been] dedicated [inaugurated] without blood. 19For when Moses had spoken every precept to all the people according to the10 law, he took the blood of calves and of goats,11 with water, and scarlet wool, and hyssop, and sprinkled12 both the book [itself, 20 ] and all the people, Saying, This is the blood of the testament [or, covenant] 21which God hath [om. hath] enjoined unto you. Moreover [And] he sprinkled likewise with blood both the tabernacle, and all the vessels of the ministry [service]. 22And almost [parety nearly, or about, ] all things are by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of blood is [there takes place] no remission.
[Heb 9:16., not be, as E. V., but, adduced, declared, Alf., implied; Words., brought to pass; many, afferri coram judice, of establishing judicially; Moll renders beigebracht werden.
Heb 9:17. , over the dead, in case of the dead, lit., on condition of persons as dead. elegantly softening and appealing rather to the judgment of the reader; for look whether perchance it has force; see if it be not perhaps invalid. It is by no means intensive, as in the E. V., it has no force at all. Otherwise it should be taken as a question: Since does it at all=it does not at all, does it?
Heb 9:18., whence, logical.., not even., Perf., has been inaugurated, not, was dedicated. The Perf, implies that it stands before our eyes.
Heb 9:19. , for after every commandment was spoken, etc. , both the book itself.
Heb 9:20., Aor., enjoined, not, hath enjoined.
Heb 9:21. , and the tabernacle too; so , constantly and elegantly used in Greek. Not quite as in E. V. and Alf., and moreover.
Heb 9:22. , and pretty much, pretty nearly, as one might say. It does not like our almost (Gr. ) positively exclude a part, but simply declines to guarantee the exact accuracy of the statement. Almost, therefore, is never its proper rendering. Alf. renders almost, but adds parenthetically, one may say that, which is sufficiently exact., either shedding of blood in the slaughter of the victim, or pouring out of the blood of the victim when slaughtered; the former here seems more probable. ., seems to be a word coined by the sacred writer, to express his meaning. Alf., takes place.K.].
EXEGETICAL AND CRITICAL
Heb 9:16. For where a testament is, etc.Attempts have been very naturally made (springing from the of Heb 9:18, and the connecting this verse with Heb 9:15), to take here in its ordinary sense of covenant (Crit. Sacr., VII. 2 p., 1067 sq., Seb. Schmidt, Michaelis, Cramer, Ebrard, etc.). They are convicted at once, however, of error, by the utter falseness of the idea that in the formation of a covenant the death of Him who framed it is indispensable to its validity, as well as by the intolerable harshness of any other mode of explaining . For although might indeed denote over slaughtered sacrificial victims, inasmuch as in later usage , is frequently= ,it is impossible that can be applied either to the animal offered in sacrifice in confirmation of the covenant, or to the man regarded as replaced and represented by the victim, and thus pledging himself as it were to a moral death, or to the mediator of the covenant. If, on the other hand, in allusion to the above mentioned inheritance (), we evolve here out of the more general signification of (arrangement, dispositio) the more special one of testamentary arrangement, testament, we must beware of extending the application of the comparison made in illustration of the thought, beyond the immediate sentiment and purpose of the writer, and thus of introducing alien and incongruous elements into the passage. Such is the idea advanced by Menken, who says (Homilies on Chapters 9 and 10., p. 142) that only He who by His death has proved Himself worthy of the inheritance, could make others fellow-heirs with Him; as also that of Hofmann, who (Weissag. II., 165) appeals in proof of the necessity of the death of the , to the fact that during His life He could add something to His possessions, and thus could not during His life-time make any one an heir of the whole property that He should leave behind Him. The question is not now of a setting forth of the ultimate ground of the death of Christ, a ground already assigned at Heb 9:15but of an illustration of its practical necessity, in order for the delivering over of the blessings of salvation, as an inheritance. Compare as to the idea, Luk 22:29 : . Among the ancient Hebrews there were, it is true, no arbitrary testamentary bequests, Deu 21:16. But among the later Jews they were by no means unknown (Michaelis, Mos. Recht. II., 80), and the sentiment in question is conceived and expressed not from a Hebrew, but a Hellenic point of view. If we decline giving to the signification adduced (Hofm. Schriftb. II. 1, 428) or endured (referred by Wittich to the relatives), the most probable rendering will be that of sermone ferri=constare (Bretschn.). The juristic application of the word=afferri coram judice (Hammond, Elsner, and the majority, since Valckenaer) is restricted properly to the adducing of evidence in court, and applies not to the right of inheritance. The rendering esse, extare= [be or become), which, with the ancients and up to the time of Valck., was the prevalent one, is held among later comm. only by Schultz and Bhme, and cannot be sustained. The rendering expectari (Grot.) is totally inadmissible. Grammatically indefensible too is the making =, not yet (Vulg., Erasm., Luth., Schlicht., Bhme). In a strictly objective sentence we should indeed have expected ; but the later writers in causal sentences with and frequently confound and (Madvig, Synt., 207, Anm. 2). If, with Winer, we decline ascribing to our author a negligence belonging properly to the vulgar idiom (Mullach, Gramm. der Griech. Vulgarsprache, p. 29), but give to its subjective force, we must then (with c., Beng., Lachm., Hofm., Del., etc.) assume an interrogation; and this all the more, as , also at Heb 10:2; Rom. 3 6; 1Co 14:16; 1Co 15:29; introduces a proof in the form of interrogation, and appears alike in direct (Joh 7:26) and indirect (Luk 3:15; 2Ti 2:25) interrogations. Quite unnecessarily Isidor. Pelus. (Ep. IV., 113) prefers the reading found only in D13.
Heb 9:18. Whence, also, neither has the first covenant, etc.The reference of to Heb 9:15 by putting Heb 9:16-17, in parenthesis (Zachar., Mor., Storr, Heinr., Bisp.,) is inadmissible. The words are not to be connected with =(Every commandment as contained in the law, (Schlicht., Calov, Beng., Bl., Bisp., etc.,) but with , c. Erasm., Calv., Bez., Grot., etc.,); not, however, in the sense of according to the command in reference to the injunction, Exo 20:22, (Bez., etc.,) but, in accordance with the law received on Sinai; inasmuch as in concluding the covenant, an exact repetition of the divine commands was indispensable.
Heb 9:19. He took the blood, etc.The after which we must not (with Colomes. and Valcken.) strike out, and which cannot possibly, with Beng., be taken as corresponding to the of Heb 9:21, forbids our making . dependent on . We are to assume here, as also in the mention of the goats which might be chosen for burnt offering, (Lev 1:10 f.; Lev 4:23 f.; Lev 9:2 f.; Num 6:10 f.; Heb 7:27; comp. Exo 24:5); and were also used in the expiatory offerings mentioned in Heb 9:12-13, and in like manner in respect to the means of purification, (which elsewhere are found only in the case of lepers, LeHebrews Heb 9:14 and those defiled by dead bodies, Numbers 19.) an expression drawn from tradition, (and which, at least in respect to that which immediately follows, is also found in Joseph. Antt. III. 8, 6), of the event recorded, Exodus 24. In the citation we have instead of the of the Sept., instead of , and instead of .
Heb 9:21. And the tabernacle, too.Since the tabernacle and vessels were constructed at a later period, the author cannot refer to anything that is contemporaneous with what is hitherto mentioned. To this fact points the =but also, on the other hand also. The anointing is that enjoined, Exo 40:10, which is probably identical with that which was performed, Lev 8:10, during the seven days of priestly consecration, an account of which, similar to that here recorded, is given by Josephus, while the original text recounts only the sprinkling with oil, as of the positive means of consecration, but mentions the purifying by the blood of atonement only in reference to the altar, Lev 8:15; Lev 8:19; Lev 8:24.
Heb 9:22. And all things, as one might say, are purified with blood, etc.Also, water and fire are a means of purification; but when the question is of forgiveness of sin, then blood is demanded, according to Lev 17:11. The vegetable sin-offering of the poor, Lev 5:11-13, forms no exception, but is a recognized substitute. Chrys., Primas., etc., erroneously refer to as if expressing the imperfection of this purification, neither, however, does it belong to , (Beng., Bhm.), but to . The word is understood by De W., Thol., Hofm., Keil, of the pouring out of blood on the altar, and the sprinkling, while Bl., Ln., Del., Kurtz, on the contrary, refer it to the slaughter, which is parallel to the death of Christ upon the cross. Del. recalls the language of the last Supper, Luk 22:20, as in point of symbol and of fact, furnishing the closest parallel, without yet being insensible to what, on purely archological grounds, may be urged in favor of the former explanation (comp. Einhorn, Prinzip des Mosaismus, p. 82 ff.).
DOCTRINAL AND ETHICAL
1. Even in the Old Test the salvation promised by God to His people, under certain terms and conditions, appears as an inheritance. . It is thus not unscriptural, and not even surprising, but merely uncommon, when Christ, who previously was regarded as the accomplisher of the revelation of God, and as royal head and leader of His people to salvation, as pledge and mediator of that new covenant which was promised and typified in the Old, is now represented as a Testator, in that, for the vivid illustration of the close connection, lying in the very nature of the case, between the death of Jesus Christ and the attainment of the inheritance of the children of God, promised to us by God, and given over as His own, to Christ, for transmission to us, this comparison opens the most appropriate and the most instructive analogies.
2. Since such is the state of the case, for this reason even in the formation of the old covenant, the application of blood, for cleansing and for expiation, was indispensable, and during the existence of that economy was always employed for such a purpose, in accordance with the express command of God. It was then, with a reference to the death of Jesus Christ, as the true and efficacious sacrifice, that this arrangement was instituted; and it is no accommodation to Jewish prejudices, and Rabbinical modes of expression, to regard Christ as a priest and an offering; rather, on the contrary, the Levitical offerings are to be conceived under the point of view of a divinely ordained type of the sacrifice determined in the eternal counsels of God, and freely undertaken by Christ, (Heb 10:5 ff.). Hence the , Heb 9:18.
3. In this connection becomes explicable, also, the sprinkling of the Tabernacle, and of the sacred vessels, and of the sacred records of the divine revelation and covenant, with blood, as well as the sprinkling of the people, although this belongs only to tradition. It expresses the obligation inhering in both parties for the offering of the efficient sacrifice, and the present inability to furnish it with the means existing at the time. Remittere peccata non est opus absolut misericordi, sed fit interveniente simul satisfactione eaque sufficientissima licet a misericordia divina procurata. (Seb. Schmidt).
HOMILETICAL AND PRACTICAL
Obedience to the ordinances of God is not merely the duty of men, but our best auxiliary in the struggle against sin.The law of God which makes acquainted with and condemns sin, points also the way to the forgiveness of sin.Sin is a stain which can be removed only by blood.On the connection of sin, expiation, and forgiveness.
Starke:Just as surely as Christ has died, so sure is the covenant of grace with God.Divine justice demanded blood, and without this God could not be propitiated, Col 1:14; Col 1:20.Moses, a faithful servant in the house of God. Blessed are they who are his imitators!There is, in itself, nothing pure before God, not even the holy place, nor the teachers who enter thither to conduct the service of God, as the people who assemble there to serve God, and this even in their best acts; yet the blood of Christ purifies all.How capital a point of faith is furnished by the blood and death of Jesus Christ! without this, all His suffering were in vain, and that even though it had been far heavier than it was. By this we are reconciled with God.
Rieger:Only through Christ, and His death, has the whole blessing of redemption, which God would apply to us miserable wretches for our salvation, amounted to a proper testament and bequest, i.e., to a gracious economy confirmed by the death of its Author.
Heubner:If everything is defiled by the impure hands of men, if the whole earth is desecrated by sin, then does everything stand in need of cleansing and consecration, Job 15:4.In the expiatory power of the death of Jesus lies its proper significance, Isaiah 53.Without a surrender to death there is no reconciliation. The yielding up of life an expiation for desecrated life, Exo 17:11.
Footnotes:
[9]Heb 9:18.Instead of A. C. D. E. L., 4, 44, 55 (but at the Sin.), write .
[10]Heb 9:19.The article before is vouched for by A. C. D*. L., 21, 47, 71. In the Sin. it comes from a second hand.
[11]Heb 9:19.The Art. before is required by Sin. A. C. D. E., 80.
[12]Heb 9:19.For all the Uncial MSS. have .
[13]Alford criticises the Eng. ver. must have suffered on the ground that the antecedent time, being already indicated by the , need not be again expressed by . The criticism would be just if the were in the English version instead of in the Greek. But in English the must, which translates the , not having in itself the idea of past time, this idea has to be put into the accompanying Infinitive. The rendering of the common version is therefore, I think, idiomatic and unexceptionable.K.].
Fuente: A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures, Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical by Lange
16 For where a testament is , there must also of necessity be the death of the testator.
Ver. 16. For where a testament is ] See Trapp “ Heb 8:6 “ Here the testator is Christ, heirs the saints, legacies the gifts of the Spirit, executor the Holy Ghost, witnesses apostles, martyrs, &c.
Fuente: John Trapp’s Complete Commentary (Old and New Testaments)
16 .] For (justification of , by an appeal to common usage) where a testament is (it is quite in vain to attempt to deny the testamentary sense of in this verse. Many have made the attempt: e. g. Codurcus, in a long excursus, which may be seen in Critici Sacri, vol. vii. part 2, fol. 1067 ff.: Whitby in loc., Seb. Schmidt, Michaelis, al., and recently Ebrard and Hofmann. As these recent expositors have written with the others before them, it may be well to give an account of their views of the passage. Ebrard understands it thus: “Wherever sinful man will enter into a covenant with the holy God, the man must first die, must first atone for his guilt by death (or must put in a substitute for himself).” This he gives as the summary of his argumentation. But, as Hofmann asks, where does he find one word of this in the general assertion of the Writer? The text speaks axiomatically of something which every one knows in common life. Ebrard interprets theologically: by a declaration which it requires a theologian to accept. The Writer speaks in the abstract of all whatever: Ebrard interprets in the concrete of one particular set of . It is true, Eb. attempts to anticipate this objection, by saying that from the context, every one would know what sort of was meant. But this does not meet it in the least degree. Our verse is a perfectly general axiom, extending over all , in whatsoever sense the word be taken. Hofmann on the other hand rejects (Schriftb. ii. 1. 302 ff.) both meanings, testament and covenant , and maintains that of ordinance, disposition , understanding that disposition to extend to the whole property. Then, he says (see also Weissagung u. Erfllung, ii. 165), “This idea of necessity implies that he must die who makes such a disposition of his whole property: because, as long as he lives, he can be always adding to his property, so that this disposition ( ) cannot be meant to be used of the time while the disposer is alive.” But this, though approaching nearer the true meaning, is just as futile as the other. Why may not a man yet living make such a disposition? And if it cannot be made till death, wherein does it in reality differ from a testament? It would be quite impossible to follow out the various argumentations by which the testamentary sense has been sought to be evaded. It will be far more profitable for us to endeavour to substantiate that which I believe to be the only admissible acceptation. And this I will do by starting from the word itself about which all the question is raised. , from , ‘ disponere ,’ , ‘ disponere sibi ,’ regards, in ordinary Greek usage, that disposition of a man’s property which he makes in prospect of his death, and signifies, 1. a will or testament . So in Plato, Legg. xi. p. 926 B, , and in reff.: in Demosth. 1136. 12, , , , , and al. On the other hand, the word is by no means tied to this its more usual meaning. The general one, of a disposition of any kind, is sometimes found applied to other circumstances than those at the close of life. So Aristoph. Av. 439, where Peisthetrus says, , , . . .: where it evidently means a covenant , an agreement . And in this sense, either where there are two distinct parties, or where one only arranges or ordains a ‘dispositio,’ do we find the word most often used in the LXX and N. T. In the former sense, 2. of a covenant , with two agreeing parties, it is not so frequent as in the latter: but we find it Gen 21:27 ; Gen 21:32 , : in Job 40:23 ( Job 41:4 ) of Leviathan, : 2Ki 3:12 ; Jos 9:6 ; Jos 9:11 al. fr. The other sense, 3. that of a disposition or ordinance made by God , or , is the most ordinary one in the LXX. To it may be referred almost all the passages where in a loose sense of the word we in English render ‘ covenant :’ e. g. Gen 6:18 ; Gen 9:9 &c.; Gen 15:18 ; and a hundred other places. In this latter sense it is that the word has come to be used absolutely and technically as in , , &c.: and in the quotation in our ch. Heb 8:8 ff.
Now, having these there leading senses of the word before us, we are to enquire, which of them our Writer is likely to have intended when he wrote as a general axiom, , . It is obvious that in no general axiomatic sense can it be predicated of a covenant , or of an ordinance . There may be particular instances where a death (setting aside for a moment ) might have been the requisite ratification of a covenant, or result of an ordinance: but such particular cases are clearly not here in question. Only when we recur to sense (1), that of a testament , can it be true, that where a is, there must of necessity be death, and that, the death , of him who has made the testament. And if it be objected to this, that a testament may exist many years before the death of the testator, the answer is easy, that the Writer here detines his own meaning of , when he says : viz. that the document in question does not in reality become a , a disposition , till it is of force, till things are disposed by it. I believe then it will be found that we must at all hazards accept the meaning testament here, as being the only one which will in any way meet the plain requirements of the verse) there is necessity that the death ( is prefixed before , as carrying the whole weight of emphasis, and is for this reason also anarthrous) of him who made it (the testator , as E. V., but it is important to mark that it is , not , as it ought to be on the interpretation of Ebr. al. In the meaning, Christ is the : and this agrees wonderfully with St. Luke’s manner of speaking in that text which is in fact the key-text to this: , Luk 22:29 . There the great and primary is the Father, who is not here in question, as neither is His with His Son: but as regards us , the is Christ; to whom alone, as human, the axiom, spoken of human relations, is applicable, and not to the divine Father. And when Ebrard insists on the former of these facts, and altogether omits noticing the second, saying that according to our interpretation God Himself must have died, we can only marvel at this fresh instance of the inconceivable rashness and carelessness which unfortunately characterize his spirited and clever commentary) be implied (it is not easy to express the exact sense of here. For we must remember, 1. that we have had in Heb 9:15 , quite far enough off to prevent it being probable that is a mere rhetorical elegance to avoid repeating , and inducing us to think that some meaning different from is here intended: even could it be shewn that could bear to be rendered = , which I am not aware that it has been: 2. that in looking for a sense for , we must be careful not to give too pregnant or emphatic an one, seeing that it holds a very insignificant and unemphatic place in the sentence. This being premised, I believe the most suitable sense will be found in such phrases as , to allege all grounds , Demosth. p. 1328. 22; , to produce examples , Polyb. xvii. 13. 7; , to make one’s apologies to , id. i. 32. 4. And of these I would take ‘ alleged ,’ ‘ carried in to the matter ,’ in fact, ‘ implied ,’ which seems the best word: he who speaks of , ( ) , carries in to, involves in, that assertion, the death of the . On the logical connexion, see below):
Fuente: Henry Alford’s Greek Testament
Heb 9:16 . The meaning of these words is doubtful. In the LXX occurs about 280 times and in all but four instances translates , covenant. In classical and Hellenistic Greek, however, it is the common word for “will” or “testament” (see especially The Oxyrhynchus Papyri , Grenfell and Hunt, Part I., 105, etc., where the normal meaning of the word appears also from the use of for “intestate” and for “to alter a will”). Accordingly it has been supposed by several interpreters that the writer, taking advantage of the double meaning of , at this point introduces an argument which applies to it in the sense of “will” or “testament,” but not in the sense of “covenant”; as if he said, “where a testamentary disposition of property is made, this comes into force only on the decease of the testator”. “it is necessary that the death of him who made the disposition be adduced”. On the very common omission of the copula in the third singular indicative see Buttmann, p. 136. , “necesse est afferri testimonia de morte testatoris” (Wetstein). For passages establishing its use as a term of the courts for the production of evidence, etc., see Field in loc . and especially Appian, De Bell. Civil . ii. 143, f1 . (See also Eisner in loc .) is apparently even used for “to register” in the Oxy. Papyri , Part II., 244. The reason of this necessity is given in Heb 9:17 . “for a testament is of force with reference to dead people, since it is never of any force when the testator is alive”. On this interpretation the words mean that before the inheritance, alluded to in Heb 9:15 , could become the possession of those to whom it had been promised, Christ must die. He is thus represented as a testator. The illustration from the general law relating to wills or testaments extends only to the one point that Christ’s people could inherit only on condition of Christ’s death. The reason of Christ’s death receives no illustration. He did not die merely to make room for the heir. The objections to this interpretation are (1) the constant Biblical usage by which, with one doubtful exception in Gal 3 , stands for “covenant,” not for “will”. On this point see the strong statement of Hatch, Essays in Bibl. Greek , p. 48. “There can be little doubt that the word must be invariably taken in this sense of “covenant” in the N.T., and especially in a book which is so impregnated with the language of the LXX as the epistle to the Hebrews”. (2) His argument regarding covenants receives no help from usages which obtain in connection with testaments which are not covenants. The fact that both could be spoken of under the same name shows that they were related in some way; but presumably the writer had in view things and not merely words. To adduce the fact that in the case of wills the death of the testator is the condition of validity, is, of course, no proof at all that a death is necessary to make a covenant valid. (3) The argument of Heb 9:18 is destroyed if we understand Heb 9:16-17 of wills; for in this verse it is the first covenant that is referred to.
But is it possible to retain the meaning “covenant”? Westcott, Rendall, Hatch, Moulton and others think it is possible. To support his argument, proving the necessity of Christ’s death, the writer adduces the general law that he who makes a covenant does so at the expense of life. What is meant becomes plain in the 18th verse, for in the covenant there alluded to, the covenanting people were received into covenant through death. That covenant only became valid over the dead bodies of the victims slain as representing the people. Whatever this substitutionary death may have meant, it was necessary to the ratification of the covenant. The sacrifices may have been expiatory, indicating that all old debts and obligations were cancelled and that the covenanters entered into this covenant as clean and new men; or they may have meant that the terms of the covenant were immutable; or that the people died to the past and became wholly the people of God. In any case the dead victims were necessary, and without them, , the covenant was not inaugurated or ratified. Great light has been thrown on this passage by Dr. Trumbull in his Blood Covenant , in which he shows the universality of that form of compact and the significance of the blood. The rite of interchanging blood or tasting one another’s blood, indicates that the two are bound in one life and must be all in all to one another. On the whole, this interpretation is to be preferred. Certainly it connects much better with what follows. For having shown that by dead victims all covenants are ratified, the writer proceeds , “wherefore not even the first,” although imperfect and temporary “was inaugurated without blood,” i.e. , without death. [The perfect here as elsewhere in Hebrews is scarcely distinguishable from the aorist.] Proof that this statement regarding the first covenant is correct he forthwith gives in Heb 9:19-20 .
Heb 9:19 . . “For when Moses had spoken to the people every commandment of the law,” this being the needful preliminary, that the people might clearly understand the obligations they assumed on entering the covenant, he then took the blood of the calves and the goats, etc. In Exo 24:3 ff., an account is given of the inauguration of the first covenant. To that narrative certain additions of no importance are here made. In Exodus no mention is made of goats, only of . (See Westcott on this discrepancy.) Probably this addition is due to an echo of Heb 9:12-13 . Water , which was added to the blood to prevent coagulation or possibly as a symbol of cleansing; ( cf. Joh 19:34 ; 1Jn 5:6 ) scarlet wool , , so called from “the grain or berry of the ilex coccifera ” used in dyeing ( cf. Lev 14:4 ) and the hyssop or wild marjoram on which the wool was tied, are all added as associated with sacrifice in general, and all connected with the blood and the sprinkling. here takes the place of the of Exodus and the action is not confined to the people as in the original narrative but includes , the book itself, that is, even the book in which Moses had written the words of the Lord, the terms of the covenant. Everything connected with the covenant bore the mark of blood, of death. Again, in Heb 9:20 , instead of the of the LXX, which literally renders the Hebrew we have . . ., a possible echo of our Lord’s words in instituting the new covenant, and instead of of Exo 24:8 we have corresponding with the of Heb 9:19 .
Fuente: The Expositors Greek Testament by Robertson
there must, &c. = it is necessary that the death . . . be brought in.
testator = appointed (victim). Greek. diatithemi. See Heb 8:10.
Fuente: Companion Bible Notes, Appendices and Graphics
16.] For (justification of , by an appeal to common usage) where a testament is (it is quite in vain to attempt to deny the testamentary sense of in this verse. Many have made the attempt: e. g. Codurcus, in a long excursus, which may be seen in Critici Sacri, vol. vii. part 2, fol. 1067 ff.: Whitby in loc., Seb. Schmidt, Michaelis, al., and recently Ebrard and Hofmann. As these recent expositors have written with the others before them, it may be well to give an account of their views of the passage. Ebrard understands it thus: Wherever sinful man will enter into a covenant with the holy God, the man must first die,-must first atone for his guilt by death (or must put in a substitute for himself). This he gives as the summary of his argumentation. But, as Hofmann asks, where does he find one word of this in the general assertion of the Writer? The text speaks axiomatically of something which every one knows in common life. Ebrard interprets theologically: by a declaration which it requires a theologian to accept. The Writer speaks in the abstract-of all whatever: Ebrard interprets in the concrete-of one particular set of . It is true, Eb. attempts to anticipate this objection, by saying that from the context, every one would know what sort of was meant. But this does not meet it in the least degree. Our verse is a perfectly general axiom, extending over all , in whatsoever sense the word be taken. Hofmann on the other hand rejects (Schriftb. ii. 1. 302 ff.) both meanings, testament and covenant, and maintains that of ordinance, disposition, understanding that disposition to extend to the whole property. Then, he says (see also Weissagung u. Erfllung, ii. 165), This idea of necessity implies that he must die who makes such a disposition of his whole property: because, as long as he lives, he can be always adding to his property, so that this disposition () cannot be meant to be used of the time while the disposer is alive. But this, though approaching nearer the true meaning, is just as futile as the other. Why may not a man yet living make such a disposition? And if it cannot be made till death, wherein does it in reality differ from a testament? It would be quite impossible to follow out the various argumentations by which the testamentary sense has been sought to be evaded. It will be far more profitable for us to endeavour to substantiate that which I believe to be the only admissible acceptation. And this I will do by starting from the word itself about which all the question is raised. , from , disponere, , disponere sibi, regards, in ordinary Greek usage, that disposition of a mans property which he makes in prospect of his death, and signifies, 1. a will or testament. So in Plato, Legg. xi. p. 926 B, , and in reff.: in Demosth. 1136. 12, , , , , and al. On the other hand, the word is by no means tied to this its more usual meaning. The general one, of a disposition of any kind, is sometimes found applied to other circumstances than those at the close of life. So Aristoph. Av. 439, where Peisthetrus says, , , …: where it evidently means a covenant, an agreement. And in this sense, either where there are two distinct parties, or where one only arranges or ordains a dispositio, do we find the word most often used in the LXX and N. T. In the former sense, 2. of a covenant, with two agreeing parties, it is not so frequent as in the latter: but we find it Gen 21:27; Gen 21:32, : in Job 40:23 (Job 41:4) of Leviathan, : 2Ki 3:12; Jos 9:6; Jos 9:11 al. fr. The other sense, 3. that of a disposition or ordinance made by God , or , is the most ordinary one in the LXX. To it may be referred almost all the passages where in a loose sense of the word we in English render covenant: e. g. Gen 6:18; Gen 9:9 &c.; Gen 15:18; and a hundred other places. In this latter sense it is that the word has come to be used absolutely and technically as in , , &c.: and in the quotation in our ch. Heb 8:8 ff.
Now, having these there leading senses of the word before us, we are to enquire, which of them our Writer is likely to have intended when he wrote as a general axiom, , . It is obvious that in no general axiomatic sense can it be predicated of a covenant, or of an ordinance. There may be particular instances where a death (setting aside for a moment ) might have been the requisite ratification of a covenant, or result of an ordinance: but such particular cases are clearly not here in question. Only when we recur to sense (1), that of a testament, can it be true, that where a is, there must of necessity be death, and that, the death , of him who has made the testament. And if it be objected to this, that a testament may exist many years before the death of the testator, the answer is easy, that the Writer here detines his own meaning of , when he says : viz. that the document in question does not in reality become a , a disposition, till it is of force, till things are disposed by it. I believe then it will be found that we must at all hazards accept the meaning testament here, as being the only one which will in any way meet the plain requirements of the verse) there is necessity that the death ( is prefixed before , as carrying the whole weight of emphasis, and is for this reason also anarthrous) of him who made it (the testator, as E. V., but it is important to mark that it is , not , as it ought to be on the interpretation of Ebr. al. In the meaning, Christ is the : and this agrees wonderfully with St. Lukes manner of speaking in that text which is in fact the key-text to this: , Luk 22:29. There the great and primary is the Father, who is not here in question, as neither is His with His Son: but as regards us, the is Christ; to whom alone, as human, the axiom, spoken of human relations, is applicable, and not to the divine Father. And when Ebrard insists on the former of these facts, and altogether omits noticing the second, saying that according to our interpretation God Himself must have died, we can only marvel at this fresh instance of the inconceivable rashness and carelessness which unfortunately characterize his spirited and clever commentary) be implied (it is not easy to express the exact sense of here. For we must remember, 1. that we have had in Heb 9:15, quite far enough off to prevent it being probable that is a mere rhetorical elegance to avoid repeating , and inducing us to think that some meaning different from is here intended: even could it be shewn that could bear to be rendered = , which I am not aware that it has been: 2. that in looking for a sense for , we must be careful not to give too pregnant or emphatic an one, seeing that it holds a very insignificant and unemphatic place in the sentence. This being premised, I believe the most suitable sense will be found in such phrases as , to allege all grounds, Demosth. p. 1328. 22; , to produce examples, Polyb. xvii. 13. 7; , to make ones apologies to, id. i. 32. 4. And of these I would take alleged, carried in to the matter, in fact, implied, which seems the best word: he who speaks of , () , carries in to, involves in, that assertion, the death of the . On the logical connexion, see below):
Fuente: The Greek Testament
Heb 9:16. ) testament. This is the peculiar force of the Greek word, as compared with (above, pr) the Hebrew . The article omitted agrees with the general sentiment expressed, as in Gal 3:15.-) be shown, or made good, fulfilled (prstari). The Greek words, , , Heb 9:14, allude to each other.- , of the testator) Christ is the testator in respect of us. This agrees with the words of the Lord before His death; Luk 22:29.
Fuente: Gnomon of the New Testament
, , .
. Syr., the death of him is declared, showed, argued, or proved. Mors intercedat necesse est; necesse est mortem intercedere. Ar., Necesse est mortem ferri; which is not proper in the Latin tongue: however, there is an emphasis in
, more than is expressed by intercedo. . Syr., , of him that made it; of the testator. . Syr., , in him that is dead; in mortuis, among them that are dead. . Vulg., confirmatum est; and so the Syriac, ratum est, more proper. . Syr., , there is no use, profit, or benefit in it. Ar., nunquam valet; quandoquidem nunquam valet; nondum valet; it is not yet of force. [10]
[10] EXPOSITION. Scholefield characterizes this passage as perhaps the most perplexing in the whole New Testament. The dispute relates to the import of , whether the translation covenant should be retained, as the word is commonly rendered; or whether the translation testament is not more suitable to the idea conveyed, particularly by verses 16, 17. Most of the Greek fathers, most of the Reformed theologians, Grotius, Pierce, Doddridge, Michaelis, .Macknight, Scholefield, Tholuck, Dr Henderson, Turner, and Ebrard, pronounce in favor of covenant. On the other hand, Chrysostom, Luther, Calvin, Erasmus, Wolf, Campbell, Bengel, Schleusner, Wahl, Rosenmuller, Bretschneider, Kuinoel, Stuart, Robinson, Conybeare and Howson, decide in favor of testament as the proper translation. The central difficulty in the passage will probably be admitted to Ale in the meaning of . Conybeare and Howson affirm that the A.V. is unquestionably correct in translating testament in this passage. The attempts which have been made to avoid this meaning are irreconcilable with any natural explanation of . Macknight renders it appointed sacrifice. But this would involve a grammatical error: and to obviate this consideration, Scholefield proposes a rendering in an active sense, mediating sacrifice; but he candidly owns that there is no instance of the word being used elsewhere in this signification; and besides, there is great harshness in affixing to a meaning so widely different from its congener, , occurring as they do in the same sentence. Whitby and Burton, accordingly, propose the phrase covenanting party. But from this translation results another difficulty; the death of a covenanting party dissolves rather than confirms a covenant. Ebrards solution of this difficulty is ingenious: The man who will enter into a covenant with God is a sinner, and as such incapable of entering into fellowship with the holy God, nay, even of appearing before Gods presence, Deu 5:26. He must die on account of his guilt, if a substitutionary sacrifice be not offered for him. But he must also die to his former life, in order to begin a new life in covenant with God. In short, from a simple view of the symbolical import of the covenant burnt-offering, described in verses 18-22, the following may be stated as the result: When a sinful man will enter into covenant with the holy God, the man must first die, must first atone for his guilt by a death, (or he must produce a substitutionary burnt-offering.) ED.
Heb 9:16-17. For where a testament [is,] there must also of necessity be brought in the death of the testator. For a testament [is] firm [or ratifed] after men are dead; otherwise it is of no force whilst the testator liveth.
There is not much more to be considered in these verses, but only how the observation contained in them doth promote and confirm the argument which the apostle insists upon. Now this is to prove the necessity and use of the death of Christ, from the nature, ends, and use of the covenant whereof he was the mediator; for it being a testament also, it was to be confirmed with the death of the testator. This is proved in these verses from the notion of a testament, and the only use of it amongst men. For the apostle in this epistle doth argue several times from such usages amongst men as, proceeding from the principles of reason and equity, were generally prevalent among them. So he doth in his discourse concerning the assurance given by the oath of God, Hebrews 6. And here he doth the same from what was commonly agreed upon, and suitable unto the reason of things, about the nature and use of a testament. The things here mentioned were known to all, approved by all, and were the principal means of the preservation of peace and property in human societies. For although testaments, as unto their especial regulation, owe their original unto the Roman civil law, yet as unto the substance of them, they were in use amongst all mankind from the foundation of the world. For a testament is the just determination of a mans will concerning what he will have done with his goods after his decease; or, it is the will of him that is dead. Take this power from men, and you root up the whole foundation of all industry and diligence in the world. For what man will labor to increase his substance, if when he dies he may not dispose of it unto those which by nature, affinity, or other obligations, he hath must respect unto? Wherefore the foundation of the apostles arguing from this usage amongst men is firm and stable.
Of the like nature is his observation, that a testament is of no force whilst the testator liveth. The nature of the thing itself, expounded by constant practice, will admit no doubt of it. For by what way soever a man disposeth of his goods, so as that it shall take effect whilst he is alive, as by sale or gift, it is not a testament, nor hath any thing of the nature of a testament in it; for that is only the will of a man concerning his goods when he is dead.
These things being unquestionable, we are only to consider whence the apostle takes his argument to prove the necessity of the death of Christ, as he was the mediator of the new testament.
Now this is not merely from the signification of the word , which yet is of consideration also, as hath been declared, but whereas he treats principally of the two covenants, it is the affinity that is between a solemn covenant and a testament that he hath respect unto. For he speaks not of the death of Christ merely as it was death, which is all that is required unto a testament properly so called, without any consideration of what nature it is; but he speaks of it also as it was a sacrifice, by the effusion of his blood, which belongs unto a covenant, and is no way required unto a testament. Whereas, therefore, the word may signify either a covenant or a testament precisely so called, the apostle hath respect unto both the significations of it. And having in these verses mentioned his death as the death of a testator, which is proper unto a testament, in the 4th verse, and those that follow, he insists on his blood as a sacrifice, which is proper unto a covenant. But these things must be more fully explained, whereby the difficulty which appears in the whole context will be removed. Unto the confirmation or ratification of a testament, that it may be , sure, stable, and of force, there must be death, the death of the testator. But there is no need that this should be by blood, the blood of the testator, or any other. Unto the consideration of a covenant, blood was required, the blood of the sacrifice, and death only consequentially, as that which would ensue thereon; but there was no need that it should be the blood or death of him that made the covenant. Wherefore the apostle, declaring the necessity of the death of Christ, both as to the nature of it, that it was really death; and as to the manner of it, that it was by the effusion of his blood; and that from the consideration of the two covenants, the old and the new testament, and what was required unto them; he evinceth it by that which was essential unto them both, in a covenant as such, and in a testament precisely so called. That which is most eminent and essential unto a testament, is, that it is confirmed and made irrevocable by the death of the testator; and that which is the excellency of a solemn covenant, whereby it is made firm and stable, is, that it was confirmed with the blood of sacrifices, as he proves in the instance of the covenant made at Sinai, verses 18-20. Wherefore, whatever is excellent in either of these was to be found in the mediator of the new testament. Take it as a testament, which, upon the bequeathment made therein of the goods of the testator unto the heirs of promise, of grace and glory, it hath the nature of, and he died as the testator; whereby the grant of the inheritance was made irrevocable unto them. Hereunto no more is required but his death, without the consideration of the nature of it, in the way of a sacrifice. Take it as a covenant, as, upon the consideration of the promises contained in it, and the prescription of obedience, it hath the nature of a covenant, though not of a covenant strictly so called, and so it was to be confirmed with the blood of the sacrifice of himself; which is the eminency of the solemn confirmation of this covenant. And as his death had an eminency above the death required unto a testament, in that it was by blood, and in the sacrifice of himself, which it is no way necessary that the death of a testator should be, yet it fully answered the death of a testator, in that he truly died; so had it an eminency above all the ways of the confirmation of the old covenant, or any other solemn covenant whatever, in that whereas such a covenant was to be confirmed with the blood of sacrifices, yet was it not required that it should be the blood of him that made the covenant, as here it was.
The consideration hereof solves all the appearing difficulties in the nature and manner of the apostles argument. The word , whereunto respect is here had, is, as we have showed, of a large signification and various use. And frequently it is taken for a free grant and disposition of things by promise, which hath the nature of a testament. And in the old covenant there was a free grant and donation of the inheritance of the land of Canaan unto the people; which belongs unto the nature of a testament also. Moreover, both of them, a covenant and a testament, do agree in the general nature of their confirmation, the one by blood, the other by death. Hereon the apostle, in the use of the word , doth diversely argue both unto the nature, necessity, and use of the death of the mediator of the new testament. He was to die in the confirmation of it as it was a testament, he being the testator of it; and he was to offer himself as a sacrifice in his blood, for the establishment of it, as it had the nature of a covenant. Wherefore the apostle doth not argue, as some imagine, merely from the signification of the word, whereby, as they say, that in the original is not exactly rendered. And those who have from hence troubled themselves and others about the authority of this epistle, have nothing to thank for it but their own ignorance of the design of the apostle, and the nature of his argument. And it were well if we all were more sensible of our own ignorance, and more apt to acknowledge it, when we meet with difficulties in the Scripture, than for the most part we are. Alas! how short are our lines, when we come to fathom the depths of it! How inextricable difficulties do appear sometimes in passages of it, which when God is pleased to teach us, are all pleasant and easy!
These things being premised, to clear the scope and nature of the apostles argument, we proceed unto a brief exposition of the words.
Heb 9:16. For where a testament [is,] there must also of necessity be the death of the testator.
There are two things in the words:
1. A supposition of a testament.
2. What is required thereunto.
1. In the first place there is,
(1.) The note of inference;
(2.) The supposition itself.
(1.) The first is the particle for. This doth not infer a reason to ensue of what he had before affirmed, which is the common use of that illative; but only the introduction of an illustration of it, from what is the usage of mankind in such cases, on supposition that this covenant is also a testament. For then there must be the death of the testator, as it is in all testaments amongst men.
(2.) The supposition itself is in these words, . The verb substantive is wanting. Where a testament is; so it is by us supplied, it may be, not necessarily. For the expression, Where a testament is, may suppose that the death of the testator is required unto the making of a testament; which, as the apostle showeth in the next verse, it is not, but only unto its execution. In the case of a testament, namely, that it may be executed,is the meaning of the word where; that is, wherever. Amongst all sorts of men, living according unto the light of nature and the conduct of reason, the making of testaments is in use; for without it neither can private industry be encouraged nor public peace maintained. Wherefore, as was before observed the apostle argueth from the common usage of mankind, resolved into the principles of reason and equity.
2. What is required unto the validity of a testament; and that is, the death of the testator. And the way of the introduction of this death unto the validity of a testament is, by being brought in, ; that it enter, namely, after the ratifying of the testament, to make it of force, or to give it operation. The testament is made by a living man; but whilst he lives it is dead, or of no use. That it may operate and be effectual, death must be brought into the account. This death must be the death of the testator, . is he who disposeth of things; who hath right so to do, and actually doth it. This in a testament is the testator. And and have in the Greek the same respect unto one another as testamentum and testator in the Latin.
Wherefore, if the new covenant hath the nature of a testament, it must have a testator, and that testator must die, before it can be of force and efficacy; which is what was to be proved.
This is further confirmed,
Heb 9:17. For a testament [is] of force after men are dead: otherwise it is of no strength at all, while the testator liveth.
It is not of the making and constitution of a testament, but of the force and execution of it, that he speaks. And in these words he gives a reason of the necessity of the death of the testator thereunto. And this is because the validity and efficacy of the testament depend solely thereon. And this reason he introduceth by the conjunction , for.
A testament , is of force, say we; that is, firm, stable, not to be disannulled. For if it be but a mans testament, yet if it be confirmed, no man disannulleth, or addeth thereunto, Gal 3:15.It is ratified, made unalterable, so as that it must be executed according unto the mind of the testator. And it is so , among them that are dead, after men are dead; that is, those who make the testament: for it is opposed unto , whilst the testator liveth; for testaments are the wills of dead men. Living men have no heirs. And this sense is declared in these words, , quandoquidem, quoniam, seeing that; otherwise, say we, without this accession unto the making of a testament, as yet it prevaileth not, it is not of force for the actual distribution of the inheritance or the goods of the testator.
Two things must yet further be declared:
1. What are the grounds or general reasons of this assertion.
2. Where lies the force of the argument from it:
1. The force of a testament depends on the death of the testator, or the death of the testator is required to make it effectual, for these two reasons:
(1.) Because a testament is no act or deed of a man whereby he presently, and in the making of it, conveys, gives, or grants, any part of his possession unto another, or others, so as that it should immediately thereon cease to be his own, and become the property of those others: all such instruments of contract, bargain, sale, or deeds of gift, are of another nature, they are not testaments. A testament is only the signification of the will of a man as unto what he will have done with his goods after his death. Wherefore unto the force and execution of it his death is necessary.
(2.) A testament, that is only so, is alterable at the pleasure of him that makes it whilst he is alive. Wherefore it can be of no force whilst he is so; for he may change it or disannul it when he pleaseth. The foundation, therefore, of the apostles argument from this usage amongst men is firm and stable.
2. Whereas the apostle argueth from the proportion and similitude that is between this new testament or covenant and the testaments of men, we may consider what are the things wherein that similitude doth consist, and show also wherein there is a dissimilitude, whereunto his reasonings are not to be extended. For so it is in all comparisons; the comparates are not alike in all things, especially where things spiritual and temporal are compared together. So was it also in all the types of old. Every person or every thing that was a type of Christ, was not so in all things, in all that they were. And therefore it requires both wisdom and diligence to distinguish in what they were so, and in what they were not, that no false inferences or conclusions be made from them. So is it in all comparisons; and therefore, in the present instance, we must consider wherein the things compared do agree, and wherein they differ.
(1.) They agree principally in the death of the testator. This alone makes a testament among men effectual and irrevocable. So is it in this new testament. It was confirmed and ratified by the death of the testator, Jesus Christ; and otherwise could not have been of force. This is the fundamental agreement between them, which therefore alone the apostle expressly insisteth on, although there are other things which necessarily accompany it, as essential unto every testament; as,
(2.) In every testament amongst men there are goods disposed and bequeathed unto heirs or legatees, which were the property of the testator. Where a man hath nothing to give or bequeath, he can make no testament; for that is nothing but his will concerning the disposal of his own goods after his decease. So is it in this new testament. All the goods of grace and glory were the property, the inheritance of Christ, firmly instated in him alone; for he was appointed heir of all things. But in his death, as a testator, he made a bequeathment of them all unto the elect, appointing them to be heirs of God, co-heirs with himself. And this also is required unto the nature and essence of a testament.
(3.) In a testament there is always an absolute grant made of the goods bequeathed, without condition or limitation. So is it here also; the goods and inheritance of the kingdom of heaven are bequeathed absolutely unto all the elect, so as that no intervenience can defeat them of it. And what there is in the gospel, which is the instrument of this testament, that prescribes conditions unto them, that exacts terms of obedience from them, it belongs unto it as it is a covenant, and not as a testament. Yet, (4.) It is in the will and power of the testator, in and by his testament, to assign and determine both the time, season, and way, whereby those to whom he hath bequeathed his goods shall be admitted unto the actual possession of them. So it is in this case also. The Lord Christ, the great testator, hath determined the way whereby the elect shall come to be actually possessed of their legacies, namely, by faith that is in him, Act 26:18. So also he hath reserved the time and season of their conversion in this world, and entrance into future glory, in his own hand and power.
And these things belong unto the illustration of the comparison insisted on, although it be only one thing that the apostle argues from it, touching the necessity of the death of the testator. But notwithstanding these instances of agreement between the new testament and the testaments of men, whereby it appears to have in it, in sundry respects, the nature of a testament, yet in many things there is also a disagreement between them, evidencing that it is also a covenant, and abideth so, notwithstanding what it hath of the nature of a testament, from the death of the testator; as,
(1.) A testator amongst men ceaseth to have any right in or use of the goods bequeathed by him, when once his testament is of force. And this is by reason of death, which destroys all title and use of them. But our testator divests himself neither of right nor possession, nor of the use of any of his goods. And this follows on a twofold difference, the one in the persons, the other in the goods or things bequeathed:
[1.] In the persons. For a testator amongst men dieth absolutely; he liveth not again in this world, but lieth down, and riseth not, until the heavens be no more. Hereon all right unto, and all use of the goods of this life, cease for ever. Our testator died actually and really, to confirm his testament: but, 1st. He died not in his whole person; 2dly. In that nature wherein he died he lived again, and is alive for evermore.
Hence all his goods are still in his own power.
[2.] In the things themselves. For the goods bequeathed in the testaments of men are of that nature as that the propriety of them cannot be vested in many, so as that every one should have a right unto and the enjoyment of all, but in one only. But the spiritual good things of the new testament are such, as that in all the riches and fullness of them they may be in the possession of the testator, and of those also unto whom they are bequeathed. Christ parts with no grace from himself, he diminisheth not his own riches, nor exhausts any thing from his own fullness, by his communication of it unto others. Hence also,
(2.) In the wills of men, if there be a bequeathment of goods made unto many, no one can enjoy the whole inheritance, but every one is to have his own share and portion only. But in and by the new testament, every one is made heir to the whole inheritance. All have the same, and every one hath the whole; for God himself thence becomes their portion, who is all unto all, and all unto every one.
(3.) In human testaments, the goods bequeathed are such only as either descended unto the testators from their progenitors, or were acquired during their lives by their own industry. By their death they obtained no new right or title unto any thing; only what they had before is now disposed of according unto their wills. But our testator, according unto an antecedent contract between God the Father and him, purchased the whole inheritance by his own blood, obtaining for us eternal redemption.
(4.) They differ principally in this, that a testament amongst men is no more but merely so; it is not moreover a solemn covenant, that needs a confirmation suited thereunto. The bare signification of the will of the testator, witnessed unto, is sufficient unto its constitution and confirmation. But in this mystery the testament is not merely so, but a covenant also. Hence it was not sufficient, unto its force and establishment, that the testator should die only, but it was also required that he should offer himself in sacrifice by the shedding of his blood, unto its confirmation.
These things I have observed, because, as we shall see, the apostle in the progress of his discourse doth not confine himself unto this notion of a testament, but treats of it principally as it had the nature of a covenant. And we may here observe,
Obs. 1. It is a great and gracious condescension in the Holy Spirit, to give encouragement and confirmation unto our faith by a representation of the truth and reality of spiritual things in those which are temporal and agreeing with them in their general nature, whereby they are presented unto the common understanding of men. This way of proceeding the apostle calls a speaking , Gal 3:15, after the manner of men. Of the same kind were all the parables used by our Savior; for it is all one whether these representations be taken from things real or from those which, according unto the same rule of reason and right, are framed on purpose for that end.
Obs. 2. There is an irrevocable grant of the whole inheritance of grace and glory made unto the elect in the new covenant. Without this, it could not in any sense have the nature of a testament, nor that name given unto it. For a testament is such a free grant, and nothing else. And our best plea for them, for an interest in them, for a participation of them, before God, is from the free grant and donation of them in the testament of Jesus Christ.
Obs. 3. As the grant of these things is free and absolute, so the enjoyment of them is secured from all interveniencies by the death of the testator.
Fuente: An Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews
be: or, be brought in, Heb 9:16
Reciprocal: Heb 1:3 – by himself Heb 9:15 – means Heb 9:20 – testament Heb 13:20 – covenant
Fuente: The Treasury of Scripture Knowledge
Heb 9:16-17. This paragraph may-he regarded as a companion passage of chapter 8:4, in that the New Testament which is the covenant or will of Christ was not in force until after His death. This is a rule that is generally recognized concerning testaments (or wills) that men make, in that such wills are not in force during the lifetime of the men who make them.
Fuente: Combined Bible Commentary
Heb 9:16. And it is a covenantwith all the requisite validity. For where a covenant is, there must also be (brought inor, there is necessarily implied) the death of the covenanting victim.
Fuente: A Popular Commentary on the New Testament
Heb 9:16-17. For where a testament is That is, where there is a covenant, which is also a testament; there must of necessity be the death of the testator As if he had said, The reason why there was a necessity that Christ should die, is taken from the nature of the covenant whereof he is Mediator, which covenant is also a testament, and therefore could not be of force but by his death. For a testament is of force Has validity; after men are dead When, and not before, the legatees may claim their legacies. Otherwise it is of no strength at all while the testator liveth And therefore hath power to alter his will at pleasure. But it is not necessary that the expression , at the end of Heb 9:16, should signify a testator, properly so called: it may mean only a promiser, and one that confirms his promise with his own blood. For , according to Phavorinus, is, I promise, I covenant; and is very commonly in profane authors, to enter into covenant; and in the same sense the phrase is used in the Old Testament; and therefore the participle , derived from the same verb, must probably have the same signification here, in which it is continually used by the LXX., and which it always bears in the New Testament. Thus, Act 3:25, Ye are the children, , of the covenant which God made with our fathers; Luk 22:29; , and I appoint to you a kingdom, , as my Father hath appointed to me. So in this epistle, Heb 8:10; Heb 10:16, , This is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel. And because covenants were usually made victimas cdendo, by sacrifices, as the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin expressions used in the making of covenants show; accordingly, the new covenant was established in the blood of Jesus. Hence the apostle speaks thus of this covenant, and the appointed disposer or maker of it. This sense of the passage is defended at large by Dr. Macknight, in a note too long to be here quoted. His paraphrase on it is as follows: And for this reason, that the death of Christ is so efficacious, [namely, as is set forth in Heb 9:13-14,] of the new covenant he is the Mediator, or High-Priest, by whom its blessings are dispensed; and also the sacrifice by which it is procured and ratified; that his death being accomplished for obtaining the pardon of the transgressions of the first covenant, believers of all ages and nations, as the called seed of Abraham, (Rom 8:28,) may receive the promised eternal inheritance. For where a covenant is made by sacrifice, there is a necessity that the death of the appointed sacrifice be produced. For According to the practice of God and man; a covenant is made firm over dead sacrifices, seeing it never hath force while the goat, calf, or bullock, appointed as the sacrifice of ratification, liveth. Because from the beginning God ratified his covenant by sacrifice, to preserve among men the expectation of the sacrifice of his Son; hence not even the covenant of Sinai was made without sacrifice.
Fuente: Joseph Bensons Commentary on the Old and New Testaments
Verse 16
A will, however fully executed, does not take effect until the death of the testator. The apostle takes occasion from this circumstance to represent the gospel as a will, made effective by the death of Christ, inasmuch as it was by his death that the blessings of salvation were sealed and secured.
Fuente: Abbott’s Illustrated New Testament
9:16 {11} For where a testament [is], there must also of necessity be the death of the testator.
(11) A reason why the testament must be established by the death of the Mediator, because this testament has the condition of a testament or gift, which is made effective by death, and therefore that it might be effective, it must be that he that made the Testament, should die.
Fuente: Geneva Bible Notes
The superior sacrifice for sin 9:16-28
"The author has made it clear that Christ’s death has instituted a better covenant (Heb 9:11-15) which is superior to animal offerings (Heb 9:12-14). But the need for such a sacrifice has yet to be explored. So a key word in this subunit [Heb 9:16-28] is ’necessary’ (ananke, Heb 9:16; Heb 9:23). In the process of exploring this point, the author clearly underscored the measureless superiority of the sacrificial death of Christ." [Note: Hodges, "Hebrews," p. 802.]
Fuente: Expository Notes of Dr. Constable (Old and New Testaments)
In certain respects the covenants God made with humankind are similar to wills. With all wills, the person who made the will must die before the beneficiaries experience any effects of the will.