Biblia

Exegetical and Hermeneutical Commentary of Isaiah 5:20

Exegetical and Hermeneutical Commentary of Isaiah 5:20

Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!

20. The fourth woe, against those who confuse moral distinctions. Amongst the “wise men” of the time (Pro 25:1) there may have been a class of sophists, who employed their subtlety in making out a case for abuses condemned by the unsophisticated moral sense.

Fuente: The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges

Wo unto them that call evil good … – This is the fourth class of sins denounced. The sin which is reprobated here is that of perverting and confounding things, especially the distinctions of morality and religion. They prefer erroneous and fake doctrines to the true; they prefer an evil to an upright course of conduct. The Chaldee renders this, Wo to those who say to the impious, who are prospered in this age, You are good; and who say to the meek, Ye are impious. Jarchi thinks that the prophet here refers to those who worship idols, but he evidently has a more general reference to those who confound all the distinctions of right and wrong, and who prefer the wrong.

That put darkness for light – Darkness, in the Scriptures, is the emblem of ignorance, error, false doctrine, crime. Light denotes truth, knowledge, piety. This clause, therefore, expresses in a figurative, but more emphatic manner, what was said in the previous member of the verse.

That put bitter – Bitter and bitterness are often used to denote sin; see the note at Act 8:23; also Rom 3:14; Eph 4:31; Heb 12:15; Jer 2:19; Jer 4:18. The meaning here does not differ from that expressed in the other parts of the verse, except that there is implied the additional idea that sin is bitter; and that virtue, or holiness, is sweet: that is, that the one is attended with painful consequences, and the other with pleasure.

Fuente: Albert Barnes’ Notes on the Bible

Isa 5:20

Woe unto them that call evil good and good evil

Woe unto them that call evil good and good evil

There is a customary mode of talking, in which familiar formulas of praise and censure, as to moral objects, are employed as if by rote, revolving the admission of important principles, and recognising in its full extent the grand distinction between moral good and evil.

Such men will speak familiarly of other men and of their acts as right or wrong, as virtuous or vicious, in a manner which implies not only preference of judgment, but of inclination; so that if we draw conclusions from their language merely, we should certainly infer that they not only understood the principles of sound morality, but loved them and obeyed them. The latter conclusion would, in too many instances, be found to be erroneous, not because the person, in his talk, was guilty of deliberate hypocrisy, or even intended to deceive at all, but because his words conveyed more than he meant, especially when phrases used of course, and by a sort of habit, came to be subjected to the rules of a strict interpretation. In all such cases it will soon be found, upon a little observation, that the dialect in question, however near it may approach to that of evangelical morality, is still distinguished from it by indubitable marks.

1. Any one who thus indulges in the use of such conventional expressions as imply a recognition of those principles of morals which are laid down in the Bible, but whose conduct repudiates and nullifies them, avoids, as if instinctively, those terms of censure and of approbation which belong distinctively to Scripture, and conches himself to those which are common to the Bible and the heathen moralists, to Christian ethics and the code of honour. He will speak of an act, or a course of acts, as wrong, perhaps as vicious,–it may even be as wicked, but not as sinful. The difference between the terms, as viewed by such a person, seems to be that vice and crime are referable merely to an abstract standard, and perhaps a variable one; while sin brings into view the legislative and judicial character of God. Sin, too, is associated most minds with the humiliating doctrine of a natural depravity, while vice and crime suggest the idea of a voluntary aberration on the part of one by nature free from taint, and abundantly able to stand fast in his own strength. By tracing such diversities, however slight and trivial they seem to be when in themselves considered, we may soon learn to distinguish the characteristic dialect of worldly moralists from that of evangelical religion.

2. It will also be found that in the use of terms employed by both, there is a difference of sense, it may be unintentional, denoting no small difference in point of principle. Especially is this the case in reference to those important principles of morals which bear most directly upon the ordinary business of life, and come most frequently into collision with the selfish interests and inclinations of ungodly men. Two men, for instance, shall converse together upon truth and falsehood, upon honesty and fraud, employing the same words and phrases, and, perhaps, aware of no diversity of meaning in their application. And yet, when you come to ascertain the sense in which they severally use the terms employed by both, you shall find that while the one adopts the rigorous and simple rule of truth and falsehood which is laid down in the Bible and by common sense, the other holds it with so many qualifications and exceptions, as almost to render it a rule more honoured in the breach than the observance. There can be no doubt that this diversity in the use of language exerts a constant and extensive influence on human intercourse, and leads to many of those misconceptions which are tending daily to increase the mutual distrust of men in one anothers candour and sincerity.

3. Who pretends to think that men are often, I might almost say ever, better in the bent of their affections and their moral dispositions than in the general drift of their discourse? Who does not know that they are often worse, and that where any marked diversity exists, the difference is commonly in favour of his words at the expense of his thoughts and feelings? Nothing, however, could be more unjust or utterly subversive of impartial judgment in this matter, than to choose as tests or symptoms mere occasional expressions.

4. It must not be forgotten that a rational nature is incapable of loving evil, simply viewed as evil, or of hating good, when simply viewed as good. Whatever thing you love, you thereby recognise as good; and what you abhor, you thereby recognise as evil. When, therefore, men profess to look upon that as excellent which in their hearts and lives they treat as hateful, and to regard as evil that which they are seeking after, and which they delight in, they are not expressing their own feelings, but assenting to the judgment of others. They are measuring the object by a borrowed standard, while their own is wholly different. And if they are really so far enlightened as to think sincerely that the objects of their passionate attachment are evil, this is only admitting that their own affections are disordered and at variance with reason. So the sinner may believe on Gods authority or mans that sin is evil and that holiness is good, but as a matter of affection and of inclination, his corrupted taste will still reject the sweet as bitter, and receive the bitter as sweet; his diseased eye will still confound light with darkness, and his lips, whenever they express the feelings of his heart, will continue to call good evil and evil good.

5. The text does not teach us merely that punishment awaits those who choose evil in preference to good, but that an outward mark of those who hate God, and whom God designs to punish, is their confounding moral distinctions in their conversation.

6. When one who admits in words the great first principles of morals, takes away so much on one hand and grants so much on the other, as to obliterate the practical distinction between right and wrong; when with one breath he asserts the inviolable sanctity of truth, but with the next makes provision for benevolent, professional, jocose, or thoughtless falsehood; when he admits the paramount importance of religious duties in general, but in detail dissects away the vital parts as superstition, sanctimony, or fanaticism, and leaves a mere abstraction or an outward form behind; when he approves the requisitions of the law and the provisions of the Gospel in so far as they apply to other people, but repudiates them as applying to himself;–I ask, whatever his professions or his creed may be, whether he does not virtually, actually, call evil good and good evil?

7. Again, I ask, whether he who in the general admits the turpitude of fraud, impurity, intemperance, malignity, and other vicious dispositions with their practical effects, and thus appears to be an advocate for purity of morals, but when insulated cases or specific acts of vice are made the subjects of discussion, treats them all as peccadilloes, inadvertencies, absurdities, indiscretions, or, perhaps, as virtues modestly disguised, can be protected by the mere assertion of a few general principles from the fatal charge of calling evil good? And, as the counterpart of this, I ask whether he who praises and admires all goodness, not embodied in the life of living men or women, but detests it when thus realised in concrete excellence, does not really and practically call good evil?

8. And I ask, lastly, whether he who, in relation to the self-same acts, performed by men of opposite descriptions, has a judgment suited to the case of each, but who is all compassion to the wilful transgressions of the wicked, and all inexorable sternness to the innocent infirmities of godly men; he who strains at a gnat in the behaviour of the meek and conscientious Christian, but can swallow a camel in the conduct of the self-indulgent votary of pleasure; he who lauds religion as exhibited in those who give him no uneasiness by their example, but maligns and disparages it when, from its peculiar strength and brightness, it reflects a glare of painful and intolerable light upon his own corruptions,–let his maxims of moral philosophy be what they will,–does not, to all intents and purposes, incur the woe pronounced on those who call evil good and good evil, who put darkness for light and light for darkness, who put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter? (J. A. Alexander, D. D.)

The guilt of establishing unscriptural principles of conduct


I.
Among the most prominent illustrations of the present subject we may produce THOSE PERSONS, WHO REPRESENT ENTHUSIASM AS RELIGION. By enthusiasm, as applied with a reference to religion, I understand the subjection of the judgment, in points of religious faith or practice, to the influence of the imagination.


II.
Let us now turn our eyes to the opposite quarter; to MEN WHO DENOMINATE RELIGION ENTHUSIASM. Enthusiasm is on principle busy and loquacious. Lukewarmness, though capable of being roused to a turbulent defence of forms and of its own conduct, is by nature silent and supine. Hence enthusiasm, in proportion to the relative number of its adherents, raises a much louder stir, and attracts far more extensive notice, than lukewarmness. But let the torpid conviction of the lukewarm be contrasted with the illusion of the enthusiast, and the former will prove itself not less dangerous, and generally more deliberately criminal, than the latter.


III.
Another illustration of the text is furnished by PERSONS WHO REPRESENT A PARTIAL CONFORMITY TO THE COMMANDMENTS OF GOD AS MERITING THE APPELLATION OF RELIGION: and thus also by implication STIGMATISE THE TRUE CHRISTIAN AS RIGHTEOUS OVER MUCH.


IV.
We may in the next place produce as illustrative of the general proposition WITH THE CHARACTER OF CENSORIOUSNESS ALL OPINIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS OF GUILT CONFORMABLE TO THE SCRIPTURES. From the mouth of these apologisers no sin receives its appropriate denomination. Some lighter phrase is ever on the lips to cloke its enormity, perhaps to transform it into a virtue. Is profaneness noticed? It is an idle habit by which nothing is intended. Is extravagance named? It is a generous disregard of money. Is luxury mentioned? It is a hospitable desire to see our friends happy. What is worldly-mindedness? It is prudence. What is pride? It is proper spirit, a due attention to our own dignity. What is ambition? A laudable desire of distinction and preeminence; a just sense of our own excellence and desert. What is servility? It is skill in making our way to advancement. What are intemperance and sins of impurity? They are indecorums, irregularities, human frailties, customary indiscretions, the natural and venial consequences of cheerfulness, company, and temptation; the unguarded ebullitions of youth, which in a little time will satiate and cure themselves. Now all this is candour: all this is charity. If a reference be made to religion, these men immediately enlarge on the mercy of God.


V.
There yet remains to be specified an exemplification of the guilt menaced with vengeance by the prophet: A PERVERSION OF PRINCIPLE which, while the lower ranks are happily too little refined to be infected with it, taints with a greater or a less degree of its deceitful influence the bulk of the middle and higher classes of the community. By what criterion are applause and censure apportioned? By the rule of honour. Honour reigns, because multitudes love the praise of men more than the praise of God. It reigns, because they receive honour one of another; and seek not that honour which cometh from God only. What is this idol, which men worship in the place of the living God? The votary of honour may delude himself with the idea that, whatever be the ordinary expressions of his lips, his heart is dedicated to religion. But his heart is fixed on his idol, human applause. In the place of the love and the fear of God he substitutes the love of praise and the fear of shame. In the place of conscience he substitutes pride. For the dread of guilt he substitutes the apprehension of disgrace. (T. Gisborne, M. A.)

The unchangeable difference of good and evil

Moral good and evil are as truly and as widely different in their own nature as the perceptions of the outward senses; and God has endued us with faculties of the soul as well fitted to distinguish them, as the bodily senses are to discern corporeal objects. If any man, notwithstanding this, will obstinately call evil good and good evil, and will deny all distinctions between virtue and vice, he must as much have laid aside the use of his natural reason and understanding as he that would conferred light and darkness must contradict his senses and deny the evidence of his clearest sight. And when such a person falls finally into the just punishment of sin, he will no more deserve pity than one who falls down a precipice because he would not open his eyes to discern that light which should have guided him in his way.


I.
THERE IS ORIGINALLY IN THE VERY NATURE OF THINGS A NECESSARY AND ETERNAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL, BETWEEN VIRTUE AND VICE, WHICH THE REASON OF THINGS DOES ITSELF OBLIGE MEN TO HAVE CONSTANT REGARD TO. This is supposed in the text by the prophets comparing the difference between good and evil to that most obvious and sensible difference of light and darkness.


II.
GOD HAS, MOREOVER, BY HIS SUPREME AND ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY, AND BY EXPRESS DECLARATION OF HIS WILL IN HOLY SCRIPTURE, ESTABLISHED AND CONFIRMED THIS ORIGINAL DIFFERENCE OF THINGS, AND WILL SUPPORT AND MAINTAIN IT BY HIS IMMEDIATE POWER AND GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD. Woe unto them, etc.


III.
OBSERVATIONS WHICH MAY BE OF USE TO US IN PRACTICE.

1. Religion and virtue are truly most agreeable to nature, and vice and wickedness are of all things the most contrary to it.

2. Knowledge of the most important and fundamental doctrines of religion must be very easy to be attained, and gross ignorance of our duty can by no means be innocent or excusable, our minds being as naturally fitted to understand the most necessary parts of it as our eyes are to judge of colours or our palate of tastes.

3. The judgments of God upon impenitent sinners, who obstinately disobey the most reasonable and necessary laws in the world, are true and just and righteous judgments.

4. Whatever doctrine is contrary to the nature and attributes, of God, whatever is plainly unwise or wicked, whatever tends to confound the essential and eternal differences of good and evil, must necessarily be false.

5. Every person or doctrine which would separate religion from a holy life, and make it to consist merely in such speculative opinions as may be defended by an ill liver, or in such outward solemnities of worship as may be performed by a vicious and corrupt man, does greatly corrupt religion. (S. Clarke, D. D.)

Good and evil

The difference of good and evil is a subject of the highest concern, since upon it is founded the truth of religion, the obligation to virtue, and the peace and satisfaction of our minds. Upon it is founded the knowledge which we can attain of Gods moral perfections; for we cannot prove that God is good, unless we have antecedent notions of goodness considered in itself, and separated from all law, will, or appointment, Divine or human. I shall, therefore, now proceed to prove the different natures of our actions as to moral good and evil–


I.
FROM THE HISTORY OF THE MOST ANCIENT TIMES AS RECORDED IN THE SACRED BOOKS. From the whole dispensation of providence, as set forth in the Old Testament, it may be collected that the distinctions of right and wrong, good and evil, just and unjust, might always have been evident to those who would make a proper use of their senses and faculties. But that we may not carry this point too far, it is to be observed, that men being frail and fallible, surrounded with temptations, and having passions as well as reason, God did not totally leave them to discover their duty by their own natural abilities. Certain religious traditions were, without question, delivered down by Adam and his sons, and some prophets and pious teachers were raised up in the earliest ages from time to time by the Divine Providence to instruct and correct the world, and to enforce the laws of nature and the moral duties, by declaring that God required the observance of them, and that He would be the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the wicked. Such an one was Enoch, and such was Noah, prophets and righteous men, and preachers of righteousness in their generations.


II.
FROM OUR RELATION TO GOD. That there is a Maker and Governor of the world, who is endued with all perfections, is evident from His works. Without any instructor, besides our own understanding, we know that we are and that we did not make ourselves, and that we owe our being to a superior cause; and then we proceed to the discovery of a First Cause of us and of all other things; and thence we also discern our duty towards Him. It is absurd to suppose that God should have supreme power, and we not be bound to revere Him; that He should have perfect goodness, and we not be bound to love Him. He who gives life and the comforts of life to His creatures, hath a right to their gratitude and to their best services: and if it be absurd not to think ourselves obliged to obey Him, it is right and fit to obey Him, and to conform our will to His. So that, with respect to God, there must be moral good or moral evil in our behaviour. As the foundations of religion are thus fixed and unchangeable, so the continual practice of religion is necessary through the whole course of our lives. They who seem to have little or no value for religion yet will often tell you that they have a great regard for virtue, for honour, for justice, and for gratitude to friends and benefactors. If they would reason consistently, they would find the same obligations in a higher manner to serve God, who is both their Master and their Father.


III.
Another way to find out the differences of good and evil is FROM THE CONSIDERATION OF THE PECULIAR FRAME OF HUMAN NATURE. The beasts, though so much our inferiors, fulfil the designs of providence by pursuing the ends for which they were made. But they are no patterns for us whom God hath endued with faculties above sense, and who are able to control and subdue the inclinations which we have in common with brutes. Nature hath limited and determined their appetites within certain bounds, which they have no desire to transgress. Nature hath not so dealt with mankind; for our desires are impetuous and boundless: but then God hath implanted in us understanding and reason to direct them, and to judge what is right and wrong. And thus, as man by the help of reason and reflection, and by moral motives, becomes vastly superior to the brutes; so by vice, and particularly by intemperance and sensuality, he sinks as much beneath them, and runs into excesses which are not to be found in them. Hence the real and moral differences of good and evil may be proved; for the superior faculties in man must have a superior good agreeable to them. And as the inferior faculties, namely, the bodily senses, have always external objects suitable to them, or unsuitable; so it is with those nobler powers of the mind, thinking, reflecting, inquiring, judging, refusing, and choosing. The proper objects of these powers are moral or religious good and evil. No faculty creates its own object, but only discerns it. In like manner, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, are the objects of the understanding; and no man surely is so absurd or stupid as to think that we can make a thing true by believing it, or false by disbelieving it. So virtue or goodness is the proper object of our unprejudiced and reasonable desires. Everyone would infallibly choose it, if he acted according to his nature, to pure and undefiled reason, and were not seduced by sensual motives and temporary views.


IV.
We may also judge of good and evil BY THE COMMON INTEREST AND SENSE OF MANKIND. And here we are not to be determined so much by the opinion of this or that person, though eminent perhaps in some respects, as by the general consent of men in approving things praiseworthy and conducing to the common advantage. Some things are so universally esteemed, that even they who do not practise them must approve them; and this shows their intrinsic and invariable excellence. For men are very partial to their own conduct, and therefore when they approve virtue in others, though themselves be vicious, there must be an overbearing evidence in favour of it. The common and public interest cannot be supported by any measures contrary to virtue and goodness.


V.
FROM THE WILL OF GOD AS DISCOVERABLE BY REASON AND AS DISCOVERED TO US BY REVELATION. (J. Jortin, D. D.)

Confusion in mens notions of good and evil

Whence comes it to pass that men should lose the notions of good and evil so far as to stand in need of a Divine law to reinforce them, whilst yet they never lose the notion of things pleasing or hurtful to their senses? We may answer–

1. That sense hath usually nothing to corrupt its judgment; but it is not so with the determinations which the mind passeth upon well-doing and evil-doing; for there is often an inclination one way more than another, and this inclination is towards the wrong way, arising from various causes internal and external; so that serious consideration and caution are necessary to go before the judgment.

2. The reasons of good and evil are not usually understood in their whole extent by the bulk of mankind. It is generally agreed that there are some right and some wrong actions; but accurate notions of right and wrong have seldom been found where revelation hath not been received; which should teach us to set a just value upon the Gospel.

3. Great examples have greatly tended to corrupt mens notions of good and evil. Many there are who judge not for themselves, but take up with the judgment of others; and seeing men of knowledge, rank, and figure, practising iniquity without fear or remorse, they think they may do the same, and follow their leaders.

4. The prevalence of any vice in any country or society takes away mens apprehensions of the evil of it. When a wee is uncommon, men stare at it as at a monster; but when it is generally practised, they are insensibly reconciled to it. (J. Jortin, D. D.)

Good and evil

1. Give some general account of the nature of good and evil, and of the reasons upon which they are founded.

2. Show that the way by which good and evil commonly operate upon the mind of man, is by those respective names and appellations, by which they are notified and conveyed to the mind.

3. Show the mischief which directly, naturally, and unavoidably follows, from the misapplication and confusion of these names.

4. Show the grand and principal instances in which the abuse or misapplication of those names has such a fatal and pernicious effect. (R. South, D. D.)

The misapplication of words and names


I.
IN RELIGION. Religion is certainly in itself the best thing in the world; and it is as certain that, as it has been managed by some, it has had the worst effects: such being the nature, or rather the fate of the best things, to be transcendently the worst upon corruption.


II.
IN CIVIL GOVERNMENT, or polities.


III.
TO THE PRIVATE INTERESTS OF INDIVIDUALS.

1. An outrageous, ungoverned insolence and revenge, frequently passes by the name of sense of honour.

2. Bodily abstinence, joined with a demure, affected countenance, is often called piety and mortification.

3. Some have found a way to smooth over an implacable, unalterable spleen and malice, by dignifying it with the name of constancy.

4. A staunch, resolved temper of mind, not suffering a man to sneak, fawn, cringe, and accommodate himself to all humours, though never so absurd and unreasonable, as commonly branded with and exposed under the character of pride, morosity and ill-nature.

5. Some would needs have a pragmatical prying into and meddling with other mens matters, a fitness for business, forsooth, and accordingly call and account none but such persons men of business. (R. South, D. D.)

An espied difference between virtue and vice in the nature of things


I.
I shall first EXPLAIN THE MEANING, AND THEN CONFIRM THE TRUTH OF THIS OBSERVATION. Every thing has a nature which is peculiar to itself, and which is essential to its very existence. Light has a nature by which it is distinguished from darkness. Sweet has a nature by which it is distinguished from bitter. Animals have a nature by which they are distinguished from men. Men have a nature by which they are distinguished from angels. Angels have a nature by which they are distinguished from God. And God has a nature by which He is distinguished from all other beings. Now such different natures lay a foundation for different obligations; and different obligations lay a foundation for virtue and vice in all their different degrees. As virtue and vice, therefore, take their origin from the nature of things, so the difference between moral good and moral evil is as immutable as the nature of things from which it results. The truth of this assertion will appear if we consider–

1. That the essential difference between virtue and vice may be known by those who are wholly ignorant of God. The barbarians, who saw the viper on Pauls hand, knew the nature and ill-desert of murder. The pagans, who were in the ship with Jonah, knew the difference between natural and moral evil, and considered the former as a proper and just punishment of the latter. And even little children know the nature of virtue and vice. But how would children and heathens discover the essential difference between moral good and evil, if this difference were not founded in the nature of things?

2. Men are capable of judging what is right or wrong in respect to the Divine character and conduct. This God implicitly allows, by appealing to their own judgment, whether He has not treated them according to perfect rectitude. In the context, He solemnly cells upon His people to judge of the propriety and benignity of His conduct towards them (verses 3, 4; also Jer 2:5; Eze 18:25; Eze 18:29; Mic 6:1-5). In these solemn appeals to the consciences of men, God does not require them to believe that His character is good because it is His character; nor that His laws are good because they are His laws; nor that His conduct is good because it is His conduct. But He allows them to judge of His character, His laws and His conduct, according to the immutable difference between right and wrong, in the nature of things; which is the infallible rule by which to judge of the moral conduct of all moral beings.

3. God cannot destroy this difference without destroying the nature of things.

4. The Deity cannot alter the nature of things so as to destroy the essential distinction between virtue and vice. We can conceive that God should make great alterations in us, and in the objects about us; but we cannot conceive that He should make any alterations in us, and in the objects about us, which should transform virtue into vice, or vice into virtue, or which should destroy their essential difference.


II.
TAKE NOTICE OF ONE OR TWO OBJECTIONS which may be made against what has been said.

1. To suppose that the difference between virtue and vice results from the nature of things, is derogatory and injurious to the character of God. For, on this supposition, there is a standard of right and wrong superior to the will of the Deity, to which He is absolutely bound to submit. To say that the difference between right and wrong does not depend upon the will of God, but upon the nature of things, is no more injurious to His character than to say that it does not depend upon His will whether two and two shall be equal to four; whether a circle and square shall be different figures; whether the whole shall be greater than a part; or whether a thing shall exist and not exist at the same time. These things do not depend upon the will of God, because they cannot depend upon His will. So the difference between virtue and vice does not depend upon the will of God, because His will cannot make or destroy this immutable difference. And it is more to the honour of God to suppose that He cannot, than that He can, perform impossibilities. But if the eternal rule of right must necessarily result from the nature of things, then it is no reproach to the Deity to suppose that He is morally obliged to conform to it. To set God above the law of rectitude, is not to exalt, but to debase His character. It is the glory of any moral agent to conform to moral obligation. The supreme excellency of the Deity consists, not in always doing what He pleases, but in always pleasing to do what is fit and proper in the nature of things.

2. There is no other difference between virtue and vice than what arises from custom, education, or caprice. Different nations judge differently upon moral subjects. This objection is more specious than solid. For–

(1) It is certain that all nations do feel and acknowledge the essential distinction between virtue and vice. They all have words to express this distinction. Besides, all nations have some penal laws, which are made to punish those who are guilty of criminal actions.

(2) No nation ever did deny the distinction between virtue and vice. Though the Spartans allowed their children to take things from others without their knowledge and consent, yet they did not mean to allow them to steal, in order to increase their wealth, and gratify a sordid, avaricious spirit. They meant to distinguish between taking and stealing. The former they considered as a mere act, which was suited to teach their children skill and dexterity in their lawful pursuits, but the latter they detested and punished as an infamous crime. So when the Chinese expose their useless children, or their useless parents, they mean to do it as an act of kindness both to their friends and to the public. These, and all other mistakes of the same nature, are to be ascribed to the corruption of the human heart, which blinds and stupefies the conscience, and prevents it from doing its proper office.


III.
It now remains to MAKE A NUMBER OF DEDUCTIONS FROM THE IMPORTANT TRUTH WHICH WE HAVE EXPLAINED AND ESTABLISHED.

1. If there be an immutable difference between virtue and vice, right and wrong, then there is a propriety in every mans judging for himself in matters of morality and religion.

2. If there be a standard of right and wrong in the nature of things, then it is not impossible to arrive at absolute certainty in our moral and religious sentiments.

3. If right and wrong are founded in the nature of things, then it is impossible for any man to become a thorough sceptic in morality and religion.

4. If right and wrong, truth and falsehood, be founded in the nature of things, then it is not a matter of indifference what moral and religious sentiments mankind imbibe and maintain.

5. If right and wrong, truth and falsehood, be founded in the nature of things, then there appears to be a great propriety in Gods appointing a day of judgment.

6. All who go to heaven will go there by the unanimous voice of the whole universe.

7. All who are excluded from heaven will be excluded from it by the unanimous voice of all moral beings. It will appear clearly to the view of the universe, that all who are condemned ought to be condemned and punished forever. (N. Emmons, D. D.)

Perverting the right ways of the Lord


I.
NATURE OF THE PRACTICE.

1. Not a mere error or defect of judgment, but a habit, practice or system of perverting right and wrong.

2. Examples of calling evil good, and good evil (Psa 10:3; Mal 2:17; Mal 3:15; Luk 16:15; 2Pe 2:19). Putting bondage to sin for liberty, and counting Christian freedom to be servitude.

3. Examples of putting darkness for light, and light for darkness. The traditions of men for doctrines of God. Oppositions of science, falsely so called, for truths of Holy Writ.

4. Examples of putting bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter. Pleasures of sin counted sweet; the joy of the Lord despised. (Pro 9:17) Stolen waters (i.e., sins)

are sweet. (Pro 5:4.) Her end is bitter as wormwood. (Pro 20:17.)


II.
ORIGIN OF THE PRACTICE.

1. Satan the first on record who thus acted. (Gen 3:1-5.) It is an old device.

2. As he did, so do his children and dupes (Joh 8:44; 2Co 11:13-15).

3. Men perverted become perverters, deceiving and being deceived.

4. The practice is easy, and seems to be a source of malicious pleasure to those who so do.


III.
EFFECTS OF THE PRACTICE.

1. The practice is, to a mournful extent, successful, because of our weak and perverted fallen nature.

2. It discredits Gods words and ways.

3. It distresses the righteous (Eze 13:22).

4. It deceives the young and unstable.

5. It destroys both the perverters and the perverted.


IV.
JUDGMENT ON THESE PERVERTERS. Woe unto them (Pro 17:15).

1. By these perversions the perverters become such as described in Eph 4:18-19; 1Ti 4:2.

2. It is too true that men may come at length to say, Evil, be thou my good.

3. They who have done the works of the devil in perverting and confusing right and wrong, will share the devils judgment.


V.
PRESERVATION FROM PERVERSION.

1. How to be kept from sharing with such perverters, and from being seduced or deceived by them; most important to know this.

2. See the example of Jesus in His temptation. Prayer and keeping close to Holy Scripture.

3. Copy His example.

4. Gospel light, good, sweet, here set forth, showing the way of salvation by faith in Christ.

5. Pray that the Spirit may guide you into all the truth, and give you a right judgment in all things.

6. Hereafter good and evil, light and darkness, sweet and bitter, will be known, seen, and tasted, without the confusion and perversion which now prevail. (Flavel Cook, B. A.)

Sinful nomenclature

Reproof and denunciation, distasteful as they ever must be, have their office. The Word of God is something more than a pleasant song. It is sometimes a fire to scathe, a hammer to dash in pieces, a sword to divide the soul and spirit, the joints and marrow; and therefore it is a great sin to try to blunt the edge of the sword of the Spirit by calling evil good and good evil.


I.
IT IS A GREAT SIN to disregard or even to underrate in the least degree the eternal distinctions of right and wrong, to view things in their wrong aspects and to call things by their wrong names. He that saith to the wicked, Thou art righteous, says Solomon, him shall the people curse. And Paul tells us there are some things that ought not to be so much as named among those who live holy lives. The evil word is a long step beyond the evil thought. Speak of sin in its true terms and you strip it of its seductiveness. Call a vice by its real name and you rob it of half its danger by exposing its grossness. The very guiltiest of sinners is he who paints the gates of hell with the colours of Paradise, and gives names of clear disparagement and dislike to scrupulous honour and stainless purity.


II.
THE CAUSE OF THIS SIN is due to a fading appreciation of moral evil, to a tampering with it, and to a destruction of that healthy instinct which revolts at it. This is illustrated in the third chapter of Genesis. Light words and careless thoughts are not indifferent things. Character is not cut in marble; it may become diseased as our bodies do. Abhor that which is evil, cleave to that which is good.


III.
THE PUNISHMENT OF THIS SIN is the failure of all life, the waste, the loss, the shipwreck of the human soul. The rose is a glorious flower, but it withers sometimes and produces nothing but mouldering and loathly buds, because there is some poison in the sap or some canker at the root. Careers that might have been prosperous and happy are sometimes cut short, blighted with disgrace, the conscience seared, the distinction between right and wrong lost. They are mortified to painlessness, and this is death. This is the worst woe that can befall those who miscall things which God has stamped with His own signet. (Dean Farrar, D. D.)

The sin of confounding good and evil


I.
Consider the particular species of crime against which we have the warning of the text AS IT RELATES TO THE INDIVIDUAL WHO IS GUILTY OF IT.

1. There is scarcely one of us who does not think himself sufficiently religious; and yet, to what does the religion of many a man amount?

2. If we can be successful enough to persuade men to believe that the slight notion which they have of religion is insufficient, we then find them flying to another subterfuge to screen them from its duties, by affixing the name of evil to what we pronounce to be good, and calling our representation of religion morose and gloomy.

3. Religion being once rendered so slight in the mind, once esteemed so gloomy and unworthy a pursuit, its restraints are neglected, its principles evaded, and the wavering deceitfulness of mens hearts made the standard of mens actions.

4. To these notions of indifference concerning religion, we may add those arising from misguided zeal in it. Divisions, persecutions, etc.


II.
Consider those who are not imposing on themselves by believing things to be good, which are really evil, but WHO WILFULLY AND MALICIOUSLY ENDEAVOUR TO DESTROY A TRUE BELIEF IN OTHERS, BY FALSE REPRESENTATIONS OF SIN DUTY.

1. How artfully and speciously vice is often portrayed in those numerous works which find the easiest admission to the closets of the young! Into the character of the frail and guilty is thrown a variety of qualities of seeming liberality, honour, and the like; the reader, with an ingenuous tenderness, without deliberation, pities and forgives; and begins to think the crime no indiscretion, or at least no crime at all!

2. You have witnessed the effect of similar principles conveyed, not in books, but conversation.

3. We find many a villain pouring forth his artful tale of constancy and honour, calling all good evil, and all evil good, ridiculing marriage as a useless human ceremony, decrying religion as an idle state invention, painting human nature, its passions and the indulgence of them, in every glowing colour, till he has broken a parents heart, and brought his child to ruin in time and in eternity! (G. Mathews, M. A.)

The perversion of right and wrong

Nothing tends more to remove the just distinctions of virtue and vice, or to blend the nature of good and evil, than the giving plausible and specious names to what are really great and substantial crimes.

1. The boldest attacks of infidelity are often couched under the plausible name of a spirit of free inquiry.

2. An indifference to all religious worship is often concealed under the specious term of a truly religious spirit of universal toleration.

3. The duel is converted into an honourable deed.

4. Shameless and lawless adultery is denominated gallantry.

5. Is not a certain profusion and expense, which causes a breach of common justice in squandering what men are not able to pay, often described as an enlarged and generous mode of living?

6. If the libertine who indulges in every sensual appetite without control, happen to possess a certain share of vivacity and good humour, or be a man of boundless profusion and indiscriminate liberality, his vices are swallowed up in the sup posed good qualities of his heart; and the worst title perhaps that is bestowed on his worst actions, is that of a thoughtless ease and good nature, which is too apt to be led astray by the example and vices of others. (C. Moore, M. A.)

Calling evil good and good evil

The real horror of this passage consists in the fact that we have here one of the greatest sins that can be conceived, and, at the same time, one of the most common. To call evil good is practical atheism. To call good evil is practical blasphemy. The words of the passage supply a certain vision of the order of the process.

1. To call evil good is the sin especially of the young and careless–the giddy and wanton in their way.

2. The calling good evil is the sin especially of the earnest and professedly religious–whether or not their religion be of the kind called Christian. This was the great crime of the Pharisees against Christ. This has been the crime of all the persecutors of the Church of Christ from the Roman emperors to the Romish priests. Also, of many theologians of all sides in controversy; and of politicians.

3. Before our eyes the evil and the good are mingled, in characters and acts and institutions, till it is often beyond our power to extricate. And what are we to do? Let us call on the name of the Lord, confessing we are helpless often in the matter, remembering also this, that although it be in ignorance, our error may be great, like the crucifying of Christ. Let the Church be improved from within, seeking rather the resources of the heavenly grace to replenish her heart with charity–its native and original virtue. Let her turn from all the tumult without to Him who is the glory in the midst of her. Let her learn her liberality at the feet of Jesus. For evil rolls into the light of Christ and is detected and abhorred. The good that is in evil is caught by that light and gladly hailed. The love of Christ is the best of teaching here. (J. Cunningham, M. A.)

The danger of depraving the moral sense

1. The current conventional standard of society around them is even in this Christian land the main principle by which the great mass of the better sort of people regulate their conduct. For one who refers truly to the law of God, hundreds maybe found who act upon the common maxims of society. This, therefore, it becomes us especially to bear in mind: never can we live for ourselves alone.

2. It is one especial part of their punishment who are thus engaged in lowering the moral standard of society around them, that they must be, in a still greater measure, injuring themselves. How shall a man touch pitch and not be defiled? We have no other way of transmitting moral evil than by contagion; we must, in the first place, be our selves the victims of that which we convey to others.

(1) There is within each of us a power or faculty by which we judge of good or evil, and which we call conscience or the moral sense. Although we cannot by a direct act of the reason alter, or at our immediate volition, silence, the decision and the voice of moral consciousness, we may, by a course of actions, altogether debase, and even for the time extinguish it.

(2) It is of great moment to observe how from this it follows that there is a necessary tendency in anyone allowed form of evil to prepare the soil for receiving others.

(3) After vicious practice, there is nothing of which they who would preserve their moral sense unclouded should more cautiously beware, than a needless acquaintance with sin. The first and evident form in which this danger meets us is from the company of evil men. There are some remarkable provisions by which the Christians power of discrimination can be formed, without encouraging an evil curiosity or courting any familiarity with vice. For, first, it will grow gradually with the growth of our self-knowledge. Alas! we bear evil always with us; and if we search ourselves we must become acquainted with it. Yet even here we need a word of caution, for our very self-inspection may become the means of self-defilement. At Gods call we may walk unharmed even in the fire of present sin. And here, again, we may trace the provision God has made for this security in the nature He has given us. For the feelings of grief and shame which are naturally roused by the first sight of sin, and which of themselves will die away with each repetition, if, from curiosity or the love of excitement, we call them into fruitless exercise, these, when they lead us to strive against the evil which we see, grow into a living habit of resisting sin; and this habit keeps the conscience quick and tender, and, through the blessing of Gods grace, purifies and strengthens the power of moral judgment beyond all other means of wholesome exercise. Thus it is that Gods especial witnesses have borne, amidst an evil generation, the burden of His holiness and truth. (Bishop S. Wilberforce, D. D.)

A shameful doctrine

Bellarmine, in his 4 th Book and fifth chapter, De Pontifice Romano, has this monstrous passage: That if the Pope should through error or mistake command vices and prohibit virtues, the Church would be bound in conscience to believe vice to be good and virtue evil. (R. South, D. D.)

Straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel

A Neapolitan shepherd came in anguish to his priest, saying, Father, have mercy on a miserable sinner. It is the holy season of Lent; and while I was busy at work, some whey spirting from the cheese press flew into my mouth, and,–wretched man!–I swallowed it. Free my distressed conscience from its agonies by absolving me from my guilt! Have you no other sins to confess? said his spiritual guide. No; I do not know that I have committed any other. There are, said the priest, many robberies and murders from time to time committed on your mountains, and I have reason to believe that you are one of the persons concerned in them. Yes, he replied, I am, but these are never accounted as a crime; it is a thing practised by us all and there needs no confession on that account. (K. Arvine.)

Defective moral sense

It is no exaggeration to assert that Napoleon I–strangely called the Great–had no moral sense. Carlyle tells the storyof a German emperor who, when corrected for a mistake he made in Latin, replied, I am King of the Romans and above grammar! Napoleons arrogance was infinitely greater. He thought himself above morality and really seems to have believed that he had a perfect right to commit any crime, political or personal, that would advance his interests by an iota: and, in truth, he did commit so many it is almost impossible to recount them. (H. O. Mackey.)

Little evils making way for greater

The carpenters gimblet makes but a small hole, but it enables him to drive a great nail. May we not here see a representation of those minor departures from the truth which prepare the minds of men for grievous errors and of those thoughts of sin which open a way for the worst of crimes! Beware, then, of Satans gimblet. (C. H.Spurgeon.)

Fuente: Biblical Illustrator Edited by Joseph S. Exell

That call evil good, and good evil; that take away the difference between good and evil; that justify and approve wicked men and things, and condemn piety, or virtue; or righteous persons. Compare Pro 17:15. Thus many call serious godliness, humorous singularity; and justice, morosity; and meekness, stupidity, &c.; as, on the contrary, they call pride, magnanimity; and covetousness, good husbandry. And men are very apt to follow the course of the world in their false judgments of things; which therefore the prophet so severely forbids.

Fuente: English Annotations on the Holy Bible by Matthew Poole

20. Fourth Woeagainstthose who confound the distinctions of right and wrong (compare Ro1:28), “reprobate,” Greek, “undiscriminating:the moral perception darkened.”

bitter . . . sweetsinis bitter (Jer 2:19;Jer 4:18; Act 8:23;Heb 12:15); though it seem sweetfor a time (Pro 9:17; Pro 9:18).Religion is sweet (Ps119:103).

Fuente: Jamieson, Fausset and Brown’s Commentary Critical and Explanatory on the Whole Bible

Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil,…. That call evil actions good, and good actions evil; that excuse the one, and reproach the other; or that call evil men good, and good men evil; to which the Targum agrees. Some understand this of false prophets rejecting the true worship of God, and recommending false worship; others of wicked judges, pronouncing the causes of bad men good, and of good men evil; others of sensualists, that speak in praise of drunkenness, gluttony, and all carnal pleasures, and fleshly lusts, and treat with contempt fear, worship, and service of God. It may very well be applied to the Scribes and Pharisees in Christ’s time, who preferred the evil traditions of their elders, both to the law of God, that is holy, just, and good, and to the Gospel, the good word of God, preached by John the Baptist, Christ and his apostles, and to the ordinances of the Gospel dispensation:

that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter; for calling good evil, and evil good, is all one as putting these things one for another; there being as great a difference between good and evil, as between light and darkness, sweet and bitter; and it suggests, as if the perversion of these things was not merely through ignorance and mistake, but purposely and wilfully against light and knowledge; so the Jews acted when they preferred the darkness of their rites and ceremonies, and human traditions, before the light of the glorious Gospel of Christ; which showed they loved darkness rather than light, Joh 3:19 and chose that which would be bitter to them in the end, than the sweet doctrines of the grace of God; the bitter root of error, rather than the words of Christ’s mouth, which are sweeter than the honey, or the honeycomb. The Targum is,

“woe to them that say to the wicked who prosper in this world, ye are good; and say to the meek, ye are wicked: when light cometh to the righteous, shall it not be dark with the wicked? and sweet shall be the words of the law to them that do them; but bitterness (some read “rebellion”) shall come to the wicked; and they shall know, that in the end sin is bitter to them that commit it.”

Abarbinel interprets this of the ten tribes preferring the worship at Dan and Bethel, before that at Jerusalem.

Fuente: John Gill’s Exposition of the Entire Bible

The fourth woe: “Woe to those who call evil good, and good evil; who give out darkness for light, and light for darkness; who give out bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter.” The previous woe had reference to those who made the facts of sacred history the butt of their naturalistic doubt and ridicule, especially so far as they were the subject of prophecy. This fourth woe relates to those who adopted a code of morals that completely overturned the first principles of ethics, and was utterly opposed to the law of God; for evil, darkness, and bitter, with their respective antitheses, represent moral principles that are essentially related (Mat 6:23; Jam 3:11), Evil, as hostile to God, is dark in its nature, and therefore loves darkness, and is exposed to the punitive power of darkness. And although it may be sweet to the material taste, it is nevertheless bitter, inasmuch as it produces abhorrence and disgust in the godlike nature of man, and, after a brief period of self-deception, is turned into the bitter woe of fatal results. Darkness and light, bitter and sweet, therefore, are not tautological metaphors for evil and good; but epithets applied to evil and good according to their essential principles, and their necessary and internal effects.

Fuente: Keil & Delitzsch Commentary on the Old Testament

20. Wo to them that call evil good. Though some limit this statement to judges, yet if it be carefully examined, we shall easily learn from the whole context that it is general; for, having a little before reproved those who cannot listen to any warnings, he now proceeds with the same reproof. It is evident that men of this sort have always some excuse to plead, and some way of imposing on themselves; and, therefore, there is no end to their reproachful language, when their crimes are brought to light. But here he particularly reproves the insolence of those who endeavor to overthrow all distinction between good and evil

The preposition ל ( lamed), prefixed to the words good and evil, is equivalent to Of; and therefore the meaning is, They who say of evil, It is good, and of good, It is evil; that is, they who by vain hypocrisy conceal, excuse, and disguise wicked actions, as if they would change the nature of everything by their sophistical arguments, but who, on the contrary deface good actions by their calumnies. These things are almost always joined together, for every one in whom the fear of God dwells is restrained both by conscience and by modesty from venturing to apologize for his sins, or to condemn what is good and right; but they who have not this fear do not hesitate with the same impudence to commend what is bad and to condemn what is good; which is a proof of desperate wickedness.

This statement may be applied to various cases; for if a wo is here pronounced even on private individuals, when they say of evil that it is good, and of good that it is evil, how much more on those who have been raised to any elevated rank, and discharge a public office, whose duty it is to defend what is right and honorable! But he addresses a general reproof to all who flatter themselves in what is evil, and who, through the hatred which they bear to virtue, condemn what is done aright; and not only so, but who, by the subterfuges which they employ for the sake of concealing their own enormities, harden themselves in wickedness. Such persons, the Prophet tells us, act as if they would change light into darkness, and sweet into bitter; by which he means that their folly is monstrous, for it would tend to confound and destroy all the principles of nature.

Fuente: Calvin’s Complete Commentary

THE INFLUENCE OF LANGUAGE ON CHARACTER

Isa. 5:20. Woe to them, that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter.

Only those who have had extensive opportunities of observation, can have any idea of the evil influence of the abuse and misapplication of words in questions of religion and morals, especially among the young [664] To an almost incredible degree the distinctness of our associations and intellectual perceptions depends upon our correct use of the machinery of words. From long usage, words become at length identified in the mind with the things we have accustomed them to represent. What, then, must be the effect when language is deliberately misapplied for the express purpose of confounding the distinctions of right and wrong! For various reasons, it is more easy to mis-apply words in relation to morals, than in relation to other subjects.

1. Ethical propositions are to a great degree incapable of absolute proof.
2. In discussing the great topics of morals, very few persons bring a perfectly unbiased mind to the task.
3. Vice and virtue, though essentially distinct as qualities, are still in many cases nothing more than different modifications of some common subject. The line which separates the use of a thing from its abuse is not always strongly marked; or rather is sufficiently indistinct for those who are determined not to see clearly to afford themselves a plausible justification for the aberration of their choice. But on all these accounts we should be the more careful to use accurate language on all questions of morals, especially in society, where the temptation to speak as others are speaking is so strong. Two things especially lead to that perversion of language which our text condemns.
1. Men call evil good, from an almost irresistible desire to cloak and veil their vices. It is one of ten thousand daily recurring proofs of the strange inconsistencies of human nature, that the same persons whose conscience will not recoil for a moment at the actual commission of deeds of sin and atrocity, and who even appear to defy public opinion in the conduct they are pursuing, will still to the last shrink from the admission of those terms which really characterise their conduct. It is the appellation and not the actual guilt which to them constitutes the disgrace.

2. Men call good evil, from a desire to defend themselves from the condemnation passed upon them by the better example of others. They attempt, in the first place, by palliations and misstatements, to render vice less odious than it really is; and secondly, by attributing to the pious unworthy and corrupt motives, to render unamiable that goodness in others which they want strength of mind and of principle to imitate. From this latter species of wickedness very few stand perfectly clear. Which of us has never felt as a reproach the example of principles better and holier than our own, nor attempted in consequence to restore the equilibrium of our self-respect, not by improving our own practice, but by depreciating and ridiculing that which as Christians it was our duty to admire? Let us be on our guard against disparaging that sincerity of disposition, which strives to regulate its conduct by the unbending Christian standard, by calling it enthusiasm, fanaticism, austerity. Enough difficulty, we know from our own experience, lies in the way of every mans spiritual improvement, without throwing in his path the additional obstacles of ridicule, contempt, and odium, which few minds, even the most religious, have sufficient fortitude to despise. (Mat. 23:13; Mar. 9:42.) Thus, to call good evil is to imitate the Pharisees (Mar. 3:22), and comes perilously near committing the sin against the Holy Ghost.P. R. Shuttleworth, D.D., Sermons, 117143.

[664] The world is generally governed by words and shows: for men can swallow the same thing under one name, which they would abominate and detest under another. The name of king was to the old Romans odious and insufferable; but in Sylla and Julius Csar they could endure the power and absoluteness of a king, disguised under the name of dictator.South, 16331716.

I think that one of the master incantations, one of the most signal deceits, which we practise upon ourselves, comes from the use of language. There are words that we learn in childhood which we abandon when we come to manhood. Generally speaking, our fireside words are old Saxon wordsshort, knotty, tough, and imbued with moral and affectional meanings; but as we grow older these words are too rude and plain for our use, and so we get Latin terms and periphrases by which to express many of our thoughts. When we talk about ourselves we almost invariably use Latin words, and when we talk about our neighbours we use Saxon words. And one of the best things a man can do, I think, is to examine himself in the Saxon tongue. If a man tells that which is contrary to truth, let him not say, I equivocate; let him say I lie. Lie! why, it brings the judgment-day right home to a mans thought. Men do not like it, but it is exactly the thing that will most effectually touch the moral sense; and the more the moral sense is touched the better. If a man has departed from rectitude in his dealings with another, let him not say I took advantage, which is a roundabout, long sentence: let him say, I cheated. That is a very direct word. It springs straight to the conscience, as the arrow flies from the bow to the centre of the mark. Does it grate harshly on your ear? Nevertheless, it is better that you should employ it; and you should come to this determination: I will call things that I detect in my conduct by those clear-faced, rough-tongued words that my enemies use if they wanted to sting me to the quick.Beecher.

THE SIN OF CONFOUNDING GOOD AND EVIL

Isa. 5:20. Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil.

The conscience of every man testifies that there is an unchangeable difference between good and evil; but each man is prone to think his own vice little or no sin at all. He substitutes other names for his crime, and calls his evil good.

I. Many are self-deceived (Pro. 14:12). How many think themselves religious, merely because they pay some or much respect to the outward ordinances of religion, while there is no change in their character. How many justify their irreligion, by depicting religion as morose and gloomy. How many commit crimes without one misgiving of conscience, merely because they are varnished over by specious names. How often under the pretence of promoting the honour of true religion, massacres and murders have been sanctified; the torch of persecution brandished round, and the flame of civil discord raised, to light the path to heaven!

II. Many endeavour to deceive others, by false representations of sin and duty (Luk. 17:1-2).George Mathew, M.A., Sermons, ii. 101118.

ON THE PERVERSION OF RIGHT AND WRONG

Isa. 5:20. Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil.

There is in many a wonderful propensity to perplex the distinctions between right and wrong, and to obscure the boundaries of virtue and vice. Their propensity is both absurd and wicked. It most frequently manifests itself in two ways:

1. By bestowing soft and gentle names on crimes of real and destructive magnitude. Thus, infidelity and scepticism have been called free inquiry, indifference to all religion a spirit of toleration, duelling an honourable deed, adultery gallantry, extravagance a liberal expenditure, the selfish sensualist a good-natured man. By the use of such false and misleading terms, we lower the standard of right and wrong, and expose ourselves to the temptation of practising what we have persuaded ourselves is not so very wrong.

2. By applauding works of genius and imagination of which the real tendency is to inflame the passions, and to weaken moral and religious principle. The tendency of such works should lead us unhesitatingly to condemn and reject them, whatever may be the literary fascinations of their style. Nothing is more dangerous than a book which imparts to vice the delusive appearance of a virtue. Thus, to confound the distinctions between right and wrong, is to renounce the superiority which man claims over the brute creationthat of being a rational creature, for the brutes are never guilty of anything so irrational as that of calling good evil, and evil good.Charles Moore, M.A., Sermons, ii. pp. 155172.

THE SIN OF USING WRONG NAMES

Isa. 5:20. Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil.

What difference can it make what anything is called?

Whats in a name?
A rose by any other name would smell as sweet.

Yet the Bible pronounces its woe upon those who merely call things by wrong names. Why?

1. Names are not mere words: they are the representatives of ideas; and hence, they have a force of meaning which makes them powerful instruments. There are opprobrious epithets that wound more severely than a blow. Slander has slain more than the dagger. The name of a place or person suggests to us all that we know, or have conceived, about it or him. Paul, Jesuswhat a power there is in these names! How suggestive are the phrases, an upright man, a transparent character! Because words are representatives of ideas, to use wrong names is to convey false ideas.

2. The wrong use of names confounds moral distinctions, and perplexes and misleads men in regard to duty. Right must not be called wrong, or wrong right. This is to sweep away all the landmarks of duty; or, rather, it is shifting all the buoys and beacons by which we navigate the sea of life, so that instead of warning us of danger, they shall rather draw us upon shoals and rocks. The skill of every successful errorist consists in a dexterous jugglery of names.

3. By giving decent names to gross sins, the standard of public morals is lowered, and the community is corrupted. One of the things that blinded America to the evil of slavery was, the term that used to be applied to itour domestic institution, &c. Be on your guard, then, against wrong names. Do not try to deceive yourself by means of them. Pure covetousness is sin, even though you do call it economy, &c. Do not try to deceive others (Mat. 5:19; Mar. 9:42).S. G. Buckingham, American National Preacher, xxxv. 269278.

Fuente: The Preacher’s Complete Homiletical Commentary Edited by Joseph S. Exell

MORAL PERVERSITY

Isa. 5:20. Woe unto them that call evil good, &c.

If the judgments of men are habitually influenced by their affections, it is not surprising that their speech should bear the impress of the same controlling power. What we hear men say in the way of passing judgment upon things and persons, unless said deliberately for the purpose of deception, will afford us, for the most part, a correct idea of their dispositions and prevailing inclinations. There is, indeed, a customary mode of talking in which familiar formulas of praise and censure as to moral objects are employed as if by rote; but this dialect, however near it may approach to that of evangelical morality, is still distinguished from it by indubitable marks. One who thus indulges in the use of such expressions as imply a recognition of the principles of Biblical morality, but whose conduct repudiates them, in expressing his opinions on moral subjects avoids, as if instinctively, the terms of censure and of approbation which belong to Scripture. He will speak of an act or a course of acts as wrong, perhaps as vicious,it may even be as wicked, but not as sinful. There are crimes and vices, but no sins in his vocabulary. Vice and sin are referable, it would seem, to an abstract and perhaps variable standard, while sin brings into view the legislative and judicial character of God. Two men shall converse together upon truth and falsehood, employing the same words and phrases; and yet when you come to ascertain the sense in which they severally use the same language, you shall find that while the one adopts the rigorous and simple rule of truth and falsehood laid down in the Bible and by common sense, the other holds it with so many qualifications and exceptions as almost to render it a rule more honoured in the breach than the observance. But who does not know that men are often worse in the bent of their affections than in the general drift of their discourse? If we err, therefore, in the application of the test proposed, we are far more apt to err in favour of the subject than against him. He who is invariably prompted, when there is no counteracting influence, to call evil good and good evil, is one who, like the fallen angel, says in his heart, Evil, be thou my good! and is, therefore, a just subject of the woe denounced by the prophet in the text.

I. The expression is descriptive of those who hate good and love evilnot of those who err as to what is good and what is evil. A rational nature is incapable of loving evil, simply viewed as evil, or of hating good when simply viewed as good. Whatever thing you love, you thereby recognise as good; and what you hate or abhor, you thereby recognise as evil. No man can dislike a taste, or smell, or sound which at the same time he regards as pleasant, nor can he like one which he thinks unpleasant. But change the standard of comparison, and what appeared impossible is realised. The music which is sweetest to your ear may be offensive when it breaks the slumber of your sleeping friend; the harshest voice may charm you when it announces that your friend still lives. The darling sin is hated by the sinner as the means of his damnation, though he loves it as the source of present pleasure. When, therefore, men profess to look upon that as excellent which in their hearts and lives they treat as hateful, and to regard as evil and abominable that which they are seeking after and which they delight in, they are not expressing their own feelings, but assenting to the judgment of others. And if they are really so far enlightened as to think sincerely that the objects of their passionate attachment are evil, this is only admitting that their own affections are disordered and at variance with reason. It is as if a mans sense of taste should be so vitiated through disease, that what is sweet to others is to him a pungent bitter. So the sinner may believe, on Gods authority or mans, that sin is evil and holiness is good, but his diseased eye will still confound light with darkness, and his lips, whenever they express the feelings of his heart, will continue to call good evil and evil good.

The three forms of expression in the text appear to be significant of one and the same thing. The thought is clothed first in literal and then in metaphorical expressions. The character thus drawn is generally applicable to ungodly men. If the verse be taken merely in this general sense, the woe which it pronounces is a general woe, or declaration of Divine displeasure and denunciation of impending wrath against the wicked generally, simply equivalent to that in chap. Isa. 3:11.

Such a declaration, awful as it is, would furnish no specific test of character, because it would still leave the question undecided who it is that chooses evil and rejects good. But the prophet is very far from meaning merely to assert the general liability of sinners to the wrath of God. In view of the context, then, consider

II. An enumeration of particular offences then especially prevailing. The text is the fourth in a series of six woes denounced upon as many outward manifestations of corrupt affection then especially prevalent, but by no means limited to that age or country; and these are set forth, not as the product of so many evil principles, but as the varied exhibition of that universal and profound corruption which he had just asserted to exist in general terms.

1. The avaricious and ambitious grasping after great possessions, not merely as a means of luxurious indulgence, but as a distinction and a gratification of pride (Isa. 5:8). To such the prophet threatened woe (Isa. 5:9), and to such the Apostle James also (Jas. 5:4).

2. Drunkenness (Isa. 5:11). Here also the description of the vice is followed by its punishment, including not only personal but national calamities, as war, desolation, and captivity.

3. Presumption and blasphemy (Isa. 5:18-19).

4. Moral perversity, as set forth in the text.

5. Overweening confidence in human reason as opposed to Gods unerring revelation (Isa. 5:21).

6. Drunkenness, considered, not, as in the former case, as a personal excess, producing inconsideration and neglect of God, but as a vice of magistrates and rulers, and as leading to oppression and all practical injustice (Isa. 5:22-23).

This view of the context is given for two reasons

1. To show that in this whole passage the prophet refers to species of iniquity familiar to our own time and country; and,
2. Chiefly to show that we have in the text the description of a certain outward form in which the prevailing wickedness betrayed itself. An outward mark of those who hate God and whom He designs to punish is their confounding moral distinctions in their conversation. Consider, then

III. How moral distinctions are confounded. When one admits in words the great first principles in morals, yet takes away so much as to obliterate the practical distinction between right and wrong, truth and falsehood, religion and irreligion, he does virtually, actually, call evil good and good evil. When one admits generally the turpitude of fraud, impurity, intemperance, malignity, &c., and yet in insulated cases treats these as peccadilloes, inadvertences, &c., he cannot be protected by the mere assertion of a few general principles from the fatal charge of calling evil good. And as the counterpart of this, he who praises and admires all goodness in the abstract, but detests it when realised in concrete excellence, really and practically calls good evil. And he who, in relation to the self-same acts performed by different men, has a judgment suited to the case of each, all compassion to the wilful transgressions of the wicked, and all inexorable sternness to the infirmities of godly men, to all intents and purposes incurs the woe pronounced on those who call evil good and good evil. These distinctions may at present appear arbitrary, frivolous, or false, and, as a necessary consequence, the guilt of confounding them may almost fade to nothing,to a stain so faint upon the conscience as to need no blood of expiation to remove it. But the day is coming when the eye of reason shall no longer find it possible to look at light and darkness as the same, and the woe already heard shall then be seen and felt. From the darkness and bitterness of that damnation may we all find deliverance through Jesus Christ our Lord!J. Addison Alexander, D.D.: The Gospel of Jesus Christ, pp. 568578.

Fuente: The Preacher’s Complete Homiletical Commentary Edited by Joseph S. Exell

(20) Woe unto them that call evil good.The moral state described was the natural outcome of the sins condemned in the preceding verses. So Thucydides (iii. 82-84) describes the effects of the spirit of party in the Peloponnesian war. Rashness was called courage, and prudence timidity, and treachery cleverness, and honesty stupidity. That deliberate perversion is in all ages the ultimate outcome of the spirit that knows not God, and therefore neither fears nor loves Him, whether it shows itself in the licence of profligacy, or the diplomacy of Machiavellian statesmen, or the speculations of the worshippers of Mammon.

Fuente: Ellicott’s Commentary for English Readers (Old and New Testaments)

Fourth woe on the reversers of right and wrong, Isa 5:20.

It takes but little time for such sinners wholly to reverse and uproot all moral distinctions, hence another woe is pronounced upon such.

20. That call evil good Those who call “evil,” “good,” and “good,” “evil;” to whom right is to be shunned, and wrong to be preferred; to whom the truth is a lie, and a lie is the truth. The woe is on such for their villainous attempts utterly to deprave the moral principles of the people.

Fuente: Whedon’s Commentary on the Old and New Testaments

Isa 5:20. Woe unto them that call evil good, &c. The fourth crime alleged is, the subversion of all the principles of truth, and of equity in judgment. A most corrupt condition of a church and state is here described, in which men accustomed to vices begin, with the things themselves, to lose also the true names of them, and to draw a vail, as it were, over their impieties, by sanctifying their crimes with the name of virtues. Thucydides pathetically describes this evil in the third book of his history; and was not this remarkably the case with those Jews who called the holy and the temperate Jesus a glutton and a wine-bibber?

Fuente: Commentary on the Holy Bible by Thomas Coke

DISCOURSE: 865
THE SINFULNESS OF CONFOUNDING GOOD AND EVIL

Isa 5:20. Wo unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter.

THAT man in his present state is a corrupt and sinful creature, is too plain to be denied: the whole tenour of his conduct proves it beyond a doubt. But the generality give themselves credit for meaning well at the very time that they are doing ill. In this, however, they are mistaken. There is in all a far greater consciousness of the evil of their conduct than they are willing to allow. But they wish to quiet their own minds, and to approve themselves to the world: and therefore they change the names of things, calling good evil, and evil good, putting darkness for light, and light for darkness, bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter. By these means they succeed in allaying their own fears, and in commending themselves to each other; but their guilt before God is thereby greatly increased: for our Lord says, This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil. There is in their hearts a rooted aversion to what is good, and a consequent determination to decry it: there is also an inveterate love of evil, and a consequent desire to justify it. Hence arises that conduct which is so justly reprobated in the text; the prevalence and evil of which we shall proceed to lay before you.

We will endeavour to point out,

I.

The prevalence of this conduct

The more we examine the principles and actions of men, the more shall we find that this system obtains among them both in theory and practice.

Inspect their views of religion; and it will appear that they consider it as a superficial thing, consisting in a bare assent to certain notions, and a formal observance of certain rites. If they have been baptized in their infancy; if they have some general views of Christianity, together with a persuasion of its divine authority; if they attend regularly on public worship, and occasionally communicate at the Lords supper; and finally, if they are not guilty of any gross and scandalous violations of their duty, they think they have all the religion that they need.

But they substitute the shadow for the substance. Religion is widely different from this: it is a conversion of the soul to God; it is a resurrection from the dead: it is a new creation. Religion, as it exists in the soul, is a heaven-born principle, that pervades all its powers, and operates in all its faculties. It is to the soul what the soul is to the body. It restrains our passions, corrects our appetites, purifies our affections. It enters into all our motives, and subjects every thing to itself. It will endure no rival: it will make a truce with no enemy: it will reign absolute over the whole man. Its avowed object is to bring man to God as a redeemed sinner, and to restore him to a meetness for that inheritance which he has forfeited by his transgressions: in order to accomplish this, it casts down every high and towering imagination, brings its votary to the foot of the cross, constrains him to walk in the steps of his divine Master, and progressively transforms him into the image of his God.
Compare this with the slight and worthless thing which men in general call religion, and it will appear that they use the term without any just apprehension of its true import.
Again; as religion is esteemed a superficial thing, so it is also deemed a melancholy thing. When true religion is described, the generality of men are ready to exclaim against it as incompatible with social happiness: If we must repent of our past sins, and enter on a course of mortification and self-denial; if we must renounce the pleasures of sin, and the society of the ungodly; if we must converse familiarly with death and judgment, and spend our lives in preparation for eternity; what remains for us in this world but gloom and melancholy? So they think.

But is this the light in which the Scriptures speak of religion? or are these notions justified by experience? We allow the premises to be correct; but is the conclusion just? Suppose for a moment that the whole life of a person who appeared religious, were a scene of melancholy: must that melancholy be imputed to religion? Must it not rather be imputed to his former wickedness, and to his present want of more religion? If pain arise to the body during the cure of an inveterate disorder, is that pain to be imputed to the medicine, or the disease? to the disease, no doubt: to that therefore must be ascribed all the pain of sorrow and contrition, even supposing it to be ever so great, and ever so long continued. As for religion itself, we need only ascertain what it is, and we shall immediately see the absurdity of calling it a source of misery. What; is it melancholy to walk with God, to enjoy God, to glorify God? Was our Lord melancholy? Were his Apostles melancholy? Are the angels in heaven melancholy? Then shall we be melancholy in proportion as we resemble them! But if the ways of religion be ways of pleasantness and peace, and they who believe in Christ be privileged to rejoice with joy unspeakable and glorified, then are they perverse who deem religion melancholy; they call evil good, and good evil, they put darkness for light, and light for darkness, they put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter.

To complete their perverseness, men go farther still, and actually represent religion as contemptible. What is there under the sun more despised than this? With what opprobrium has it not been stigmatized? We appeal to all, whether terms of reproach are not universally assigned to religious characters, and whether the name given them do not universally convey the idea of a weak contemptible enthusiast? Is not their very profession considered as a just bar to their preferment? Yea, are they not so odious in the eyes of the world, that none but those infected with their mania will venture to associate with them, or to acknowledge them as their friends? The drunkard, the whoremonger, the sabbath-breaker, the infidel, shall find a more favourable reception than they; and solely on account of their religion.

But does religion deserve this character? What is there in it that is so contemptible? What is there in it that to an impartial judge would not appear lovely, great, and venerable? Is the subjugation of the passions a contemptible attainment? Is a superiority to all the pleasures of sense, and the interests of the world, a worthless acquisition! Is there any thing mean in love to God, and benevolence to man? Is the aspiring after heaven a low and pitiful ambition? Viewing at a distance the conduct of the Apostles, we call it magnanimity: but when we see it exhibited before our eyes, we call it preciseness, enthusiasm, hypocrisy. Ah! when will men cease to pervert the right ways of the Lord, and to brand that with infamy, which he prescribes and approves?
Hitherto we have noticed only mens conduct in respect of theory; let us now behold it as it is manifest in their practice.

1.

In the first place they magnify beyond all reasonable bounds the pursuits of time

From our earliest infancy we hear of little but getting forward in the world. To be rich, to be great, to be honourable, this is the chief good of man. All are aspiring after a higher place than they possess, and conceive that they shall catch the phantom of happiness when they have reached a certain point. Moreover, all are applauded in proportion us they succeed in this race; and no period but that of their departure from the body is thought a fit season for prosecuting their eternal interests.
But are the concerns of time really of such importance? When we have got forward in the world, what have we more than food and raiment, which we might have possessed with half the trouble! We do not mean to discourage industry; that is truly becoming in every person, and highly advantageous in every state. But if all our time and labour be occupied about this world, and the concerns of the soul be subordinated to those of the body, then is our conduct precisely such as is reprobated in the text.

2.

In the next place, men extenuate sin as venial

There are some crimes which degrade human nature, or greatly disturb the happiness of society, which are therefore very generally reprobated and abhorred. But a forgetfulness of God, a neglect of Christ, a resistance of the Holy Ghost, an indifference about the soul, with ten thousand other sins of omission or of commission, are considered as light and venial, and as affording no ground for sorrow and contrition. If the outward conduct have been decent, it is no matter what has been harboured within, or how much God has been disregarded and despised.
But is this the light in which the Scriptures teach us to regard sin? What was it that cast angels out of heaven? the sin of pride. What drove our first parents from Paradise, and brought a curse on all their posterity? one single transgression; and that a breach, not so much of a moral precept, as of a positive institution. Whom is it that according to Gods declaration he will cast into hell? the wicked, and all the nations that forget God. Does sin appear a light matter when we are told, that nothing but the sacrifice of the Son of God could make atonement for it? Or will it appear a light matter to ourselves, when we are suffering the vengeance due to it in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone? Surely, they are fools who make a mock at sin, and blind, who doubt of its malignity.

3.

To adduce only one instance more, they persuade themselves that their eternal state is safe

Men living in a direct violation of Gods commandments, and in a perfect contrast with the example of Christ, imagine that they have nothing to fear: they have done no harm; and God is very merciful; and if they were to perish, what must become of all the world? These, and such like arguments, are considered as sufficient to invalidate every word that God has spoken, and to justify their hopes of eternal happiness.

But darkness and light are not more opposite than these sentiments are to the declarations of God. Where will they find one single passage that will warrant such expectations as these? They must indeed make evil good, and good evil, and must change bitter to sweet, and sweet to bitter, before they can have the smallest ground of hope in such a state as theirs.

We might easily prosecute this subject in a great variety of views: but enough has been spoken to elucidate the words before us: and we trust that no doubt can remain upon your minds, but that all who consider religion as superficial, melancholy, or contemptible, together with all who magnify the pursuits of time, and extenuate sin as venial, and at the same time persuade themselves that their eternal state is safe, are indeed obnoxious to the censure in the text.

We shall pass on therefore to shew,

II.

The evil of this conduct

But where shall we find words sufficient to declare its great enormity?

1.

It is in the first place, a contemptuous rejection of Gods truth

God has clearly marked the difference between good and evil in his word: and if the eyes of our understanding be not blinded by prejudice or passion, we may discern it as easily as we can discern by our bodily senses, light from darkness, or sweet from bitter. But when an appeal is made to the sacred records, their testimony is considered as of no account. Who has not seen the contempt with which Gods word is treated, when it is brought forward to oppose some fashionable practice, some favourite lust? One would suppose that its import should be candidly examined, and carefully ascertained. One might expect that they who heard it, should act like mariners sailing by the compass; that they would endeavour to proceed, us much as possible, in the right direction; that they would deliberate, if at any time they had reason to think that they were out of their proper course; that they would be thankful for any information that might tend to rectify their mistakes: above all, they would not madly steer in direct opposition to the compass, and at the same time discard all doubts about their safe arrival at the place of their destination: that were a folly of which no man in his senses is capable. Yet this is the very manner in which men act with respect to the Scriptures. There is no other directory than that; and yet they will not only not follow it, but will go on in wilful opposition to it, and still affirm that they are in the way to heaven. Do we speak too harshly of this conduct if we call it a contempt of Gods truth? It is the very expression used by our Lord himself: He that heareth you, heareth me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me; and he that despiseth me, despiseth him that sent me. Indeed, the inspired writers speak in yet severer terms: they do not hesitate to affirm, that whosoever acts thus, makes God a liar; he that believeth not God, hath made him a liar. What horrible iniquity is this! If an avowed infidel disregard the admonitions of the Scriptures, he acts consistently, because he does not acknowledge them to be of divine-authority. But if we despise them, we who profess to regard them as inspired of God, we who expect to be judged according to them in the last day, what can be said in extenuation of our guilt? Even Sodom and Gomorrha may well rise up in judgment against us.

2.

In the next place their conduct is a wilful deluding of those around them

Every man, whether he design it or not, has a considerable influence on his friends and neighbours. The rich and learned in particular, and more especially they who minister in holy things, are looked up to as examples; and their conduct is pleaded both as a precedent, and as a justification of those who follow it. Can such learned men be deceived? Can they who have entered into the service of the sanctuary, and solemnly undertaken to guide us in the way of peace, can they be wrong? Can they be blind, who are leaders of the blind? If then they, who from their education, their office and profession, ought to understand the Scriptures better than we, if they do not approve, either in theory or practice, the things which appear to be enjoined in the Bible, doubtless they have good reasons for their conduct: they would not proceed in a way which they knew to be wrong; we therefore may safely follow them.

By this mode of arguing, all persons lull themselves asleep in their evil ways. Every one upholds his neighbour in the sentiments he has embraced, and in the path he has marked out for himself: and all, instead of condemning themselves for not obeying the divine commands, unite in condemning the obedient as needlessly singular and precise.
Now we cannot but know that, though an individual has not this extensive influence, the collective body of individuals has; and that every member of society contributes his share according to the conspicuousness of his station, and the sanctity of his profession. Yet we persist in calling good evil, notwithstanding we know that, by so doing, we encourage others to do the same. And is this no aggravation of our guilt? Are we not responsible to God for stirring up, according to our ability, an universal rebellion against him: and for contributing thus to the eternal condemnation, not of those only with whom we associate, but of thousands also whom we have not known!
Doubtless Jeroboam contracted peculiar guilt in establishing iniquity by a law: but did not exceeding great guilt attach also to those, who willingly ran after his commandment! Did not every one of them countenance idolatry, and render an adherence to the true God more difficult! They however might plead obedience to an established law: but there is no law, except the imperious law of fashion, to mislead us; and that we establish, whilst we follow it: we bind others, while we ourselves yield obedience to it. Would to God that men could consider their conduct in this view, as discouraging, and perhaps turning aside, the weak; as rendering odious the godly; and as hardening the wicked! Surely they would not then say, What harm have I done? but would be ready to confess themselves the very chief of sinners.

III.

Lastly, the confounding of good and evil is an awful trifling with our eternal state

We profess to believe that there is a day appointed of God, wherein he will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained: and that every one of us shall stand at the judgment-seat of Christ to receive according to the things done in the body, whether they have been good or evil. Now in that day we shall not be judged by the opinions of men, but by the word of God. It will be no excuse to any one that such or such maxims were generally received, or that such practices were sanctioned by custom: there will be one standard to which every principle and every action will be referred. The sacred volume will be open before the Judge: and every erroneous sentiment be confronted with the dictates of inspiration. The Judge himself will know no other rule of judgment: every thing that accorded with the Scriptures will be approved; and every thing that contradicted them will be condemned. To what end then is it to impose specious names on things, when they will so soon appear in their true light? Will God call evil good, and good evil, because we have done so? Can we convince him that light was darkness, and darkness light, because we persuaded ourselves and others that it was so? What infatuation is it so to trifle with our eternal state! If our error could be pleaded before God in extenuation of our fault, then indeed we might have some reason for persisting in it: but how can we excuse ourselves before him, when we had the means of information in our hands, and followed our own surmises in preference to his commands?

Let us then remember that we are acting now for eternity; and that in a little time every thing will appear, not as we wish it, but as it really is. And, if we think it of any importance what our condition shall be in the invisible world, let us desist from our self-deception, which, however pleasant or fashionable it may be, will most unquestionably issue in our eternal ruin.

Before I conclude, suffer me to address a word of exhortation both to those who are deceiving their own souls, and to those who desire to regulate their conduct according to truth.

To the former I beg leave to propose one solemn question: God has said, Woe unto them that call evil good, &c. Can you change that woe into a blessing! Can you prevail on God to retract his word? Can you make void that sentence, when God shall come to execute it upon you in the last day? Yea, will you not then curse your folly, for using such pains to deceive yourselves and others, and for involving yourselves in everlasting misery, when, if you had not so rebelled against the light, you might have been heirs of everlasting glory? Permit me then to address you in the words of the Apostle, Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light. Begin to weigh both sentiments and actions in the balance of the sanctuary. Begin to judge righteous judgment. Begin to view things, as you will surely view them when you shall stand at the tribunal of Christ. Bear in mind, that in your present state God has denounced a woe against you. Remember too, that it will be small consolation to you to have others involved in the same misery with yourselves: it will rather be a source of more intense misery to all, by reason of their mutual execrations, for having so greatly contributed to each others ruin. If the word of God be intended for a light to our feet, and a lantern to our paths, then make use of it; study it, as it were, upon your knees: meditate upon it day and night: and beg of God to open your understandings that you may understand it, and to sanctify your hearts that you may obey it.

To those who are of a better mind I would say, Be strong, and dare to stem the torrent of iniquity, that would bear down all before it. Be not ashamed to call good and evil by their proper names; and to shew by the whole tenour of your lives, that you know how to distinguish them. Let not too great weight be given to the opinions of men. Bow not to the authority of fashion and custom; but prove all things, and hold fast that which is good. Bring your advisers to the law and to the testimony: for if they speak not according to that, there is no light in them. In matters of duty or of discipline indeed you cannot be too diffident, you cannot be too submissive. In those things obedience is your highest honour. But when men presume to think for you in the concerns of your souls, it is high time to inquire, whether they will also perish for you? If you perish, you must perish for yourselves; and therefore it behoves you to think for yourselves, and to act for yourselves. The self-deceiving world cannot remove the woe from their own souls; much less can they from yours. Walk not then according to the course of this world: follow not a multitude to do evil. Look not at your neighbours, but at Christ and his holy Apostles. Let the Scriptures regulate your every sentiment, your every act. And, without concerning yourselves about the misrepresentations which blind and ungodly men will give of your conduct, be steadfast, immoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as ye know that your labour is not in vain in the Lord.


Fuente: Charles Simeon’s Horae Homileticae (Old and New Testaments)

Isa 5:20 Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!

Ver. 20. Woe unto them that call evil good, &c. ] That can make candida de nigris, et de candentibus atra, and go about to invert the nature of things, and to change the very names of them; while they call – not out of ignorance or infirmity, but out of base calumny or gross flattery – evil good, and good evil; calling drunkenness good fellowship, covetousness good husbandry, prodigality liberality, swearing with a grace a gentleman-like quality, fornication a trick of youth, adultery an enjoyment of the fellow creature, as Ranters call it, &c. Thus the Athenians flattered their own vices, calling , , , &c. Cicero a said it was an ill omen of the overthrow of the commonwealth, that the true names of things were lost; and in divinity it is a rule, Qui fingit nova verba, nova gignit dogmata, He that affecteth new terms would bring in new opinions. That saying of Luther was oft in Pareus’s mouth, Theologus gloriae dicit malum bonum, et bonum malum. Theologus crucis dicit id quod res est. The theology of vain glory says good is bad and bad is good. The theology of popery says this because it is the problem. b Not long before our late unhappy troubles the martyrs of the Protestant religion were disgraced, the conspirators in the gunpowder treason excused in a sermon at St Mary’s, Cambridge, by one Kemp of Queen’s College. c The schools, press, and pulpit began to speak Italian apace, and to persuade to a moderation, to a reconciliation with Rome, which now was said to be a true Church, the Pope not Antichrist, &c. The great elixir called state policy hath, with some at least, so transmutive a faculty, as to make copper seem gold, right wrong, and wrong right. But let us pray, with good David in Psa 119:66 , “Teach me good judgment and knowledge”; give me senses habitually “exercised to discern between good and evil.” Heb 5:14 And then take heed that we neither make censure’s whip nor charity’s cloak too long; we may offend in both.

a In Catil.

b David. Par. Vita.

c Myst. of Iniquity, p. 15.

Fuente: John Trapp’s Complete Commentary (Old and New Testaments)

call = are calling.

evil good. Note the Introversion in each of the three clauses of this verse.

put = give out.

Fuente: Companion Bible Notes, Appendices and Graphics

them: Pro 17:15, Mal 2:17, Mal 3:15, Mat 6:23, Mat 15:3-6, Mat 23:16-23, Luk 11:35, Luk 16:15, 2Ti 3:1-5, 2Pe 2:1, 2Pe 2:18, 2Pe 2:19

call evil good: Heb. say concerning evil, It is good, etc

Reciprocal: Lev 13:29 – General Pro 24:24 – that Isa 10:1 – Woe Isa 32:5 – vile Joh 11:49 – Ye

Fuente: The Treasury of Scripture Knowledge

Isa 5:20. Wo unto them that call evil good, and good evil That endeavour to confound both the names and the natures of virtue and vice, of piety and impiety; commend and applaud what is evil, and disparage and discountenance what is good; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness, &c. Ignorance and error, for knowledge and truth: in other words, who subvert, or pervert, all the great principles of truth, wisdom, and of righteousness. A most corrupt condition of a church and state is that indeed, in which men, accustomed to vices, begin, with the things themselves, to lose also the names of them, and to draw a veil, as it were, over their impieties, by sanctifying their crimes with the names of virtues. This reproof of the prophet supposes, that the difference between good and evil, sin and holiness, is as self-evident as that between the most contrary qualities which we are informed of by the report of our senses: and that the advantage which light hath above darkness does not shine out with a brighter evidence than the pre-eminence which virtue hath above vice, righteousness above unrighteousness. See Lowth.

Fuente: Joseph Bensons Commentary on the Old and New Testaments

5:20 Woe to them that call evil good, {a} and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!

(a) Who are not ashamed of sin, nor care for honesty but are grown to a desperate impiety.

Fuente: Geneva Bible Notes

The fourth bad product of the Israelite vineyard was perversity. The people were calling good what God called evil, and vice versa. For example, glorifying adultery and treating committed believers as dangerous radicals turns the truth on its head. They were mocking God’s ways publicly and privately. They refused to accept the standard of God’s revelation.

"Moral standards were destroyed by new definitions of sin (see Amo 5:7), people using God’s vocabulary but not His dictionary." [Note: Wiersbe, p. 17.]

Fuente: Expository Notes of Dr. Constable (Old and New Testaments)